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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to present inter-war historiography on Australians and the 
monarchy by providing a narrative for the previously under-researched evolution of the 
public life of Edward, Prince of Wales, in this country between approximately 1916 and 
1936. The objectives are twofold: firstly, to provide an Australian account of what has 
been most commonly presented as a public life that resonated mainly within Britain, 
and in doing so illustrate the potency of the relationship that existed between Australia, 
as one of the Dominions, and the Crown. Secondly, through identifying the changing 
nature of Edward’s appeal as espoused by the public, the press and political rulers over 
time, I aim to establish fresh insights into the localised preoccupations of Australian 
society and contribute to a greater understanding of the centrality of the monarch in the 
inter-war imperial imagination. 
I conclude that Edward’s supposedly democratic characteristics both enhanced 
and conflicted with inter-war Australian ideals of nationhood, and were founded on a 
fixed suite of expectations for the private and public life of the monarch. His persona 
was remarkably disassociated from religious or class-based affiliations, meaning that his 
personal appeal flourished in public, press and political perceptions. Nonetheless, I 
establish that contemporary Australians perceived the monarch as central to the survival 
of the Empire. Although the legal and political elements of the Kingship were flexible 
according to the best interests of Australian independence, traditional attitudes prevailed 
in matters of sexual modernity. Ultimately, for Australians, as part of an Empire caught 
between the devastation of two world wars, the survival of the monarchy prevailed over 
the survival of the monarch.  
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Introduction 
 
Here was a man who plainly needed to express himself as a human 
being in order to be prince then king in his own way. 
-The Canberra Times, 31 May 1972.1 
 
When Edward, Duke of Windsor, died on 28 May 1972, the Australian government was 
at first unsure how to respond. Although official procedure upon the demise of members 
of the royal family was well established, there was no obvious precedent for the case of 
a former King scandalously exiled from Britain almost forty years before. Records held 
by the National Archives of Australia (NAA) reveal how Labor leader Gough Whitlam 
struggled with the delicate balance between offering condolences to the ranks of the 
Duke’s immediate relatives, and to his wife Wallis, who in an ‘out of date and 
vindictive decision’ had been deliberately denied her rightful title and position as a 
member of the royal family.2 In the end, Whitlam decided against ‘stirring the matter’, 
and so after some deliberation Liberal prime minister William McMahon and his 
colleagues settled on a formulaic message of sympathy. This was communicated to 
Windsor, for the attention of the Duke’s niece, Queen Elizabeth II, and to Paris for the 
grieving Duchess. McMahon’s message to the latter incorporated a personal addendum, 
noting that as a consequence of the ‘brilliant success’ of his royal tour of Australia in 
1920, Edward was ‘remembered here with respect and affection.’3  
The government’s trouble with the Duke did not end with the issue of titles. The 
notorious matter of Edward’s 1936 abdication of the throne, as prompted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘What might have been’, The Canberra Times, A.C.T., 31 May 1972, p. 2. 
2 NAA, A1209, 1972/6551. Note for file regarding telephone conversation between Whitlam 
and E.J. Bunting, 30 May 1972.  
3 NAA, A1209, 1972/6551. Telegram to British High Commission from Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 28 May 1972.  
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couple’s relationship, also had to be tactfully dealt with. In a press release, McMahon 
simply alluded to an incident that ‘deeply moved’ the Commonwealth, moving quickly 
to draw attention instead to the royal tour of some five decades before. It was then, he 
stated, that the young Prince of Wales first ‘captivated this country with his youth and 
charm’, continuing subsequently to command respect due to his particular ‘personal 
qualities.’4 Beyond these gestures, it was unclear what else was expected of the 
Australian government. The British High Commission in Canberra was tasked with 
finding out if any further action would be taken in the House of Commons, reporting 
back that the official acknowledgement in Britain was likely to be ‘fairly low key’, 
possibly even ‘a token gesture only.’5 Accordingly, tentative plans for an Australian 
memorial service or a lengthy parliamentary adjournment were abandoned, apparently 
to the relief of all concerned.6 McMahon worried that ‘we would be laughed at’ for such 
a profligate gesture, although whether he meant by the British or the Australians, or 
both, is not clear.  
In the Senate the next day, Liberal Tom Drake-Brockman offered a simple 
eulogy that also emphasised the success of Edward’s 1920 tour and the ‘qualities of 
essential humanity’ that underpinned his early popularity with the Australian people.7 
On the whole, the speeches in Parliament that day followed McMahon’s lead and 
pointedly evaded any mention of the international uproar of 1936. The lone voice of 
Labor’s Lionel Murphy was heard to offer the opinion that the couple had been treated 
‘miserably and shabbily’ following the abdication.8 After standing for a few moments of 
silence, senators moved debate swiftly on to other business. It was by any estimation a 
forlorn farewell for a man once superlatively hailed as ‘the most popular personage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 NAA, A1209, 1972/6551. Statement by McMahon for the press, 28 May 1972. 
5 NAA, A1209, 1972/6551. Note for the Secretary from K.W. Pearson, 29 May 1972  
6 NAA, A1209, 1972/6551. Note for file by J.H. Sholtens, 1 June 1972; note for file by E.J. 
Bunting, 29 May 1972; note not intended for file by K.W. Pearson, 30 May 1972.  
7 Parliament of Australia, Senate, ‘Debates’, 30 May 1972, p. 2223. 
8 Ibid. 
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Australia has ever known.’9 Of course, the decision of an Australian government of the 
early 1970s to effect a ‘low key’ response to matters royal should not come as too great 
a surprise, considering the impassioned contemporary debates over Australia’s 
independence. It is also certain that this would not be the first obituary to favour 
discretion almost to the point of misremembering.  
Nonetheless, the nuances discernible in these politicians’ treatment of the 
Duke’s death do raise some interesting questions. From a contemporary standpoint, 
these retrospective views tend to privilege Edward’s ‘personal qualities’, and were less 
eager to acknowledge the ignominious failure of his Kingship. The effect is of a public 
life that played out between two defining moments, from widespread approval in 1920 
to an uncomfortable apathy following 1936. What is the basis for this perception of his 
character? Present historiography on the topic has little to offer on the topic, but even 
the most perfunctory foray into the contemporary press record reveals the heightened 
emotions that seem to confirm McMahon’s estimation of Edward’s early popularity as 
the beloved Prince of Wales. In July 1920, for example, Adelaide songwriter Ellie 
Wemyss was confident in her assertion that Edward was ‘a prince of men, and of all our 
hearts!’10 What then, can we make of the blunt appraisal made in December 1936 by the 
Rev. F. Barclay, a Presbyterian clergyman in Wentworth, New South Wales, that 
Edward had ‘failed the British Empire’?11 It seems that by and large, despite over two 
decades as the celebrated Prince of Wales, Edward had forfeited with his throne the 
enduring affection of Australians. An obvious explanation might be that the shock of 
the abdication and the uneasy legacy of Edward’s later political ambitions simply 
eclipsed the remarkable success of his public life as a young man, but even so this can 
only be part of the story.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ‘Prince Of Wales At Randwick’, Sydney Mail, N.S.W., 23 June 1920, p. 39. 
10 ‘OUR PRINCE OF HEARTS’, The Register, Adelaide, S.A., 20 July 1920, p. 9. 
11 ‘“FAILED EMPIRE”’, The Cumberland Argus and Fruitgrowers Advocate, Parramatta, 
N.S.W., 17 December 1936, p. 7. 
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It is this shift in Australian perceptions of Edward’s public persona, or the wax 
and wane of sentiment between the 1910s and 1930s, which this thesis aims to 
reconcile.12 The objectives are twofold: firstly, to provide a chronological narrative for 
the previously under-researched evolution of Edward’s public life in Australia, and 
secondly, to turn the lens of this examination on the key localised traits of Australian 
society of the time. What can these perceptions reveal about the cultural dynamics of 
the time? I have set out to identify the contours of this connection and in doing so draw 
wider inferences about the attitudes of Australian society as a whole towards their inter-
war relationship with the British monarchy. Such a case study will contribute to present 
historiography on Australians and the monarchy by adding to a greater understanding of 
the importance of the monarch in the Australian imagination. Furthermore, although this 
thesis is not intended to be comparative, many of the themes highlighted therein also 
resonated widely across the other white settler Dominions of New Zealand, South 
Africa and Canada.  
These objectives address a gap in present scholarship relating to Edward’s early 
public life in Australia. As I will show, although the biographical literature is extensive, 
neither his royal tour nor abdication have been examined from an Australian 
perspective. Edward was among the most controversial and oft-chronicled figures of the 
twentieth century and hence his life has generated hundreds of publications. Perhaps the 
first biography was published as early as 1916, and they would appear with increasing 
regularity throughout the 1920s, in even greater numbers following 1936 and yet again 
after his death in 1972.13 Later twentieth century publications present almost 
exclusively the perspective of British or North American authors focusing on the British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This thesis explores a chronology of events occurring, in the main, between 1916 and 1936, 
and so encompassing the Edward’s first encounter with Australians to the period immediately 
following his abdication. I also draw upon contextual material outside of this timeframe. 
Edward was known throughout this period by three differing titles: Prince, King and Duke. 
13 Among the earliest works is David Williamson’s The Prince of Wales: a biography (London: 
George Newnes, 1916). 
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context of his life.14 This has helped generate the widespread acceptance that Edward’s 
life comprised a primarily British story. Instead, as this thesis will argue, this was a life 
that resonated across Australia as one of the white settler Dominions, the self-governing 
former colonies that comprised the Empire and held a common allegiance to the Crown, 
itself most usefully defined by Mark McKenna as the ultimate and singular symbol of 
moral, legal and political authority.15  
Despite some recent advances in related inter-disciplinary and cross-cultural 
research by other Commonwealth-based historians, a full-length monograph publication 
concerning the importance and evolution of Edward’s public life outside of Britain is 
still outstanding.16 It is therefore my broad intention in this and following sections to 
demonstrate the potential for this area of study alongside existing narratives explaining 
the rise of his public profile from the 1910s onward. Accordingly, this chapter will first 
set out the major milestones of Edward’s public life, beginning with his adolescence 
before the First World War. Here I draw upon the respected works by British 
biographers Philip Ziegler and Frances Donaldson, with the aim of establishing an 
objective character assessment, or at least offer a view of the man as perceived by the 
most astute of his biographers.17 Localised Australian perceptions as discussed in later 
chapters may be usefully considered with this well-informed story in mind.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For example, Patrick Balfour, The Windsor years: the life of Edward, as Prince of Wales, 
King, and Duke of Windsor (London: Collins, 1967); J. Bryan III and Charles Murphy, The 
Windsor story (London: Grenada, 1979); Richard Durnin, King Edward VIII (The Duke of 
Windsor), 1894-1972 (New Brunswick: English-Speaking Union, 1994). 
15 Mark McKenna, ‘The Crown’, in Melissa Harper and Richard White (eds.), Symbols of 
Australia (Sydney, N.S.W.: U.N.S.W. Press, 2010), pp. 33-37, p. 34. 
16 One exception is the work of New Zealand historian Hector Bolitho, although this was 
published several decades before Edward’s death and hence cannot be said to offer a full 
biographical account. For example, King Edward VIII: His life and reign (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1937). 
17 Philip Ziegler, King Edward VIII: the official biography (London: Collins, 1990); Frances 
Donaldson, Edward VIII (London: Futura Publications Ltd, 1976). I describe these authors as 
‘respected’ due to their status within the discipline of popular history, and their access to 
restricted material at the National Archives at Kew (TNA) and the Royal Archives (RA).  
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Secondly, I provide an overview of the extent of existing scholarship on 
Edward’s royal tour of 1920, within the context of his early inter-war royal tours of the 
Dominions more generally. Thirdly, I examine existing accounts of the Edward’s 
abdication of 1936. The fourth section determines the status of existing scholarship that 
specifically examines the Australian response to the event. I then move beyond the two 
events central to this thesis to identify the broader areas of research to which it 
contributes. I consider existing scholarship on the relationship between Australians and 
the monarchy, and then examine the twentieth century context of Australia’s changing 
relationship with Britain and their shared imperial past. 
 
Edward’s early life 
As is well known, Edward Albert Christian George Andrew Patrick David was born on 
23 June 1894 at White Lodge, Richmond Park, the eldest son of the Duke and Duchess 
of York (later King George V and Queen Mary).18 As third in line to the throne, 
Edward’s childhood received little public scrutiny. He later recalled how ‘I grew up 
before the age of the flash camera … we were not often recognized on the street.’19 
Restraint proved short-lived and his public responsibilities only expanded as he grew 
older. Alongside developed a set of expectations for the public life of the prospective 
King. Many contemporary accounts demonstrate a common insistence on the Prince’s 
suitability as the future leader of disparate peoples living across a far-flung Empire.20 
The English biographer Arthur Groom, for example, argued that even as a boy, Edward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, pp. 4-5. 
19 Edward, Duke of Windsor, A king’s story: the memoirs of H.R.H. the Duke of Windsor K.G. 
(London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1951), p. 34. 
20 For example, F. E. Verney, H.R.H.: a character study of the Prince of Wales (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1928); Arthur Groom, Edward the eighth: our king (Watford: Allied 
Newspapers, 1936); Bolitho, King Edward VIII. 
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‘displayed a great interest in the life and customs of people of other lands.’21 His profile 
steadily increased as he completed his naval education, but grew most notably after his 
father ascended the throne in 1910 as King George V, and yet again after his investiture 
as the Prince of Wales in 1911. In 1912, there followed an undistinguished stint at 
Magdalen College, Oxford. Contemporary biographer Francis Verney viewed these 
experiences as creating one whose ‘conduct would be watched by the inhabitants of half 
the habitable earth.’22  
In his discussion of Edward’s adolescent years, Ziegler offers a sense of a 
diffident individual lacking in intellectual curiosity and given to mild excesses, which 
were mostly expended through physical sports and high spirits.23 The Prince resented 
attempts to influence his choice of friends and eschewed ceremonial functions that ‘set 
him on a pedestal for his fellows to goggle at and worship.’24 As he grew into a self-
assured young man, his preference to live out the comfortable existence of a minor 
aristocrat became an increasingly unlikely prospect. Donaldson has explained how the 
Prince’s unpromising academic career came to an end with the outbreak of war in 
Europe in 1914.25 The 20-year-old’s desire to join the Allied forces in France and 
Belgium would be instrumental in the making of his character. ‘What does it matter if I 
am killed? I have four brothers’, he reportedly urged Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of 
State for War.26 Rejecting his assigned desk-based duties, he devoted his energies to 
closing in on the front line, despite a near miss when his car came under fire and his 
driver killed.27 ‘A bad shelling will always produce the Prince of Wales’, recounted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Groom, Edward the eighth, pp. 18-19. 
22 Verney, H.R.H., p. 23. 
23 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, pp. 37-40. 
24 Ibid., p. 27. 
25 Donaldson, Edward VIII, p. 49.  
26 Quoted in ibid., p. 50.  
27 Ibid., p. 52.  
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members of his regiment.28 As the following chapter will discuss, Edward first came 
into contact with Australians during a 1916 visit to Anzac troops stationed in Egypt, and 
again in France and England by the end of the war in 1918.  
Like many previous royals, the Prince’s coming of age also heralded the 
beginnings of fervent speculation from worldwide observers as to his eventual marriage. 
Although by now perhaps the world’s most eligible bachelor, the Prince was in no hurry 
to marry. For much of his twenties, he was, as an equerry remarked, ‘continuously in 
the throes of one shattering and absorbing love affair after another.’29 Most of these 
were fleeting, punctuated by a smaller number of grand passions. Donaldson has 
pondered the contradictory aspects of Edward’s nature when it came to relationships 
with other people, concluding that the fervent form of his romantic attachment was 
remarkably consistent throughout his life.30 Socialites Marion Coke, Freda Dudley 
Ward, and later Thelma Furness and Wallis Simpson all offered the Prince a nurturing 
type of affection, and all were married to other men. Freda in particular captivated the 
Prince for over a decade between 1919, when he returned from the army, and 1931 
when the focus of his adoration turned irrevocably towards Wallis. In the early years, 
the immature Prince’s devotion to Freda was hardly unusual or cause for official 
concern; after all, members of the royal family and aristocracy had for generations 
conducted discrete extra-marital affairs, shielded and observed only by the close-knit 
upper tiers of London Society.31 While he was young, Edward’s relationships did little 
to dispel the comfortable and widely held expectation that he would one day make a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Quoted in ibid., p. 53.  
29 Alan Lascelles, quoted in Ziegler, King Edward VIII, p. 222. 
30 Donaldson, Edward VIII, p. 56.  
31 The term ‘Society’ in the British context is generally held to indicate a small closed group of 
individuals holding greater wealth or social prestige than the remainder of the population. Many 
a blind eye therein had been turned to the affair of Edward’s grandfather, King Edward VII, 
with Lily Langtry during his marriage to Queen Alexandra. 
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strategic marriage alliance with a woman suitable to be his consort.  
 
The first royal tours 
By the early 1920s, as the Prince’s pursuit of his private life became ever more pivotal 
to his happiness, he was at the same time pushed ever more into the public eye. Of 
Edward’s apparent frustration with the limitations of ‘princing’, Ziegler writes 
perceptively that the young man was ill equipped to deal with the abundance of post-
war pleasures. His character thrived amid ‘the heady and dangerous delights of 
liberty.’32 Speaking of the younger generations and those who had survived the warfare, 
Donaldson describes a ‘jeunesse dorée who danced with a feverish determination to 
shut out the memories of the terrible past.’33 This unruly optimism and appetite for 
leisure widened the generational gap between Edward and his father, a traditionalist 
who espoused the moral code of the previous century. Even as he embarked on his 
public life, Edward’s behaviour was already fatally at odds with the conventional tastes 
of older generations. Nonetheless, an apparent solution soon presented itself. The King 
never quite recovered from a serious wartime riding accident, and so as the Prince 
entered his late twenties he began to take on more public duties. This included a 
succession of visits to the Dominions. These grand popular events took place on the 
official pretext of thanking the Empire populations for their wartime contribution to the 
Allied forces, but also served as a crucial reminder to the obstinate young man of his 
inherited duties. Canada was first, in 1919, then New Zealand and Australia the 
following year.34 In 1921-22, Edward visited India, and then South Africa in 1925.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, p. 107. 
33 Donaldson, Edward VIII, p. 83.  
34 The Prince visited Canada again in 1923, 1924 and 1927.  
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The local reception of the Prince’s tours, occurring during what Vernon 
Bogdanor has identified as a time of critical importance to the Dominions as they 
embarked on a process of reinvention as ‘separate sovereign states and distinct 
international identities’, is undoubtedly fertile ground for scholarship.35 The tours have 
attracted some modest attention from other Commonwealth-based historians. Given this 
shared Dominion status and the comparative potential of these themes, their conclusions 
may be usefully considered within the Australian context. For example, in his 1969 
study of Canadian perceptions of Edward’s public life, Gordon Beadle suggested that 
his appeal in 1919 lay in his capacity to symbolise ‘the return of peace and [personify] 
the hope of the future.’36 Many of Beadle’s arguments also resonate strongly within the 
Australian context, most notably the related contention that the Prince’s character was 
largely a creation of the press. He identifies the Canadian press as responsible for 
magnifying the significance of his tours, noting that journalists ‘professed to see in his 
unorthodox style and impromptu speeches evidence of statesmanship of the highest 
order’, and endowed Edward with unjustifiable virtues and youthfulness long after he 
ceased to embody those qualities.37  
Others agree that the popular success of the Dominion tours relied heavily on the 
continuing approval of the public and press, and only rarely did cracks emerge in the 
Prince’s pleasant and apolitical façade. For example, in her 2012 article South African 
historian Hilary Sapire convincingly demonstrated the extent of localised tensions and 
controversies at play during the royal tours of India in 1921-22 and Africa in 1925.38 
Edward’s stubborn character also posed a threat to the outward success of his tours. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Vernon Bogdanor, The monarchy and the constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 
245. 
36 Gordon Beadle, ‘Canada and the Abdication of Edward VIII’, Journal of Canadian Studies, 
4/3, pp. 33-46, p. 34. 
37 Ibid., p. 35. 
38 Hilary Sapire, ‘Ambiguities of Loyalism: the Prince of Wales in India and Africa, 1921–2 and 
25’, History Workshop Journal, 73/1 (2012), pp. 37-65. 
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Discussing the visit to India in 1921 and then Japan, Ziegler explains how positive 
public perceptions were sustained only due to the concerted efforts of the Prince’s staff 
in ensuring their royal charge behaved dutifully in the presence of the public and press, 
and discretely in private.39 This impression of the Prince as possessing joie de vivre yet 
not always dutiful integrity is borne out in Alistair Cooke’s observation that: 
It was not that he had ever been a deeply serious man, much less an 
intellectual … But he also had a genuine curiosity about the lands he 
had to visit and the gorgeous range of human oddities who inhabited 
them … his official duties, though routinely irksome, provided both a 
discipline and a curiosity shop that kept him lively and inquisitive.40 
 
Recent studies have further interrogated the construction of the façade that 
overlaid the Prince’s character. The American historians Ryan Linkoff and Laura Nym 
Mayhall, for example, support Beadle’s contention that Edward’s outward personality 
was a potent force manufactured and perpetuated by the international press.41 Mayhall 
identifies the post-war period as a time when a monarch could also be a ‘celebrity’, a 
development she allies with advances in photographic and other visual technology, as 
well as the less reverent attitudes of the press itself.42 Mayhall hails the Prince as the 
‘male sensation of Hollywood’, that is, attractive, affable, and respected in comparable 
terms to American actors, public intellectuals and fashion models of the 1920s.43 Swiss 
historian Alexis Schwartzenbach has also examined the particularity of Edward’s 
appeal, identifying ‘the accidental facts of his extremely youthful looks, his great charm 
and spontaneity as well as his splendid photogenic smile.’44Although existing literature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, pp. 142-43, 146-47. 
40 Alistair Cooke, ‘Foreword’, in Robert Gray and Jane Olivier, Edward VIII, the man we lost: a 
pictorial study (Salisbury: Compton Press, 1972), no pagination. 
41 Ryan Linkoff, ‘The photographic attack on his royal highness: the Prince of Wales, Wallis 
Simpson and the prehistory of the paparazzi’, Photography & Culture, 4/3 (2011), pp. 277-92; 
Laura E. Nym Mayhall, ‘The Prince of Wales Versus Clark Gable: Anglophone Celebrity and 
Citizenship Between the Wars’, Cultural and Social History, 4/4 (2007), pp. 529-29. 
42 Mayhall, ‘The Prince of Wales Versus Clark Gable’, p. 532. 
43 Ibid., p. 531. 
44 Alexis Schwartzenbach, ‘Love, Marriage and Divorce: American and European Reactions to 
the Abdication of Edward VIII’, in Luisa Passerini, Liliana Ellena, and Alexander C. T. Geppert 
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examining the Prince’s early public life and royal tours has not thus far examined the 
Australian context in any depth, it does establish that the world’s press were 
instrumental in perpetuating a romanticised perception of his personality that existed 
independently of his constitutional position, which in turn masked many of his 
shortcomings. 
These authors’ conclusions concerning new world monarchist and egalitarian 
responses to the Prince may also be usefully considered in this thesis’ exploration of the 
Australian context of his early public life. Before now, Edward’s royal tour of Australia 
in 1920 has been the subject of little analysis from historians. Generally, although a 
strategic ‘device for maintaining imperial unity’ offering much potential insight into 
Australia’s cultural relations with the monarchy, the study of royal tours sparked little 
Australian scholarly interest for much of the twentieth century.45 In her valuable 1996 
study of Queen Elizabeth’s 1954 tour, Jane Connors attributed this neglect to the 
conventions of mid to later twentieth century historical practice, which privileged 
matters of politics or economics over intangible aspects of everyday life, such as 
domestic, emotional, or family preoccupations.46 Sentiment lends itself less readily to 
precise examination, and as Connors suggests, left-wing critics easily dismissed studies 
of the popular Australian attachment to the monarchy as a passive preoccupation of the 
easily manipulated.47  
Nevertheless, the gathering pace of scholarship on Australians and the monarchy 
has done much to address this gap in more recent years, although research on the 1920 
royal tour has yet to catch up. Some useful theoretical parallels may first be drawn from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(eds.), New dangerous liaisons: discourses on Europe and love in the twentieth century (New 
York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), pp. 137-57, p. 151. 
45 Geoffrey Bolton, Britain’s legacy overseas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 112-
13. 
46 Jane Connors, ‘The Glittering Thread: The 1954 Royal Tour of Australia’, PhD thesis 
(University of Technology, Sydney, 1996), pp. 20-21. 
47 Ibid., pp. 17, 20-21. 
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a small body of publications examining aspects of the local reaction to other royal tours 
undertaken in both Australia and the other Dominions. As Charles Reed’s work on 
nineteenth century Empire tours has shown, the enacting of civic ritual festivals, such as 
royal tours, reflects in meaningful ways the imperial identities and local preoccupations 
of a community.48 In addition to Connors’ work, Judith Bassett’s thoughtful 1987 study 
of the 1901 royal tour of New Zealand, or Phillip Buckner’s examination of the 
Canadian tour of the same year, for example, have also proved how analysis of shared 
events can be illuminating of local cultural dynamics.49 In 1995, David Lowe examined 
the impact of the international context on Queen Elizabeth II’s royal tour of Australia in 
1954.50 More recently, Cindy McCreery examined the local and gendered response of 
Sydney’s population to the attempted assassination of Prince Alfred during the 1868 
royal tour of Australia.51 These works confirm royal tours of Australia as an area of rich 
socio-historical interest.  
Within this illuminating historiographical context, the 1920 royal tour has yet to 
be fully investigated. Connors’ identification of the diverted focus of mid to late 
twentieth century historical practice probably explains why, until relatively recently, 
analyses of this event have been mostly confined within biographical chronologies of 
imperial tours. As Donaldson, for example, has outlined, over almost three months the 
Prince would visit over one hundred regional and urban destinations on a 14,000 
kilometre round trip through Victoria, New South Wales, across to Western Australia, 
then returning eastwards through South Australia and Tasmania before finally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Charles V. Reed, Royal tourists, colonial subjects and the making of a British world, 1860–
1911 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). 
49 Judith Bassett, ‘A Thousand Miles of Loyalty: The Royal Tour of 1901’, New Zealand 
Journal of History, 21/1 (1987), pp. 125-38; Phillip Buckner, ‘Casting daylight upon magic: 
Deconstructing the royal tour of 1901 to Canada’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 31/2 (2003), pp. 158-89. 
50 David Lowe, ‘1954: The Queen and Australia in the World’, Journal of Australian Studies, 46 
(1995), pp. 1-10. 
51 Cindy McCreery, ‘Rude Interruption: Colonial Manners, Gender and Prince Alfred’s Visit to 
New South Wales, 1868’, Forum for Modern Language Studies, 49/4 (2013), pp. 437-456. 
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proceeding north to Queensland.52 Huge crowds of all political persuasions greeted him 
at every turn. The gruelling itinerary prescribed the laying of many foundation stones, 
the inspection of public works, participation in reviews, balls and garden parties, and 
the extending of thousands of handshakes to dignitaries and citizens alike. Some 
estimation of the tour’s popular attraction can be gleaned from a July 1920 description 
of the scene in Windsor, New South Wales, where:  
[T]here has never been an occasion when there was such a 
manifestation of goodwill and enthusiasm towards one man … an 
absolute roar of cheers rent the air as the Prince drove up. Hats and 
flags were waved, and the scene was one such as we have never 
before witnessed in Windsor.53 
 
To the twenty first century eye, the tour appears a memorable milestone in 
Australia’s relationship with the Prince. Whether this registers a moment of enthusiasm 
for Edward as an individual or Edward as his father’s representative, or some 
combination of the two, is less easy to ascertain. Donaldson, for one, places great 
emphasis on the cohesive power of this affection, arguing that the Prince’s tours 
aroused ‘emotions then which attached the people to the crown, survived the 
restlessness of the post-war years, the abdication crisis and the transfer of loyalty to the 
new King and Queen.’54 While this may be true, the background to the development of 
these emotions in an Australian context remains obscure. Considering that, as McKenna 
has pointed out, Australia lacked, to some degree, a class-based hierarchy topped by an 
aristocracy or an established church in quite the same way as Britain, and so chiefly 
experienced royal tours promoted as popular and secular occasions, it follows that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Donaldson, Edward VIII, pp. 75-82.  
53 ‘The Royal Visit’, Windsor and Richmond Gazette, N.S.W., 2 July 1920, p. 2. 
54 Donaldson, Edward VIII, p. 80. 
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studies of this event are likely revealing of the interplay of localised cultural dynamics 
of the time.55  
Although rare, comparative literature is not entirely absent. Some important 
historical context has been established, most notably by the 1980 article by Kevin 
Fewster. Here the author argued for Edward’s visit as setting Australia’s direction 
‘towards a closer imperial relationship when, if it had so desired, greater autonomy 
could have been won.’56 Although now dating to some thirty-five years ago, Fewster’s 
conclusions indicate that amid the imperial legislative reinvention of the 1920s, royal 
tours created an unexpected phenomenon whereby people drew closer to the symbolism 
of the Crown as the major unifying authority within the Commonwealth. Fewster’s 
work does much to confirm the strategic importance of the tour and the unsettled 
cultural context in which it took place, but also highlights that, in light of more recent 
critiques of Edward’s public life, there is still much work to be done on unravelling the 
ill-defined relationship between affection for the Prince as an individual, and as 
representative of the monarchy.  
Following Fewster’s publication, the tour received little further scholarly 
attention throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, although the topic is now 
experiencing a resurgence of interest. In 2015, David Hill offered a brief descriptive 
account drawn from contemporary newspaper sources, concluding uncritically that the 
visit was an ‘outstanding and unqualified success in cementing relations between 
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Australia and Britain.’57 Also published in 2015, Connors’ pictorial monograph Royal 
Visits to Australia identifies this as ‘the sexiest of all the royal tours.’58 Although their 
scrutiny is necessarily limited by the broader chronological scope of their respective 
studies, Hill and Connors’ work demonstrates the increasing level of popular interest in 
the 1920 tour as an event of some historical significance. It also hints at the existence of 
an extensive material and archival record held by the NAA and the National Library of 
Australia (NLA), much of which remains unexplored. Further research has abundant 
potential to cast further light on the basis for Australia’s affection for both the Prince 
and the monarchy.  
 
The abdication 
If the tour was a ‘tumultuous success’, how did this influence the relationship between 
the Prince and the Australian people?59 No historian has examined Australian 
perceptions of Edward’s rising public profile just prior to and during his brief Kingship, 
although there can be no doubt that this period has provoked intense fascination for 
generations of British and North American historians and biographers alike.60 In 
contrast to the brevity of scholarly engagement with the royal tour of 1920, Edward’s 
abdication of 1936 must be the most intensively chronicled royal event of the twentieth 
century.61 Whether scholarly or salacious, such prolonged attention confirms the 
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incident as pivotal in the early twentieth century history of the British monarchy, and by 
extension a moment with significant legislative and cultural implications for the 
Empire. Many of these accounts have adopted a determinist flavour that has served to 
cement the idea of a renegade King patently unsuited for his position, endorsing and 
legitimising a particular understanding of the abdication as inevitable; a view most 
notably promoted by the Establishment of the time. In the writing of this thesis, I have 
sought to tread carefully around determinist blueprints of Edward’s public life as an 
inevitable decline, although ultimately my conclusions are broadly similar. In any case, 
although much of the British context to this episode is well established, the 
identification of any disparity in the Australian perspective, or that of any other 
Dominion, remains lacking.  
The literature shows how, as the Prince left his late twenties behind and entered 
his thirties, he maintained his hectic lifestyle of social and official engagements and, 
outwardly, his feted ‘Prince Charming’ persona. Ziegler has considered the determinist 
assumption that Edward throughout the 1920s and early 1930s had sought ways to avoid 
his eventual accession to the throne, but concluded instead that he understood the 
potential influence the position offered, if he could bide his time in the tedious role as 
heir. The Prince ‘could never do more than alleviate the burden of his life’, Ziegler 
writes, whereas as King he believed he could ‘create a new, streamlined monarchy 
which would allow him the privacy and liberty he desired.’62 In the meantime, his 
preference for dangerous activities, such as hunting on horseback and flying in 
aeroplanes, and especially his private life caused increasing concern to the 
Establishment.63 His staff was becoming unable to conceal his disdain for royal 
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‘stunting’ and his disinclination to marry and produce an heir of his own. Beadle 
suggests that the Prince’s behaviour at this time indicates that he had perhaps begun to 
believe the hyperbole that surrounded his persona, and disastrously conflate his own 
personal popularity with that of the institution he was held to represent.64  
Other cracks were beginning to emerge. Although outside the scope of this 
thesis in timeframe and subject matter, a body of literature alleging that Edward’s later 
period as Prince of Wales coincided with the development of his alleged sympathy for 
German National Socialism of the 1930s has done much to sour his later reputation, and 
so cannot be excluded from this survey. The lurid recent publication by royal observer 
Andrew Morton, for example, serves only to perpetuate the Duke and Duchess as 
traitorous Nazi collaborators.65 The issue may never be laid to rest, but the truth 
probably lies closer to Bloch’s interpretation of the Prince as a man aware of his lack of 
real political influence but nonetheless possessing inclinations consistent with the 
commonplace opinion held by many members of the public, government and Foreign 
Office during the 1930s; that is, that communism was a force to be subdued and that 
appeasement was necessary to divert the prospect of another war.66 Ziegler firmly 
refutes the notion of Edward succumbing to Adolf Hitler’s alleged plan to reinstate him 
as a dictator in occupied Britain, arguing that he was ‘a patriot who would never have 
wished his country be defeated.’67 
All this aside, it cannot be denied that Edward was a preoccupied man during the 
early months of his reign following the death of his father on 20 January 1936. He had 
for several years been enthralled by Wallis Simpson, a divorced American woman with 
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whom it appeared he could have no future. Born Bessiewallis Warfield in Baltimore, 
Maryland, in 1896, the object of the King’s affection remains one of the most 
mysterious women of the twentieth century. Several authors have devoted a dizzying 
amount of energy to uncovering the nature of her appeal.68 As biographer Anne Sebba 
notes, understanding is complicated by the sexual double standards of the day that 
served to paint Wallis as the villain of the affair as well as the bewildering welter of 
commentary that surrounded her from the moment she entered Edward’s social orbit. As 
‘[observers] cannot imagine such a woman they have invented an image of her’, she 
writes.69 In view of her unremarkable appearance, Charles Higham, for example, 
suggested in 1988 that Wallis’ talents lay in releasing Edward’s sexual dysfunctions 
using skills learnt during a sojourn to China.70 Despite the fact that the King was known 
to have successfully seduced numerous women and held grand passions for two or 
three, this notion has not been allowed to derail a good story. The truth is probably far 
simpler. In short, the King believed that he and Wallis were ‘made for each other and 
that there was no other honest way of meeting the situation than marrying her’, wrote 
his friend Walter Monckton.71  
This attachment would be the defining characteristic of the King’s short reign. 
The present literature provides valuable insight into the way the abdication played out in 
Britain. Contrary to Ziegler’s prediction of Edward’s reforming ambitions on ascending 
the throne, Bloch advanced the view that the new King was instead deeply uneasy with 
his rapidly elevated public position. He pinpoints Edward’s apparent disregard for the 
‘chaos and suspicion’ that engrossed his band of ill-chosen and mistrustful courtiers, his 
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reluctance to formally reside at Buckingham Palace and his lack of consideration for 
public criticism all as demonstrating his overwhelming preoccupation with prolonging 
his liaison with Wallis at any cost.72 Edward’s lifestyle and apparent irreverence for his 
father’s traditions rankled with his staff. Clive Wigram, his Private Secretary, wrote 
cautiously of his new charge as ‘another type of King. One of a new generation, a 
product of the war.’73 Within months, Wigram would resign over ‘the King’s habits; his 
subservience to Mrs Simpson’s wishes; his consequent extravagance; his treatment of 
staff at Buckingham Palace [and] his lack of discretion.’74  
Although at this time the King’s popular outward persona remained undisturbed, 
the succession of events that would conclude with abdication was already in motion. 
Gossip was rife along the official, familial and informal channels of communication 
between the top levels of the Civil Service, the British government and Society, 
meaning that it was unlikely that the relationship would remain concealed for long. ‘If it 
becomes generally known’, British prime minister Stanley Baldwin told a friend, ‘the 
country won’t stand it.’75 Wallis had not only divorced one man but was still married to 
another, and so in the eyes of the Establishment and Church of England was utterly 
unsuited to the role of King’s consort, even if she were free to marry him. 
The legislative ramifications of this moral dilemma encompasses many elements 
of interest to social historians. In particular, the question of the extent to which 
Baldwin’s prediction extended to the ‘British’ populations outside of Britain is an 
interesting one. Australia’s constitution of 1901 set out a system of governance based 
on a cooperative system of executive power under the sovereignty of the Crown, 
administered by a representative Governor-General and within an association of 
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autonomous Dominions. As mentioned in the preceding pages, at this time the 
Dominions’ relationship to the Crown was undergoing a gradual transformation towards 
greater independence. As Joan Beaumont has explained, even though the post-
Federation Australian government was entitled to manage its own ‘external affairs’, 
politicians still deferred to London in matters of imperial foreign policy during and after 
the war.76 During wartime, the Imperial War Conference of 1917 sought to re-confirm 
these friendly associations amongst the Dominions in issues of defence.77 Australian 
influence was felt following the Treaty of Versailles in the establishment of the League 
of Nations, and the 1926 Balfour Declaration served as Britain’s acceptance of the 
Dominions’ growing political and diplomatic independence.78 By 1931, the Statute of 
Westminster had begun the formal process of devolving British parliamentary control 
over the Dominions, where no British Act of Parliament could apply without consent to 
the Australian federal Parliament, which in turn could enact its own legislation. Over 
time, this legislative distance helped recast the former colonial relationship as a 
voluntary allegiance between the Dominions and Britain, critically connected by the 
symbolism of the monarch as a guardian of imperial interests.  
As Mort outlines, this legislative reinvention registered a profound and 
significant shift in the monarch’s role from the guarantor of democratic politics to the 
‘focal point of a system of media orchestrated populism, grounded in an economy of 
personal identification between ordinary subjects and themselves.’79 As we shall see, 
this conflict between the monarch as a political icon and as an individual personality 
favoured by human interest journalism would surface most significantly during the 
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debates over the King’s character during the abdication episode. Although the terms of 
the Statute were not fully applicable to all the Dominions in 1936, also of particular 
relevance to the monarch was the preamble, which states that ‘any alteration in the Law 
touching the succession to the throne or the royal style or titles shall thereafter require 
the assent as well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom.’80  
This growing tension between constitutional distance and royal populism could 
only spell trouble in Buckingham Palace. As Godfrey Thomas, Edward’s new Private 
Secretary, mused, the white settler Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and Canada were connected mainly ‘by their common loyalty to the Crown. What will 
happen if they find their sole link is in the person of a sovereign for whom they have 
little respect?’81 Rather than the issue of adultery between Edward and Wallis, the 
Establishment allied with the established Church of England in moral condemnation of 
divorce. Although the King was free to marry whomever he wished (except a Catholic), 
legally, at least, there were no restrictions on his marriage, his role as ‘Defender of the 
Faith’ required him to support, publicly in any case, the Church’s rejection of divorce. 
As long as Wallis remained the King’s mistress only, her divorced status was 
inconsequential.  
The King resoundingly underestimated these powerful moral codes and imperial 
sensitivities. In July 1936, a few months into his reign, Wallis initiated her divorce 
proceedings. To those aware of the affair, this move was the clearest indication yet that 
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the couple eventually wished to marry. If another suitor were waiting in the wings, she 
would be legally free to marry again by April 1937, only one month before the planned 
Coronation. Things went from bad to worse between August and September, when the 
couple undertook a lavish Mediterranean cruise aboard the luxury steam yacht Nahlin, 
attended at every stop by the world’s press. Ernest Simpson was conspicuously absent.  
This indulgent jaunt laid on for sixteen of the King’s friends must have seemed 
woefully inopportune to observers, undertaken as it was at a time of economic distress 
and amid growing political tension across Europe. A few months prior, Britain and 
France observed as Hitler took steps to contravene the Treaty of Versailles by 
remilitarising the Rhineland in March 1936. Britain was also engaged in dispute over 
fascist Italy’s military campaigns in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and further unrest followed in 
July 1936 with the breakout of civil war in Spain.82 With the benefit of hindsight, Bloch 
has suggested that, even by this stage, the King had made up his mind that he meant to 
marry Wallis, and as such there was never any real conflict, or the oft-described ‘crisis’, 
between him and the British government.83 This is not to say that it did not appear so at 
the time, with both parties never certain what move the other was planning. However, in 
contrast to the way it later played out in the world’s press, the disproportionally feared 
constitutional ‘crisis’ ultimately failed to materialise.  
The ramifications of the King’s actions on those of the world’s press is also of 
interest to social historians. The successful suppression of commentary concerning the 
couple’s relationship remains an extraordinary feat attributable to some degree to the 
top-heavy nature of British Society and the attitudes held by the press proprietors of 
1936. Rather than informing the electorate, many in Fleet Street saw their role as 
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assisting the Establishment in maintaining stability.84 In mid-1936, Edward made an 
agreement with powerful media magnates Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere to limit 
publicity of the Simpsons’ impending divorce hearing and its association with himself.85 
The self-imposed ‘gentleman’s agreement’ continued throughout the British 
government’s management of the unfolding situation, until the gratuitous remarks of an 
English bishop opened the floodgates and the story broke across the world in early 
December. This has been a subject of interest for many British, European and American 
historians across a wide range of issues from the obligations of the free press in 
disseminating information, to the impact of the abdication on the domestic 
representation of the royal family.86 As early as 1937, Fred Siebert contrasted the 
reticence of the British press with the avid reporting of the American papers.87 More 
recently, Schwartzenbach compared the European and American reaction to the 
abdication, finding that modern American romantic ideals of love, marriage and divorce 
drawn from popular culture underpinned support for the marriage outside of Britain and 
Europe.88  
The existence of this broad comparative body of knowledge serves to highlight a 
gap in understandings of the Australian reception of news of the abdication. This is 
surely significant, as the King’s inability to speak directly to the people meant that it 
was largely left to the Dominion press, themselves relying on cabled British and 
American accounts, to explain the issues at stake. Later biographers such as Donaldson 
have touched upon the status of reporting in other Dominions, such as the growing 
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sense of outrage among British ex-patriate communities in America where reporting 
was less inhibited.89 Some now-dated accounts have assumed that Australian journalism 
deferred to Britain’s lead in suppressing the circulation. In 1965, Cecil Edwards, for 
example, identified a ‘pall of silence’ in the Dominion press regarding the 
relationship.’90 George Fairbanks’ 1966 article speculated on Australia’s position during 
the management of the abdication, finding a deliberate attempt by those in ‘high places’ 
to suppress the development of Australian public opinion.91 These views sit 
uncomfortably with what is known from more recent studies of Australian 
independence and self-interest in matters imperial at the time. Yet, despite the increased 
accessibility of digitised newspapers and government records, the existence of any 
corresponding press gag in Australia has remained unexplored until now. 
In terms of scholarly interest, the ‘pall of silence’ also extends to the role of the 
Dominions in the abdication. In December 1936, Edward formally renounced the throne 
so as to be free to marry Wallis. The move was precipitated by Stanley Baldwin, the 
British prime minister, with the support of the Dominion prime ministers.92 The 
literature to date has tended to focus on the British context of political machinations 
before, during and after the event.93 Although existing accounts agree that the role of the 
Dominion governments was a critical element in the sequence of events that led to the 
abdication, they pay only general attention to the development and significance of their 
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respective attitudes. For example, although he analyses a broad range of British sources, 
Bloch’s considered discussion of the prime ministers’ input runs to only a few pages 
and fails to address the domestic reception and management of the episode within each 
of the overseas Dominions.94 But as mentioned earlier, the Statute of Westminster ruled 
that the Dominion prime ministers had a right to be consulted on equal terms on any 
change in the royal succession, style or title on an equivalent basis to that of the British 
government. This is a significant and, in the case of Australia, largely unexplored 
element of proceedings deserving of further attention. 
As will be explained in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the prime ministers’ responsibility 
came into play in the weeks prior to the abdication, when Baldwin secretly requested 
their advice in support of his proposal to refuse to consider the passing of new 
legislation enabling the King to marry Wallis morganatically; an alliance where she 
would assume neither his rank nor status.95 By agreeing to request the Dominion prime 
ministers’ advice, and failing to avail himself of the many opportunities to put forward 
his case for the marriage, morganatic or otherwise, and garner popular support, the King 
passively sealed his own fate. By agreeing to an official course of action, he was bound 
to accept the advice of his government. However, if he rejected this advice, the 
government would be forced to resign, possibly creating a constitutional upheaval of 
unprecedented magnitude. This seemed to centre on fears that politician Winston 
Churchill, Edward’s most vocal supporter in Britain, would seize the chance to form a 
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rival ‘King’s Party’, the implications of which would surely influence the existing 
political stance on potential war in Europe.96  
The social and political impact may also have soon been felt within the 
Dominions, at that time asserting their own independence under the Crown. In any case, 
it soon seemed to transpire that Edward had little support therein. In the case of 
Australia, the United Australia Party prime minister Joseph Lyons quickly responded 
that there would be ‘widespread condemnation’ of such a marriage despite the King’s 
popularity.97 Implying consensus, he later affirmed that ‘the clear opinion of my 
government the Commonwealth Parliament and Australian people is unfavourable to 
such a marriage.’98 Not all of the responses were as emphatic. Bloch argues that the 
opportunistic Baldwin was able to collate and misrepresent the Dominion responses as 
part of a strategy to remove the King from the throne.99 And so abdication became the 
King’s only option.  
This historical episode illustrated as never before the inner conflict between the 
monarch as a duty-bound symbol of a time-honoured institution, and as an individual 
with human aspirations living in the modern world. It also highlighted the potential for 
constitutional danger when the King overstepped the long-observed parameters in his 
relationship with the government. For people living across the Empire, the episode 
revealed a new and not wholly agreeable view of the fallibility of the monarch. In the 
end, the much-anticipated Coronation proceeded as planned, albeit with a replacement 
monarch, Edward’s brother, the less glamorous King George VI. The exiled Duke and 
Duchess of Windsor retreated to France and a nomadic existence on the Society circuit.  
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Australia and the abdication 
Until now, the full story of the development of Australia’s position has remained 
unclear. Little of the manoeuvring described above was publicly known in the 
immediate aftermath of the abdication, as most of the previously restricted British 
government-related archival material held by the National Archives at Kew (TNA) was 
not made fully available for public access until 2003.100 As such, even at a distance of 
thirteen years from then, research into this event could be described as still in its 
infancy. Admittedly, the British sources have in the time since been extensively mined 
for information given the intense and continuous public interest in the couple. So much 
so, that in one remarkable case evidence was amateurishly invented in what can only be 
a marker of how emotive and controversial the lives of Edward and Wallis remain. 
Among other dubious claims concerning aspects of inter-war history, British author 
Martin Allen’s ‘revelation’ of material supposedly confirming the communication of 
secret intelligence to Hitler by the Duke of Windsor held within the TNA collections 
was found in 2008 to be based on a letter forged by the author and planted, along with 
28 others, within the original files.101  
More fortuitously, major significant British scholarship has also emerged during 
this time, the most important being the 2004 work by Susan Williams. In a substantial 
reinterpretation of the abdication using a range of social-historical archives, Williams 
concludes that Baldwin misjudged a large body of working-class support for the King in 
Britain. She also convincingly demonstrates the differences and tensions implicit in the 
cabled messages from the Dominions in response to requests for advice from London.102 
Similarly, Frank Mort’s 2013 study repositions the event as symptomatic of wider social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Prior to this, parts of the collection were made available to researchers upon application.  
101 Paul Lewis, ‘The 29 fakes behind a rewriting of history’, The Guardian website 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/05/nationalarchives.secondworldwar >, accessed 5 
January 2016.  
102 Williams, The People’s King, p. 130. 
	  	   29	  
anxieties concerning sexual morals and the domestic character of the 1930s.103 While 
these works do not rely on Australian sources, they nonetheless demonstrate some of 
the possibilities of this area of social history, and confirm the assumption that there 
might be more to the matter than has recently met the historical eye. 
Considerable new information was also added to the public record in Australia 
in 2003, when the NAA released the corresponding set of Australian government 
records from 1936, following advice from the British High Commission on behalf of the 
British Government that information relating to the abdication was ‘no longer 
sensitive.’104 Despite this, the episode has never attracted the same degree of scrutiny 
from a local perspective. The context of Lyons’ reasoning and the nature of public 
opinion have never been fully investigated. In a 1949 biography of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Cosmo Gordon Lang, Baldwin is quoted as placing particular emphasis on 
the Australian prime minister’s input in the years after Lyons’ death. ‘The decisive 
factor’, he reportedly stated, ‘was the uncompromising stand of the Dominion premiers 
and especially of the Prime Minister of Australia.’105 This retrospective emphasis on the 
Dominions’ common attitude and Lyons’ opposition was uncritically reiterated in each 
of the major biographical works.106 Donaldson, for example, unreservedly accepts the 
‘official’ perspective, remarking that ‘the strongest reply came from Lyons’ and that: 
Baldwin’s view was shared by the cabinet, by the leaders and almost 
all members of all political parties, by everyone except a handful of 
MPs, by the vast majority of his countrymen and of the populations of 
the Dominions.107  
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Ziegler was similarly unequivocal, describing the Dominion responses as 
‘predictable’ and that the Australians ‘were the most decided.’108 Bogdanor has also 
agreed that Lyons’ response was, somehow, consistent with those of the other 
Dominions, in that their ‘common political instincts and habits of mind led [them]…to 
act together.’109 However, as more recently shown by Williams’ findings, grassroots 
public opinion is not always at one with that of the ruling decision-makers. The factors 
that contributed to Australia’s official response to the abdication remain 
uncompromisingly obscure, although there is some related context available for the 
public response elsewhere in at least one other Dominion. Beadle’s 1969 Canadian 
study remains the only in-depth examination of the reception of the abdication outside 
of Britain.110 Here, in an interesting contrast to Williams’ discovery of British popular 
support for the King’s predicament, he concludes that the majority of Canadians 
condemned Edward’s choice on moral grounds, pointing to the prevalent Puritan and 
Roman Catholic morality of the time.111 Significantly, this indicates that differences in 
local responses to the abdication existed within the coalition of Dominions. As a 
paradox between private happiness and public duty, it is not difficult to imagine that the 
abdication caused Australians to review existing convictions concerning the royals and 
the institution they symbolised.  
In any case, no biographer or historian, Australian or otherwise, has 
satisfactorily explained the background to Lyons’ resolute claim that Australians would 
not support the King’s marriage, nor offered a satisfactory explanation for why the 
popular regard for Edward that supposedly existed in 1920 was no longer in evidence. 
In 1979, J. Bryan III and Charles J.V. Murphy suggested that Lyons, a Roman Catholic, 
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was motivated by religious prejudice, claiming ‘he had no sympathy for divorce as an 
institution, or divorced people … he had only scorn for both the monarchy and its most 
conspicuous ornament.’112 Lyons’ biographers have only partially analysed his position. 
Anne Henderson, for example, argued that the prime minister ‘correctly pinpointed the 
moral judgement of many ordinary citizens about a twice-divorced woman.’113 Kate 
White offers that Australians opposed the marriage ‘because she was a commoner.’114 
What then, are we to make of Fairbanks’ assertion of fifty years ago that there was a 
‘remarkable outpouring of sentiment in favour of King Edward’ as the abdication 
became public knowledge?115  
A final point of interest is the fervent Empire-wide propaganda that assisted in 
the promotion of the new King, George VI, between the abdication and his Coronation 
of May 1937. Bloch has convincingly demonstrated how both the royal family and the 
Establishment attempted to subdue Edward’s public visibility in the aftermath of the 
abdication due to fears that he would embark on an independent political career that 
might pose a threat to his brother’s Kingship.116 Here the British press and its networks 
played a role in attempting to smooth the transfer of public affection from one monarch 
to the next. In contrast to the unsuitable Wallis, from whom rightful royal status was 
withheld, the new Queen Elizabeth was promoted as a model of domesticity, and 
importantly, of steadfast assistance to her husband. David Sinclair contends that this 
process was eased by the symbolic nature of the occupant of the throne, where the 
individuality of that person was of little importance. This, he argues, explains why ‘the 
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once-popular Edward was forgotten so quickly after the abdication and the loyalty and 
affection he had commanded were transferred immediately to his successor.’117  
The extent to which this situation might also apply to the Dominions remains 
uncertain, although many of the themes discussed likely resonate widely. Beadle’s work 
on the Canadian press, for example, indicates that journalists in that Dominion were 
quick to follow Britain’s lead, with little public dissent.118 What, then, was the attitude 
of the Australian press, and what was its lasting effect? What is clear is that an 
exploration of changing public perceptions of a member of the royal family suddenly 
persona non grata may offer fresh insights into Australian inter-war expectations of 
morality, duty and modernity in a monarch, and how this related to their public office. 
 
Australians and the monarchy  
Beyond the body of literature specifically examining Edward’s life and comparative 
examples of early twentieth century royal tours, there is a small but growing group of 
Australian historians whose work engages with the popular experience of constitutional 
monarchy. This has not always been so, and in fact the tide has only recently begun to 
turn. In 2008, for example, McKenna echoed Connors’ earlier observation concerning 
this neglected area of social history, remarking that it had been regarded with 
‘condescension and bemusement, more pilloried than understood.’ This attitude, he 
concluded, served to ‘leave a vast terrain of Australian cultural history unexplored.’119 
This is not to deny that the popular experience of imperialism has not featured, albeit 
obliquely, in the large body of mid to late twentieth century Australian historiography 
concerned with republicanism or the legal constitutional role of the monarchy in all its 
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guises. Certainly, the idea of a colonial and post-Federation Australia completely 
subservient to the British ideal has been largely picked apart from the 1960s onward.120 
There was, for example, a significant surge of republican sentiment during Queen 
Victoria’s Golden Jubilee in 1887, and there were continuing tensions in matters of 
defence, trade, finance and immigration policy during the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Historians’ attention was also diverted by the extraordinary interactions 
between the then prime minister Gough Whitlam and the Governor-General John Kerr 
in 1975, which provoked a number of both scholarly and combative works musing on 
many strategic or political aspects of the monarchy’s role in Australia.121 Later prime 
ministers devoted varying degrees of attention to the topic, culminating in the 
referendum of 1999.  
However, as McKenna points out, discussion has been limited by the way critics 
have viewed the monarchy as a foreign entity in Australia, and perceived that its 
presence implied dependence and limited nationalist aspirations.122 Although evidently 
a critical part of Australia’s long relationship with the monarchy, less frequently has the 
spotlight in the republican and nationalist debate been directed towards the significance 
of the monarchy’s popular expression. Furthermore, as Deryck Schreuder and Stuart 
Ward observed in 2008, much historical attention of the later twentieth century was 
diverted towards narratives examining post-colonial tensions distinct from and in 
opposition to imperialism, most notably the theme of frontier conflict.123  
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Although underpinned by the political, foreign policy, defence and economic 
imperatives as played out in the theatre of Empire, this thesis is mostly concerned with 
the popular perception of monarchy in Australia that in many ways bolstered continued 
support for imperialism in an independent nation. I seek to further explore Beaumont’s 
argument that at the time of the First World War ‘imperial loyalty was anchored in a 
cultural and emotional identification with the United Kingdom which transcended any 
rational calculations of strategic pragmatism’ by explicitly identifying the monarch as 
the symbolic pinnacle of this emotional connection.124 If we consider that loyalty to the 
monarch has played a central role in the formation of Australian identity, it becomes 
evident that their widespread presence is embedded in many facets of Australian life. 
Curiously, however, this has at few points been subject to critique. For example, Justice 
Michael Kirby remarked in 1993 that ‘for more than 200 years Australians have had a 
King or Queen. It has become, and is, part of our society’s very nature.’125 While 
uncritical perceptions such as this have raised the ire of republican commentators in the 
past, this study argues that the popular dimension of this supposedly ‘natural’ 
relationship with the royals is a significant aspect of Australia’s experience of 
constitutional monarchy.  
There are a small but significant number of British and American studies that 
provide useful historical context for the growth and function of popular monarchism.126 
Walter Bagehot’s evocative argument of 1867 remains highly relevant to contemporary 
studies. He writes that the combination of a human figurehead with the forces of 
religion, pageantry and morality ensured the continued place of the monarch on the 
throne. A royal family, he argues, ‘sweetens politics by the seasoned addition of nice 
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and pretty events.’127 More recently in 1988, Tom Nairn cautioned against 
underestimating the social significance of such innocuous public appearances, asserting 
that popular monarchism has ‘an apparently inexhaustible electric charge.’128 Among 
the most prominent and influential historians on matters of royalty are Vernon 
Bogdanor and David Cannadine.129 Cannadine’s research is particularly expansive and 
provides a guiding hand throughout this thesis, and although he does not specifically 
discuss Australia’s popular experience of monarchy, his argument for so-called royal 
traditions as modern twentieth century inventions is of enormous relevance to any 
examination of royal public lives and tours.130 
Also useful here is the theoretical context established by works seeking to 
provide an insight into a particular royal individual. Briefly, these explore the critical 
contention that the royal family exerts a symbolic power, most commonly identified 
with Bagehot’s observation that ‘its mystery is its life. We must not let daylight in upon 
magic.’131 In her work examining Queen Elizabeth II, Ilse Hayden, for example, 
discusses the relevant idea that the royal family function as the focus of the projected 
desires of the onlookers. Hayden examines the dual persona of the monarch, in 
combining both an extraordinary royal persona and that of an ordinary person.132 Also 
of relevance is Nairn’s argument that perceptions of ordinariness ‘somehow underwrites 
the collective soul and reinforces a feeling of community.’133 Nairn alludes to the broad 
and re-inventive appeal of the institution of monarchy, and its capacity to ‘offer itself in 
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suitably varying modes to its believers.’134 These analyses can be usefully considered 
within a study of Edward’s inter-war Australian public life.  
British and American studies, however, have inevitable limitations. Undoubtedly 
the development of similar sentiment in an Australian context cannot be explained 
solely by the Anglo-Celtic cultural background characteristic of most of the population 
during the early decades of the twentieth century. While these sources provide valuable 
context, perceptions of the monarchy in Australia, and indeed the other Commonwealth 
Dominions, present a different set of social conditions and so comparisons or 
projections are not straightforward.  
There is however a small body of Australian literature that recognises the 
importance of the British monarchy to this country’s historical imaginings. This was 
initially established during the 1980s and is currently experiencing a significant 
resurgence. In 1986, Peter Spearritt, for example, was one of the first historians to 
directly address popular monarchism, in this case as directed towards Queen Elizabeth 
II, as an area of historical study.135 Spearritt’s work also demonstrates the value of a 
wide range of surviving contemporary, everyday visual and material culture as historical 
sources.136 Connors also found that the scope of the Queen’s royal tour of 1954, and its 
participants, strongly reflected the cultural context from which it was generated.137 The 
role of the monarch has also been explored within the scholarly discipline of law with a 
focus on its changing role within legal and political institutions.138 However, these 
publications focus almost exclusively on Australian expressions of popular monarchism 
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as associated with Queen Elizabeth II during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
with lesser attention paid to Edward, Prince of Wales during the inter-war years.  
This scholarly interest is ongoing. At present, a distinct resurgence can be 
discerned in studies re-examining aspects of monarchical symbolism in former imperial 
colonies.139 For example, Philip Murphy’s 2013 book Monarchy and the End of Empire 
provides one of the first intensive examinations of the changing role of the monarch and 
the overseas realms.140 In 2015, Luke Mansillo examined the correlation between the 
activities of the royal family from the 1990s and fluctuations of Australian support for 
the institution, noting ‘significant gains’ from the turn of the twenty-first century.141 
Also in 2015, Hill’s Australians and the Monarchy became the first full-length 
monograph on the local historical context, although his conclusion that the ‘magic’ the 
royals exerted over Australia was composed of the ‘familiarity and comfort that comes 
from continuity’ and the thrill of pageantry and ‘in recent times the new breed of royal 
“celebrity”’still left much of the attraction unexplained.142 This context may be more 
usefully considered in light of aspects of the broader work of authors such as Beadle, 
Nairn or Connors that interrogate the aspirations, ideals and press-created facades that 
coalesce around popular understandings of the monarchy. This thesis’ objective is to 
partially reveal aspects of McKenna’s unexplored terrain of cultural history and 
contribute to this vibrant field of scholarly analysis.  
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Australia and the Empire  
In contrast to the relatively neglected topic of the monarchy in Australia, there is a wide 
body of literature that engages with Australia’s relationship with Britain as part of the 
Empire, and explores some of the tensions therein as Australia grew into an independent 
nation following Federation in 1901. This provides essential context to the widely felt 
Australian affection for the monarchy despite its increasingly anachronistic position in 
strategic matters as Australia sought to define its place within the Empire during the 
first half of the twentieth century. As Bernard Attard and Carl Bridge noted in 2000, 
although Australia made the journey from colonial to self-governing status in 1901, 
Federation served to further complicate the ambiguity of its future strategic direction 
within the Empire.143 McKenna suggests that ‘imperialism, for all its gaudy symbolism, 
provided the vision, the grandeur and the glorious past that Australians were not able to 
find in their own beginnings.’144 The compelling evidence for continuing British 
patriotic cultural and educational prerogatives of the immediate post-Federation era has 
also been well explored by social historians.145 Gavin Souter, for example, has 
identified the establishment of Empire Day in 1905 as a key point during the immediate 
post-Federation period that demonstrates renewed middle-class support for imperialism 
as means of promoting cohesion within the Empire.146  
The co-existence of Australia’s increasingly powerful assertion of independence 
and ongoing connection to British culture, education, and legislative and political 
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frameworks in the following decades has been thoroughly scrutinised by generations of 
historians. The cultural imperatives that prompted 416,809 Anzacs to join their British 
allies at war between 1914 and 1918 have provided the focus for many publications.147 
Beaumont, for example, points to the revised identities emerging from the First World 
War as both validating imperial loyalty and allowing the federal government to 
establish and maintain the ideology as ‘a means of legitimating their hold on power’ for 
decades after. Only afterwards, she writes, would it emerge that the Empire was in fact 
weakened by the war and the assertions of Britain and France during the negotiations 
for peace manifestly deficient.148 Schreuder and Ward also identify the inter-war period 
as typified by complexity, describing ‘a hybrid ideology, one that drew from both a 
tenacious race identity of Britishness, together with an increasingly assertive sense of 
material self-interest, and an environmental sense of place.’149 Even while Australia’s 
international relations remained inseparable from those of the Empire, the nation’s 
politicians, public servants and soldiers sought to pursue Australian goals within a 
British world. Kosmas Tsokhas has outlined how the Australian government of the time 
negotiated fiercely for Australia’s political interests, foreign policy and defence, but in 
other respects were ‘cooperative, mutual and relatively conflict-free’ in their dealings 
with Britain.150  
Although existing studies have little to say about the position of the monarch in 
nationalistic or patriotic imagination, in many ways the symbolism of the Crown was 
able to co-exist with the new nation’s affirmation of egalitarian independence. Several 
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authors have considered how these two responses can be reconciled. John Hirst, for 
example, suggests that in fact the buoyancy of sentiment reflects the degree to which 
self-interest was being served.151 Neville Meaney also identifies two distinct Australian 
views of the connection to Britain; firstly one that perceived Britain as the ‘metropolitan 
superior’ at the heart of a network of colonial subordinates; and secondly the Empire as 
‘a multi-polar structure, an alliance of British peoples in which all the white constituent 
elements were entitled to [equal] consideration and dignity.’152 Ward also points out 
that, although political aspirations of the time were viewed through this ‘sentimental 
prism of British race patriotism’, this in no way deflected Australia’s political pursuit of 
its own freedom, priorities and interests – and this remained the status quo until the 
early 1960s, when British strategic attention turned towards Europe rather than the 
Commonwealth.153 Frank Bongiorno has also drawn attention to the cohesive power of 
the symbolism of the Crown, rather than royalty per se, in inter-war Australian political 
imagination. With a distant and benevolent monarch as its figurehead, the Crown was 
seen in some liberal quarters as an essential foundation for self-government, in turn 
representative of political independence within a common legislative framework.154 As I 
will show, within this context, perceptions of Edward would ebb and flow in response 
to these political and social imperatives.  
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Summary  
This thesis charts the evolution of Edward’s public life in Australia between 
approximately 1916 and 1936 by analysing changing Australian perceptions of his 
particular qualities or characteristics. My first objective is to address a gap in the 
historical record, as there is currently no study that engages with Edward’s public life 
from an Australian perspective. The 1920 royal tour and 1936 abdication are significant 
and under-studied episodes bearing on broader understandings of the inter-war history 
of the monarchy in Australia. Their analysis is timely given the renewed scholarly 
interest in the social history of imperialism and royalty during the inter-war period. This 
is also an area of historical interest that can only gain fresh prominence as the present 
Queen ages and the future of the British monarchy is subject to further debate. The 
consequence of this detailed analysis of Edward’s public life is an advanced 
understanding of the foundation for the deep inter-war attachment to the monarchy, 
which contributes fresh insights into the conflicted position of Australian’s relations 
with Britain during the first half of the twentieth century.  
In the following pages, I argue that between the First World War and his 
abdication, Edward both provided a focus for and reflected the projected cultural and 
social desires of Australians. He was seen to possess a series of appealing and 
aspirational masculine qualities: a symbol of the Crown, as an inspiration for peace, as a 
modern exemplar and as a member of the family. I find that these qualities were both 
deliberately and intuitively manufactured by both popular and official undertakings, 
such as government imperatives, the press and educational activities, as well as 
Edward’s own prerogatives. Australian perceptions of the monarch’s behaviour therein 
fall broadly into two halves; firstly, those that accentuated his personal humanity, often 
in masculine terms, and secondly, those that apparently demonstrated his dedication to 
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his duties. The balance of emphasis between these two halves – the man and the 
monarch – shifts from one extreme to the other within the timeframe discussed.  
The thesis’ findings further inform the historical context. I argue that the 
analysis of this conflict between private fulfilment and obligation to the state can be 
correlated with the resonance of the same debate within inter-war society of the time. 
The Prince’s star shone the brightest in the immediate post-war era, when his modern 
and masculine qualities seemed to epitomise the hopes and fears of the young, and his 
reign promised an equitable and democratic imperial future. As he aged, Australian 
observers found this could not be sustained. To his discredit, his seemingly selfish and 
reckless behaviour called into question his qualities suitable for the Kingship, in a time 
of growing preoccupation over Australia’s independence. When Edward overstepped 
the confines of his public persona by the act of seeming to insist on a relationship 
reportedly established on immoral foundations and seemingly contravening his pre-
ordained ‘duty’ to the throne, he became morally undesirable as a leader. Along with the 
destruction of the Prince’s attractive persona, came also a blow to Australia’s own 
imperial identity. Although some lamented Edward’s lost potential, Australian support 
was readily transferred to another man supposedly exhibiting the suite of prized 
qualities.  
This thesis concludes that inter-war Australian political and popular affection for 
individual monarchs could variously enhance and come into conflict with ideals of 
nationhood and expectations of the symbolic institution of British monarchy. In 
Australia, the royals enjoyed an unusual disassociation from religious or class-based 
affiliations, meaning that the attractiveness of their individual characters flourished in 
the perceptions of onlookers. I demonstrate that, although support for the monarchy 
could be temporarily agitated by the behaviour of the incumbent, this affection was 
superficial. For Australians, the peace and longevity of the Crown as a governing entity, 
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took precedence. Although promoted as an individual personality, Edward ultimately 
fell below Australians’ expectations for what a royal public life should entail. It is the 
personal qualities of the monarch that bind observers to the symbolism of the throne, 
but these are swiftly discarded if any moral aspect comes into question. Ultimately, for 
Australians of the inter-war period, the figure of the monarch was inescapably bound up 
in his or her inherited duty to ensuring the prosperity and survival of the monarchy. 
 
Methodology 
Taking as its starting point the contention that the royal tour and abdication were 
received in a distinctive manner reflecting local circumstances, and accepting that inter-
war Australian social dynamics differed from their British antecedents, the methodology 
of this thesis is to establish and chart a set of qualities that reveal Edward’s particular 
appeal in Australia. To do this, I analysed a representative range of responses to both 
the royal tour and the abdication from across the social and political spectrum, as 
revealed by transcripts and recordings, public addresses, private letters and diaries, press 
reports and other ephemera. In seeking to partially untangle the ‘webs of significance’ 
that underpin these responses, I adopt the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz’ 
methodology of ‘thick description’; that is, the extraction of meaning from layers of 
cultural commentary and interpretation.155 This is guided by the principles of the socio-
historical approach popularised by the British historian Edward Thompson that aimed to 
reveal the lives and preoccupations of ordinary people through viewing history as if 
‘from below.’156  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 The use of this term in anthropology was introduced by the ethnographer Clifford Geertz in 
his essay ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz 
(ed.), The interpretation of cultures: selected essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30, 
p. 5. 
156 For further discussion, see Miles Taylor, ‘The Beginnings of Modern British Social 
History?’, History Workshop Journal 43 (1997), pp. 155-76. 
	  	   44	  
The available source material is considerable. I found that greater access to 
selected metropolitan and regional newspapers digitised by the NLA within the last five 
years has exposed an enormous terrain of grassroots public accounts of both events, in 
fact more than I could ever have hoped to include.157 The accessibility of unpublished 
official records and personal manuscripts to researchers has been improved following 
the establishment of national and state repositories and reading rooms from the 1980s 
onwards. As well as the availability of Australian government records and the private 
papers of relevant political and public figures associated with both the abdication and 
the royal tour held at the NLA and the NAA, I also accessed those of their British 
counterparts held at the TNA, and the Royal Archives (RA).158 The majority of my data 
is drawn from these four sources. I also discovered relevant information in the 
collections of the Mitchell Library at the State Library of New South Wales 
(MLSLNSW), the National Film and Sound Archive (NFSA), the Imperial War 
Museum (IWM), the National Museum of Australia (NMA), the John Oxley Library at 
the State Library of Queensland (JOLSLQ), the Archives Office of Tasmania (AOT), 
the State Library of South Australia (SLSA) and the Australian War Memorial (AWM). 
Hansard, the published record of Australian parliamentary debates and proceedings, 
was also hugely useful. 
Knowing in some cases only limited information about the writers and producers 
of such a plethora of evidence, the ephemeral and fragmented nature of certain parts of 
my source material in some cases hampered my ability to come to grips with it. Taken 
individually, highly subjective perceptions in private letters, official records and press 
reports cannot alone provide a clear impression of the views of the public at large. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 The core of the study is drawn from an examination of over 500 original sources comprising 
approximately 300 newspaper articles, approximately 200 official or published records, and 
approximately 100 expressions of private opinion. 
158 At the RA I was permitted to access only the royal tour related material as ‘those studying 
for postgraduate degrees are only permitted to see records in the Royal Archives up to the end 
of 1935.’ Letter to author from Pamela Clark, Senior Archivist, RA, 11 October 2013. 
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is further complicated by the overlapping and unquantifiable gendered, religious or 
class-based affiliations of the authors. However, we should not forget Thompson’s well 
known lobster trap metaphor for these types of texts as ‘curious literary creatures’ that, 
when raised from the depths to break the ‘bland surface’ of historiography, offer a 
teeming supply of representative views.159 Moreover, I found that when considered 
within a comparative swath of evidence, these sources allow for the identification of 
broad themes that provide fresh insight into Australian perceptions of the royals and the 
monarchy. I am reassured in this endeavour by Connors’ advice that ‘talking about the 
royal family shows how people organise ideas about privilege, nationality, morality and 
family.’160 
 
Outline 
This thesis is structured in six chapters. Broadly, it falls into two halves corresponding 
to the high and low contours of Edward’s public visibility in Australian perceptions. 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 argue for the development of a series of four main qualities or roles 
ascribed to the Prince of Wales – imagining the young man as a symbol of the Crown, 
an inspiration for peace, a modern exemplar and as a member of the family – that 
emerged before the First World War and would reach their zenith during his royal tour 
of 1920. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 chart how perceptions of these same qualities changed 
throughout the later 1920s and during the series of events that led to Edward’s 
abdication and the accession of a new monarch in 1936. The Conclusion considers 
changing perceptions and expectations of the inter-war role of the monarchy as played 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Crime of Anonymity, from Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in 
Eighteenth Century England’, in E. P. Thompson and Dorothy Thompson (eds.), The essential 
E.P. Thompson (New York: New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), pp. 378-
431, p. 380. 
160 Connors, ‘The Glittering Thread’, p. 18. 
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out in Edward’s abbreviated but nonetheless significant public life in Australia. It is to 
this untold narrative that I now turn.  
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Chapter 1: The heir presumptive 
 
He struck me as being very decent, shy & reserved & conscious of his 
position. 
-Henry Gissing, 29 March 1916.1  
 
An examination of the beginnings of the changeable relationship between Edward and 
the people of Australia highlights the four main qualities that, for good or ill, would 
become synonymous with his Australian persona between 1916 and 1936. By exploring 
these, my objective is, in part, to address a gap in the historical understanding of 
Edward’s public life, considering, as Schwartzenbach has noted in the context of 
Britain, the abdication episode saw the interplay of not one but two love stories; that of 
Edward and Wallis, but also the love between the people and their King.2 The 
development and nature of the latter relationship has received notably less coverage in 
existing historiography, and in the case of Australia remains almost unexplored. Taking 
up the notion that attitudes towards the royal family might reflect the projected desires 
of onlookers, we might ask: can aspects of Australian social history offer further insight 
into how the Prince’s public persona was forged?  
But research on this topic is complicated by the complexities imposed by the 
Crown’s role as one of the last formal links Britain and the Dominions, and not least, as 
Nicholas Mansergh has observed, that ‘the King should fulfil many roles.’3 Although 
many of these ‘roles’ resonated widely across the Dominions, I consider here whether 
these might be imagined in a localised Australian way. Accordingly, the major objective 
in this chapter is to establish a lens, via these specific roles, characteristics or qualities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 MLSLNSW, MSS 1845, Henry Ernest Gissing diary. Entry for 29 March 1916.  
2 Schwartzenbach, ‘Love, Marriage and Divorce’, p. 151. 
3 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth affairs, p. 40. 
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to be applied throughout this thesis to chart the rise and fall of Edward’s persona 
following wartime until 1936. By gleaning from the secondary literature some sense of 
both the Prince’s character, and the cultural context of Australia during this timeframe, 
we can more easily identify how the two interrelated during the earliest stages of his 
public life in this country, particularly from around 1916 when he emerged into 
Australian consciousness as the heir presumptive.  
I will show how Australian perceptions of Edward’s early public life, that is, 
from wartime to the eve of his arrival in Australia in 1920, coalesce within four broad 
categories, or distinct qualities that can be ascribed particularly to his Australian 
persona. These are, firstly, as a symbol of the Crown, secondly, as an inspiration for 
peace, thirdly, as a modern exemplar and finally as a member of the family. It is against 
this backdrop that we can better understand the popular response to the royal tour of 
1920, to be discussed in later chapters.  
 
A symbol of the Crown 
Edward was not well known in Australia during the years before the First World War, 
partly due to his youth but largely attributable to the greater attention paid to his 
grandfather King Edward VII, and after 1910, his father King George V. The Border 
Morning Mail and Riverina Times, for example, explained to its readers that the 
Prince’s mother, Queen Mary, had deliberately sought to keep him ‘very much in the 
background’ before he turned 18-years-old, meaning his character was not well known 
to the ‘outside world.’ As an adolescent, the promotion of the monarch’s strategic role 
as symbolic figurehead for the Crown rested firmly with his father, as Queen Mary 
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apparently wished that ‘irresponsibility be delayed as long as possible.’4 Nevertheless, 
there are several points where Australians had cause to become acquainted with their 
future King, and these contributed, albeit in a modest way, to the shaping of his public 
person that would come into force by the end of the First World War. The earliest 
instance was through an initially restrained range of newspaper coverage. Edward’s 
investiture as the Prince of Wales in 1911, for example, attracted some reserved 
attention. The Brisbane Telegraph took the opportunity to provide an assessment of the 
17-year-old, concluding that: 
Without being particularly handsome, Prince Edward is finely built, 
well set up, and in his naval uniform looks every inch a British sailor. 
His hair is fair and his eyes blue, his expression often decidedly 
serious and very determined. From babyhood he has always been the 
picture of health, a sturdy lad untroubled so far by any serious illness 
and possessed of unbounded vitality and keenness for both work and 
pleasure.5 Image 1 
 
However, the most significant pre-war point of connection between Australians 
and their future King, and the one most transparently formalised, was via the education 
system. Some links can be drawn between Australian perceptions of the royal family as 
exemplary role models, and contemporary understandings of the monarch as the acme 
of the system of governance within the Dominions. Pre-war educational prerogatives 
favoured powerful symbolic imagery and rhetoric concerning the idealised role of the 
nuclear royal family as imperial rulers. In his 1997 study of the pre-war School Paper, a 
printed circular published for schoolchildren by the state education departments of the 
time, Bob Bessant identified the royal family as an essential ‘focus for ensuring the 
devotion and the loyalty of the young people’ towards the idea of a cohesive Empire 
populated by a uniformly devoted people willing to make sacrifices for the King.6 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ‘THE PRINCE OF WALES AS HE IS’, The Border Morning Mail and Riverina Times, 
Albury, N.S.W., 11 December 1912, p. 3. 
5 ‘Young Prince’s Career’, The Telegraph, Brisbane, Qld., 15 July 1911, p. 12. 
6 Bob Bessant, ‘“We just got to look at her”. Propaganda, royalty and young people: Victoria 
1900-1954’, Critical Studies in Education, 38/2 (1997), pp. 35-59, p. 38.  
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was evidenced by photographs, drawings and text that extolled King George V’s 
harmonious family as possessing a range of superior qualities suitable to govern a 
disparate people. A range of other imperial symbols such as maps, the Union Jack, as 
well as representations and panegyrics of the deeds of British-born ‘heroes’ also 
populated its pages. Later perceptions of Edward would draw strongly on the 
antecedents set by the School Paper, most notably what Bessant identified as the 
‘romantic’ tone of ‘adventure and heroic deeds, bravery, and kindness to the less 
privileged.’7  
Several other authors have explored other monarchs’ unusual and unique 
capacity to appeal to onlookers as an individual, both as a means to distance them from 
perceptions of their political or religious stance, and to encourage support from across 
the political spectrum.8 In fact, their essential appeal can be found in this multiplicity. 
Hayden, for example, defines this as a ‘twoness’, that is, the combination of the 
‘messiness of being a person’ and a symbol perpetuating their role as democratic 
constitutional guardian.9 This perceived humanity enabled onlookers to understand the 
monarch as defending the wishes and interests of those in more humble positions, or as 
Alan Atkinson has described, playing a role as the ‘guarantors of common liberties.’10  
Others have further examined the seeming fluidity of constructional and 
personal roles, insofar as this was assisted by the media from the end of the nineteenth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bessant, ‘The Experience of Patriotism and Propaganda for Children in Australian Elementary 
Schools before the Great War’, p. 91. 
8 For further discussion, see Kinley Roby, The King, the press and the people: a study of 
Edward VII (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975); Matthew Glencross, The State Visits of 
Edward VII: Reinventing Royal Diplomacy for the Twentieth Century (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016). 
9 Hayden, Symbol and privilege, p. 10-11.  
10 Alan Atkinson, ‘Monarchy’, in Graeme Davison, Stuart Macintyre, and John Hirst (eds.), The 
Oxford companion to Australian history (South Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 437-38, p. 437. 
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century.11 As Paul Pickering has pointed out, the perceived leadership and personal 
qualities of the ‘good’ monarch have long been promoted in glowing terms by sections 
of the press, both during their reign and after death.12 As demonstrated by the work of 
John Plunkett, the monarch as a domestic role model has its antecedents in the late 
nineteenth century, most notably Queen Victoria as the first ‘media monarch.’ In 
employing burgeoning photographic technology, Victoria actively involved observers in 
her family domesticity, an action that both enhanced and stripped away some of the 
‘magic’ surrounding the doings of the royal family.13 By emphasising a role beyond that 
of aristocratic guardian of government, this paved the way for subsequent monarchs to 
occupy a less visible role in governance, and to strengthen their public persona as seen 
to be working for the betterment of the people. 
As the School Paper shows, Australian educational imperatives of the pre-war 
era embraced this supposedly natural subdual of the monarch’s political stance and at 
the same time enhanced their position as social exemplars. Cooke has argued that the 
reign of the intractable King Edward VII was of only middling popular success, and it 
was not until the reign of Edward’s introverted father, King George V, that the monarch 
could be said to have achieved widespread public approval.14 In his autobiography, 
Edward agreed that his father had transformed the throne into a ‘model of traditional 
family values … all the more genuine for its suspected but inconspicuous flaws.’15 It 
seems clear that their experience of King George V, perhaps more inclined to rigid 
domesticity than his father but an arch conservative nonetheless, paved the way for 
Australian’s expectations as to the public life of his son. All told, by the inter-war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: the British press and India, c. 1880-1922 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Bennett, ‘Public communication in crisis.’ 
12 Paul Pickering, ‘Confronting the good monarch: searching for a democratic case for the 
republic’, in Benjamin Jones and Mark McKenna (eds.), Project republic: plans and arguments 
for a new Australia (Australia: Black Inc., 2013), pp. 118-32, pp. 129-31. 
13 John Plunkett, Queen Victoria: first media monarch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
14 Alistair Cooke, Six men (New York: Knopf, 1977), p. 49. 
15 Windsor, A king’s story, p. 279. 
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period, the royal family served as a personable façade for the remote and strategic 
function of the Crown as the apex of Empire governance and executive power.  
By extension, respect for the figure of the monarch also equated to patriotic 
esteem for the nation. Of particular relevance here is Mansergh’s suggestion that, for 
former colonial nations, the division between monarch and Crown can be indistinct, 
with the monarch almost held to be the source of governance. Within the Dominions, 
the appeal is ‘direct and profound’ he explains, and represents ‘something personal and 
intelligible in the elaborate mechanism of government.’16 This resonated in parts of 
Australia. Speaking of the planned festivities for the King’s Birthday public holiday, for 
example, one Brisbane journalist wrote in 1914 that the King’s position above politics 
allowed the people to ‘honour the constitutional system of their own creation … their 
own genius for sound constitutional government.’17  
Bessant suggests that post-Federation Australia’s willingness to accept the royal 
family as a metaphor for the state arose as a result of the widespread if unspoken 
agreement between the government and the imperially orientated organisations and 
societies that patriotic loyalty should be propagated in the public interest.18 As Martin 
Crotty has also argued, the idea of nation rather than God became the most important 
paradigm in 1910s Australian society in response to emerging threats to the Empire.19 
By the end of the nineteenth century, growing German naval power challenged the 
British navy’s northern spheres of influence, leaving the sparsely populated southern 
stretches of the Empire vulnerable to invasion from expansionist Asian countries, 
particularly Japan after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905.20 In a 1909 issue, the School 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth affairs, p. 40. 
17 ‘KING’S BIRTHDAY’, The Telegraph, Brisbane, Qld., 2 June 1914, p. 2. 
18 Bessant, ‘“We just got to look at her”’, pp. 37-38.  
19 Martin Crotty, Making the Australian male: middle-class masculinity 1870-1920 (Carlton 
South, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. 24. 
20 Ibid., p. 25. For further discussion, see Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian 
Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth-Century (Cambridge: 
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Paper fervently assured children that the symbolic might of the Crown could conquer 
all opposition. This power, the author wrote, could be:  
great and far-reaching; and it can act as an almost indispensable 
rallying point among the varying interests of a great empire …[it is] a 
real, vital, and effective part of the constitution by which the unity of 
the British Empire is largely preserved and strengthened, and its 
influence among the nations of the world maintained and enhanced.21  
 
Although the young Prince was certainly by no means as publicly visible or 
revered as his father during the early 1910s, it is against this background and as a result 
of the efforts of educational propagandists of the early decades of the twentieth century 
that he emerged as a person of interest to Australians. He was one figure amid the 
widespread patriotic promotion of the royal family in Australia, notably maintained by 
the celebration of Empire Day from 1905. Considering, as anthropologist Victor Turner 
suggests, ‘a celebratory performance rejoices in the key values and virtues of the society 
that produces it’, these annual events offer some further insight into the place of the 
monarch and their immediate family in Australia’s cultural imagination.22  
Indisputably aligning with Cannadine’s identification of an ‘invented tradition’, 
this celebration of the unity of culture, language and kinship under a common allegiance 
to the Crown was held on Queen Victoria’s birthday, 24 May, and reflected many of the 
themes espoused by the School Paper. The day was observed in varying forms and with 
declining zeal within conservative schools and communities across Australia for over 
half a century until 1958. The height of its appeal coincided with the first decades of the 
twentieth century, at a time when a significant proportion of the population had either 
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been born in England, Ireland, Scotland or Wales or claimed descent therein.23 Intended 
to appeal to both citizens and children, celebrations centred on schools and included the 
recitation of songs, parades, pageants and dances glorifying the power of Empire, 
followed by a half day holiday where sections of the community participated in public 
luncheons, speeches and church services.24  
Participants were supposed to feel proud and grateful for the Empire’s 
continuing constitutional stability, prosperity and progress, and its ready military 
prowess was showcased by the recitation of soldierly rhetoric and displays of military-
style drill performed by schoolchildren. The figure of Queen Victoria, as well as the 
reigning monarch and other members of the royal family, were central to proceedings. 
In Cooma, New South Wales, in 1910, for example, a series of lantern slides were 
shown demonstrating ‘chief incidents’ in the lives of the royal family.25 In North 
Melbourne in 1912, decorative flags and bunting were interspersed with pictures of the 
King and Queen, and at Tunbridge, Tasmania, the local school received a framed 
photograph of the royal family as a memento of the day.26 ‘God Save the King’ and 
‘God save the Prince of Wales’ were among the patriotic songs sung, and children 
dressed as Queen Victoria, Britannia and adopted the national dress of other nations 
within the Empire. Attendees were sometimes given mass-produced keepsakes, 
including medallions depicting the King or Prince of Wales, as a souvenir of the day. 
Image 2  
Not everyone was as enthusiastic. In many ways, Empire Day seemed to 
complicate Australia’s uncertainty over a post-Federation national identity rather than 
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For further discussion, see Beaumont, ‘“Unitedly we have fought”’, p. 400. 
24 For example, ‘EMPIRE DAY’, Examiner, Launceston, Tas., 29 May 1912, p. 6. 
25 ‘Empire Day at Cooma’, The Monaro Mercury, and Cooma and Bombala Advertiser, N.S.W., 
27 May 1910, p. 2. 
26 ‘EMPIRE DAY’, North Melbourne Courier and West Melbourne Advertiser, Vic., 31 May 
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resolving it. When the proposal was first mooted in 1903, prime minister Edmund 
Barton was concerned that the focus on imperialism directly opposed ‘the leaders of 
democracy’, thought and liberty.27 John Griffiths describes the celebration as initially 
something of a ‘political football’ that received varying lukewarm responses and 
provoked controversies across different states.28 The event was opposed to varying 
degrees by Catholics, socialists, nationalists and the labour movement.29 Maurice 
French argues that the strategic propagation of loyalist attitudes was a deliberate ploy on 
behalf of the subsequent government led by prime minister George Reid to avert 
socialism in an era of concern over wider imperial trade and defence.30 A partial 
explanation for the hesitation over Empire Day may also lie in what McKenna has 
broadly identified as a ‘cultural and spiritual’ anxiety over Australia’s intrinsic worth 
without British-derived antecedents.31 
However, what is also clear is that there was nevertheless an underlying body of 
support to the individual figure of the monarch that had little to do with strategic 
imperialism per se, as opposed by Australia’s left-wing or radical bodies. Griffiths, for 
example, shows how some Australians insisted that the day be abandoned in favour of 
the King’s Birthday holiday, in order to mark a continuing allegiance to the monarchy 
in general terms, rather than the federal constraints implied in Australia’s wider loyalty 
to the Empire.32 One writer to the Argus in 1910 suggested Empire Day simply be 
replaced in the calendar by the King’s Birthday public holiday, pointing out that many 
years had elapsed since Victoria’s reign, and that the celebrations could be ‘more 
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Empire Day in New South Wales 1900–1905’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical 
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28 John Griffiths, Imperial culture in Antipodean cities, 1880-1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), p. 154. 
29 French, ‘One People, One Destiny’, p. 245-46.  
30 Ibid., p. 244-45.  
31 McKenna, ‘Monarchy: from reverence to indifference’, p. 272. 
32 Griffiths, Imperial culture in Antipodean cities, p. 155. 
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fittingly done on the King’s birthday, for the King is the real personal head and symbol 
of the Empire.’33 On the other hand, both business owners and citizens alike complained 
about the proliferation of meaningless public holidays on the commercial calendar. 
‘This sort of business is rather overdone in Australia’, one man complained to his son in 
1918.34 
Nevertheless, the centrality of the royal family in pre-war Empire Day 
proceedings was one element of the cultural context that encouraged the participation of 
many Australians in the First World War effort. As Beaumont points out, by 1914 a 
social environment had been created where ‘the language of duty and imperial loyalty 
provided a means whereby many volunteers validated to themselves, and to their 
families, their decision to take an active part in the war.’35 It was within this context of 
de-emphasising the formal observation of the monarch’s constitutional responsibilities 
in favour of their individual merits that the Prince of Wales would come to prominence 
in public life. In a period where the importance of the royals’ inherited role as defenders 
and protectors of the imperial ideal dominated, instead the attraction of Edward’s 
personal qualities would flourish in wartime.  
 
An inspiration for peace 
Of his wartime experience, Edward would later remark that ‘in those four years I found 
my manhood.’36 The war would also powerfully influence the way his public life would 
be perceived by Australians, and from the conflict would emerge some of the most 
persistent narratives spun about his perceived attributes. For Australia’s volunteers to 
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the expeditionary forces, the Empire was the defining motif championed in eloquent 
recruitment addresses across the country. Recruiters maintained that Australians were 
compelled to oppose the German objective of world domination and to loyally bolster 
British forces in support of ‘King and Country.’ Les Carlyon, for example, observes that 
at the onset of war ‘Australians saw themselves as transplanted Britons. A war against 
England was a war against them.’37 Other motivations are more difficult to quantify, 
although many must also have been encouraged by the chance to travel while receiving 
generous pay. Generally Australia’s military involvement in the conflict met minimal 
resistance and only a small number of pacifists and far-left dissenters voiced serious 
objections.38 The response was at first hugely enthusiastic, and over the duration of the 
war, 412,953 men voluntarily enlisted from a population of fewer than five million.39 
Peter Stanley has calculated that so many new volunteers came forward in 1915 that 
their numbers ‘doubled’ the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) as established the previous 
year.40  
However, for some Australians the surge of loyal optimism soon proved 
misguided. Having tasted the reality of warfare, some rapidly voiced disillusionment 
with the patriotic and imperial propaganda that had pervaded their pre-war existence. 
Shortly after the beginning of the war, naval officer Frederick Riley reflected in a letter 
to his wife how: 
When one is at home in the piping times of peace, with wife at side & 
children at knee, to read of war & heroic deeds gives just a needful 
splash of colour to deceive the monotony of slowly passing time; but 
to run up against it actually seems to smack & shatter the mind out of 
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38 Nick Dyrenfurth, Mateship: a very Australian history (Brunswick, Vic.: Scribe, 2015), p. 99. 
39 Figure reproduced in Beaumont, ‘“Unitedly we have fought”’, p. 398. 
40 Peter Stanley, Bad characters: sex, crime, mutiny, murder and the Australian Imperial Force 
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semblance to itself.41 
 
Such opinions were not often voiced publicly in favour of the rhetoric of 
upholding imperial loyalty to mobilise the expeditionary forces. Following reports of 
the Prince’s attempts to contribute to the war effort on the Western Front, many 
Australian journalists took up a romantic view of his character. In January 1915, the 
Maitland Daily Mercury recorded approvingly that this ‘English lad, scarce out of 
boyhood’ was eager to do his duty and have a share in the inevitable victory.42 Although 
Edward was rarely in danger, this perception implicitly assumed that the King had 
chosen to honourably offer up the heir to the throne as a sacrifice for the greater 
imperial good, like so many thousands of Australian families. As the Adelaide Register 
commented in June 1916, the theme of gilded manhood setting off in defence of the 
Empire was as well suited to both prince and commoner:  
The almost unexampled affliction and trial incidental to the war have 
brought the Sovereigns and their children into [an] intimate 
sympathetic relationship with all classes of the King’s subjects: and 
the Prince of Wales … is proving a worthy member of a noble House 
by the way in which he is sharing in the perils and responsibilities of 
the fierce and protracted conflict.43  
 
The Prince’s presence in the theatre of war also garnered attention from 
Australian soldiers. This was, however, a view decidedly less clouded by the desire of 
some sections of the press to promote recruitment and a positive view of the frontlines 
as envisioned in the War Precautions Act of 1914. Edward’s first encounter with the 
Anzacs, then recently evacuated from the scene of a sustained assault on Ottoman forces 
at the Gallipoli peninsula, was during a six-week tour of Egypt between March and May 
1916. He was chaperoned by Colonel Archibald Murray and General William 
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Birdwood, a British Army Officer who had commanded the AIF in Turkey. Here 
Edward inspected troops, hospitals and training facilities in Tel-el-Kabir, Ismailia, 
Khartoum and Serapeum, and reviewed the defence fortifications at the Suez Canal. 
This was the first time that large numbers of young Australians had encountered the 22-
year-old Prince in person, and vice versa. This marked the beginnings of a jocular yet 
disparaging familiarity that would be sustained throughout the war.  
The Prince’s visit came at a highly significant moment in the history of the 
development of Australia’s national identity. Nick Dyrenfurth, for example, points out 
how contemporary observers and politicians firmly identified the scenes of carnage 
throughout the Gallipoli campaign as the ‘real birth’ of the nation. Dyrenfurth explains 
how certain masculine and democratic qualities drawn from anti-authoritarian 
precedents from the colonial bush and goldfields ‘transmuted into the classless Anzac 
fighting for his fellow nationals’ on the First World War battlefields.44 Beaumont also 
identifies 1916 as a critical moment in Australian discourse on imperial loyalty, 
coinciding as it did with further losses on the Western Front, slowing recruitment, and 
the growing debate at home over the obligations of citizenship and by extension military 
service. She points to ‘an explosive mix of anxieties’ including the loss of the fittest 
members of society, industrial disputes over potential military conscription, and the 
notion of soldiers being replaced in the workforce by female or Asian labour.45 As will 
be discussed in greater detail in the following two chapters, Irish Australian apathy for 
imperialism also increased after 1916. 
It is within this turbulent context that the mainstream Australian press’ 
promotion of the figure of the Prince of Wales can be understood. Journalists 
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entertained no doubt over what sort of a man their troops should expect to meet, 
insisting almost universally on the Prince’s unpretentious nature as an asset beyond that 
of his role as his father’s emissary, and a reassuring symbol of forthcoming peace and 
imperial unity. Although accounts of his generosity and desire to remain anonymous in 
public had been reproduced in Australian newspapers from early 1915, it was the Egypt 
visit that heralded the beginnings of domestic Australian perceptions of his personality 
as considerate and self-effacing.46 Edward’s comfortable stay at the British residency, 
tea with the Sultan and chauffeured tours of Cairo were barely mentioned. Instead, The 
North Western Advocate and the Emu Bay Times assured its readers that ‘he lives with 
the army in the simplest manner.’47 The Prince was ‘free from all “side”’ and was 
simply ‘doing his duty at the front in a quiet unobtrusive way’ said one journalist.48 
Edward’s apparent dislike of fuss continued to be a regular topic of interest.49  
This impression was only partially borne out in Egypt. Here the Prince’s 
inexperience in public life became all too evident. Unobtrusiveness and self-effacement 
can all too easily be perceived as timidity or ennui. As one journalist later commented 
apologetically, ‘the Prince’s natural quietness, almost shyness of demeanour, was 
mistaken for kill-joy tendencies by the Australians.’50 The men initially thought him 
‘supercilious’ and ‘superior’, agreed another.51 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that 
his appearance generated a stir in the Australian camps. Everywhere he went, mostly 
appearing unannounced, the Prince produced scenes of huge excitement with soldiers 
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rushing to line the road down which he was travelling.52 Wilfred Allsop noted in his 
diary that Edward’s whereabouts ‘could easily be followed by the intense cheering.’53 
Few wanted to miss out on the spectacle. Another soldier described the vision at 
Serapeum in a letter to his mother: 
The Prince of Wales was flitting about in a launch, and it must have 
been a wonderful sight to see both banks of the Canal lined with 
thousands & thousands of troops. When he first came on the scene, 
the band played the National Anthem, and every soldier stood to 
attention, and they then gave three cheers.54 
 
Archie Barwick was also struck by the enthusiasm with which the Australians 
responded to a surprise visit:  
[Y]ou ought to have seem some of the boys rushing out to have a look 
at him, some with no boots on some without tunics or hats & others 
with just their trousers on I warrant he thought we were a pretty rough 
looking crowd but the boys gave him a good welcome they crowded 
all round him trying to get snapshots with their cameras.55 
 
For at least some men who saw the Prince in Egypt, he assumed the role of 
imperial protector, capable of legitimising and thereby to some degree soothing the 
horrors of war. Morale-raising was, after all, his primary role. General Birdwood 
reportedly ‘did all of the talking’, and the Prince’s duties were largely confined to 
expressing approval of the Australian facilities and sympathy to the wounded.56 At 
times, he fulfilled this role effectively. During the visit to the No. 1 Australian Hospital, 
for example, one soldier recalled how he ‘pleased everyone with his pleasant manner’ 
and seemed eager to exchange at least a few words with every patient in the hospital.57  
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The visit also reportedly resonated with the Prince. Ziegler explains that he was 
at first deterred by the Anzacs’ reputation for drunkenness and indiscipline, but was 
soon impressed by how ‘they have fought so hard and are so keen’, moved by a 
‘‘marvellous imperial spirit’ for they weren’t ‘fighting for themselves or their own 
country either; only for the Empire.’58 Ziegler goes so far as to identify the Egypt visit 
to the Australians as the first time Edward experienced the force of the ‘adulation which 
was so often to be his lot’ over the following decades.59 He quotes a third-hand account 
as enthusing that the Anzacs ‘looked at him so intently they forgot to salute … Some of 
them gazed at him with tears rolling down their cheeks.’60 This depth of emotion is not 
sustained by the archival sources consulted here, although one soldier did remark how 
Edward ‘was good to look upon.’61 
It seems Ziegler’s estimation can be only partially correct. In contrast, the 
Australians’ private letters and diaries reveal their attention to be of a most irreverent 
type. As I will discuss in the following pages, a sudden surge of imperial popular 
adulation of the Prince can be more precisely connected with the Allies’ later 
overwhelming elation following victory and the end of the war. But in 1916, the cheers 
of the Anzacs were most likely in response to the prospect of a high-profile visitor to 
break the monotony of camp life. There was little else to write home about on the banks 
of the Canal. ‘This place gets more monotonous every day’ one private noted glumly.62 
Not everyone approved of the fuss made of the visitors, and some expressed a feeling of 
egalitarian discomfort with the prospect of genuflecting to royalty. The Prince was well-
received, Alan Fry thought, but: 
there was no wild excitement or anything like that. The general 
opinion was that he was “not a bad looking little cove”, and the thing 
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that struck one lad next to me most was the horse he was riding, for he 
turned round to me and said “Cripes! Cobber that’s some neddy 
“Walsee’s” riding isn’t it?” Royalty evidently didn’t trouble him 
much, and though some people may think it rather disrespectful, it 
was not meant in that way at all, as anyone who knows Australians, 
will know. It doesn’t matter a fig to most of them, if it is Royalty or 
anyone else inspecting them; they are not going to run mad with joy 
& make a great fuss just because someone rides through the Camp on 
a horse.63  
 
By all accounts, this ‘flash black horse’ made more of an impression than its 
rider; particularly for the members of the Light Horse who observed that the Prince 
experienced ‘some difficulty in managing his steed.’64 Alfred Bray also admired the 
‘beautiful black charger’ but felt the rush of troops crowding the visitors belied the fact 
that ‘nothing sensational’ was taking place.65 Although the Australians were keen to 
indulge in an opportunity for celebration and a break in routine, they were also 
markedly uncomfortable with the notion that one man should be celebrated over 
another, heir to the throne or no. Charles Bean’s wartime observation that the 
Australians took ‘everything on its merits and nothing on authority’ would appear 
accurate.66  
For some, the desire to enjoy the visit of a ‘celebrity’ in their midst was merely a 
good excuse for high spirits. Accounts of the Egypt trip confirm how ownership of low-
cost basic Kodak cameras allowed soldiers to capture their own mementos of the 
Prince’s journey through the camps, some of which would be sent home to their friends 
and families. ‘Cameras were much in evidence’, recalled Henry Gissing, and ‘at one 
time I counted twenty in a row, altogether there must have been forty, some fellows 
even on the roof, some lurking in the hedges, round corners, out of windows etc. 
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anywhere for a snap.’67 Nurse Edith Thistlethwaite was sympathetic, describing how the 
‘poor little chap had a bad time with the Cameras … [everybody] who had a camera 
tried to get a Snap of him.’68 These attempts to photograph him at every turn could be 
considered a forerunner of the intense attention the Prince would attract at every stage 
of his public life from then on in, but all the same do not go far enough to justify 
Ziegler’s estimation of Australian ‘adulation.’ Image 3 
Celebrity aside, the physicality of the Prince was a particular disappointment. 
On top of their contempt for his poor riding skills, the Australians discovered to their 
surprise that their much-vaulted future King was simply an undistinguished-looking 
youth as could be found on any battlefield. Thistlethwaite was among the kinder 
observers, saying ‘the little Prince is very fair & good looking, but oh, such a boy.’69 
‘He is only a mere boy, as tall as I am’, one soldier echoed in a tone of some 
astonishment to his father.70 ‘He is just like a little girl’, Allan Brown similarly confided 
to his diary.71  
The physical contrast between the slight, pale Prince and the brawny 
Australians, fit from their strenuous activities and deeply tanned from swimming in the 
canal must have been profoundly evident. Taking part in a review some weeks after 
Edward’s visit, George Faulkner observed his peers to be ‘the essence of manhood, men 
well trained & in the pink of condition, tanned with the monotonous heat of the 
desert.’72 It is likely that many also possessed a sense of maturity, a gravity beyond their 
years, at having survived the devastation of Gallipoli. Even so, the Australians may 
have been predisposed to criticism. As Crotty has pointed out, the oft-voiced paradox 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 MLSLNSW, MSS 1845. Entry for 29 March 1916.  
68 MLSLNSW, MSS 7703, Edith Thistlethwaite correspondence. Letter to ‘Belle’ from 
Thistlethwaite, 3 April 1918. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Monty Jones, quoted in ‘ARMIDALE BOY IN EGYPT’, The Tamworth Daily Observer, 
N.S.W., 20 May 1916, p. 6. 
71 MLSLNSW, MSS 17, Allan Dunn Brown diary. Undated entry. 
72 MLSLNSW, MSS 1151, George Redmond Faulkner war diaries. Entry for 25 May 1916.  
	  	   65	  
between the ‘manly Australian and the effeminate Englishman’, and the notion of ex-
British stock thriving in favourable and uncorrupted climatic conditions was one firmly 
in evidence in Australian culture by the end of the nineteenth century.73  
It is therefore unsurprising, perhaps, that the Prince’s unimpressive physique 
was gleefully criticised. As Aubrey Wiltshire pointed out in the wake of his visit, ‘the 
prevailing opinion seems to be one of compassion in his insignificant stature.’74 There 
were ‘great comments about the miserable appearance and physique of the poor little 
Prince of Wales. The feeling of our big men is one of compassion & pity!’75 ‘He is 
rather effeminate looking’, another man wrote to his sister, ‘and seemed to be bashful, 
as he had very little to say.’76 There was no end to the complaints. Still another 
despaired that ‘his walk is execrable & reminded me of an old man walking flat footed 
through a plouged [sic] field.’77 Despite his timid attempts to connect informally with 
Australians, the Prince’s first meeting with them seems to on the whole have fallen flat. 
The soldiers nevertheless relished the ceremony of the occasion, even if he did not. As 
Terence Garling noted in a letter to his parents, at times the Prince ‘seemed exceedingly 
bored.’78  
Australian perceptions did not improve much after the Anzacs were transferred 
to the Western Front. Here they encountered Edward several times in France and 
Belgium with his father and, at times, his brother Prince Albert, during a series of 
reviews intended to boost the tattered morale of the allied troops before they returned to 
the trenches. After the continued onslaught of death and destruction, those who had 
survived were thoroughly disillusioned with the discomfort of their situation and the 
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pre-war propaganda that had motivated them to join the allied war effort. Encounters 
with royalty continued to meet with cynicism. Some Australians were intolerant of 
unearned privileged status and viewed such events as nothing other than posturing. In 
his diary, Frank Weir quoted a censored piece of correspondence that complained about 
the time devoted to polishing equipment and practicing ceremonial routines in case of a 
visit from the King or Prince. ‘What do we want him for, he’s not been fighting & is 
only a man … if the officers aren’t careful there will be a riot’ the unnamed solider 
complained.79 A.W. Ralston described for his father how an inspection by King George 
V entailed a march of up to 18 miles only to be left shivering in the cold for hours: 
We were ordered to parade without coats and nearly froze. The King 
although he had a coat and a closed car looked half frozen and got 
through the job as quickly as possible.80  
 
The sight of the royals was at best uninspiring, the King being ‘not by any 
means a vital personality.’81 A sense of humour was not much in evidence and he failed 
to respond to Australian wayside banter as he passed through their ranks.82 John McRae 
was in the minority when he expressed in April 1917 how the sight of the King during a 
review of troops in England had moved him deeply and restored his conviction about 
his role in the conflict. ‘I now have absolute confidence in England’s King and our 
King, his sad, sweet smile and the tone of his deep voice impressed me greatly, and 
more than ever am I proud to think that I may in my small way help the King & his 
ministers in their “Crusade”’, he wrote in his diary.83 Perceptions of the hapless 
Edward, however, remained consistent. Aubrey Wiltshire, for example, who had first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 MLSLNSW, MSS 1024, Frank Valentine Weir letter diary. Entry for 17 January 1919.  
80 MLSLNSW, MSS 1713, Ralston family correspondence. Letter to ‘Father’ from Ralston, 1 
December 1917. 
81 MLSLNSW, MSS 1887, Charles Harold Peters correspondence. Entry for 27 September 
1916. 
82 ‘War Notes’, The Richmond River Herald and Northern Districts Advertiser, N.S.W., 7 
November 1916, p. 3. 
83 MLSLNSW, MSS 1031, John Duncan McRae diaries. Entry for 17 April 1917. Punctuation in 
original. 
	  	   67	  
been underwhelmed by the Prince in Egypt, two years later still observed merely ‘a 
small pallid youth with a soft petulant face devoid of firmness.’84 During the dismal 
winter of November 1916, another noted simply: ‘saw the Prince of Wales today; he 
looked aggravatingly clean.’85 As the war drew towards its close, McRae’s estimation 
of the irreverent attitudes of his brothers in arms towards royalty is most likely closest 
to the truth. ‘Royalty is by no means universally popular amongst the boys and the 
value of tradition and of traditions’ emblems is not acknowledged generally by 
Australia’s sons’, he acknowledged in his diary.86 
However, Australian perceptions of the Prince of Wales would undergo a major 
transformation as victory became ever more certain and the end of the war approached. 
Pre-war Australian understandings of the division between monarch as an individual 
and monarch as the symbol of the Crown had become even more pronounced. Certainly, 
these two apparently incongruous roles have appeared to long co-exist comfortably in 
an Australian context. As Pickering writes, Australians can demonstrate a ‘long history 
of being able to differentiate institution and individual.’87 The immediate post-war 
period enabled a surge of Australian willingness to approve of the personal 
characteristics of the royals, despite their uncertainty over Australia’s imperial strategy. 
This division is explicit in Bolitho’s 1937 observation that ‘the Australians were loyal 
after the war, but … they had become apathetic about crowns, thrones and all this 
monarchy business.’88  
This gives us some basis to better understand changing Australian perceptions of 
the Prince. In the second half of 1918 he was attached to the Australian corps in 
Belgium before returning to England in early 1919, meaning the opportunities for 
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contact during this critical period of high collective emotion were dramatically 
increased. Aided by the press coverage of the unbridled victory celebrations, it should 
come as no surprise that the sentiment grew all the more persuasive as the British 
monarchy sought to distance themselves from their European cousins and promote their 
democratic appeal in the glow of victory over Germany.  
It is at this point that the Prince of Wales’ persona fully emerges as distinct from 
that of his father and he began to embody positive qualities of particular resonance to 
Australians. Several of Edward’s biographers have made note of this but none have 
examined these qualities in detail. Bolitho claimed that the Prince liked the directness of 
‘the people of the new country, who dealt in neither compliments nor idle words.’89 
Donaldson later agreed that the Prince’s personality was particularly in tune with ‘a 
philosophy they [the Dominion soldiers] cherished deeply’, but she also asserts that his 
presence counteracted in some way ‘the sense of uncertainty and insecurity inevitably 
felt by the citizens of these aggressively young countries.’90 This explanation falls far 
short of adequately explaining the dynamics within the relationship or allowing for the 
presence of distinct Australian cultural aspirations. More perceptively, Cooke points to 
the Prince as having successfully promulgated his only two assets: firstly the ‘royal 
respectability’ of his forebears, tempered by his own particular sense of ‘fun and 
mischief’, the latter having particular resonance with Australians.91 This seems most 
plausible, with this post-war shift in attitudes towards the Prince suggesting that 
Australian soldiers sought in their future leader the democratic qualities most prized 
amongst themselves. 
Certainly, the evidence for the genuine and ever-growing appeal of the Prince’s 
down-to-earth qualities with ordinary people in the immediate post-war period is 
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persuasive. The elation of victory promoted a surge of support for the Empire with the 
Prince as its figurehead for the new post-war age. The symbol of the monarch as the 
figurehead of Empire provided some solace to some of the bereaved, although doubtless 
many felt their convictions sorely tested. The grieving parents of Terence Garling, the 
soldier who had observed the Prince’s boredom in Egypt in 1916, felt able to tell the 
King that they had found ‘a silver lining to the cloud’ of their son’s death in the 
knowledge that he had ‘given his life fighting for all that is good among Nations – the 
preservation of the British Empire.’92 Whereas during the misery of wartime, contact 
with the royals made little impression on Australians disillusioned with the imperial 
cause and hostile to the inherent inequality in privileging one man over another, these 
perceptions would be largely overturned. Bolitho’s perception that the Prince fulfilled 
an emotional need by the people of the Empire in the widespread devastation that 
followed is insightful. ‘The Prince of Wales soon became a public hero and a lion’, he 
explains, noting that Edward’s supposed empathy ‘satisfied the public craving for 
peaceful chivalry, to take the place of the filth and misery of war.’93  
The change coincided almost exactly with the Armistice at the end of 1918. For 
example, although the absolute veracity of such tales should be viewed with suspicion, a 
story recounted for its readers by the Adelaide Daily Herald exemplifies the ways the 
Prince supposedly demonstrated empathy and consideration for ordinary people in a 
way quite different to his distant father. It began much like A.W. Ralston’s sorry tale of 
men parading without coats in the rain as the King passed by snug in his coat and closed 
car, but in the case of this Christmas 1918 visit the Prince reportedly ‘instantly took off 
his own coat and insisted on seeing proceedings through without any protection from 
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the weather. He got wet through like the troops on parade.’94 Such narratives 
encouraged perceptions of his character as classless, sympathetic and democratic. ‘He 
not only saw and heard but he felt and shared’, Verney would later assert in 1928.95 
Whether the Prince deserved this altruistic accolade remains uncertain, although Cooke, 
otherwise a fairly critical observer, nonetheless believed that he ‘felt a genuine 
obligation to the men he had seen in the trenches.’96 By all accounts this persona held 
great sway. By March 1919, a South Australian woman writing to her friend of an 
enthusiastic meeting between Australian soldiers and the Prince at the Army and Navy 
Leave Club in Paris was confident that ‘after such a scene as that, no one need think that 
our British throne is tottering. The Army simply worships the Prince.’97 
Suddenly, the Prince’s personality was intrinsically in tune with favourable 
aspects of Australian identity. Some estimation of why this might be can be gleaned 
from accounts of the victory celebrations held in London throughout 1919. Drawing on 
contrasts between the men of the Dominion forces observed when gathered together, the 
Tweed Daily of November 1919 helpfully outlined for its readers the aspects perceived 
as unique to the Australian forces that rendered them distinct to those of the other 
Dominions. As to their appearance, the Australians were ‘tall, lithe, clean-limbed … 
wearing a smile that was easily the first cousin to a grin.’ Their temperament reflected 
their upbringing in ‘an atmosphere of freedom and unrestraint’, and a dislike of ‘swank, 
form and snobbery.’ The Australian, it asserted, was always ready to make friends, and 
the Prince ‘one of the very first notable Englishmen to understand the Australians as 
Australians.’98 Accounts such as this make it clear that the figure of the Prince had been 
firmly incorporated within the redolent culture of mythmaking surrounding the 
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emergence of a distinct Australian cultural identity in the immediate post-war period. 
As Crotty has explained, the manliness of the Australian ‘Diggers’ was held to 
demonstrate how by the end of the war ‘the nation’s sons, and by extension the nation 
itself, were worthy and unaffected by the convict stain and the allegedly degenerative 
effects of the Australian climate and modern civilisation.’99 The Prince was no longer 
seen as aloof, bored or effeminate but expanded to fit the Australians’ ideals for 
manhood: confident, engaged and masculine.  
His shyness in Egypt was quickly forgotten. For example, the Geelong 
Advertiser in May 1919 recounted for its readers a tale of an encounter between the 
Prince and a crowd of ‘cobbers’ in London. ‘He would easily pass for an Australian in 
his speech and manner. He has none of the “haw-haw” business of the usual English 
officer, but is quite natural all the time’ said one.100 Several years of experience in the 
public eye had dispelled Edward’s nervousness at being the focus of so much attention. 
He received ‘all the evidences of his great popularity with the characteristic impassivity 
of the soldier, but a quick eye could detect the manifest pleasure in his face’ an observer 
recorded.101 He was even forgiven his poor physique. Writing of a march past 
Buckingham Palace in March 1919, one soldier offered a reassessment of the Prince’s 
masculinity in the first flush of victory and amid cheering crowds. ‘The Prince is a 
paradox. He retains his extremely youthful look, but almost everyone noticed that he 
had acquired a very manly appearance.’102 It is fair to say that the championing of these 
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sympathetic and democratic qualities coincide precisely with broader aspirations of an 
Australian national character – courage, mateship and larrikin independence - that were 
seen to have been made manifest on the battlefields and ever since have been seen as 
arguably central to national identity.103 Image 4 
For his part, the Prince perceived the Australians as ‘a tough, independent yet 
sensitive people, proud of what they had accomplished on their island continent and 
quick to take offence.’104 Crotty argues that by 1920, the Australian male was judged by 
‘physical strength, patriotism, military usefulness, and ultimately, his worthiness as a 
member of the nation and empire.’105 Such qualities served as a barricade against 
anxieties concerning the shape of the world to come, and, critically, become from this 
point on synonymous with the Prince of Wales. According to the press at least, 
Australian soldiers were quick to claim Edward for their own with the affectionate 
nickname ‘the Digger Prince’ from early 1919.106 Although not used in wartime, this 
now brought the Prince within the ranks of spontaneous and unaffected soldiers, binding 
him within their collective experience of the conflict, rather than a man apart in his 
lonely position as the heir to the throne.  
Coming into being with the Armistice, mythical Australian perceptions of the 
Prince as a democratic, un-ceremonial and masculine Digger would only become more 
powerful prior to his arrival in Australia for the royal tour of 1920. Writing in Sydney 
that year, the myth had firmly persuaded the Rev. Frank Swyny, who offered some 
further insights into what he perceived to be the Australian national character in the 
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pages of The Methodist.107 He argued that during the war the Prince embodied qualities 
beyond those expected of the monarch as the constitutional exemplar, extending 
Australian affection for what he called ‘the monarchical idea as it commends itself to 
the more advanced democracies of the Dominions.’ These advancements he allied with 
favourable Australian conditions including an unspoilt ‘virgin’ countryside, greater 
franchise equality, the socially advantageous aspects of industrialisation and the lack of 
an inherited ‘feudal landlordism.’ This last element was of particular relevance to 
Swyny, who explained that: 
The average Australian despises servility and affectation … the 
universal affection in which he [the Prince] is held by the soldiers 
speaks volumes. No man who failed to evidence the qualities of a 
winning personality, manliness, and good fellowship, could have 
made good, as young Edward has done, with our men.108 
 
The development of the popular façade of the Prince of Wales during the First 
World War underscored the supportive attitudes of everyday Australians towards the 
democratisation of the monarchy by the time of the royal tour of 1920. Bolitho also 
credits the beginnings of this relationship as significant for the future King, arguing that 
the Anzacs’ ‘vitality and frankness’ prompted a new interest in the people of the 
Dominions, which would inform his future duties as his ‘father’s greatest 
ambassador.’109 The royal family emerged from the conflict with their popularity and 
prestige largely intact, and in command of their individuality as a tool of perpetuating 
rule across a newly fragmented Empire. By any estimation, the establishment of a 
particular Australian affection would serve the ‘dinkum Digger’ well in the immediate 
post-war period.110  
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A modern exemplar  
If the end of the war in 1918 had set the stage for the myths spun around the Prince’s 
masculine and leadership qualities, these would only go from strength to strength before 
reaching their zenith during his royal tour of 1920. Original sources from this short but 
heady time also reveal the existence of other overlapping sub-themes that were inherent 
in expectations for the Prince’s public life, newly minted as the ideal Australian male. 
Edward emerges as a bastion of racial strength, dynastic continuity and protection; an 
idea in reality almost comically at odds with the genetic abnormalities and inferior 
physique characteristic of his European-derived pedigree. This in turn illuminates 
longstanding contemporary social concerns over white dominance within the Empire 
following the devastation of war. In July 1920, for example, the Adelaide Register drew 
superlatively upon the themes of youth and renewal in homage to the Prince as the 
symbol of ‘a proud virile old nation for ever [sic] renewing its youth.’111 As McKenna 
has observed, the monarch’s position as ‘the pinnacle of racial identity’ underscores 
white racial superiority, the protection of racial equality and continued imperial 
expansion into the future.112 These concerns also registered unambiguously in Verney’s 
estimation of the Prince’s global popularity by 1928:  
He is talked of in places where the Great War was never more than a 
vague rumour. On the n.w. frontier of India I have seen the eyes of a 
wild Afghan gleam with interest at the mention of his name. A group 
of naked Barotse hunters around a campfire in the basin of the 
Zambesi invited me to applaud a legend of his hunting prowess. I saw 
his photograph hanging in the mud hut of a Dinka chief in the Soudan. 
I could have bought picture postcards of him in most of the bazaars of 
Egypt. I once heard some river arabs discussing him fantastically on a 
Tigris mahalla.113 
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The youthful Prince embodied hope for the future, and became identified with 
wider social values, most notably the at times paradoxical relationship between 
nationalism and imperial loyalty. As McKenna puts it ‘if being Australian meant being 
of white British stock, then the best way to nurture Australian sentiment was to maintain 
the connection with the protective fountain of that racial stock.’114 The unmistakeably 
delicate English appearance of the supposedly vivacious Edward may also have been a 
reassuring beacon of continuity in an uncertain world where eugenicists foretold of the 
extinction and dilution of racial characteristics.  
This was by no means a new anxiety; expectations of citizenship were 
powerfully gendered during the early decades of the twentieth century, alongside a 
reported decline in the birth rate and the formal implementation of the exclusive 1901 
White Australia settlement policy. In 1912, for example, the Labor government 
instituted a £5 maternity allowance payable to European mothers only.115 As Marina 
Larsson has shown, the robustness of the Australian stock became subject to increasing 
post-war scrutiny as eugenicists feared that the ‘unfit’ were breeding out the ‘fit.’116 
After the end of the war, the perceived threat to racial continuity became more acute, 
given that the ‘most virile and most productive’ had supposedly been lost through death 
or permanent disability.117 The reproductive aspect of marriage loomed large in post-
war Australian imaginations, and so too did personal re-evaluations of what this meant 
in an everyday sense. The pool of marriageable men had shrunk, and women 
outnumbered men.118 Many questioned the established template for marriage as critical 
to the maintenance of the birth rate, and some advocated for artificial insemination and 
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a culture of celibate motherhood as an alternative method of ensuring racial 
continuation.119  
Later, during the 1920s this threat would also be clearly discernible in the 
fostering of agricultural and nation-building skills that furthered the government’s geo-
political ambitions, and countered concerns over Australia’s isolated and unprotected 
position within the Empire. As well as physical prowess and whiteness, potential settler 
families were also expected to possess certain desirable personal qualities: steadiness, 
affability, traditional morality and a work ethic. 
Within this climate, the Prince’s virility and reproductive capabilities were 
increasingly of interest to Australians. This is not to say that there had not been for 
many years great curiosity concerning who, and most important when, he would marry 
and secure the divine right of succession to his offspring. From the earliest years of his 
public life, his marriage was perceived by many Australians as a critical element in the 
success of his future Kingship. For example, despite his tender years, the Mackay Daily 
Mercury of October 1911 saw fit to fret over the apparent lack of a suitable royal 
Princess to be found within the European dynasties.120 Not to be defeated, the Perth 
Daily News of the following month took on the guise of matchmaker, devoting several 
columns to a list of prospective princesses, finishing as a last resort with those of minor 
dynastic worth ‘in a sort of subsidiary list.’ It remarked, erroneously as it turned out, 
that Edward could easily insist on some flexibility in his marriage choice if he wanted 
to, as ‘reasons of state prevail only to a certain extent.’121  
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By early 1915 German heiresses were definitively excluded from the running 
and it was rumoured he had settled on marrying one of the four daughters of Tsar 
Nicholas II.122 By the end of that year the notion of the Prince marrying a British 
aristocrat, ‘or even a commoner’ had been mooted as a reasonable alternative to 
continuing to broker alliances with the European royal dynasties.123 The abandonment 
of dynastic marriage, enforced by the dissolution of the Russian, German and Austro-
Hungarian thrones by 1917-18, was one element in the post-war reinvention of the 
British royal family. Hayden has shown how the supposed relaxation of the royal 
family’s attitudes towards strategic alliances reflects instead one aspect of a larger and 
deliberate process of transformation of the Germanic house of Hanover to the newly 
English Windsor.124 King George V replaced the family’s grand Germanic titles with a 
new invented tradition of English names. Royal status was not automatically conferred 
to those outside the uppermost tier of the family. The pre-war associations with German 
princesses became distant memory as British non-royals were encouraged as suitable 
prospective partners for the first time.125 
Nonetheless, in the immediate post-war period, Edward seemed manifestly 
unaware of the importance of maintaining his bloodline, and instead appeared to be 
embracing head on all elements of post-war modernity. There was a discernible sense of 
optimism surrounding the Prince’s public life in the post-war period that underpinned 
his suitability as a role model for a young, racially distinct, modern Australian identity. 
Jill Matthews identifies ‘modernity’ as encompassing a pantheon of social changes 
including urban redevelopment, innovative machinery, increased female freedom, the 
emergence of leisure time, and international markets, casual fashions and irreverent 
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cultural influences.126 In this case, Edward’s known penchant for violent sports, 
socialising, the most casual and flashy of fashions, motor cars and airplanes, and his 
dislike of red carpets, hats and other monarchical trappings marked him as an exemplar 
of progressive and acquisitive modernity. Image 5 
This casualness was an aspect of his persona frequently repeated in cheap and 
plentiful Australian newspapers, pictorials and magazines, themselves heralds of 
modernity. ‘The spirit of youth and buoyant outlook on life have an infectiousness and 
romantic charm when carried by somebody who is destined to grace the greatest throne 
in history’, observed the Adelaide Register indulgently.127 From the early years of the 
twentieth century, modernity also manifested itself in radio and cinematographic 
technologies, also part of the media pantheon embraced by the newly visible British 
monarchy.128 As Linkoff describes, this literally offered ‘a new way of seeing the 
monarchy.’129 Following on from Queen Victoria’s cosy but deliberately crafted scenes 
of domesticity, journalists were producing casual and candid images that revealed 
moments of introspection and aspects of royal private life not normally seen beyond the 
rendering of births, marriages and other rites of passage. In short, by 1920, Edward 
appeared to have achieved the most desirable combination of personal appeal and 
capable leadership as a role model for the younger generations at a time of great 
change.130 His disinclination to abandon bachelorhood was fondly tolerated by his 
admirers while he was a young man in his twenties and thirties but, as later chapters will 
discuss, became a point of contention as he grew closer to ascending the throne.  
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A member of the family 
With the idealisation of the Prince’s marriage in mind, further connection can be made 
between the supposed domestic aspirations of the royal family and the corresponding 
private ambitions of the everyday Australian population, who looked to the monarch as 
a familial role model. There had been a gap of almost two decades between the royal 
Federation tour of 1901 and the Prince’s arrival in 1920. Interested Australians at home 
had been able to follow the royal family’s public life in the intervening years via the 
press, but unlike the troops in wartime Egypt and France, had not seen them in person. 
Accordingly, some people practised other ways of celebrating and perpetuating the 
figure of the monarch in an everyday domestic sense.  
Firstly, even for those uninterested in far-away royals, their image was 
pervasive. As well as through owning copies of official portraits, Australian admirers 
were most familiar with representations of royalty through the multitude of 
commemorative objects on which their portraits appeared. The King, Queen and their 
children materialised, sometimes incongruously, on a range of household objects 
including tea-sets, gossip magazines, toiletries and other perishable goods. Portraits 
were hung in schools, businesses and municipal centres. Commercial vendors traded 
loosely on associated phrases such as ‘royal’ or ‘princely’, or used illustrated portraits 
vaguely reminiscent of the royals to sell a range of goods intended for men, women and 
children. Believing that the royal tour of 1920 would ‘mark an epoch in our national 
history’, the W.H. Paling Company suggested that customers also ‘mark an epoch in 
your home life by buying a player piano.’131 The proliferation of material culture and 
ephemera available also allowed Australians to become familiar with the multitude of 
royal weddings, births, christenings and other rites of passage reported on in the British 
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press. Central to theatricalities such as weddings, accessions and royal tours was the 
manufacture and appropriation of royal-themed flags, banners, pins, commemorative 
medals, fancy dress costumes, pictorial programs and other souvenirs. McKenna 
identifies such souvenirs as the ‘building blocks’ in the construction of common feeling 
towards the monarchy.132 Image 6 
By purchasing and displaying a souvenir, patrons were firstly identifying 
themselves within a community of like-minded loyalists, and also retaining a memento 
of the day or event as a keepsake. A.J. Morison, a South Australian clerk, wrote to the 
prime minister in 1920 in the hope of adding to his ‘large collection from all parts’ of 
royal-themed ephemera, having been collecting for almost 20 years since the royal visit 
of 1901. Perhaps over-optimistically, Morison requested copies of ‘all the invitation 
cards, including menu cards, ball programmes etc., issued by the Commonwealth 
Government for functions.’133 The collectors’ gaze was not confined only to officially 
produced mementoes; almost anything related could be perceived as valuable. In a tone 
of outrage, the Melbourne Argus reported how in New Zealand in 1920 prior to the 
Prince’s arrival in Australia, souvenir hunters ‘took possession of everything that was 
removable’ following a people’s supper at Wanganui, including four silver vases, 400 
cups and saucers, 120 yards of blue and gold ribbon and a three-tier cake.134  
By purchasing these familiar domestic objects to bring into the home as a 
keepsake or functional object, these ‘popular monarchists’ perpetuated a warm and 
friendly interest in the far-away doings of the royal family.135 In 1936, Kathleen 
Stephen, for example, recalled fondly how as a child all the members of the royal family 
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were ‘familiar to me by sight’, and in later life held a ‘warm place in my heart and 
memory.’136 The concentration and repetition of royal cinematographic and visual 
imagery served to firmly establish the familiarity of members of the royal family in both 
a domestic and community context. For some soldiers who laid eyes on the Prince of 
Wales during wartime, it was as if they were recognising an old acquaintance. ‘I would 
know him from his photo anywhere’, George Faulkner remarked in 1916.137 Another 
recalled the appearance of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace in 1919 as ‘a 
moment I had always long [sic] for, to see the King and Queen in the flesh, as I had so 
often seen them in the Pictures.’138 Others wrote of the remarkable and ‘beautiful’ sight 
to their children, for whom visits to England were synonymous with seeing the royals in 
person. ‘Fancy yesterday I saw the King, Queen, Prince of Wales, & Princess Mary’, 
wrote Arthur Burrowes to his young daughter from London.139 These friendly 
impressions of the royal family were not based on reality but created through experience 
of numerous visual types of representation. 
A large body of work agrees that such representations and reminders of royalty 
have long been manipulated to control particular social tensions and inspire certain 
loyalties.140 By virtue of this perceived familiarity, the post-war Prince of Wales 
functioned as a foil for Australian imagining, assured by most sources of his affability, 
domesticity and empathy. In part, this can be attributed to the long-standing and familiar 
presence of the royal family. The familiarity of the Prince across the Dominions may 
also be a symptom peculiar to the press attitudes of the age. In his study of Edward’s 
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public persona in Britain, Mort credits the onslaught of press and newsreel journalism 
that accompanied royal tours as having loosened Edward from both the ‘ritualised 
pomp’ and ‘highly conventional representations of domesticity’ common to previous 
monarchs, giving him more malleable and accessible public profile.141 This seems also 
true for Australia, meaning it may be that Australians hoped to find, or at least were 
more readily able to identify points of commonality with their own lives.  
Moral integrity was a critical element in the construct of post-war ideal 
Australian masculinity, and extending beyond expectations for the Prince’s reproductive 
capabilities, can also be discerned in Australian attitudes to his private life. As later 
chapters will discuss in greater detail, the abdication would reveal a deep divide in 
Australian attitudes towards the relationship between public responsibility and private 
life, specifically the characteristics of a successful marriage. Popular expectations of 
royal behaviour in private life lend useful insight into broad cultural changes that 
coincide with changing attitudes towards individual freedoms during the immediate 
post-war era. Frank Bongiorno, for example, has identified more permissive inter-war 
understandings of sexuality and a revolt in some quarters against the traditional morals 
associated with ‘Victorianism.’142 This turn from communitarian values was shaped by 
a number of social factors, including protestations over sexual double standards in 
married life, the economic breakdown of the Depression, the changing composition and 
roles of individuals within the family unit, and growing fears over the fragility of the 
Australian stock. Freedom to vote and work in a professional capacity had also 
contributed to some extent to the emancipation of Australian women. 
If on one hand inter-war Australians were questioning the fundamentals 
underpinning married and family relations, they were also aware of their formal public 
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cessation. Drawing its legislative basis from British (primarily English) law, Australia’s 
colonial familial model hardly differed from its precedent. Later, as Ailsa Burns 
explains, the cost of dissolving a marriage between the wars limited its legalities to 
wealthy Australians, and so it may be that many other couples simply quietly separated, 
thus avoiding the social stigma attached.143 This remains difficult to quantify as it was 
not until 1947 that the then Bureau of Census and Statistics included ‘married but 
permanently separated’ as a category.144 Divorce may have been the last resort for 
separated individuals who wished to remarry, and was only awarded along certain 
protracted grounds and heard only in the Supreme Court.  
Nonetheless, divorce was irrefutably on the rise. In 1920 there were 1148 
divorce cases recorded nationally, and this had more than doubled to 2424 by 1935.145 
The changing cultural context may be attributable for changing patterns of behaviour 
and attitudes. Of the colonial period, Henry Finlay points to a ‘degree of rootlessness in 
the Australian population … the migratory propensities around the continent … the 
relatively high rate of desertions’ as allowing for a more sympathetic view of divorced 
individuals.146 By the end of the war, Larsson suggests that an increase in the 
breakdown of marriage can be attributed to aspects of post-war life such as disability, 
prolonged separation, adultery, desertion and venereal disease.147  
The divide in the social response can be exemplified by the opposing view of 
long-serving Supreme Court judges John Barry and Owen Dixon. The latter insisted on 
a strict view of the marital oath and social responsibility, while the former wished the 
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law to provide for the social ills occasioned by violence and private hardship.148 On one 
hand, inter-war conservative commentators were eager to preserve the social status quo 
from perceived moral ruin and ultimate collapse. James Duhig, the Archbishop of 
Brisbane, for example, in 1925 warned his parishioners against a ‘terrible invasion of 
Australia by a multiplicity of highly immoral influences’, which he identified as the 
‘unpermitted liberty’ of young people, dancing halls, drinking, attending races, 
gambling, the use of motor cars for ‘night excursions’ and so on. Duhig equated the 
reality of divorce with the breakup of ‘hundreds of families’, also condemning the 
offspring of divorced parents to be forever stigmatised and ‘sent adrift.’149  
On the other hand, Bongiorno also identifies an inter-war turn to sexual 
modernity and increasing emphasis on individual happiness that served to redefine 
marriage as an affinity based on love and pleasure.150 In the British context, Mort too 
has observed that by the 1930s, citizenship encompassed a ‘rich interiorised 
subjectivity’ and aspirations of ‘companionable marriage based on heterosexual 
mutuality and by an accessible ideal of conjugal human love.’151 Certainly, a growing 
insistence on the rights of the individual can be discerned in published opinion that 
coincides with the rise of the Prince’s public life. The International Socialist of 1918, 
for example, aspired to marriage ‘only when there is an affinity.’152  
More than anything else, social concerns over the Prince’s domestic life and 
projections therein have the potential to lend important insight into the emotional lives 
of observers. A few years later in 1921, a writer to the Geelong Advertiser rejected the 
idea that it was ‘looseness and degradation’ that contributed to increasing instances of 
divorce, but instead pointed to a trend whereby unhappy marriages were brought ‘out 
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into the open and have done with it.’ Instead of suffering within an unhappy 
relationship, men and women had discovered the ‘right to love and be loved’, they 
continued. ‘They are becoming less and less afraid of asserting it … they all use the 
same kind of language’ asserting a claim to private happiness.153 As will be shown in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, these two sharply divided views of the rights of the individual to 
pursue happiness and their obligations as citizens would be most sharply etched during 
the crux of the abdication.  
This chapter accounted for the changing nature of Australian attraction to the 
Prince of Wales from before the First World War and over the following years 
preceding the royal tour of 1920. The novel situation created by the global devastation 
resulted in a range of new invented traditions specific to the public life of the popular 
Prince of Wales. Four main qualities, or roles, are often repeated throughout popular 
and private sources dating to this time period. These reflect distinct idealised masculine 
perceptions of Edward as a symbol of the Crown, as an inspiration for peace, as a 
modern exemplar and as a member of the family. Although during wartime the future 
King fell far short of prevalent ideals of masculinity and leadership, his unimpressive 
persona was almost instantly adapted within a pervasive myth that arose alongside the 
Armistice. The figure of the ‘Digger Prince’ grew in stature and symbolism, 
establishing an emotional connection with Australian troops that would set the scene for 
his royal tour of 1920. By the inter-war period, the monarch-to-be’s personal qualities 
became a critical aspect of how Kingships were publicly performed. As we will see, the 
preparations for the proposed tour of 1920 that ensued from early 1919 in both Britain 
and Australia aimed to further safeguard and promote these qualities to the Empire.  
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Chapter 2: The Empire’s salesman 
 
Gifted with all the needs of thriving man … He can realise our “ideal” 
plan. 
-William Watson Boyes, 1920.1 
 
Edward’s tour of the country between May and August 1920 would mark royalty’s 
fourth visit to Australia. Regularly enacted since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the royal tour has long been a marker of continuity in Australia’s relationship with the 
British monarchy. The royal family across generations recognised the need to be seen in 
all parts of the Empire, in the same way as they toured to regional areas of Britain. With 
the turn of the twentieth century, this became more logistically possible given 
developing seafaring and railway technologies. Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh, 
was the first member of the royal family to visit Australia in 1867, and then the 
adolescent Princes George and Albert Edward in 1881. In 1901, Albert Edward, the 
then Prince of Wales, and his wife Alexandra had planned to visit Australia to take part 
in the Federation celebrations but were replaced following the death of Queen Victoria 
by their son, the adult Prince George and his wife Mary, then the Duke and Duchess of 
Cornwall and York.  
Some nineteen years later, as this chapter will discuss, their son Edward’s 1920 
visit would take place amid the transformed cultural circumstances generated by the 
First World War. Here, the political strategy behind the tour of ‘the Empire’s salesman’ 
emerges most compellingly in contrast with all that had gone before.2  
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The British preparations 
Pre-war Australian newspapers reveal that a royal visit by the Prince had been rumoured 
for many years. A decade before Edward eventually set foot on Australian soil, the 
Adelaide Evening Journal of January 1910 announced that the young Princes Edward 
and Albert were to embark on an Empire-wide tour the following year, conveyed from 
port to port by battleship.3 The ‘royal tourists’ were to be shown the far reaches of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India in a manner reminiscent of 
their father’s 1881 cruise, ostensibly to further their naval training and to introduce 
them to the disparate peoples of the Empire. No confirmation eventuated, but in 
September 1913 the Adelaide Advertiser further plied its readers with rumours from 
London that the Princes, by then 19 and 18-years-old respectively, were to embark on a 
tour of the Dominions in 1915.4 This time, the purpose of the visit, the journalist 
explained, was for the visiting royals to fulfil a token constitutional role; to open the 
first session of federal Parliament to take place in the fledgling city of Canberra. When 
asked for comment, prime minister Joseph Cook reportedly merely smiled at the 
suggestion that Parliament House would have sufficiently advanced beyond its 
foundation stones by 1915.5 
As it turned out, the onset of war would overturn much more than the plans for 
Canberra’s Parliament House. Proposals for a royal tour were revived following the 
Armistice and Imperial Conferences, and the notion of a grand, convivial but transient 
tour encompassing all the Dominions collectively was abandoned in favour of 
individual extended visits. From this point onwards, the Prince’s projected tour became 
an instrument of policy intended to rally popular support for imperialism. The timing of 
any such visit was critical. As the King’s Private Secretary, Lord Stamfordham, later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘ROYAL TOURISTS’, Evening Journal, Adelaide, S.A., 6 January 1910, p. 2. 
4 ‘PRINCE OF WALES’, The Advertiser, Adelaide, S.A., 11 September 1913, p. 19. 
5 Ibid. 
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confided to the Australian Governor-General, Ronald Crauford Munro Ferguson, ‘the 
psychological moment for these visits is as soon as possible after the return of the troops 
to the different dominions.’6 This comment stemmed from the British government’s 
desire to capitalise on the wave of imperial unity and collective pride in the Allies’ 
achievement that followed victory. The Catholic Press of June 1920, for example, 
quoted the speech made by Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the 
House of Lords on the future modes of consultation between the Dominions. Here he 
urged that ‘the splendid harmony existing in wartime was not to be frittered away in 
peace time’ and that a formal policy on communication would prevent the Dominions 
from separating and ‘going different roads even without knowing it.’7 This hopeful 
sentiment had been previously echoed by the King in a wartime speech to troops. The 
Germans had set out to ‘smash the British Empire! - smash it to pieces - and look, just 
look … see what they’ve really done. They’ve made an Empire of us’, he claimed.8  
This rallying call may be considered alongside Piers Brendon and Philip 
Whitehead’s observation that the post-war Empire’s ‘drumbeat sounded louder’ as its 
power was threatened.9 The British powers’ desire for renewed imperial cohesion aimed 
to offset other perceived dangers to be found within this flexible relationship between 
imperialist fervour and growing Dominion nationalism. It is within this state of flux that 
the Anzacs’ seemingly spontaneous alignment of Edward’s post-war persona alongside 
newly conceived Australian national identities, as established in the previous chapter, is 
better understood. As Beaumont has explained, the increased nationalistic sentiment 
that arose with the war ‘did not eclipse imperial loyalty. Rather, national pride was 
subsumed into the imperial imagining which remained, in public discourse at least, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 NLA, MS 696/509, Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson papers. Letter to Munro Ferguson from 
Stamfordham, 9 December 1919.  
7 ‘IMPERIALISM AND BIGOTRY’, The Catholic Press, Sydney, N.S.W., 24 June 1920, p. 27. 
8 Quoted by John Monash, 30 September 1916, himself quoted in ‘Back to 1914-18 With Sir 
John Monash’, The Queenslander, Brisbane, Qld., 20 December 1934, p. 19. 
9 Brendon and Whitehead, The Windsors, p. 121. 
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dominant value.’10 By the end of the war, she argues, the nation emerged ‘in many cases 
more independent and self-consciously Australian but still proudly British.’11 In no 
uncertain terms, these ideological concerns amid the jubilation of victory were writ 
large in the transformation of the Prince of Wales’ wartime persona.  
However, as Milner and many at the British government’s London Colonial 
Office feared, the turmoil could potentially alter or disperse Dominion loyalties in other, 
as yet uncertain, ways. It is likely that Stamfordham’s urgent percipience was justified. 
For example, Renee Lockwood identifies one of victory’s most pivotal aspects as ‘the 
sense it created of breaking away from the British’, marking a definitive end to 
Australia’s colonial history, and the beginning of a newly independent era drawing on 
previously unrecognised skills and strengths. The bravery and power of the Anzac 
soldiers, she observes, was held by contemporary commentators to exceed that of the 
British.12 These characteristics were also applicable to the rebirth of the nation-state 
itself, meaning that this growing self-confidence and assertion could have been 
perceived in London as prompting profound reappraisals of Australia’s continuing 
loyalty to Britain. As this chapter will go on to discuss, Australian supporters of 
imperialism at home were both elated by victory yet profoundly divided over the 
nation’s contribution to the conflict and its future strategic direction.  
Accordingly, the idea of a substantial tour of Australia by the Prince of Wales 
was planned following the signing of the Armistice. Rumours reached the Australian 
press but were again denied in Parliament in December 1918.13 Instead, Admiral Lord 
John Jellicoe, commander of the British fleet, was dispatched in early 1919, ostensibly 
to gather information for a naval policy review but also to encounter Australians in an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Beaumont, ‘“Unitedly we have fought”’, p. 399. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Lockwood, ‘The Great War, the Soldier and the Holy ANZAC Spirit’, pp. 122-23.  
13 Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Debates’, 19 December 1918, p. 9820. 
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attempt to instil public pride in imperial war heroes and the protective power of the 
British navy over Australian interests. The visit was underwhelming for some. The 
veteran labour-movement publicist Henry Boote, for example, viewed it as nothing 
more than an attempt to impress ‘upon us how pleasant it would be to wear the gilded 
chains of subservience’, remarking that Australia took such visits ‘coolly.’14 
Nevertheless, Munro Ferguson was convinced that the visit had been a tremendous 
success (‘no man could be better fitted than Lord Jellicoe to ‘star it’ round the Empire’), 
although he also lamented that ‘the appearance amongst us of such men is so 
uncommon.’15  
Happily he did not have long to wait for the arrival of another. Rumours 
concerning a possible forthcoming visit of the Prince of Wales, accompanied once again 
by General Birdwood, would not be quelled.16 Although this inspired pairing would not 
ultimately be realised, it was nonetheless the first indication of the militaristic agenda 
that would pervade the tour that eventuated. The flames of rumour were fanned again in 
mid-1919 when Edward casually remarked to a gathering of Australians at the Aldwych 
Y.M.C.A. in London that he hoped to ‘see them again soon.’17 Although it was publicly 
denied, confidential affirmation of his visit reached Munro Ferguson in August 1919.18 
In the meantime, Birdwood’s visit was delayed and the Prince departed instead for his 
first imperial tour of Canada.19  
Buoyed by the Canadians’ enthusiastic response, King George V directed that 
two further extended tours be implemented in 1920; firstly to New Zealand and 
Australia during the cooler months of the year, to be swiftly followed by yet another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ‘THE PRINCE’S VISIT’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 15 April 1920, p. 3. 
15 NLA, MS 696/1176. Letter to W. Long from Munro Ferguson, 5 August 1919.  
16 ‘ONLY BIRDWOOD’, The Northern Herald, Cairns, Qld., 2 January 1919, p. 7. 
17 ‘PRINCE OF WALES’ VISIT’, Advocate, Burnie, Tas., 18 July 1919, p. 1. 
18 NAA, A11052, 1. Letter to Hughes from Munro Ferguson, 8 August 1919. It is assumed that 
the Prince would have been formally invited to visit Australia by Hughes.  
19 For further discussion of this visit, see Beadle, ‘The Canadian press reaction to the abdication 
of Edward VIII.’  
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departure to India. The visits were overtly intended to boost imperial sentiment by 
promoting Edward as a celebrated personality. British prime minister David Lloyd 
George hoped that the appearance of the popular Prince ‘might do more to calm the 
discord than half a dozen solemn Imperial Conferences.’20 Returning from Canada, 
Edward was to spend only three months in England before the planned departure for 
Australia, causing him considerable anguish at the enforced separation from Freda 
Dudley Ward.21 Lloyd George also hoped to make him conform to a set of exacting 
moral behaviours by distancing him from his lover.22 As his father aged, it was 
becoming apparent that the wilful Prince needed training in the outward management of 
his public life. 
Though the visit was not confirmed to the Australian public until February 1920, 
official arrangements were by then well under way.23 Records of the spirited exchanges 
between the Prince’s staff and the British government during the preparations confirm 
that from the outset the tour was highly politicised and the pro-imperial dimensions 
were explicit. The organisation drew upon a growing culture of reinvented royal 
diplomatic ventures by King Edward VII and King George V during the earlier years of 
the twentieth century.24 Here the monarch’s particular cordial brand of ‘soft’ 
international relations sought to capitalise on the symbolic power of British royalty 
overseas in a manner explicitly calculated to further the objectives of the British 
government and diplomatic services. Nonetheless, some attempt was made to disguise 
the tour’s political intentions with a façade of benevolent and classless popular 
engagement. For example, Lloyd George took ‘serious objection’ to the suggestion that 
Colonel Edward Grigg, a former journalist and member of the Prince’s Secretariat, be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lloyd George, quoted in Windsor, A king’s story, p. 132. 
21 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, p. 124.  
22 Murphy, Monarchy and the end of empire, p. 24. 
23 NAA, A11052, 3. Telegram to Munro Ferguson from Milner, 31 January 1920.  24	  For further discussion, see Glencross, The State Visits of Edward VII, 2016.	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given the title ‘Political Secretary.’25 Although keenly aware of the tour’s ‘important 
political results’, Hugh Thornton, Milner’s Private Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
worried nonetheless about the use of ‘phraseology which might imply that the tour had 
definite political objects.’26 
Of course, as was made clear during the Canadian tour, the separation of the 
innocuous and the political was nigh on impossible. ‘Everything that the Prince of 
Wales does on such a tour has a political bearing’, Grigg maintained.27 The division of 
responsibility almost led to a skirmish between Grigg and Lionel Halsey, a former 
Admiral of the Fleet and the Prince’s Chief of Staff. Both men had accompanied him on 
the tour of Canada. The Prince had developed a strong friendship with Halsey, although 
the Colonial Office’s Under Secretary Leo Amery thought his handling of political 
matters incompetent.28 However, the Prince’s strained relationship with Grigg continued 
to rankle. ‘We are not in any way kindred spirits’, Edward wrote to his father, 
remarking that for all Grigg’s experience he was ‘terribly impetuous and becomes daily 
more difficult to work with.’29 Ultimately, Grigg won his autonomy over most of the 
public relations aspects of the tour. Halsey was given responsibility for the management 
of the refitted battleship in which they were to travel, H.M.S. Renown, and a range of 
other duties including finance, management of staff, naval arrangements and 
correspondence, dress and equipment, medical provision, transport and supplies, escort 
and guards, and police.30  
In time, the Australian public would come to be familiar with the other members 
of the Prince’s inner retinue. These included his trusted Private Secretary, Sir Godfrey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1580/20. Letter to R. Baring, Lord Cromer, from Stamfordham, 3 
February 1920. In the end, Grigg travelled simply as ‘Secretary.’ 
26 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1580/6. Letter to Stamfordham from Thornton, 26 January 1920.  
27 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1580/2. Letter to Stamfordham from Grigg, 20 January 1920.  
28 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, p. 123. 
29 RA, EDW/PRIV/MAIN/A/2291. Letter to King George V from Edward, Prince of Wales, 29 
June 1920. 
30 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1580/11. Undated folio detailing staff responsibilities. 
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Thomas, as well as Captain Dudley North, Lord Claud Hamilton and Captain Joey Legh 
as his equerries, and a party of nine servants, five clerks, two detective officers and five 
orderlies. The last addition to the group was his ‘vigorous and high-spirited’ 19-year-old 
cousin Louis ‘Dickie’ Mountbatten.31 ‘One doesn’t often come across such a charming 
fellow’ the Prince enthused.32 Officially acting as Halsey’s Flag Lieutenant, the 
mischievous Mountbatten was firstly a companion for the Prince. Also on board were 
his bodyguard, Sergeant Alfred Burt, Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Jannion 
as Halsey’s Secretary, and Surgeon-Commander A.C.W. Newport as the Medical 
Officer. Image 7 
Despite drawing on the Canadian precedent, the organisation for the Australian 
tour was considerable. Administrators in both Australia and Britain generated a welter 
of correspondence in mapping out an itinerary that would change almost daily. Some 
sympathy must be apportioned to Grigg, responsible as he was for the manufacture of 
an itinerary typified by visual accessibility and studied political disinterest, and catering 
to the agenda of both the Australian hosts and the British visitors. As the Prince himself 
later described in his autobiography, he saw his role during the imperial tours as to 
mingle with veterans, schoolchildren, ‘natives’ and officials in order to ‘remind my 
father’s subjects of the kindly benefits attaching to the ties of Empire.’33 The Australian 
tour certainly fell within this definition, shaped as it was from the earliest stages to 
impress his persona as a modern exemplar and a member of the family upon a range of 
citizens. Although on the surface, and as the Prince perceived, this was a ‘simple 
mission’, the preparation was anything but.34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Windsor, A king’s story, p. 152. 
32 RA, EDW/PRIV/MAIN/A/2291. Letter to King George V from Edward, Prince of Wales, 29 
June 1920.  
33 Windsor, A king’s story, p. 152. 
34 Ibid. 
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The intended participants were clearly identified by Grigg from the outset. 
Several months before the proposed departure, he invited Australian federal and state 
organisers to submit ideas for functions and engagements that allowed for the Prince to 
come into contact with specific groups of Australians. Of primary and specific 
consideration were those who had participated in war service. ‘His Royal Highness 
desires to meet as many returned soldiers and sailors as possible at all points of his 
journey’ he directed.35 The organisers wished to present the Prince as an inspiration for 
peace and a former soldier bound by experience to the veterans and their families who 
made up a significant proportion of Australian society. The tour offered the chance to 
capitalise on and strengthen the connection between the so-called ‘Diggers [sic] friend’ 
and the Anzacs that had begun, albeit unpromisingly, in 1916.36 
The tour was intended as a national event; plans to use Australia’s extensive 
railway network allowed for gatherings in both large cities and urban centres and 
smaller regional towns where the royal train could halt or simply slow down in passing. 
Particular consideration was extended to servicemen suffering from ‘shell-shock’ who 
may have struggled with crowded and noisy environs.37 Citing the ‘strongest aversion to 
putting any unnecessary strain’ on returned servicemen, the King agreed to abandon the 
traditional yet thunderous on-shore naval salutes at the suggestion of the Governor-
General.38 Milner thought the concern overstated and could not resist the pointed (and 
surely incorrect) remark that in London, despite being home to severely traumatised 
soldiers and civilians, ‘artillery salutes are constantly fired and no bad effects have been 
reported.’39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 NAA, A11052, 3. Telegram to Munro Ferguson from Milner, 28 January 1920. 
36 NAA, A2, 1920/1113 PART 26. Letter to M.L. Shepherd from B. Cork, 24 March 1920. 
37 NAA, A11052, 3. Letter to Munro Ferguson from White, 11 March 1920. 
38 NAA, A11052, 3. Telegram to Munro Ferguson from Milner, 16 March 1920. 
39 Ibid. 
	  	   95	  
Beyond returned men, the scope of social engagement was broad. There was 
little ambiguity as to the popular focus of the Prince’s visit: ‘[He] wishes to see as much 
as possible of the people of Australia … whenever it is necessary to choose between 
seeing the sights and seeing the people preference will be given to the latter’, Grigg 
directed.40 Although he also specified that Edward liked the presence of women as well 
as men, the Australian national administrator, former AIF commander Cyril Brudenell 
White, considered the Prince’s landing at St Kilda a masculine affair. ‘It has been 
decided that ladies will not be included in the arrangements’ he wrote.41 As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, nurses and Red Cross workers nonetheless fought for their 
representation during the tour and in some states held a prominent position in official 
military-inspired reviews and parades. Most Australian women were to set eyes on the 
Prince in less formal circumstances, most notably the ‘People’s Receptions’ that would 
feature throughout.  
From the earliest stages, Grigg aimed to replicate the numerous publicly focused 
gatherings that had proved successful in Canada, outlining to Munro Ferguson his idea 
of a ‘popular reception to which the general public would be admitted without ticket or 
social selection of any kind.’42 In contrast to the idea that Edward should enjoy seeing 
something of the Australian people, these arrangements were instead designed for the 
edification of the large crowds who journeyed to see the royal personage on display. 
This decision reinforced the personable and democratic façade that was one of the 
dominant elements in the Prince of Wales’ Australian persona, and is revealing of the 
known expectations for what a royal public event should be. Unlike its antecedents in 
Britain, this Australian royal progress garnered widespread attention through its 
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41 NAA, A6678, R56. Memo from White, 3 May 1920. 
42 NAA, A11052, 3. Telegram to Munro Ferguson from Milner, 28 January 1920.  
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consciously inclusive and supposedly apolitical character, and it was not pitched at any 
one class or section of society.  
Also clearly established was the scope and tenor of the Prince’s public 
utterances so as to be scrupulously moderate, restrained and inclusive. As Stamfordham 
told him, the tour would be ‘made or marred according as you do and say the right 
thing.’43 There is some suggestion that Edward was considered a relatively 
inexperienced diplomat in need of some guidance. ‘He is a remarkably good speaker – 
tho’ of course his speeches are drafted for him he works hard at them & with a good 
memory he usually knows what he has to say’, Stamfordham assured the Governor-
General. ‘Strictly entre nous, he is of rather an obstinate nature but you will, I’m sure, 
find him delightful’ he finished.44 Winning personality aside, Edward’s diplomacy 
could not be entirely relied upon. Foreshadowing the British government’s later 
concerns over his tendency to overlook his own role as detached and apolitical head of 
state, Thornton also noted a tendency in Canada for questions to be asked ‘as to whether 
the Prince of Wales’ utterances are to be considered as representing the views and 
policy of His Majesty’s Government.’45 Happily, as Amery tactfully remarked, it was 
hoped that Grigg’s drafting hand in the Prince’s speeches and correspondence would 
enable Edward to ‘strike the right note everywhere.’46 
  
From the Australian perspective 
Following Richard White’s suggestion that twentieth century outward representations of 
Australia are consciously constructed to ‘suit the perceptions of the outside world’, to 
look closely at the Australian preparations for the 1920 royal tour is to be afforded an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Stamfordham, quoted in Windsor, A king’s story, p. 134. Punctuation in original. 
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45 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1580/17. Letter to Stamfordham from Thornton, 30 January 1920.  
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intimate view of the way the nation constructed and promoted its imperial identity.47 It 
is clear that while the tour was initially conceived and facilitated by British political 
ambitions, this in no way restricted the opportunism of Australian politicians in seizing 
the prospect for their own political capital. Political commandeering occurred at all 
levels of the administration in the months before the Prince’s arrival. Under the auspices 
of Munro Ferguson, White held administrative authority over the individual state 
itineraries, which were themselves arranged by state administrators. In practice, 
however, personal ambition played a prominent role, and when coupled with 
geographical distance and limited communications, significant state autonomy and 
deviation from the official itinerary eventuated.  
As Anne Twomey has explained, post-Federation state and federal governments 
were perpetually in disagreement over the political and communicative functions of the 
state Governors and Governors-General.48 In 1920, the shared administration could not 
fail to reprise this simmering conflict, so much so that even the site of the Prince’s first 
landing in Australia could not be agreed upon. The first sign of trouble arose over the 
revival of the well-worn argument over the status of Sydney as opposed to Melbourne, 
the temporary capital. As the seat of government and the place where the Prince’s 
parents came ashore in 1901, Melbourne was also Munro Ferguson’s home. When it 
was announced that the Prince would arrive at St Kilda pier, the newly-elected New 
South Wales Labor premier John Storey and the state Governor, Walter Davidson, 
wrote in outrage directly to the Colonial Office to protest that New South Wales was the 
‘oldest, most populous [and] wealthiest’ state in the country.’49 This perceived slight 
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would be only one of multiple territorial squabbles and determined attempts to vie for 
representation that dogged every aspect of the itinerary, both in the planning and 
execution.  
More rancour surfaced over the issue of precedence, which was treated with 
flagrant disregard by state officials. In theory, the Governor-General, as head of state in 
lieu of the King, followed in turn by the state Governors, took precedence over the 
Prince himself. To avoid any awkward situation where the star visitor would be forced 
into a publicly subordinate position, officials decided to simply limit the opportunities 
for the Prince and his father’s representatives to appear in public together as little as 
possible. Munro Ferguson, for example, skirted around the issue by attaching an aide-
de-camp, John Duncan-Hughes, to accompany the Prince’s party in his stead. The idea 
was that the state Governors would also discreetly bow out of appearing in public with 
the Prince in favour of lesser officials taking the lead. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate in greater detail, this ruling would prove both impractical and unpopular. 
Although White provided a helpful table, its usefulness ‘appeared to be unknown to the 
states, all of whom had tables of their own which they were disinclined to depart from’, 
he despaired.50 State officials took every opportunity to promote their autonomy in the 
face of attempts to exert federal influence.  
The Australian prime minister William ‘Billy’ Hughes also appeared oblivious 
to White’s supposed control over the Prince’s itinerary. Hughes was transparently 
determined both to promote the tour as a force of imperial propaganda and appropriate 
the itinerary for his own purposes in promoting trade and migration connections with 
Britain. Having previously met Edward during his wartime visits to London, Hughes’ 
first objective was to re-establish the relationship and insinuate himself in almost all 
arrangements for the tour. This caused Grigg some anxiety; he explained to Munro 
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Ferguson that Lloyd George had raised the issue on no less than three occasions, 
insisting that Hughes ‘should not be allowed to give the impression in any way that he 
is showing off the Prince of Wales, to the disadvantage of his political opponents.’51 
Munro Ferguson admitted encountering some difficulty in controlling Hughes’ 
ambitions. ‘It has not been an easy task’, he complained to the King, as the ‘masterful 
little prime minister has decided views on all questions and never forgets he is the 
supreme authority.’52 Stamfordham also added his voice to those fearing that the prime 
minister would use his influence to ‘annex’ the Prince, perceiving a boycott of support 
by opposing political parties and seeming to ally the royal visitor with one political 
alliance.53 Image 8 
There can be no doubt that the ‘masterful’ Hughes entertained all these 
objectives and more. He had been one of the founding members of the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP), although his convictions and ambitions took him further away from it over 
his long political career. Following his election as prime minister in 1915, Hughes’ two 
wartime attempts to introduce conscription failed, but in doing so divided the electorate 
over the moral right to civic freedom afforded by the state. Hughes passionately 
believed Australia should do everything within its power to support the Empire, which 
he understood would in turn enhance the development of Australia’s local interests and 
independence. He led the ‘yes’ campaigners, comprising conservative politicians, 
business groups, protestant churches and some unionists against the ‘no’ voters, 
including those from within the labour movement, the Catholic clergy and left-wing 
organisations. The public discontent over the conscription controversy spurred national 
anxieties of a socialist uprising at a time of rising costs of living and threats to workers’ 
rights, especially following a major strike in 1917.  
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The debate also challenged and embittered long-established labour beliefs on the 
obligations of citizenship and the exercise of power by the state, causing the ALP to 
adopt a definitive anti-war stance and a large-scale leftward shift of the movement 
generally.54 The Nationalist Party of Australia was formed in 1917 from a merger 
between the Commonwealth Liberal Party and the National Labour Party, Hughes’ pro-
conscription defectors from the ALP. Despite winning convincingly at an election in 
1919, Hughes struggled to escape the notoriety of his divisive pro-conscription views. 
However, as Beaumont cautions, it is important to note that his failure to introduce 
conscription by no means indicates a broader social dissatisfaction with imperialism or 
a lack of support for Australia’s involvement in the conflict.55 Instead, she argues, the 
effect was to ‘embed imperial loyalty even more firmly as the dominant discourse’ over 
several decades to come. In the hands of the Nationalists, she explains: 
‘loyalty’ came to mean much more than support for Britain, the war 
effort and conscription. Entrenching and legitimizing conservative 
power, ‘loyalty’ became coded as the essence of political reliability 
and orthodoxy. In turn, ‘disloyalty’ became a byword for treason, a 
label with which the governing elites demonized a multitude of 
political opponents.56 
 
The demonisation of perceived ‘disloyalty’ is clear in the way particular groups 
of Australians supposedly holding anti-imperial views were vilified following the 
confirmation of the Prince’s tour. Strident objections from pro-imperial government 
officials, the British Empire League, the mainstream press and many outspoken 
individuals increased in volume when the Prince was in New Zealand prior to arriving 
in Australia, but never really dissipated throughout the tour, each perceived threat 
experiencing a revival just before the royal party arrived in a new state. As this section, 
and the following chapter 3 will go on to discuss, in Victoria, supposed Catholic 
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‘disloyalty’ was much maligned, while in New South Wales the effusiveness of the 
welcome of Storey’s Labor government could apparently not be trusted. In Western 
Australia, the strength of the trade union and nationalist body, along with recent history 
of dockside riots was cause for imperialist concern. South Australia, supposedly the 
most ‘British’ of the former colonies, was also home to some of the most vocal 
advocates for independent governance. Doubt was cast over parts of Tasmania as a 
labour movement stronghold. Worse of all was Queensland, with its not insignificant 
population of menacing socialist and workers lobbyists led by a sympathetic 
government.  
First to erupt was the debate over the supposed dissent of Catholic communities. 
At the beginning of the war, most Australians, including Catholics, had supported 
Australia’s involvement in the conflict.57 Even beforehand, Catholic groups were 
accepting of the monarch, as in the case of the 1867 royal tour when schools and 
communities participated without prejudice in the celebrations.58 However, as Brenda 
Niall has shown, Irish-Australian feeling grew more distinct and radicalised after 1916, 
when anti-British sentiment surged following the British government’s violent 
repression of the Easter Rising rebellion in Dublin.59 One of Hughes’ most vociferous 
detractors in Victoria was prominent Irish Catholic Daniel Mannix, the Archbishop of 
Melbourne, who had been among the most public opponents of conscription. The divide 
between Mannix, his significant body of mostly working-class Irish-Australian 
followers and the pro-imperialist population grew following the war.60 It seems clear 
that the Catholic community held no particular animosity towards the Prince himself, 
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but also that they suffered a campaign of anti-Catholic sentiment waged in the 
mainstream press in the months before the Prince’s arrival. The Catholic Press, for 
example, perceived the ‘angry terror’ with which loyalists responded to the ‘Catholic 
question’, ever associated in Australia with the ‘Irish question.’61  
Hughes’ manifest support of the imperial agenda inherent in the Prince’s visit 
sparked lively condemnation from Mannix. Nonetheless, rather than opposing the 
Prince’s visit as a celebration of imperialism per se, Catholic dissent was in reality 
entirely moderate, their major objection being the obsequious and undemocratic manner 
in which the government, conservative press and large sections of the public responded 
to the arrival. In many ways, they chose to perceive the Prince instead through his 
democratic and progressive qualities; a welcome visitor, but nonetheless a man the same 
as any other. Taking what seems a generous stance given the British government’s 
attitude to Irish independence in 1920, the community hoped that the Prince’s visit 
would be enacted as the neutral visit of a representative of one free country to another, 
and not as the symbol of ‘a Junker Government’ denying to Ireland ‘the rights for which 
Australia made such immense sacrifices in blood and money.’62 Following the 
confirmation, the Catholic Press newspaper made its position clear, stating:  
The dreadful slobber about the Prince of Wales … threatens to make 
that estimable young man intensely unpopular … Australians are 
entitled to see and welcome a modest youth who cannot, through the 
fortune of birth, help the prominence into which fate has pitchforked 
him …there is no need to make people believe that kings and princes 
who succeed by hereditary right are just the persons who would be 
elected to the jobs if the public had a voice in the matter. Let the 
Prince of Wales go through Australia receiving the respect due to his 
rank, and kept free from the vulgar advertising stunts with which a 
certain class of exploiters are making us familiar.63 
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In was in this spirit that Mannix, deeply scornful of all the ‘gush and nonsense’, 
controversially urged Melbournians to show some sanity beyond the ‘Princeitis’ that 
seemed to have taken over the city.64 The Catholic Press also expressed disgust over the 
elaborate suggestions for expensive clothing and social niceties that appeared in 
conservative newspapers.65 The objections largely bypassed the Prince, himself 
perceived as a ‘modest, sensible young man.’66 Nonetheless, the debate raged, 
culminating in the Brisbane Telegraph’s hysterical account of Mannix’ ‘disloyalists’ 
publicly protesting in the streets of Melbourne when Edward was in New Zealand 
before arriving in Australia.67 The fervour largely dissipated following the Archbishop’s 
departure for an extended overseas tour just before the Prince’s arrival. Aided by the 
redemptive invitation of certain Catholic representatives to participate in the tour, the 
charge of disloyalty seems to have been largely manifest in the prejudices and fears of 
conservative commentators during the planning stages, rather than in the Catholic 
community itself.  
The demonisation of any opposition to imperialism, however mild, also 
extended to other groups including the major opposing political party, both at state and 
federal level. In April, the ALP’s Albert Gardiner made a point of assuring the Senate 
that the Prince was ‘assured of as loyal a welcome at the hands of Labour [sic] in New 
South Wales as if any other Government were in office.’68 He claimed that long-
standing allegations in the press that Labor supporters were ‘disloyalists, pro Germans, 
Sinn Feiners, and I.W.W. men’ were nothing more than propaganda employed by the 
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Nationalists as ‘dope for their silly followers.’69 There can be no doubt that during the 
1920s, conservative naysayers who decried Labor’s position on ‘loyalty’ exposed the 
First World War’s legacy of uncertainty over Australia’s defensive obligations to 
Britain. As James Curran explains in his work on John Curtin, a young Labor luminary 
who would go on to govern as ALP leader, the trauma of the war and its political 
repercussions could do nothing but confirm for Labor supporters their existing suspicion 
of symbols of imperial authority and disgust for those who revelled in the royal 
limelight.70  
Nonetheless, the attitude of the top tier of federal Labor politicians to the royal 
visit may be summarised as one of tolerance, even kindness, towards the royal visitor, 
with one important caveat. Edward would be feted within an understanding that the 
Empire would continue to function for the greater good of the Dominions, and its 
figureheads would be afforded no more respect than entitled to humanity as a whole. 
Curtin, for example, expressed the view that the royals should understand that their 
legitimacy existed only ‘by popular consent’, and it would be wise to respect the 
autonomy of the Dominions accordingly.71 Frank Tudor, the leader of the Opposition 
who had become leader of the ALP in 1916 following Hughes’ departure, was notably 
reticent on the topic in the House of Representatives. However, his colleague William 
Maloney could not help but remark on the tour as a ‘useless waste of money.’ He 
objected to reports of eight hours of tuition offered to enable naval soldiers to give a 
rousing rendition of ‘Hip! Hip! Hurrah’ in preparation for the visit (and ‘not the good 
Australian “Hooray.” It must be “Hip! Hip! Hurrah”.’)72 Much like the attitudes of 
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Catholic community, Labor supporters registered their distaste for activities that 
perpetuated social inequalities.  
Despite this, the labour movement was at this time most sharply conscious of its 
need to position itself within the Empire, and advance political capital and recognition 
on the back of the hoped-for success of the tour. Imperialism could be employed as a 
political mechanism conducive to the advancement of the Australian nationalist agenda. 
This seems to be have been the case with at least some of Tudor’s state colleagues, most 
notably Storey who held the view that ‘any attempt at severance from the British 
Empire would be a calamity.’73 Elsewhere, James Reed, the President of the Western 
Australian Goldfields National Labor Party also asserted that any insult to the Prince 
jeopardised ‘the bond of union, which apart from sentimental reasons, [is] in the 
interests of Australia to consolidate.’74  
Reed’s view could not be said to be shared by the majority of state and 
municipal labour supporters and politicians. Given the nation’s precarious post-war 
finances, many voiced dismay as to the generous allocation of federal and state public 
monies to the visit, headed by the symbol of what was undeniably a thoroughly 
capitalist institution. In Parliament, Hughes had stated airily that extravagance would 
not be permitted and that the government ‘are relying upon the loyalty and enthusiasm 
of the people to make the reception and welcome to His Royal Highness all that it 
should be.’75 However, for many of his state colleagues it was a given that they would 
oppose the visit on the principle that the money should be better spent elsewhere. The 
Victorian branch of the ALP registered their strong disapproval of the ‘lavish 
expenditure’ and similar sentiments were repeated in the goldfields town of Boulder, 
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Western Australia, among others.76 Percy Brookfield, a radical politician from Broken 
Hill, New South Wales, decried the spending by officials of public monies on ‘puerile 
frivolities’ to aid the ‘glorification of a youth to whom they would not give a saveloy 
but for his royal descent.’77 ‘We are WASTING ENORMOUS SUMS…in the 
idolatrous worship of an amiable, commonplace youth’ agreed Labor politician Francis 
Cotton in the Australian Worker.78  
The economic woes and inflation that continued well after the workers’ strike of 
1917 were among the prominent symptoms of the widespread social disillusionment 
that prevailed after Australia’s catastrophic losses became known after 1918. As 
Connors argues, initial feelings of pride in the Empire’s achievement could not fail to be 
eroded closer to home by the public unhappiness of returned soldiers and the grief of 
bereaved families.79 An additional 12,000 Australians died from the influenza epidemic 
that returned home with the troops.80 There were doubtless many for whom the imperial 
connection could only be synonymous with grief and devastation. It was in this vein that 
in June 1920 Cotton described how:  
Our own land, although spared the actual ravages of war, has still its 
own quota of human misery. It is burdened with an intolerable load of 
debt, and is famished by drought. Hunger and cold are here, as 
elsewhere, grim realities, as the pitiful stories told by mothers who are 
fighting a losing battle with the wolf at the door abundantly testify.81  
 
The war and its aftermath had energised the labour movement and radical 
politics around the world. As Murphy explains, widespread discontent across 
continental Europe provided abundant opportunities for revolutionary activities, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 ‘PRINCE OF WALES’ VISIT’, Daily Telegraph, Launceston, Tas., 23 March 1920, p. 2; ‘7H 
O.L.P. AND THE PRINCE’S VISIT’, The Daily News, Perth, W.A., 4 May 1920, p. 3. 
77 ‘THE PRINCE’S VISIT’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 6 May 1920, p. 19. 
78 ‘A SENSELESS SATURNALIA’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 3 June 1920, p. 
7. 
79 Connors, Royal visits to Australia, p. 45. 
80 Ibid. 
81 ‘A SENSELESS SATURNALIA’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 3 June 1920, p. 
7. 
	  	   107	  
many members of the British Establishment fearing this to be an ‘insurrectionary 
movement that would eventually undermine the established order at home and within 
the Empire.’82 The threat became increasingly evident following the Irish uprising of 
1916 when republican members of Sinn Féin established their own Free State assembly 
independent of Westminster.83 The fortunes of the British monarchy were thrown into 
further turmoil following the bloody overthrow of the tsarist autocracy during the 
Russian revolutions of 1917. Socialism gained ever-increasing traction across the 
country, giving rise to conservative fears of a Bolshevik-style revolution among the 
workers.84 Within this context, the Colonial Office’s fears for the continuity of 
economic and sentimental relations with Britain and the validity of a royal family were 
justified.  
The turbulence of this social context helps to explain why news of the Prince’s 
visit received such a cynical reaction in many quarters. In April 1920, the outspoken 
clergyman and pacifist the Rev. Albert Rivett in the Sydney Australian Worker 
correctly guessed at the Colonial Office’s hopes that the visit would create a 
‘psychology favourable to militarism.’85 There seems no doubt that the tour’s 
administration reflects a sense of Australia’s potential future vulnerabilities in matters 
of defence. In keeping with Grigg’s instructions as to the visibility of soldiers and 
sailors, naval and military rhetoric and glorification dominated the itinerary. The 
strategic use of Australia’s best harbour arrival points and the frequency of Australian 
naval escorts, parades and reviews on the program were intended to convey the 
comfortable co-existence of domestic and imperial security prerogatives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Murphy, Monarchy and the end of empire, p. 16. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Connors, Royal visits to Australia, p. 45. 
85 ‘THE RED FLAG AND THE PRINCE’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 22 April 
1920, p. 5. 
	  	   108	  
However, in 1920 the maintenance of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
continued to divide imperial interests. Australia had established an autonomous naval 
branch of its domestic defence force in 1913 although these ships were allocated to the 
British Royal Navy during the First World War.86 After the war, the winning Powers 
hoped to limit the spread of rearmament in the Pacific, and several regions were 
annexed for Australian or British administration by the League of Nations. As part of 
the British Empire, Australia’s plans for the RAN were expected to accord with 
Britain’s peace negotiations and stance on limiting a future arms race, which would 
ultimately lead to the Washington Treaties of the early 1920s. In a letter to Munro 
Ferguson, Walter Long, the British Lord of the Admiralty, conceded that it was natural 
that Australia should ‘be attracted by the idea of possessing their own battleships, their 
own Navy’, but perceived this only within the capacity of rendering ‘splendid assistance 
to an Empire Navy’ in the form of floating docks, training, stores and munitions.87 
Halsey agreed that the Australian politicians should stop playing ‘ducks and drakes’ 
with their ‘absolutely effete’ fleet, and he hoped some of his stern words to this effect 
had ‘shaken them quite a lot.’88  
 These views apparently fell on deaf ears. Hughes’ National Party government 
believed that Australia’s vulnerable imperial interests could be best preserved by a 
domestic defence strategy rather than trusting only in Britain’s protection. Pre-war, 
Japan’s domestic naval power had been perceived as a threat to Australian interests in 
the Pacific. The Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty of 1902 and its renewal in 1905 were 
seen to expand Britain’s sphere of maritime control. The Australian government, 
trusting that Britain would protect the country if attacked, did not initially develop a 
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national naval squadron nor improve its defences, instead contributing funds to the cost 
of the Royal Navy. This generated much controversial scrutiny of the government’s 
conflicted loyalties, resulting in a six-fold increase in expenditure on defence between 
1905 and 1913.89  
In the early stages, therefore, the itinerary had at the prime minister’s suggestion 
also included a naval expedition to Rabaul, an Australian territory in New Guinea 
delegated that year as a League of Nations mandate. The Australian Naval and Military 
Expeditionary Force’s possession of this and other neighbouring islands in September 
1914 had marked one of the most significant moments of the war in the Pacific. 
Although initially this was incorporated with little dissent, half way through the tour 
Grigg began to realise that the other Powers might take a dim view of a ‘naval and 
parliamentary demonstration’ crafted by Hughes to aggrandise Australia’s supposedly 
modest naval presence in the Pacific.90  
Although the Rabaul section was later excised from the itinerary, the 
contradiction between British and Australian naval interests continued to dominate. 
Long hoped that what he referred to as ‘the ultimate solution of the great problem of 
Imperial Defence’ could be effected by the ‘great feeling of imperialist patriotism’ 
following the war, and most helpfully enhanced by the Prince’s visit.91 The triumph of 
naval prowess over distant foes can be seen to be personified in the Prince. It was most 
fitting, remarked one souvenir pamphlet prepared for the New South Wales section of 
the tour, how the ‘Sailor Prince’ should arrive in Australia in H.M.S. Renown, a 
refurbished battleship. His training in the navy, the author asserted, set him apart from 
‘all braggart weakling princes’ and established ‘the sturdy quality of him’ and ‘whatever 
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counts for manhood and good omen.’92 This serves again to demonstrate how observers 
confidently aligned perceptions of the Prince’s supposed affable leadership and 
masculine attributes with concerns that most preoccupied Australia at the time.  
As well as the question of expense and the dubious co-existence of military 
obligation and loyalty, dissenters found other objectionable aspects to the tour’s 
arrangements. Labor’s social reform agenda strongly opposed the class distinctions 
inherent in the granting of imperial honours and other awards. A powerful subset of the 
movement’s attitude to Britishness was a deep-seated disdain for pretension and 
genuflection to officialdom that was so offensive to Australia’s egalitarian and 
democratic ethos. The Worker, for example, anticipated an ‘orgy of imperial gush and 
snobbish adulation’ by conservatives, and the ‘lime-lighting sycophants … of 
capitalistic organisations’ who hoped to gain a title following the visit.93 These 
genuflectors served to undermine the originality of Australian political and social 
philosophy and perpetuate the inequalities of officialdom in the new world.  
The labour movement acted upon this sense of disgust in two ways. Firstly, 
many resolved that, as the visit was inevitable, the most appropriate reaction was to 
welcome the Prince, but on their own terms, and in a manner distinct from that of their 
sycophantic political enemies. Despite the uncertainty over the institution he was held to 
represent, Edward was merely a man, and a young and inexperienced one at that. This 
view is best encapsulated by the South Australian Border Chronicle, who later 
explained that: 
To him and his family there is undoubtedly a good deal of personal 
good feeling among the peoples of the Empire … but it is as well for 
the Australian with his cynicism and his well-developed sense of 
humor [sic], not to fall into the terror of thinking that the Anglo-
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Saxon race as a whole any longer worships kings or kings’ sons … 
but rather worships itself and its institutions in paying tribute to those 
who personify those institutions and is no doubt prepared … to put on 
one side all things and men and offices that stand in the way of its 
constitutional development.94 
 
Many radical commentators held the view of Brisbane socialist Jack Roche that 
the Prince should be afforded pity, forced as he was to ‘act as a channel through which 
will be poured streams of verbal slobber and lying platitudes.’95 ‘No one entertains an 
unkind feeling towards the Prince. If anything only sympathy is felt for him … he has 
become part and parcel of a system’ agreed Rivett.96 Boote went so far as to deny 
Edward any political agency of his own, remarking how he could not ‘possibly have any 
ulterior design of State … the Prince is only an instrument in the hands of the British 
ruling class.’97 Others made a point of denying ‘any feeling of disrespect’ or any 
‘personal feeling whatever towards the Prince.’98 This willingness to view this ‘sprig of 
royalty’ as not consciously aligned with the interests of one particular system, was to 
prove Edward’s greatest asset during the tour.99 
As an alternative, some members of the labour movement decided to avoid any 
participation. Although anticipating the charge of disloyalty that must surely eventuate, 
some began to ponder the idea of a boycott following the confirmation of the tour. 
Delegates of 77 New South Wales trade unions, for example, agreed that they would 
have nothing to do with celebrations or events concerning the ‘visit of a certain young 
man.’100 In Kempsey, New South Wales, members of the One Big Union ruled that they 
would not allow their children to participate in the multitude of demonstrations by 
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schools that were arranged to in honour of the ‘young parasite from overseas.’101 The 
Melbourne Trades Hall Council also requested that unionists ‘refuse to permit their 
children to participate’ in any function.102 Likewise the Bendigo branch of the ALP 
stated that its members should refuse to take their children from school on the day of 
Edward’s visit.103  
Inevitably, reports were received with dismay by pro-imperialists. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, this reflects the emphasis placed on 
Australia’s younger generations in perpetuating affection for the royals and to the 
Empire. As the trade unionists and labour movement supporters were well-aware, the 
dedication of the next generation of imperialists was central to the dominant political 
ideology. The Rev. Charles Forscutt of Bathurst, New South Wales, for example, was 
greatly perturbed that ‘the red raggers’ were raising the next generation ‘to be disloyal, 
to cry out for a republic, and to influence others against King and country.’104  
Other public responses were more in sympathy with Tudor and Storey, in 
adopting a moderately opportunistic attitude to the potential benefits the visit might 
bring. In her poem musing over Australia’s divided response to the visit, Catholic nurse 
Agnes Macready of Sydney argued the changing fortunes of the old world and the new 
allowed for Australia to greet the Prince as a modern exemplar and on an equitable and 
mutually beneficial basis. She questioned: 
But why should we punish ‘the boy’ for ill-deeds going before? 
Let us rise up to the heights, and judge with an open mind …  
 
Thrones are tottering fast, crowns are lying in pawn 
Kings step by in the dark. Queens wait sad for the dawn … 
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We, who Imperial ties, Imperial claims, disown,  
Welcome the Prince, at morn, as if he were “one of our own.”105 
 
Others were quick to seize on the positive commercial opportunities offered by 
the publicity surrounding a tour. Despite labour’s objections, the more evident truth was 
that the manufacture of electric illuminations, arches and grandstands, and the sale of 
souvenirs and other goods during the visit did offer some short-term employment or a 
boost in earnings to significant number of people. Dress-makers, tailors, as well as the 
builders, painters and carpenters involved in reviving public spaces would all take a 
share. Crowds had to be fed locally, transported and provided with sleeping options. 
The provision of cars and trained horses was central to the pageantry.106 Night-time 
illuminations offered the chance to prolong the spectacle long after the visitor had 
passed by, and would encourage regional visitors to stay overnight and locals to venture 
into the city centre after dark.  
As well as an increase in revenue, the tour also offered some unusual 
commercial and promotional opportunities. Administrators were deluged by a range of 
offers of goods and services from Australian-made varnish for the Prince’s carriage, a 
performance of the ‘very Australian’ comedy ‘The Boss Cockie’ (‘a play of the real 
outback in the real Queensland’), to ‘excellent fire portraits of any celebrities you may 
desire.’107 As will be discussed in the following chapter, still others were alive to the 
evident possibilities the tour offered as a vehicle to promote a multitude of local 
strategic agendas. John Hoare, the mayor of Cairns, eagerly anticipated that a visit could 
only attract attention from the ‘outside world’ to the district’s ‘vastly rich and 
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underdeveloped agricultural pastoral mining resources which only await [a] tide of 
British migrants.’108 
There were other positive social benefits, most closely allied with what Kirby 
has called ‘the deep wellspring of human need for the ceremonies that mark important 
occasions in life.’109 Many Australians were also eager for a nation-wide celebration to 
break the monotony and depression of post-war life. Due to the outbreak of influenza, 
Australia had not had a mass peace celebration in 1918 or 1919, and so for many this 
offered the welcome opportunity for a public festivities.110 Such novelty gave attendees 
the chance to meet with friends to participate in a nationally observed event that would 
surely become part of their hometown or city’s historical narrative.  
The tour’s administration reflects a seemingly genuine eagerness to craft a truly 
democratic celebration for those from all walks of life to enjoy. Plans for a naval 
pageant to be held at Government House in Sydney were abandoned as White argued 
that it would ‘only be seen by a few and not by the multitude.’111 The administrators 
hoped for large crowds at all points of the itinerary. In anticipation, the Sydney 
organisers issued a pamphlet for the perusal of all would-be attendees that informed 
them of the behaviour expected. Evidently expecting a riot, this warned royal observers 
to ‘refrain from any action calculated to cause panic or other danger.’112 The throwing 
of confetti was ‘strictly prohibited’, it continued, as was the ‘waving of flags, 
handkerchiefs or other articles’ in the presence of horses. The public was particularly 
cautioned not to attempt to move locations in order to view the royal progress twice, but 
were directed in no uncertain terms to return by the nearest route straight home. Despite 
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the stern admonitions, politicians knew that the presence of crowds attending the 
Prince’s tour ensured its best chance of success. Edwin Kerby, a member of Hughes’ 
party, saw the visit as a means to mobilise Australians in support of imperialism, 
describing it as ‘the means of bringing all sections of the community together to show 
their loyalty to Throne and Empire.’113  
At the federal level in any case, it seems that, rather than being simply 
encouraged to gather together, there was something of an obligation to attend these 
supposedly spontaneous community demonstrations of loyalty. In the first instance, the 
government agreed to a recess of Parliament, so that all members ‘irrespective of party’ 
might attend the ‘spirit of welcome’ afforded to the Prince’s arrival in Melbourne.114 
The enforced attendance of parliamentarians is not too surprising perhaps, but what 
does underscore the mandatory nature of participation was Hughes’ decision in mid-
May to allocate one day’s public holiday pay, firstly to all other federal public 
servants.115 A few days later, following urging from the Opposition, he agreed that 
returned servicemen were also to be paid extra monies to cover the public holiday by 
the Repatriation Department, and apprentices, many of whom were also veterans, were 
to receive payment for a day away from their trade school training.116 Officials must 
have almost immediately begun to question the wisdom of this decision, as in no time at 
all the idea caught on and so it began that many Australian employees commenced 
spirited negotiations in search of a paid day off.  
If given the choice, it is assumed most Australian workers would likely chose to 
work rather than miss out on pay. Employees of the clothing trades in Perth, for 
example, politely informed their union that due to the ‘high costs of living and the small 
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wage’ afforded to them, they would rather work on the day of the Prince’s arrival.117 
Herein lay the dilemma. If a day’s pay was forthcoming, there was little to prevent 
people from instead gathering alongside their community to enjoy the spectacle. 
Employers had almost no choice but to grant a paid holiday to their workers or risk 
outrage if other local businesses or institutions set a precedent.118 Those who did have to 
work, such as train or tram workers, demanded double pay.119 What with the loss 
sustained by the lack of work completed in industry and services plus the extra costs of 
overtime, the cost to the state of one day day’s holiday must have been considerable. 
Of course, as previously discussed, some Australians intended to avoid the event 
whether they were paid or not and others saw only commercial gain by working during 
the celebrations. However, it must be said that knowledge of the large numbers of 
Australians across the country enjoying some sort of financial recompense does lend a 
new cynical perspective on the motivations of the great crowds who attended the tour. 
The ALP’s James Mathews’ prescient interpretation of Hughes’ favourable decision on 
public holiday pay as demanding of ‘compulsory loyalty’ can be usefully considered in 
the discussion of the reality of the tour in the following chapter.120 
Yet for all the supposed democracy of the rituals, the existence of an implicit 
code of patriotic behaviour for those participating in this people’s celebration is also 
evident. There was a distinct effort made by organisers to attempt to swell the ranks of 
the more responsible type of participant. The Australian administrators were universally 
in agreement with Grigg’s instructions regarding the tour’s focus on popular 
engagement, and in presenting the Prince as a friend of the Diggers. Public perceptions 
of the treatment of returned soldiers were of critical importance to both the British and 
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Australian governments, and demonstrated the revered yet complex position of these 
men in society immediately after their return. Here, too, lay the potential for supposed 
‘disloyalty.’ Neville Kirk, for example, has described how inter-war anti-British 
sentiment was fuelled by reports of the ‘incompetence, snobbery and indifference’ 
displayed to Anzac soldiers by British officers.121  
It was within the context of this reverence for the Digger that Grigg almost made 
a serious misjudgement in the management of the itinerary. After receiving an 
overwhelming level of interest from communities before and during the tour, he 
misguidedly attempted at a late stage to cancel all pre- arranged special functions for 
returned servicemen. It was impossible to accept just one or two invitations, he 
explained, and the sheer volume of invitations received was such that it was impossible 
to avoid creating ‘a feeling of unfairness and dissatisfaction’ among those who were 
rejected.122 This decision met with a stern warning from Munro Ferguson. ‘Returned 
soldiers regard their welcome as a principal feature of Prince’s visit’, he cautioned, 
fearing the decision to rely solely on impersonal mass parades and receptions as a 
means for veterans to see the Prince ‘would invite clamour and be most unpopular.’123  
The celebration of the Prince as a symbol of peace and military prowess 
dominated, but also allowed for a more nuanced acknowledgment of the personal cost 
of the conflict. While parades of healthy ex-servicemen could be arranged without too 
much logistical difficulty, there was a feeling that the Prince also ought to bear witness 
to the damage the war had wrought on the bodies of Australian men. The Victorian tour 
organiser fought for the right of incapacitated and disabled soldiers from the local 
Anzac hostel and Caulfield Military Hospital to participate in the local celebrations, 
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suggesting that the patients could be wheeled in their beds to a designated area.124 
Returned soldiers in uniform, were along with everyday spectators in many places 
entitled to free train travel to city centres from outlying regional areas.125 Free or cheap 
accommodation was arranged for returned men near to the city centres.126 More 
generally, accommodation for visitors was arranged via reputable organisations set up 
specifically to regulate the influx, prevent inflated costs by proprietors and secure an 
advance deposit.127 
Wherever possible, less suitable ‘disloyal’ groups thought to be dabbling in any 
form of radical or sectarian activity were simply excised from the route taken. In a 
country as large as Australia, this was a relatively straightforward and efficient means 
of shaping the popular reception of the tour to the administrators’ satisfaction. Munro 
Ferguson kept Grigg and the Colonial Office well-appraised of the potential tensions in 
Australian society. For example, after he had received reports of ‘hot-beds of 
extremists’, the northern stretches of the itinerary were curtailed at Maryborough, 
Queensland, with the official excuse being offered that it was unsafe for H.M.S Renown 
to proceed inside the Great Barrier Reef.128 As always, the extremists were a nebulous 
group, consisting of parts of the Irish community, many employed in the railways, 
policing and other services, as well as ‘aliens’ (i.e. non-citizens), and members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World, a Communist organisation that had been banned 
during the war.129  
These exclusions were easy enough to enforce in a state the size of Queensland 
without much comment. However, sometimes the views of hosts and visitors clashed 
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and the resulting excuses were revealed for what they were. During the planning of the 
Tasmanian section, Grigg discovered that the government led by Nationalist Premier 
Walter Lee had purposefully excluded the northern western Labor-voting region from 
the itinerary by neglecting to arrange transport for locals and directing the royal 
progress along the central belt. ‘The Tasmanian government is not playing the game … 
it is so important for the Prince of Wales to avoid being involved in unfairness of this 
kind’, he pleaded.130 Similarly, the notion of the ship arriving in Western Australia at 
the international port at Fremantle too was struck from the early plans, likely due to the 
violent confrontation between waterside workers, some of them soldiers, and police in 
May 1919. When it became known that H.M.S Renown would dock instead at the 
natural harbour at Albany, Fremantle workers responded with indignation to the 
explanation offered that their modern port was not deep enough to accommodate the 
battleship.131 
Other influences were unabashedly identified as unfavourable. Some members 
of the public were horrified at the selection of controversial public officials as hosts. For 
example, as the Queensland Premier Edward Theodore was scheduled to be in England 
during the visit, his deputy, prominent anti-conscriptionist John Fihelly along with 
Lieutenant-Governor William Lennon, were appointed to act as hosts in his absence. 
These men were avowed Irish republican sympathisers, had protested against 
conscription during the war, and were perceived as strongly anti-imperialist.132 In 1916, 
Fihelly had spoken out against the ‘bungling and ineptitude of British military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 NAA, A11052, 8. Telegram to White from Grigg, 11 July 1920. 
131 TNA, ADM 116/1871. Letter to Secretary, Fremantle Harbour Trust, from A.J. Lea Holt, 6 
July 1920.  
132 Rodney Sullivan, ‘Lennon, William (1849-1938)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography 
<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lennon-william-7172/text12393>, accessed 11 May 2014; 
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<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/fihelly-john-arthur-6169/text10597>, accessed 11 May 2014.  
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chieftains.’133 Four years later ‘party and religious feeling run high in Queensland’, 
Munro Ferguson told Milner, and ‘much bitterness has been aroused by the attitude of 
the Government’ during the war.134 
The Queensland judge Pope Cooper wrote anxiously of this as a ‘trap designed 
to threaten the safety of, or embarrass the Prince, or to whitewash these two Sinn Féin 
sympathisers by enabling them to offer him the hospitality of the state.’135 Similarly, 
Arthur Whittingham, the President of the ‘Queensland Club’, wrote in agitation to 
White, torn over his wish to offer official hospitality to the Prince but not to Fihelly and 
Lennon. These men would ‘not at all be acceptable as visitors to the Club’, he 
complained, and if it were compulsory to invite them ‘it will considerably affect not 
only the attendance but also the harmony of the evening.’136 
Other exclusions were more subtle. The Prince was seen as a thorough modern 
racial protector who served to unify and embody these elements most prized by the 
organisers, and the chance, as in McKenna’s words, to ‘bask in race pride.’137 In terms 
of invitations issued, or the organisation of culturally specific activities, the 
administration largely neglected the allegiance of major groups of non-British heritage 
such as Chinese Australians, and particularly German Australians.138 Although as 
discussed above, the Catholic community were vilified for their supposed disloyalty 
from conservative quarters, this does not seem to have extended to either their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Quoted in Raymond Evans, Loyalty and disloyalty: social conflict on the Queensland 
homefront, 1914-18 (Sydney, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 39. 
134 RA, EVIIIPWH/PS/VISOV/1920/AUS. Box 2, ‘Comptroller to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 
Australia 1920 main file.’ Letter to Milner from Munro Ferguson, 10 January 1920. 
135 RA, EVIIIPWH/PS/VISOV/1920/AUS. Box 2, ‘Comptroller to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 
Australia 1920 main file.’ Letter to Munro Ferguson from Cooper, 6 January 1920.  
136 NAA, A6678/R4/1/9 TO R4/1/30. Letter to White from Whittingham, 28 April 1920. 
137 McKenna, ‘Monarchy: From Reverence to Indifference’, p. 277. 
138 A ceremonial arch dedicated to the Prince by Sydney’s ‘Chinese Citizens’ can be glimpsed in 
Through Australia with the Prince of Wales, (1920) (dir. Bert Ive, Cinema and Photographic 
Branch, Department of Home and Territories, Commonwealth of Australia), item 9381, NFSA. 
This suggests that individual communities felt able to demonstrate their loyalty outside of the 
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prominent leaders or other religious affiliations. ‘The leaders of the Jewish community 
have been well-represented at both official and private festivities’, the Jewish Times 
would later note.139  
In contrast, Indigenous Australians were almost entirely absent from the 
itinerary; Australia’s Aboriginal population were simply not present in the minds of the 
organisers. It was not until the tour was well under way that White suggested to Grigg 
that a ‘native display of some kind’ could be staged as a diversion during the royal 
train’s long journey across the Nullarbor towards Adelaide.140 This is a powerful 
contrast to the active engagement with indigenous populations at earlier points of the 
tour. In New Zealand for example, equal status and prominence was afforded to both 
Maori and Pakeha dignitaries in welcoming the visitors to their communities, and 
frequent presence of Maori dancing, gift-giving and other cultural activities asserted 
their visibility. In a cinematographic film of the tour, the Prince is seen in conversation 
with Maori men identified as having fought with the Anzac troops during the First 
World War, legitimising and furthering their position as New Zealand’s first peoples on 
an equal standing to white residents.141 Image 9 
In this light, it is no longer remarkable to find that many aspects of the tour were 
deliberately orchestrated according to the dominant agenda of those involved. The final 
route travelled represents the exhaustive culmination of various competing prerogatives 
as to the type of Australia, and the type of community the Prince should see, with equal 
emphasis on what he should not see. Australian labour perceptions demonstrated a 
willingness to welcome the Prince as an individual rather than the representative of an 
institution. With little deliberate intervention on behalf of the British or Australia 
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White, undated, likely June 1920.  
141 50,000 miles with the Prince of Wales, (1920) (dir. William Barker, Topical Film Company). 
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administrators, the stage in 1920 was set for the entry of an innocuously democratic and 
benevolent monarch-to-be.  
 
Aboard H.M.S. Renown  
The royal party’s departure from Portsmouth in early March was briefly delayed due to 
an outbreak of influenza among the crew.142 Refurbishment work had for months been 
underway on H.M.S Renown, a lightly armoured battleship first launched in 1916 with 
the British fleet in the North Sea, and familiar to the Prince as the transport used for the 
Canadian tour. On returning to England, it was recommissioned in December 1919 for 
the Australian tour.143 Halsey was in charge of a staff of 1400. As well as the Prince’s 
inner retinue, H.M.S. Renown was also host to a significant representation of the British 
and Australian press. This contingent had an important role to play, not only in sending 
back accounts of the Prince’s visit for publication in their home countries, but also 
publicising the attractions of Australia and New Zealand to the Empire. Unlike in 
Britain, where the Establishment was able to exercise control over the conservative 
press through informal patronage, royal administrators were unable to influence the 
more candid Dominion press in quite the same way. When travelling in Australia, a 
steady and reliably favourable series of accounts of the journey could thus be syndicated 
directly to the major metropolitan and regional newspapers. While admitting that the 
cost of accommodating the journalists throughout the tour was not insignificant, Grigg 
assured Munro Ferguson that their presence would be ‘of permanent value in spreading 
knowledge in this country of Australian achievement and resources.’144 Nor were the 
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opportunities limited to within the Empire. Mark Sheldon, the Commonwealth 
Commissioner in New York, felt that any positive publicity that could be repeated in the 
American press ‘will do a lot of good … it will get the average American thinking in the 
right direction’ he said.145 Image 10 
There were six resident journalists on board. One was Keith Murdoch, the later 
press tycoon who was then managing the Australian United Cable Association in 
London, as well as Basil Long, the Dominions Editor for the London Times and Daily 
Mail, John Sandes of the Australian Press Association, Everard Cotes of Reuters who 
wrote for the Sydney Sun and the Melbourne Herald, and Victor Marsden, of the 
London Morning Post. Jack Myers of the London Morning Telegram joined the group 
in Melbourne. Grigg had to acknowledge that some were ‘rather difficult people’, 
although he stressed that Lloyd George and Milner hoped their presence would enhance 
the tour as ‘an imperial event of wide significance.’146 The difficult personalities seem 
to have made themselves known by the time the voyagers had reached Sydney, with the 
Prince describing ‘a bunch of the completest shits that call themselves pressmen…the 
biggest shit of the bunch is Keith Murdoch.’147  
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147 Letter to P. Sassoon from Edward, Prince of Wales, 5 July 1920, quoted in Peter Stansky, 
Sassoon: the worlds of Philip and Sybil (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 
97. This judgement seemingly originated from Murdoch’s preparation of an article that gently 
chided the Prince for an instance of lateness when in New Zealand (‘“THE UNPUNCTUAL 
PRINCE”’, Geelong Advertiser, Vic., 13 May 1920, p. 4). Later, the breakdown in the 
relationship would appear to have worsened: ‘LABOR CRITICISES AND EXPOUNDS WHY 
KEITH MURDOCH RETIRED’, Westralian Worker, Perth, W.A., 16 July 1920, p. 4. Murdoch 
was a supporter of Hughes and the nationalist cause. Geoffrey Serle, ‘Murdoch, Sir Keith 
Arthur (1885-1952)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/murdoch-sir-keith-arthur-7693/text13467>, accessed 29 
January 2016.  
	  	   124	  
The media strategy also included visual representation. Ernest Brooks was the 
official royal photographer.148 The British organisers were also well aware of the 
importance of cinematography as a new technology for promotion of the royal 
family.149 As British newspaper proprietor Lord Riddell opined, ‘of course everyone 
recognises the popularity and influences of the cinema.’150 The same can be said for the 
Australian context. Graham Shirley and Brian Adams describe 1920s cinematography 
as ‘an industrialised cultural force more potent and popular than any other medium.’151 
Matthews also describes how during the early years of the twentieth century, Australian 
cinema was the chief symbol of modernism, inspiring changes in fashion, celebrity, 
design, architecture, urban environment, photography and other media such as radio.152 
At this time, cinematography, and especially imported American films, exuded an 
enticingly morally suspect guise, perceived by conservatives as symptomatic of inter-
war social malaise.153  
But none could deny the value of a record of the Prince’s tour, and accordingly 
William Barker of the Topical Film Company was commissioned by the Admiralty to 
record ‘important and interesting incidents of his journey.’154 White was quick to 
capitalise on this as ‘a unique opportunity for advertising Australia’ and rushed to urge 
state organisers that they might prepare for Barker’s consideration a special program of 
opportunities for him to obtain ‘pictures which should be of value in advertising.’155 
The federal government’s Department of Home and Territories’ Cinema and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 NAA, A11052, 8. Minute titled ‘Press representatives on board H.M.S ‘Renown’, undated.  
149 The 1901 tour was also recorded by cinematographers.  
150 RA, EVIIIPWH/PS/VISOV/1920/AUS. Box 2, ‘Comptroller to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 
1920 tour, press arrangements.’ Letter to Grigg from Lord Riddell, 6 February 1920.  
151 Graham Shirley and Brian Adams, Australian cinema: the first eighty years (Sydney, 
N.S.W.: Angus & Robertson, 1983), p. 44. 
152 Matthews, Dance hall & picture palace, p. 15. 
153 Ibid., p. 199. 
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Photographic Branch was keen to follow suit and exploit the ‘historic value’ of a 
comprehensive visual record of the tour.156 At Melbourne, the journalistic entourage 
would be swelled by the addition of the Commonwealth Cinematographer, Bert Ive, and 
his assistant Henry Kellock. Image 11 
All this added up to a huge number of people who comprised the ship’s 
company. The extremes of rank and status on board had the potential to give rise to 
confusion, and caused some anxiety that the Australian government might inadvertently 
fail to observe some murky requirement of protocol and lay itself open to criticism. 
White urged officials engage respectfully with all members of the royal entourage given 
the sometimes misleading nature of their official titles. ‘It is found that the terms “clerk” 
and “servant” differ from our usual expectation’, he warned tactfully.157 The Sydney 
administrators put considerable effort into arranging recreational activities for the ship’s 
company when H.M.S. Renown would be at anchor during the Prince’s visit, including a 
concert by the ‘Cheer Oh! Girls’, free trips to the zoological gardens at Taronga Park, 
racecourses and the Blue Mountains, a picnic and a dance at Town Hall, plus a ‘liberal 
supply of cinematograph films’ for their entertainment.158  
H.M.S. Renown’s rescheduled departure took place on 16 March 1920. On 
leaving Freda, the Prince described how he ‘found going out of harbour a great strain on 
my self-control & all but cried like a baby again.’159 Yet although professing to be 
smitten by thoughts of his mistress, the Prince gave every appearance of enjoying 
himself on board. Careful consideration had been paid to his comfort and entertainment. 
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The on-board inventory included 29 cases of spirits, liquors, vermouths and bitters for 
the makings of a fine cocktail bar.160 A band entertained the crew and came ashore to 
play during dances that the Prince attended.161 Described by Stamfordham as often prey 
to ‘a craze of exercise’, Edward spent many hours running, clay pigeon shooting, and 
playing squash or hockey.162 His mania was reported on condescendingly by some 
sections of the Australian press. The ‘constant donning of shorts and promiscuous 
sprinting’ suggested that the Olympic Games were being held in Australia and ‘Eddie is 
an entrant for all events’, quipped the Worker.163 Image 12 
The ship travelled via Barbados, Colon, Panama, San Diego and Honolulu, 
arriving in Fiji on 20 April.164 Here, Grigg was able to peruse the latest details of any 
‘disloyalty’ in a fresh batch of Australian newspapers.165 Edward also met with two 
Australian naval officers who, with representatives of the New Zealand Governor-
General, had journeyed to submit their proposed programs in advance.166 Ziegler has 
described the New Zealand leg as ‘an important but relatively relaxed rehearsal for the 
main task ahead.’167 Yet despite Grigg’s pleas for free time every day and no early 
starts, the New Zealand Governor-General had approved a program of terrifying 
arduousness. It was possible to make some alterations to the Australian program, 
although Grigg noted approvingly that this was ‘exceedingly well-arranged.’168 There 
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was little time to change the New Zealand arrangements immediately under way. The 
ship arrived in Auckland on 24 April, for what would be a demanding tour, leaving the 
Prince and party exhausted before the next stage of the voyage: Australia. 
This chapter has examined the preparations for the 1920 Australian tour that 
ensued in both Britain and Australia following the end of the First World War with the 
aim of identifying the extent to which wartime perceptions of the Prince were sustained 
within broader pro-imperial imperatives. From its very beginnings, the royal tour was 
highly strategic in timing, scope and press approach. The four main aspects of the 
Prince’s persona – a symbol of the Crown, as an inspiration for peace, as a modern 
exemplar and as a member of the family – were promoted heavily throughout. 
Remarkably, Edward was seldom actively criticised; he was seen as an unwitting cog in 
a larger institutional system over which he had no control. Moreover, the enthusiasm 
with which Australians responded to the tour is undeniable. This reveals a widespread 
and prevalent eagerness to assert independence and, with the help of new types of visual 
media, promote the country’s attractions to their own strategic advantage. We may now 
turn to consider how the results of such extensive preparations played out during the 
tour that eventuated, and how these four qualities would become even more firmly 
embodied in the figure of the Prince.  
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Chapter 3: Our Digger Prince 
 
 [The] living symbol of that empire in whose achievements we have 
shared and whose glory is our pride. 
-The Farmer and Settler, 4 June 1920.1 
 
Charting Edward’s arrival in Melbourne in May 1920 through his onward journey 
through Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Queensland, to his departure from Sydney in August, this chapter provides the first 
detailed narrative of the royal tour of 1920. This allows us to examine Fewster’s 
argument that the royal visit enhanced the connection between the Crown and a 
significant proportion of the Australian population, in light of Beaumont’s observation 
that post-war imperial loyalty served as a long-lasting dominant political ideology.2 
Within this context, I observe that aspects of Edward’s individual persona flourished, 
becoming in the process ever more disassociated from his role as a political icon and 
formal guarantor of democracy. How did Australian perceptions of the Prince’s 
individual qualities – as a symbol of the Crown, as an inspiration for peace, as a modern 
exemplar and as a member of the family – feature in the celebrations across the 
country? What other cultural dynamics might emerge in such a study?  
This chapter will explore the ways the Prince’s qualities resonated in the 
perceptions of particular groups as he made his way across the country. It is important 
to note that sometimes these appear fleeting or state-specific, while others are repeated 
at almost every point of the journey. Nevertheless, all offer new insights into the 
contested loyalties present in Australia of 1920, and the hopes, fears and prejudices of 
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all those who came into contact with the ‘Digger’ Prince and his entourage. 
 
Establishing a popular precedent in Victoria 
The vigour of the welcome afforded to the royal party on landing in Melbourne set the 
tone for the rest of the state. H.M.S Renown arrived on 26 May following a rough 
crossing from New Zealand. Thick fog and unpredictable tides prevented the battleship 
from entering the harbour as planned, and the royal party were eventually ferried to St 
Kilda pier via the Australian destroyer H.M.A.S. Anzac and then the less glamorous P.S. 
Hygeia. Although unintentional, the hours of delay served only to heighten the 
anticipation of almost a million people – many more than the usual resident population 
– who lined the surrounding roads.3 The Prince was first welcomed with obsequious 
fanfare by Munro Ferguson and prime minister Hughes, followed by a tediously long 
line of ‘hundreds of other bearded old men.’4 It was then his turn to greet the gathered 
crowds. ‘The Australians must be handled with care’ the Governor-General advised, 
adding ‘they hate formality.’5 Unfortunately, this perception had not been taken into 
account in the arrangement for the royal progress, which featured all the wearisome 
ceremonials the Prince despised, especially the use of horses and carriages that he 
viewed as outmoded and dangerous.6 ‘We drove solemnly for 2 hrs through the streets 
in cocked hats till I thought I should die!!’ he complained to Freda.7  
Nonetheless, from most other perspectives it was a triumph of twentieth century 
royal diplomacy, demonstrating all the pageantry expected of the arrival of the King’s 
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son. The party proceeded to Government House, where the ferocity of the crowd soon 
became overwhelming. Halsey described how ‘the whole thing – although very nice – 
was extremely trying to the nerves ... the people, in their enthusiasm, kept up a regular 
bombardment of flowers, flags, nuts and other things.’8 The procession took hours 
longer than scheduled and the Prince and his staff arrived bruised and exhausted, 
although not without a profound sense of relief.  
The crowd’s enthusiasm seemed to confirm the predominance of loyalty to the 
Crown over the disloyalty thought to lurk in Melbourne’s population. As far as the royal 
party was concerned, the vast crowd was proof of the Prince’s physical presence as 
transcending social division and providing a neutral and democratic focal point for 
community celebration. Edward later recalled that any doubts he had entertained were 
overturned following the landing.9 Grigg was also thankful to find no vestige of 
Mannix’s supposedly ‘seditious and untiring propaganda.’10 The triumphant procession 
seemed testament to a wellspring of collective Australian support for imperialism. 
Journalist Donald McDonald perceived that ‘something heroic, Homeric, or very very 
human has plumbed the depths, and we stand dazed, perhaps a little bit in awe.’11 The 
industrialist Herbert Brookes wrote that: 
It was an inspiration. It was joy unspeakable … Those crowds! That 
welcome! This clean clear winsome Prince! … I was amazed by [the 
throng’s] continuous and thunderous and spontaneous welcome. 
Instinctively they felt the call of the blood, the tug at the roots of their 
souls when they beheld personified in this handsome youth the Unity 
of our Empire.12  
 
Not everyone was as enamoured. Although in distant northern New South Wales 
the Tamworth Daily Observer had heard that the arrival ‘represented every section of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1548A/28. Letter to King George V from Halsey, 2 June 1920. 
9 Windsor, A king’s story, p. 155. 
10 RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1548A/33. Letter to King George V from Grigg, 20 June 1920.  
11 ‘PRINCE AND PEOPLE’, The Argus, Melbourne, Vic., 5 June 1920, p. 6. 
12 NLA, MS 1924/1/6219, Herbert and Ivy Brookes papers. Letter to the Rev. T.E. Ruth from 
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society’, there is some suggestion that all was not quite as it seemed.13 The Catholic 
Press, for example, had claimed that ‘certain theatrical tricks’ had been employed in the 
pageantry, where the 20,000 troops stationed along the St Kilda road for the arrival 
were to be hurried over to East Melbourne to catch the end of the royal progress ‘to 
impress the Prince all over again.’14 In any case, considering that many were enjoying a 
paid holiday, it seems certain that not all attendees were compelled by loyalty alone. 
What we know of the attitudes of Anzac troops in Egypt, who were ambivalent towards 
royalty yet queued to obtain a ‘snap’ of the Prince for posterity, also suggests that the 
novelty of celebrity was a powerful draw. Dissenters seem to have comprised a modest 
minority. One ‘Sinn Feiner’ reportedly had his green flag ‘torn to tatters’ by two 
mothers of ex-servicemen.15 Bricklayer Alexander Thomas was arrested after slipping 
into a restricted area with a card bearing the words ‘Home Rule’ and a green flag, which 
he supposedly intended to throw at the Prince’s feet.16 Even taking into account the 
ambivalent and perhaps hostile perspectives present, it seems from enthusiastic reports 
that the majority of the crowd was wholeheartedly focused on the pursuit of a good day 
out. Image 13 
Irrespective of their place on the political and religious spectrum, many also 
seemed to positively relish the chance to heckle their parliamentary representatives. 
Hughes was both resoundingly booed and applauded during the royal progress. On one 
hand, Brookes gleefully perceived that ‘the little leader is now down and out once and 
for all’, while in contrast another spectator wrote to Hughes to express ‘horror and 
indignation at the cowardly and dastardly treatment meted out to you.’17 Significant 
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15 ‘PRINCE ARRIVES’, Daily Observer, Tamworth, N.S.W., 27 May 1920, p. 2. 
16 ‘ST. KILDA PIER INCIDENT’, The Ballarat Star Vic., 28 May 1920, p. 1. 
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here was Mountbatten’s perception that Hughes’ reception in no way interfered with the 
‘genuine cheers for H.R.H.’18 This not only confirms that attendees were profoundly 
divided over Hughes’ politics, but also that enthusiasm for Edward as an individual was 
seemingly uncompromised by the association. However, the more they saw of Hughes, 
both Grigg and Halsey would come to feel that the Prince should be disassociated from 
the Australian prime minister, both physically and politically.  
The carnival ascended to even greater heights over the following days. A 
multitude of events were aimed at ordinary Australians in the metropolitan area. Many 
Society functions such as balls, suppers and garden parties required invitations and so 
were limited to those deemed socially prominent or strategic by administrators. It was 
surely not insignificant, for example, that Frank Tudor’s daughter danced twice with the 
Prince on his first night in town.19 There were nonetheless dozens of other functions 
arranged for the multitude of holiday-making middle and working-class Australians 
who wished to lay eyes on the Prince. As well as the royal progress, events such as race 
meetings, cricket matches and military parades all required the attendance of crowds to 
be considered successful. The presentation of the Prince for the visual consumption of 
the people would become the tour’s defining characteristic, enhanced by its billing as a 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see the man ‘who is to be our King.’20 Most 
remarkably, Melbourne’s Royal Exhibition Building was host to Australia’s first so-
called ‘People’s Reception’, where, as Grigg had envisioned, attendees were admitted 
‘without ticket or social selection of any kind.’21 Here the Prince stood on a dais for two 
hours as 20,000 people trotted past five abreast, craning their necks, at a rate of 170 per 
minute. This type of mass public event reinforced Australian perceptions of the Prince’s 
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accessibility but not his capacity for exhaustion. Perceptively, Edward recognised the 
need to echo the Australians behaviour with his own, writing that they were a ‘very go 
ahead modern people & ultra democratic & as soon as one realises this & their energy 
and exuberance of spirits one gets on well with them.’22 However, the People’s 
Reception was not without its dangers. The crush in the Royal Exhibition Building 
caused over a hundred people to faint and three were hospitalised.23 Image 14 
Events also delivered the Prince directly to the working people in the outer 
suburbs and regions. At Flemington, in southern Melbourne, he attended a purposely 
arranged Royal Agricultural Show, enabling many Australians ‘belonging to the country 
districts’ who had been unable to travel to the inner-city to see him.24 Similarly, as 
Grigg pointed out, the departure from Port Melbourne allowed the Prince to receive ‘a 
wonderful send-off from all the people of the poorer districts.’25 The Victorian itinerary 
also called for day trips by train through regional areas such as Geelong, Winchelsea 
and Colac. Edward either stopped briefly to exchange a few words with a local dignitary 
or simply waved from the train as it passed. To the delight of observers, in Bendigo he 
donned brown overalls and descended down a mine-shaft accompanied by Hughes, 
who, according to Mountbatten, stood at the bottom ‘telling “funny” stories about what 
happened when the rope broke.’26  
While this concerted effort made it possible for many poorer, elderly or 
geographically-isolated Australians to have visual access to the Prince, there were 
limits. Many could not afford the time away from home or the expense of travelling to 
an observation point. Annie Jackson, living on a remote station near Ivanhoe on the 
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New South Wales border, regretted that ‘dry, bad times will not permit of my going to 
the city to see everything, but one has to look after the men folk these droughty times – 
they have such long days of toil and worry.’27 Similarly, Sabai Island schoolchildren 
wrote from the Torres Strait to tell the Prince how ‘we wish we could meet you, but we 
are too far away.’28  
Nonetheless, the fervent media coverage of the Prince’s every move allowed 
every Australian to follow his journey should they choose to do so. This illustrates how 
events are created for readers through these communicative rituals, rather than merely 
reflecting an accurate portrayal. The journalists from H.M.S. Renown who were 
travelling in the Prince’s party were true to the direction of the British administrators to 
present the event as one of great imperial significance, which they seemed to interpret 
as regaling readers with the most tedious of minutiae. This met with only disgust from 
their local Australian counterparts; these men were ‘comporting themselves in a way 
which would only be pardonable if the Prince were the Messiah’, observed the World.29 
The pressmen appeared to have ‘searched the English vocabulary for the most lavish 
phrases’, despaired the National Advocate.30 Others ridiculed some of Murdoch and 
Sandes’ most trite observations concerning Edward’s ‘smooth’ hair, or the ‘well-worn’ 
appearance of his belt (concluding it had ‘evidently seen service at the front’).31 Image 
15 
Whether obsequious or wry, the press’ intimate observance combined with 
heightened visual accessibility served only to enhance the Prince’s familiarity to the 
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public eye. Considering Halsey’s complaint about the time spent managing the ‘very 
heavy correspondence received from all classes of the community’, including those 
‘who wish their grievances laid before the Prince’, we might surmise that Australians 
felt comfortable addressing him directly.32 Edward did seem to genuinely enjoy 
engaging with individuals, and his all-too obvious dislike for officialdom resonated with 
the anti-authoritarian leanings of the population. In this way, he successfully integrated 
himself with Australians almost as if a member of the family. ‘He just does wonders 
with the general public’, Halsey remarked of the Prince’s propensity to delay the 
program by stopping to talk with people.33 Edward himself observed the Australian 
tendency to distinguish the monarch from their British antecedents. Australians were 
‘far more loyal to you than they are actually fond of the Old Country which they can’t 
resist having a dig at sometimes’, he told his father.34 It seems Australians were 
unreserved in their willingness to project aspirational qualities onto this rather ordinary 
man, and in their readiness to disengage him from his symbolic role. Edward had yet to 
set foot outside Victoria when the Sydney-based Farmer and Settler confidently 
asserted that his character comprised more than ‘the dignity that doth hedge about a 
throne’, perceiving ‘a strong kinship of feeling with the people.’35  
Bearing in mind Pickering’s argument that Australians’ ability to differentiate 
between individual monarchs and the institution they represented has enabled the 
survival of the monarchy despite the poor behaviour of the incumbent, this evidence 
also suggests that Edward’s early popularity and ‘good’ behaviour did much to buttress 
lukewarm local support for the institution by reflecting becomingly on imperialism and 
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modernity more generally.36 Some observers, for example, unquestioningly concluded 
that he held certain elevated social and moral values, as well as a practical capacity to 
effect change. For example, although he had previously protested against the spending 
of public funds on the tour, William Maloney was also certain that the Prince’s 
sympathy lay with social justice for the poor, suggesting that Edward might ‘take a 
quiet drive’ through Melbourne’s deprived areas with a view to making some statement 
‘that slums and slumdom should be abolished.’37  
However, by the same token, some of the Prince’s supposedly democratic and 
modern qualities offended more conservative sensibilities. His staff and journalists had 
to work hard to manage his profile. Following a range of both facetious and hostile New 
Zealand press concerning the Prince’s taste for modest gambling and allegations that he 
danced only with the prettier women, ALP Member James Mathews held the view that 
conservatives had not been ‘giving the Prince a chance’ and that the more opinionated 
of the press should be supressed under a clause in the War Precautions Act that 
prevented inciting contempt towards or hatred of the monarchy.38 The nationalist 
journalist and politician Randolph Bedford also held that the ‘heavily-veiled’ 
protestations of the ‘loyal wowsers’ succeeded only in making the ‘kindly lad’ an object 
of ridicule.39  
Unfortunately some Australians were undeniably irked by the Prince’s 
supposedly irreverent attitude to modern temptations. The ‘Christian Evidence 
Propaganda’ group, for example, despaired over the inclusion of ‘the things that are 
trivial and void of real worth, such as races and dancing’ on the Prince’s itinerary, and 
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37 NAA, A11052, 2. Letter to Munro Ferguson from Maloney, 3 June 1920.  
38 Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Debates’, 28 April 1920, p. 1532. 
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the neglect of adequate ‘time for prayer and praise to almighty God.’40 Melbournian 
James Challis also wrote to voice his ‘great grief’ concerning the Prince’s liking for a 
flutter and implored him to ‘set a right example in all things.’41  
The Prince’s greatest success was with the returned soldiers in his role as an 
inspiration for peace. As would be repeated elsewhere in the country, many Victorian 
events incorporated public displays of gratitude towards returned servicemen. With his 
presence as a validation of sacrifice, the Prince’s itinerary was interleaved with visits to 
war memorials and monuments. As Ken Inglis has suggested, the construction and 
veneration of monuments provide a means for a community to focus on ‘pride and 
gratitude for its successful heroes [and assuage] the sense of grief elicited by the deaths 
of its heroic failures.’42 In Ballarat, for example, the Prince officiated over the opening 
of a 14-mile tree-lined ‘Avenue of Honour.’ Fronted by a memorial Arch of Victory, 
over 4,000 trees each commemorated a local soldier in a powerful and vernacular 
expression of honour and memorialising. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the 
Prince’s public utterances were reduced to simply a piece of inspiring rhetoric devoid of 
political or personal agenda. In Ballarat, for example, he identified himself as a fellow 
‘soldier of the Empire’, praised the town’s ‘splendid troops’ and offered sympathy to 
those who had suffered disablement or loss.43  
Privately however, Edward’s views differed. ‘I went to the races at Flemmington 
[sic] but I only got 2 hrs racing as I had to go to a hospital for incurable returned men to 
visit about 20 spinal cases which was sordid & pathetic!!’ he grumbled.44 But the 
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returned soldiers’ affection for the Prince was much in evidence. Edward described how 
during the royal progress many drunken ex-servicemen ‘tried to jump into the barouche 
in their efforts to do in that unfortunate right hand of mine.’45 During a more restrained 
function, Halsey noted that ‘nothing could have been nicer than the quiet and delightful 
way in which these men received him.’46 Image 16 
The royal party considered their time in Victoria an outstanding success. The 
sense of civic celebration remained heightened throughout. ‘It’s frightfully touching & I 
do appreciate it all so much!! It beats anywhere in Canada’, Edward told his mother.47 
Australian perceptions of the Prince as a thoroughly modern monarch-to-be, and 
possessing an egalitarian dislike of authority resonated across the state. The intensity of 
the program had taken its toll on his health however, and his voice all but disappeared. 
In an attempt to lower the hubbub in Kyneton, Victoria, two orderlies had taken to 
holding up signs printed with ‘Silence’ to help Edward avoid delivering his speech at a 
shout.48 Mountbatten thought that the strenuousness of the program had been ‘more than 
even a super-human could be expected to stand.’49 To Freda, the Prince wrote: 
I’m becoming such a wreck & I’m afraid I’m beginning to look it now 
as I’m always hearing “Oh isn’t he tired” muttered in the crowds … 
I’m so stale that I’ve just ceased to worry now & hardly ever look at 
the programme & often haven’t the least idea where I’m going.50  
 
The schedule was delayed by one week for recuperation in anticipation of the 
arduous program ahead. H.M.S. Renown left Melbourne on 13 June bound for the New 
South Wales coast.  
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Wooing the workers in New South Wales 
Despite the triumph of the Victorian section of the tour, the royal party were assailed 
with fresh misgivings about how Australian public opinion might change from state to 
state. A ‘sinister’ motive was mooted when forged tickets to restricted areas were found 
by officials to be in circulation, sparking fears that ‘persons bent on making a disloyal 
demonstration’ were at work.51 Joseph Clarkson, a New South Wales policeman, was 
dispatched to investigate a claim alleged by a member of the public that the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW) were planning an attack.52 Having conducted some 
modest enquiries, Clarkson found no evidence for the suggestion the group meant the 
Prince any harm, and also put to rest any concerns the royal party had about Sinn Féin 
supporters in New South Wales.53 Without firm evidence to the contrary, however, it 
seems that, as in Victoria, the charge of disloyalty was mostly exaggerated and those 
who opposed imperialism as the dominant political rhetoric given their nationalist or 
labour principles had in fact little outright objection to the figure of the Prince per se.  
As it turned out, the greatest tension at play during the New South Wales tour 
was the rancorous relationship between Munro Ferguson and the Governor of New 
South Wales, Walter Davidson. Like governors of other states, Davidson resented the 
Governor-General’s constitutional precedence as the King’s representative. As the states 
held their own legislative power maintaining a direct relationship with the monarch in 
which the Commonwealth could not interfere, he fought to greet the Prince on his own 
independent terms and secure a major role for his Labor Premier, John Storey, as the 
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people’s representative. Sparks flew when the Governor-General indicated that he 
himself would be first to welcome the Prince onshore in Sydney, (having only recently 
welcomed him to the country in Melbourne) and would present him to the Governor and 
the Premier. It was inconceivable, Storey protested, that Munro Ferguson could ‘be 
regarded as representative of the people of this State.’54 Although Davidson went so far 
as to allege a plot to ‘frame the functional ceremonials so as to arrogate all authority and 
position’ to the Commonwealth, and ‘belittle’ his own role, he was forced into 
acquiescence.55 Milner had to pointedly remind Davidson that Munro Ferguson acted on 
commands issued by the King.56 
Unaware of the vigorous debate, the Prince arrived at Farm Cove on 16 June. 
Once again, a thunderous welcome greeted him. The sirens of the flotilla of both naval 
and privately owned watercraft waiting in the bay were so exuberant that the crew of 
H.M.S Renown had trouble hearing orders on board.57 On land, a crowd of around a 
million people waited in the streets for Munro Ferguson to perform his irksome 
ceremonials and allow the royal visitor to embark on his first royal progress to 
Government House. As in Melbourne, Grigg recalled how ‘the drive through the streets 
of Sydney lasted over an hour, and was one long scene of wild enthusiasm.’58 One 
might wonder how much the rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne was a factor in the 
decision of spectators to attend. In one breath, the Sydney Evening News was able to 
describe the ‘mad delight’ of the crowd but also their ‘sporting instinct’ to avoid rushing 
the car in a repeat of the ‘Melbourne experience.’59 Afterwards, Davidson could not 
resist claiming that ‘the thunderous acclamations among all classes’ were evidence of a 
‘desire to show that Sydney can do these better and in more orderly fashion than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 TNA, CO 418/192. ‘Minute for His Excellency the Governor’ by Storey, 1 May 1920.  
55 TNA, CO 418/192. Letter to Munro Ferguson from Davidson, 10 May 1920.  
56 NAA, A6690, 1. Letter to Davidson from Milner, 29 July 1920.  
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Melbourne.’60 This demonstrates how Australians could be both intensely ‘British’ and 
also deeply loyal to their own state or district. Image 17 
One common element between the two cities was the apparent lack of any real 
conflict between ‘loyal’ and left-wing or working-class spectators, all the more 
surprising given the howls of the pro-imperialists before the Prince arrived in the 
country. Even the more radical of the Labor politicians and supporters seemed to have 
revised their previously staunch determination to avoid the event, perhaps in light of the 
popular success of Melbourne. Although some groups adhered to their disinclination to 
engage with the preparations (the city’s Labour [sic] Council had ‘not helped with the 
City’s illuminations and decorations at all’, one observer complained), this did not 
preclude their attendance at the celebrations.61 The Lord Mayor, William Fitzgerald, a 
labourite and Sinn Féin supporter, for example, participated in the procession although 
he was resoundingly booed by the crowd. The Labor Treasurer Jack Lang also recalled 
with condescension how one former Trade Hall official kept a bundle of photographs, 
‘which for years afterwards he used to pull out of his drawer at the slightest excuse’ to 
point out himself in the vicinity of the Prince.62 Even allowing for some sentimentality, 
the Labor position in New South Wales largely followed the respectful rationale 
advocated by Storey and others during the preparations. This is best summarised by the 
National Advocate as the desire to: 
Treat [Edward] as a real big man, and not as some extraordinary being 
or monstrosity, as depicted by the gush writers. Let us treat the future 
King as a King amongst us – a leader to whom we look with pride.63 
 
Labor participants made clear their stance against ‘snobbishness’, apparently as 
per the democratic desire of the Prince, but nonetheless committed to a rousing 
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welcome as they would for any important visitor. The wily Hughes was well-aware of 
this body of opinion and went so far as to modify his own appearance during the royal 
progress in order to appease both ends of the voting spectrum. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, despite instructions that no Australian should go to unnecessary 
expense in preparing for the visit, the issue of appropriate clothing and especially 
headwear had become of almost unbearable importance. Wishing to avoid being seen to 
acquiesce in British-imposed officialdom, Labor parliamentarians had been 
‘conspicuous in soft grey felt hats’ at St Kilda.64 Hughes, furthermore, insisted on 
bringing a cumbersome hatbox in the carriage with him, leaving ‘no room for 
anybody’s legs in the middle.’65 The reason became clear after the procession started, 
when:  
with almost a conjuror’s deftness, Mr Hughes whipped off the shiny 
silk topper, opened the box and produced a battered soft hat that he 
donned in its place, saying with a wink “you can’t be too careful. That 
top hat might have cost me thousands of votes.” However, as 
Government House hove into sight, the old felt hat was returned to the 
box; and the Prime Minister smilingly restored to his head the 
topper.66 
 
The determination of Labor politicians to treat the Prince as a welcome visitor 
seems to have extended to many of the spectators. Halsey, at least, perceived that ‘the 
Bolshies and Sinn Feiners … are completely captured by him.’67 Whether widespread or 
not, this does indicate some degree of workers’ support for the monarchy outside of 
political battlegrounds and underpins the successful presentation of the event as a 
benign chance to see a benevolent visiting celebrity. Image 18 
Support extended throughout the tour of regional New South Wales. The party 
was first to travel to Toronto via the picturesque Hawkesbury River and then to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 ‘THE PRINCE ARRIVES’, Geelong Advertiser, Vic., 27 May 1920, p. 3. 
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Newcastle where the Prince was to officially launch the steamship S.S. Enoggera at the 
Walsh Island dockyard on the Hunter River. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, 
activity at Walsh Island helped increase Australian industry and ‘uphold the British 
boast of “Britain Rules the Waves.”’68 Although included on the itinerary for its 
ostensible role as manufacturing powerhouse for the Empire, whether this was an 
attitude shared by its workers was far less certain. As elsewhere, the royal party had 
viewed the scheduled tour through regional New South Wales with characteristic 
trepidation, unsure of how receptive some working areas would be to the arrival of the 
Prince. Halsey feared that workers in Newcastle were ‘the most advanced, and in some 
sections, revolutionary, in Australia.’69  
Initially, their troubles were to be found closer to home. Storey had both 
successfully curtailed Hughes’ desire to attend the Hawkesbury cruise and arranged 
matters so all those on board were members of his own government. Mountbatten 
explained that the day had begun badly for the royal party, when ‘all who struggled 
down for breakfast showed distressing signs of the debauchery of the night before.’70 
The prospect of a five-hour journey on a small boat gave all on board the chance to 
canvas the royal visitor, who had no hope of escape. For the Prince, this was the ‘worst 
day of the whole trip, certainly the most jarring to the nerves.’ Their scheme, he 
maintained, was to ‘get poor little me all to themselves’ while enjoying ‘an oyster & 
champagne orgy.’71 Nonetheless, Halsey thought that they were all ‘very anxious to be 
polite’ with the exception of Lang, intent on urging the Prince to subscribe to a state 
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drought loan, who showed ‘some signs of indignation when his request was not 
immediately acceded to.’72  
However, as the cruise wore on, all of the Ministers except Storey grew ‘toxy’ 
and to the royal party’s horror they were invited to participate in a sing-song.73 
Mountbatten recalled how the lunch descended into drinking games during which the 
ministerial delegation smashed many of the glasses and plates. ‘A sickly smile which 
spread over H.R.H.’s features was mistaken by the glee party as a smile of approval, so 
that they burst forth into another half a dozen songs, yelling at the unfortunate Staff to 
join in’, he recorded.74 Image 19 
Though the journey seemed to justify fears of the Prince becoming drawn into 
controversial matters by conniving politicians, the remainder of the Newcastle trip 
proved trouble-free. The local newspaper offered the perspective that many spectators 
had gathered in celebration of their community, declaring ‘this was Newcastle’s day out 
with a vengeance’, characterised by a ‘good humor [sic] which prevailed universally.’75 
This was held as a moment of some significance in the town’s history and local identity. 
‘I feel as though something had happened’ said one ‘cynic’ afterwards, ‘I feel as if the 
world had turned upside down.’76 No social or political discontentment at Walsh Island 
was discernible to Mountbatten, who wrote of the ‘genuine enthusiasm of the dockyard 
workers, and their pleased expression’ at seeing Edward.77 Similar scenes took place 
during the inspection of the steel works of the Broken Hill Company, where he was 
‘loudly cheered by great crowds, not only of the population of all sorts, but of the 
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gathered working men’, recalled Halsey in surprise.78 ‘“___ [sic] but he’s a nice bloke”’ 
a ‘wild and woolly gentleman’ was heard to agree.79 
The trip confirmed earlier indications that there was widespread Australian 
support for the Prince even from what were perceived, from a British point of view, as 
unlikely sources such as trade unionists and workers. Grigg’s focus on popular 
engagement via the medium of visual accessibility successfully convinced observers of 
the Prince’s empathetic qualities and interest in the issues faced by the Australian 
working-classes. The Newcastle Sun, for example, accepted that exceptions could be 
made in the usually distasteful celebration of imperial pomp and privilege, provided that 
person upheld the duties of their office and exhibited appropriately egalitarian qualities. 
‘We revere our institutions and we revere the men and women who typify those 
institutions’, the editor concluded, adding also ‘we have a very genuine regard for the 
smiling English boy who has come to strengthen those bonds that bind Australia … to 
the Union Jack.’80 
Although Halsey had written gloomily of how he ‘would be glad when it was 
over’, there was still a long way to go.81 Despite his week off-duty following the 
Melbourne leg of the tour, the Prince’s health continued to fail. Speaking of the 
excessively busy itinerary, he likened himself to a ‘man caught in a revolving door.’82 
His staff encouraged him to eat breakfast, and to go to bed before midnight in an effort 
to ease the strain, but found this difficult to enforce. ‘His conduct is irreproachable 
except in the matter of sleep, cigarettes and food’ wrote Munro Ferguson to 
Stamfordham.83 It was not long, however, before a solution presented itself.  
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As foreshadowed even during the preparatory stage, Grigg’s concerns over the 
controversial side-by-side representation of British alongside Australian naval power 
continued to grow. Hughes’ planned visit to Rabaul now seemed ‘extremely 
objectionable.’84 Grigg felt the event would prove controversial, as he perceived that 
‘the Australian navy is not going to be kept up afterwards’, not to mention the potential 
criticism Hughes would attract for chaperoning the Prince while also making it clear 
that he did not intend to invite along members of the Opposition.85 ‘It is neither 
dignified nor politic for His Royal Highness to be associated with a piece of empty 
gesticulation which will impress nobody but may be a serious cause of embarrassment’ 
he reprimanded Munro Ferguson.86  
As a safer alternative, the Rabaul visit and the preceding overland journey from 
South Australia to Queensland was substituted for a week or two in the ‘backblocks’; a 
period of recreation, hunting and horse-riding hosted by the state’s most prominent 
pastoral families. Edward felt this plan offered ‘far more value than seeing a crowd of 
revolting black savages.’87 The change in schedule was pitched as necessary for the 
Prince’s health in the hope of throwing Hughes off the scent.  
 
Accommodating nationalism in Western Australia  
After leaving New South Wales, Edward gained little respite during the rough voyage 
across the Bight to Western Australia. ‘He is not at all what you would call a good 
sailor’ Halsey remarked.88 H.M.S Renown arrived in Albany on 30 June, where they 
were welcomed by the newly appointed state Governor, Francis Newdegate, before 
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continuing by rail to Perth. Munro Ferguson was formally represented from Western 
Australia onwards by Duncan-Hughes, his aide-de-camp. Nevertheless, in what was 
proving a regular idiosyncrasy, the overly zealous Newdegate caused consternation to 
the royal party by his evident wish to attend various functions and day trips alongside 
the Prince. Although prior to Edward’s arrival he had been gently warned against 
seeking the Prince’s company due to holding higher office, Newdegate made clear his 
position on federal interference in his relationship with the Crown. At first, he protested 
his innocence, claiming he thought ‘a humble individual like myself would attract no 
attention in a new state where I am not well known’ even when parading in the 
company of royalty.89 He was given the benefit of the doubt, but it was not long before 
he annoyed Duncan-Hughes by making surprise appearances at the Prince’s functions. 
After being assigned what was clearly an inferior seat position during a function, 
Duncan-Hughes had to conclude that Newdegate and the Nationalist Premier, James 
Mitchell, were consciously limiting the visibility of Commonwealth representatives.90  
A few days later the royal party travelled south to Fremantle, chiefly to atone for 
the earlier insult to the port’s waterside workers. It seems no grudge was held, and the 
day of the Prince’s visit was declared a public holiday, specifically so that ‘local 
employees’ could attend.91 Despite inclement weather, this must have contributed to 
participants’ enjoyment of festivities. The Prince expressed mild regret over the 
itinerary and was careful to pay tribute to Fremantle’s ‘very fine’ harbour.’92 He visited 
more workers a few days later, during an inspection of the southern timber-getting 
region of Pemberton. This area was one of the first destinations set aside for the 
government’s Group Settlement Scheme of 1921. Throughout the early 1920s, this 
Empire-wide scheme encouraged mainly British migrants to rural localities such as the 
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ancient jarrah and karri forests of Western Australia. Incentives included assisted 
passages and generous land leases if the land could be successfully cleared by collective 
labour. According to Everard Cotes, one of the H.M.S. Renown journalists, it was hoped 
that the export of produce and timber fuelled by migrant labour would be enabled by 
both the international port at Fremantle and the newly-established Tran Australian 
Railway linking Western Australia to the eastern states.93 Like other states, the Western 
Australian government’s resentment towards the federal presence was overruled by their 
desire to market their state to the visiting party on their own terms.  
The most dramatic incident of the tour occurred on the return journey from 
Pemberton, on the railway line between Jandalup and Bridgetown. In the aftermath of 
heavy rain, the rails buckled in the soft terrain, sending the last two carriages of the 
royal train containing the Prince’s party and the Ministerial party hurtling sideways 
where they were dragged along for a short distance before coming to rest on the siding. 
Edward and Halsey were writing letters in the final carriage together, but were able to 
escape unscathed through a broken window. Had the train not just a moment before 
slowed to allow a cow to amble over the line, the results could have been disastrous for 
all concerned. ‘We both thought our time had come’, Halsey told his father.94 Although 
it was not initially clear what had happened, all were delighted to find themselves 
uninjured and took the accident in good spirits. Mountbatten describes how, on going to 
the Prince’s aid, he first passed up a ‘precious cocktail shaker’ and joked about having 
accomplished something ‘not on the official programme.’95  
The inner retinue were quick to find some light relief at the expense of their 
hosts, particularly the Minister for Works, William George (‘a most offensive & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Cotes, Down under with the prince, pp. 145-46. 
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revolting old rustic who we loathe’) who had been caught in the ‘convenience’, 
emerging in déshabillé.96 The Premier did not suffer any injury, noted Mountbatten, 
‘owing, perhaps to his natural rotundity.’97 To Freda, the Prince boasted he would rather 
encounter a ‘cushy accident like today than make a speech at any time.’98 But he does 
nonetheless seem to have been rattled, later writing to his mother how he loathed being 
on the train and had “the wind up me” the whole time!!’99 Still, his initial calm on 
emerging from the wreckage, in the presence of the anxious media contingent, ensured 
his public popularity suffered no harm. ‘His coolness has gained him much admiration’, 
wrote Duncan-Hughes.100 And when it reappeared in the local press, Mountbatten’s 
account of rescuing the Prince had been resoundingly embellished, demonstrating again 
the profound influence the particular linguistic and stylistic properties of the H.M.S. 
Renown journalists wielded over local perceptions of events. In a manner reminiscent of 
a music hall skit, the West Australian claimed the Prince was discovered ‘reclining amid 
the wreck of the costly carriage, smiling and smoking a cigar. “Hurt!” he cried in 
response to anxious enquiries through the overhead windows. “Bless your heart, no! 
And I’m glad to say the whisky flask is not broken either.”’101 Although barely credible, 
accounts of the Prince’s flippancy further encouraged public perceptions of his down-
to-earth nature. Returning to Perth, Cotes perceived that ‘the crowd plainly showed its 
impression that he had taken a bit of rough luck in the best Australian manner.’102  
There was however much wringing of hands from the West Australian 
authorities, who were understandably ‘terribly woe-begone [sic]’ that such a thing 
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should have happened in their state.103 In the immediate aftermath of the accident, some 
feared it had been an attack on the prince by an anti-British group. The Victorian police 
officer George Howard, for example, had previously warned of the large numbers of 
‘dangerous individuals in the Western State, some of whom the Police regard as being 
“up to anything.”’104 And although a small pilot train had preceded the royal train on the 
day of the accident, and ‘line watchers’ were stationed along the track, the lighter 
carriages passed safely over the warped rails.105 Despite the incident proving to be 
nothing more sinister than an accident, Munro Ferguson was quick to blame the local 
officials. As he put it, ‘the royal train itself was crowded up with anyone who could 
gain a footing on it’, pointing to the ‘droves’ of Western Australian parliamentarians 
and dignitaries ‘joy riding’ on board. He concluded, rather unfairly, that the accident 
was attributable to a ‘considerable carelessness and that “casualness” which is often a 
characteristic of newly developed communities.’106 The royal party quickly made a 
number of public statements to anxious Western Australians testifying to their good 
health. 
Following this spike in the state’s publicity, Western Australians living along 
later points of the tour could hardly be unaware of the Prince’s impending arrival. The 
royal party were unsure of their reception among the goldfields population at Northam, 
Coolgardie and then Kalgoorlie. Strikes the previous year spoke of the tension between 
unionised and non-union workers, although the contemporary press indicates that the 
population was at least receptive to the arrival of the Prince. ‘Hats off to Prince Eddie, 
we hear that he’s a sport’, wrote ‘Axeman’ of Northam, offering to ‘fill him up well 
with beer’, give him a good welcome from the local ‘flappers’ (nothing how ‘he often 
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smelt powder before’), sustain him with a locally-made meat pie and a tour of the local 
drinking dens.107 Despite these good intentions, the royal party perceived the response 
that eventuated as decidedly subdued, and the ‘people weren’t over-enthusiastic.’108 
Coolgardie, in particular, wrote Cotes, suffered from a declining population, although: 
all that were left had turned out to meet the Prince. It was a curious 
assemblage, largely consisting of men past work and women and 
children, who still cling to wooden shanties fast falling into decay, 
amidst spoil heaps and ruins of fine public buildings, a great place 
once but a sad spectacle now.109 
 
Mountbatten reported here that the local Australian Workers Union (AWU) 
members had forbidden their children to take part in a display, but that ‘not one’ local 
child was missing in the final ‘burlesque.’110 Generally, it has been difficult to calculate 
to what extent previous dissenters stood firm in their avowal to boycott the Prince’s 
tour, or prevent their children from participating. Unquestionably, some did not attend. 
In this case, however, Mountbatten goes on to explain how a well known AWU member 
was in attendance, and ‘wearing a red tie.’ When asked why he had come, he explained 
that his two children were in the procession and ‘the missus made me come to look after 
them.’ While this man made an attempt to signify his political stance with his clothing, 
he was nonetheless present. Similarly, another man in the crowd refused to remove his 
hat in the presence of the Prince.111 We can perhaps attribute this to the reasons already 
discussed; that the provision of a paid holiday and the enthusiastic participation of other 
sections of communities may have provided an incentive to attend. 
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Although sometimes to considerable strain, the royal party had accommodated 
with good grace the fervent ambitions of local politicians to exploit the promotional 
opportunities of the tour. At Kalgoorlie the royal party boarded the Trans Australia 
railway for the three-day journey to Adelaide, South Australia. Privately, Edward could 
barely face ‘the mere thought of tackling another capital’ so soon.112 
 
Promoting expansion in South Australia 
The party disembarked next at Cook, a tiny railway rest stop and connection to Ooldea, 
a distant mission under the management of the anthropologist Daisy Bates. Around 
sixty male and female Aboriginal residents had been transferred by train to meet the 
royal entourage. Here a range of what were described as ‘weird ceremonial dances’ 
were performed for the edification of the visitors.113 This was Edward’s only direct 
contact with Aboriginal people during the tour, in itself illustrative of dismissive early 
twentieth century attitudes towards Australia’s Indigenous population. Bates, thought by 
Halsey a ‘most wonderful Englishwoman’, subscribed to the prevailing official view of 
Aboriginal people in place since the colonial era – that of a race in moral and physical 
decline.114 As Cotes recounted, ‘these wretched people appear to be rapidly dying out 
despite liberal grants from the Commonwealth and State Governments to educate and 
feed them.’115 Bates evidently wished to highlight the novelty of the situation, so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Edward, Prince of Wales, Letters from a prince, p. 347. Letter to Dudley Ward from Edward, 
Prince of Wales, 11 July 1920.  
113 Cotes, Down under with the prince, p. 160-61. 
114 Ann Curthoys and Jessie Mitchell, ‘“Bring this paper to the Good Governor”: Aboriginal 
Petitioning in Britain’s Australian Colonies’, in Saliha Belmessous (ed.), Native claims: 
indigenous law against empire, 1500-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 182-
203, p. 183; RA, PS/PSO/GV/C/O/1548A/53. Letter to King George V from Halsey, 17 July 
1920.  
115 Cotes, Down under with the prince, p. 160-61. 
	  	   153	  
instructed those present to do ‘everything as if they were in their wild state again … 
there was not a dull moment’, she recalled.116 Image 20 
The royal party’s perceptions of the ceremony demonstrate their comfortable 
understanding of themselves as topping a racial hierarchy. Halsey recorded a prejudicial 
view in detail: ‘they are less like human beings, both in looks and customs, than any 
other savage race I have seen in any part of the world.’117 The Prince was in agreement, 
describing the performers as ‘the nearest thing to monkeys I’ve ever seen.’118  
Later in the journey across the Nullarbor, a group of cameleers from the Pujab, 
then part of the British Raj, also had the misfortune to come across the royal party 
during a rest stop. Cotes’ account of the encounter may be read as representative of the 
royal party’s views as to the superiority of the Caucasian race. Speaking of the presence 
of several ‘Eurasian’ children in the group, Cotes found them to be:  
a reminder of those racial problems of which the people of Australia 
take constant thought when they determine to develop the natural 
resources of their wonderful land, as far as may be, by white labour 
alone.119 
 
From here, the royal party travelled onward into South Australia. Following a 
cordial welcome from the Nationalist Premier, Henry Barwell, at the border on 10 July, 
the train proceeded to Adelaide, where the Prince and the newly-appointed South 
Australian Governor, Archibald Weigall, participated in a royal progress through the 
city. Duncan-Hughes was difficult to impress, writing that the ‘cheering was perhaps 
not so great as in the larger capitals’, although he attributed this to the ‘rather 
undemonstrative’ state disposition.120 Rather than simply a natural diffidence, it seems 
instead that Adelaide people had exercised great care in reviewing the ‘mistakes’ of 
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other capital cities and, as the Critic urged, avoiding ‘an exuberance of enthusiasm.’121 
The Southern Cross hoped that the ‘sober-minded’ citizenry would ‘restrain themselves 
within proper bounds in the displays of loyalty, and that the daily papers do not lose 
their heads as badly as their Melbourne and Sydney contemporaries.’122 Harry Blinman, 
the state organiser, had banned the public from throwing confetti at the Prince.123  
As well as a democratic disinclination for the fawning attitude seen in other 
cities, some South Australians perceived the inevitable imperial patriotic fervour as a 
danger to Australia’s future self-governing capabilities. The tour took place against a 
backdrop of protracted post-war speculation over how the Dominions should function 
within the Empire. Basil Long, one of the journalists from H.M.S. Renown, was to later 
record his observation that ‘the Australian is jealous of the right to govern himself and 
is resentful of dictation from outside. Imperialism in the conventional sense is most 
unpopular.’124 Certainly, ALP Member Norman Makin had forcefully warned against 
the tour’s ‘jingoistic spirit’ that could lead to an Imperial Federation, and the 
corresponding contraction of self-government. He hoped that sympathy towards the 
Prince as an individual would be maintained, but also noted that ‘Australia for the 
Australians is what we want.’125 Barwell’s remarks at the banquet concerning the 
desirability of a ‘unity authority for the Empire’ were reportedly met with ‘chilling 
silence.’126 Even the Returned Soldiers and Sailors Imperial League questioned whether 
‘so young and so undistinguished a man’ and one lacking any direct association with the 
AIF was worthy of the adulation and the “Digger Prince” sobriquet. Still, it concluded 
that a supposedly democratic monarchy was preferable to a republic and that the 
inoffensive Prince held qualities suitable for the role, being ‘nice looking, amiable, 
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well-behaved and not unreasonable lad.’ This was all very well, and preferable to 
allocating total power to one individual as in the case of a presidency, as long as the 
monarch posed no threat by his individual actions to the ‘hard-won liberties of the 
British people’ of the Dominions.127  
If Duncan-Hughes’ observation was correct, then perhaps the crowds in 
Adelaide during the Prince’s welcome did adopt a more circumspect attitude. However, 
it seems that mostly, the enthusiasm for both public festivities and the Prince as an 
individual won over most people’s objections. The Southern Cross journalists must 
have despaired of their colleagues at the Register, who pronounced the Prince, ‘with his 
fresh sparkling manliness, like the splendour of the morning.’128 Also of interest is the 
way the Register perceived the Prince’s idealised attributes in racial terms. It identified 
‘the beau-ideal of charming English manhood’, as being ‘fair of face, with that rich 
colouring put on by Britain’s climate, blue-eyed, fair-haired, of medium and graceful 
stature, fresh, radiant and altogether good looking.’129 The supremacy and expansion of 
the white migrant population was also a source of preoccupation to Weigall, who was 
galvanised by the promotional opportunities offered by the Prince’s arrival.  
Although South Australia had been first settled by European agriculturalists 
during the 1830s, Weigall felt the urgent need to swell the population with a ‘better 
class of immigrant’, sourced direct from the ‘mother country’ and tasked with further 
developing the wider fertile countryside for wheat production.130 Knowing that the 
Prince’s utterances would be reproduced in global newspapers, he was eager to promote 
South Australia as an agricultural idyll and avoid any reference to a prevalent 
undercurrent of local workers’ discontent over industrial working conditions and 
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standards of living.131 To this end, the Governor influenced Grigg in drafting the 
Prince’s speeches to favour instead the state’s advantages. It would be wise, he 
suggested to ‘devote the major portion of his remarks to congratulations on the 
wonderful rains of the last three weeks.’132  
So far, this chapter has considered the responses of mostly male politicians, 
radicals, servicemen and workers to the Prince. As the first state to extend the franchise 
to women voters, the South Australian section of the tour is an ideal point to give 
greater consideration to the presence of women throughout. Given the promotion of the 
tour as a public holiday, older or middle-aged women and their families made up a 
prominent proportion of the spectators in all states. In Melbourne, for example, Cotes 
observed that the ‘extraordinary masses of people’ comprised ‘largely of women and 
children’ as well as men.133 Women, particularly those whose men had fought in the 
war, were generally treated with reverence by the press. In Warwick, Queensland, for 
example, the local newspaper solemnly described the ‘loyal pilgrimage’ of 1,000 
regional women who had lost sons or husbands to view H.M.S. Renown.134 In 
Tasmania, Cotes found ‘the venerable Mrs. Roberts’, an elderly woman with a union 
jack, to be the personification of feminine patriotic loyalty: 
Many were the Mrs. Robertses, under different names, that these 
ceremonial occasions produced. One learned to look for them, figures 
full of years and honour, spirits erect in failing bodies, dim eyes lit by 
the old torch, frail arms carrying on the old tradition. Homage to Mrs. 
Roberts, war-worker … She is a symbol of the race.135 
 
However, implicit in the attitudes of the press towards younger or unmarried 
women can be discerned a sense of uncertainty about the post-war excesses of youth 
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and modernity. The majority of the press coverage surveyed for this chapter perpetuated 
sexist stereotypes of the ‘goggley-eyed flappers’, as excitable and wanton opportunists 
baying for the blood of their ‘Prince Charming.’136 ‘Never saw such a leg show in my 
life’ commented the editor of the Nambucca and Bellinger News, describing how 
Sydney’s ‘painted and powered darlings’ mobbed the Prince’s car.137  
However, such biases were not universal. The Melbourne Australasian provided 
a more cerebral summary of the Prince’s persona, and in doing so forcefully illustrated 
the particular educational and social aspirations held by some democratically-minded 
Australian women of 1920. ‘The standard of manhood expected by women nowadays is 
a very high one’, it explained, remarking that: 
Neither rank nor riches nor beauty of person will dazzle women … not 
till they have discerned behind the suavity of manner and grace of 
bearing the virile qualities that make a man and the earnestness and 
purposefulness that make a great man will they yield their tribute of 
homage and affection to any Prince.138 
 
Although well-represented in crowds, women were almost invisible in the tour’s 
formalities. Throughout the preparations Grigg had attempted to press upon officials 
that Edward particularly enjoyed formal functions where women were present, but 
nonetheless the Prince found himself more often in the company of men. This reflects 
the composition of governing bodies of the time and the tour’s particular focus on the 
visibility of returned servicemen and not female war workers. This was nonetheless 
controversial and perceived as ‘a slight’ by socially-prominent women and those who 
had contributed to the war effort.139 In Paddington, New South Wales, for example, the 
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Soldiers’ Mothers, Wives and Relatives Victory Association wrote in outrage to Hughes 
to protest their ‘right to a place’ in the arrangements, but to no avail.140  
In South Australia, more enlightened attitudes towards the prominent place of 
women are discernible in comparison to all other states. Here, the state organisers 
deliberately aimed to make the Prince’s reception ‘as representative as possible.’141 
South Australia was the only state host to a ‘purely feminine display of loyalty’, 
consisting of a People’s Reception held in Adelaide’s Exhibition Building that allowed 
4,000 women, comprising war workers, members of women’s societies and the families 
of servicemen, to view the Prince.142 Although Mountbatten failed to distinguish any 
‘striking instances of individual charm’, and criticised the Lady Mayoress’ delivery of 
her speech in a ‘frightened whisper’, as a gesture of equality the event seems well-
received.143  
It was no secret that the Prince enjoyed and sought out the individual company 
of women. Although he professed to be pining throughout the tour for Freda, the 
Prince’s spirits rallied when dancing with attractive women or being mothered by the 
wives of his hosts. Throughout the tour, his hosts sought to present him with the cream 
of local Society women at private dining and dancing parties. On one occasion in 
Adelaide, Lady Grace Weigall ‘insisted on asking a dozen girls in to Government 
House.’144 It was noted, perceptively as it would later transpire, that he liked the witty 
informal women capable of a ‘bright repartee for any remark of his.’145 He was careful 
not to convey this to Freda. ‘The women here can dance, though Christ they bore me & 
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there’s only one who could be called pretty’ he said of another gathering organised in 
Melbourne by the Hughes’.146  
It is possible, although not explicitly documented in any way, that the Prince 
enjoyed several liaisons with the greatest discretion. Apparently only half in jest, 
Mountbatten recalled a gathering in Tasmania on which the Prince insisted on attending, 
leaving his friends to ponder ‘which of the ministers’ wives’, or possibly waitresses’, 
attraction was at the bottom of it.’147 Robert Wainwright has explored his reported 
fondness for Sydney socialite Mollee Little, a close friend of his brother’s lover Sheila 
Loughborough.148 In public, Edward also turned his attention to women beyond Society. 
Duncan Hughes noted how at Adelaide’s Palais de Danse, the Prince spent a few 
minutes dancing with ‘a totally different class (A.B.s shop-girls, etc.) to that which he 
usually meets.’149 This, the Journal reported, generated the ‘wildest excitement’ among 
attendees.150 His likely contrived actions seemed to indicate his democratic regard for 
others, and his ease in striking up companionable relationships with vigorous women.  
All in all, Edward was a busy man. Despite some brief respite at Government 
House, the strain of never-ending official engagements was evident. ‘I’m such a wreck 
really’, Edward confided to Freda, ‘it’s quite pathetic & entre nous I never really feel 
quite well.’151 ‘He did not smile’, ‘Lady Kitty’ remarked in her column in the Observer, 
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‘turning his glance … almost automatically. He looked the tiredest thing on earth.’152 
The extensive public engagement rolled on regardless, Weigall finding the visit ‘an 
unqualified success from every point of view.’153 Hardly fortified, the Prince’s party 
departed Adelaide on 16 July for the two-day sea journey to Tasmania.  
 
Instilling military patriotism in Tasmania 
The Tasmanian tour could not be said to have been equally successful. ‘Nice people 
these Tasmanians’, the Prince reflected, ‘but naturally on the dull side as its all so out of 
the way.’154 Duncan-Hughes agreed that the level of interest and excitement much 
reduced. This he attributed to the confusion over the Prince’s movements and lack of 
communication between the Governor, William Allardyce, and the Nationalist Premier 
Walter Lee and organising officials.155 In contrast to the unrelenting self-
aggrandisement of most other officials encountered, Allardyce’s reticence coupled with 
a mix-up over who should officiate at the landing point meant there was great confusion 
on the Prince’s arrival.156 In addition, he had by then all but lost his voice and so did not 
speak with the exception of some brief words at the state luncheon.157  
Tasmania did have one notable accomplishment however. As noted in the 
previous chapter, one of the most critical elements in the success of popular-focused 
activities during the tour was the constant presence of children, the next generation of 
imperial supporters. The most obvious way they participated was in the mass group 
demonstrations that appeared all along the itinerary, where several schools would join 
together on local sport or showgrounds to form outsize pictures or text. In some cities, 
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school children were given more prominent positions to view the Prince in motorcades 
and royal processions.158 Frank Tate, the Director of Melbourne’s Education 
Department, saw the tour’s objective as ‘to strengthen the hold of the 
Kingship….especially in the minds and hearts of the people who come from the little 
homes.’159 Tate recognised that private talk of the tour ‘around the dinner table’ within 
families would have for months have heightened anticipation of the royal arrival, as 
would the ‘little sacrifices’ made by parents in order to ‘turn out the youngsters 
creditably.’ From this, he concluded, it was ‘a small step to keen appreciation and 
demonstrative loyalty, especially when, as in this case, the representative of the 
Kingship has exhibited so many personal qualities that have endeared him to the 
people.’160  
Although many workers and supporters of the labour movement had in the 
months before protested against this large-scale propagandistic impulse in favour of the 
dominant political ideology and some intended to prevent their children from 
participating, this fervent body of opinion seems to have dwindled after the royal visitor 
arrived. The younger generations and their families, many of whom were ex-
servicemen, were very much in evidence. As Edward noted in Western Australia, he felt 
‘quite safe in expecting to find diggers & schoolchildren everywhere.’161  
The notion of youth participation emerges particularly strongly in an 
examination of the Tasmanian section of the tour, and offers some insight into gendered 
expectations of Australian citizenship in 1920. Here responsible metropolitan citizens 
were asked to act as ‘father and mother’ by accommodating and taking care of ‘country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 NLA, MS 696/9117. Letter to Munro Ferguson from Duncan-Hughes, 21 July 1920.  
159 NLA, MS 1924/1/3954. Letter to Brookes from Tate, 4 June 1920. This is taken to mean 
working-class homes. 
160 Ibid.  
161 Edward, Prince of Wales, Letters from a prince, p. 342. Letter to Dudley Ward from Edward, 
Prince of Wales, 4 July 1920. 
	  	   162	  
children’ during the visit.162 As the Mercury explained, the visit was of the greatest 
importance for children, as:  
It will remain longer in their memories, to influence them, one may 
hope, in the direction of loyalty to the mighty Empire to which they 
belong, and which it will behove them in future to help in preserving 
… they may see him, and realise that he is as human a being as 
themselves … he may see them and understand what fine youngsters 
Tasmania can breed.163 
 
As future mothers and fathers and tomorrow’s monarchists, ideas surrounding 
the maintenance of the healthy Australian population were particularly prominent. The 
presence of children emphasised for the Prince a particular Australian identity; a young, 
pioneering and, most importantly, healthy population ably exhibiting the prescribed 
biological identity critical to the future success of the nation. In Hobart, for example, 
some 6,000 male and female children appeared in a large group demonstration that 
incorporated the fitness or ‘physical culture’ education that would reach its zenith 
during the 1930s and early 1940s.164 Charlotte MacDonald has argued that following the 
war, physical activity and the democratisation of beauty became a force for social 
improvement, creating a greater distance between the broken bodies and destruction of 
the earlier decades.165 This also implied future reproductive health. Accordingly, Bert 
Ive’s film of the Hobart demonstration was careful to assure viewers, possibly those 
living as far away as Britain, that ‘the Tasmanian schoolchildren are known for their 
rosy cheeks.’166 Image 21 
The presentation of Australians as physically superior was supported also by the 
way militarism played a central role in shaping the future generations. Angela 
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Woollacott has argued that by 1920 definitions of manliness came to centre on ‘physical 
strength, sporting prowess, and patriotic and military preparedness.’167 As elsewhere in 
Australia, the Tasmanian section of the tour featured youth cadets such as the Girl 
Guides and the Boy Scouts. By the 1930s, Edward would become the most prominent 
patron of this group.168 Established by soldier Robert Baden-Powell in England in 1908, 
the movement was adopted in Australia as a method of training boys and adolescents in 
collective identity, bush skills and authoritarian drill; qualities suitable for military 
service. Crotty explains the particular appeal of the Scouts to Australian boys as its 
resonance with ‘secular and militaristic ideals of manliness’, presided over as it was by 
Baden-Powell as an inspirational white British hero.169 This desirable combination of 
sentiment and military fervour was also manifest in a fictional tale by Pauline Eddy 
published in the Sydney Mail. Tate would have likely approved of a mother’s words to 
her son: 
Listen sonny, he is just the very best Prince in all the world – better 
even than the Prince Charming we read about in your fairy book! One 
day, when you are a man, he will be King, and you will fight for him 
just as bravely as your grandfather and daddy fought for their King!170 
Image 22 
 
Certainly, participation was memorable for some. One woman seeking an 
invitation for her nieces to a ball held in the Prince’s honour remarked, such 
celebrations could only be ‘an event in the lives of our young folk.’171 Even at a 
distance of some years, Edith Forshaw later recalled how as a young girl she and her 
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sister participated in a Sydney display wearing specially-made white and red-trimmed 
dresses: ‘we thought we were just it.’172  
These responses indicate the importance of the tour in personal recollections of 
family and childhood, and as a milestone in the collective historical memory of a 
community, but of course do not necessarily equate to the fortification of imperial 
loyalty as hoped for by Tate. On the other hand, Tasmania’s concern with an outward 
display of patriotism and biological robustness seems to have been successfully 
imparted to the royal retinue. As Cotes mused towards the end of the tour ‘the meaning 
of all we saw abides in those men and women and children working out their lot and 
their lives far from the home of the race, but standing, and ready to stand again, for its 
flag and its ideals.’173 
By this stage, it seemed necessary to further delay the journey to Queensland 
due to the Prince’s continued ill-health, but the party agreed to proceed given that this 
section was of ‘such great political importance.’174 After returning to H.M.S Renown at 
Hobart, the Prince sailed for Sydney on 23 July and immediately departed for 
Queensland by rail.  
 
Subduing political tension in Queensland 
Queensland of 1920 was the most politically volatile of the states with a powerful 
labour movement and an ALP government that had opposed conscription. In the 
absence of the Premier, ‘Red Ted’ Theodore, the royal party had been warned to tread 
cautiously around the next two highest-ranking officials, John Fihelly, the Acting 
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Premier, and William Lennon, the Lieutenant-Governor, who were to perform the 
official role of hosting the state visit. Even more so than other states, here the Prince 
was charged with winning over a population seen as especially prone to radical beliefs, 
and potentially without the support and protection of his hosts. Yet as previously, their 
fears again proved to be unfounded and much of the supposed disloyalty seemed to 
exist only in the imagination of the conservative press.175 When officially greeting the 
Prince at the state border at Wallangarra, Grigg identified an ‘intense’ feeling, 
describing how both Fihelly and Lennon were ‘extremely nervous’ and ‘showed from 
the first that they meant to be absolutely correct.’176 Grigg perceived that, in the wake of 
the success of the tour thus far, the nation’s attention had sharpened towards 
Queensland’s reception of the Prince at the finale. ‘All Australia was watching it and 
Queensland itself was nervous, like a person who felt under a cloud and determined to 
justify himself’, he wrote to the King.177  
Following the careful selection of host towns, the precedence given to certain 
types of activities was critical. The Prince’s first state engagement was to praise the 
government’s support of returned servicemen, in light of criticism of a supposed ‘lack 
of sympathy’ for them on the part of the Labor Party.178 Accordingly, the royal train 
proceeded to Pikedale soldier settlement at Amiens on the Darling Downs. The Soldier 
Settlement Scheme was a government initiative with similar migration objectives to the 
Group Settlement Scheme, as introduced to the Prince in Western Australia. It offered 
returned soldiers the opportunity to attain ‘landed independence’ by establishing small 
regional farms. Across the country, nearly 40,000 were granted blocks of land via a 
long-term loan. As Larsson has pointed out, the notion of being a self-employed farmer 
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was attractive to many Australians in the post-war period, especially those who were 
disabled or struggled otherwise in mainstream urban employment.179 In its account of 
the stop, the Queensland Times perpetuated the notion of successful agrarian post-war 
lives, enthusing that ‘a splendid stirring note of patriotism was struck by these sturdy 
“diggers” and their womenfolk.’180 The reality was somewhat different. While this 
productivity ostensibly stimulated imperial trade, reports throughout the 1920s reveal 
that the soldier settlements often suffered the same insolvency as the group schemes.181  
The Prince held some misgivings about the arrival in Brisbane. ‘Somehow I’m 
full of apprehensions as we’ll be up against the bolshies properly & the acting premier 
… who met us at the state boundary this morning, is the foulest & most infamous 
looking cut-throat Irish R. C. that I’ve ever seen!!’ he told Freda.182 Yet again, the royal 
party’s fears did not eventuate. The Prince’s cordial meeting with the Apostolic 
Delegate, Monsignor Bartholomew Cattaneo, and the pro-conscription Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Brisbane, James Duhig, was characterised by a certain studied 
casualness, and did much to finally douse rumours of the supposed ‘disloyalty’ of the 
Catholic community. Here the two men ‘went out of their way to express the loyalty 
and devotion’ of Australian Roman Catholics to the throne.183 This swell of popular 
imperialist sentiment that typified the tour had, at least ostensibly, the power to smooth 
political and religious difference.  
Neither were the ‘bolshies’ much in evidence. Even Duncan-Hughes was 
pleasantly startled by the enthusiasm demonstrated. ‘The better type of Queenslander is 
delighted that the much-talked-of Bolshevik element has (at any rate temporarily) either 
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ceased to exist or gone into retirement’ he wrote.184 To his mother, the Prince enthused 
that ‘even real Bolshies have condescended to say & do nice things’185 To top it all off, 
the greatest surprise was Lennon and Fihelly’s public demonstration of their personal 
and ardent support of the Prince. The usually humourless Duncan-Hughes evoked a 
comic occasion when Lennon was overcome with heightened fervour for the Prince’s 
personal appeal; ‘“I consider this young man” (he cried) “to be a brick, a perfect brick!” 
(dashing his cigar on the table).’186 Fihelly also went to great lengths to convey his 
regard, chartering a private plane in order to pursue the Prince to the state border to say 
his goodbyes. Duncan-Hughes perceived that Fihelly’s glowing treatment of the Prince 
came as: 
a surprise to many; he is not trusted by his political opponents, and 
some seem doubtful as to how long his “conversion” will last … he is 
quick to realise the great hold which the Prince has immediately 
acquired over all classes.187  
 
Like his colleagues elsewhere across the nation, the politically-astute Fihelly 
was prepared to overlook the political and religious symbolism of the royal visitor in 
order to greet him on equitable terms. The opportunity to appeal to Australians of all 
classes in order to cultivate nationalism was powerfully manifest in the publicity 
associated with the visit. Speaking of the way Australians joined the war effort ‘without 
asking why’, Fihelly asserted that ‘the people of Australia are building up a great 
nation; and without always asking why, the people at home should help us develop our 
great country.’188 It was also evident that the spectacle surrounding the Prince reflected 
becomingly on the host party, and quelled wild stories of an impending Bolshevik-style 
uprising among the workers. In the state Legislative Assembly, Nationalist member 
Arthur Moore remarked that before the visit, the government had been ‘shaking in their 
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shoes’ over the ‘Bolshevik element’ but had discovered that it was in reality ‘not so 
strong.’189 
Having conquered Queensland, the royal party realised with some relief that the 
end of the tour was nigh. From 6 August, the Prince, Halsey, Thomas, Legh and 
Mountbatten were given two weeks’ leave free from official duties. They spent these 
socialising and riding south through several outback pastoral properties in northern New 
South Wales.190 As we have seen, this ‘backblocks’ tour was a substitute for the planned 
trip to Rabaul, New Guinea but was not without its own complications. Although the 
objective was to affect a casual stay in privately owned pastoral properties, this stage of 
the tour inevitably attracted a political edge given the opportunities evident for both 
labour and nationalist interests. The inland visit was specifically designed to exclude the 
opportunistic Australian prime minister. As Grigg explained to the Governor-General, 
both Hughes and Storey wished to accompany the Prince, thus placing him ‘perpetually 
between the two political fires.’191 Hughes was willing to abandon the idea but refused 
to let Storey go alone, given the potential for wooing the workers’ and shearers’ vote.  
Eventually Edward was allowed to recuperate in the company of his entourage, 
although he never fully relaxed. He himself was all too aware of differing perceptions of 
himself in his role as representative of the Crown. Following a sumptuous dinner 
prepared at Canonbar Station by a leading Sydney chef and having been serenaded by a 
professional jazz pianist, he still perceived himself as an actor in a performance, 
complaining to Freda: 
 Oh! Why must it always be the P. of W. sweetie instead of just plain 
David sometimes? A fat lot of good it’s been trying to show people 
out here for nearly 3 months that I’m only human & abhor any form 
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of blatant advertisement of opulence.192 
 
Following the slaying of innumerable native animals, the royal party re-joined 
H.M.S. Renown at Sydney for further socialising and some much-reduced official 
duties. The inner retinue enjoyed a marked sense of liberation, having completed the 
tour largely unscathed. Halsey claimed ‘intense relief’ at the tour’s success, but noted 
also the ‘very great strain on the Prince and everyone else.’193 Nevertheless, Edward 
later mused that during the tour he came fully to understand:  
the varied burdens of duty that lie upon a Prince of Wales. Lonely 
drives through tumultuous crowds, the almost daily inspections of 
serried ranks of veterans, the inexhaustible supplies of cornerstones to 
be laid, the commemorative trees to be planted, deputations to be met, 
and everywhere the sad visits to hospital wards, every step bringing 
me face to face with some inconsolable tragedy calling for a 
heartening word from me, and always more hands to shake than a 
dozen Princes could have coped with.194  
 
But there were further compensations, even on the long journey home. H.M.S. 
Renown departed Sydney Harbour on 19 August for England via Hawaii, Acapulco and 
Panama, with a series of leisurely stops in the West Indies at Trinidad, Demerara, 
Grenada, St Lucia, Dominica, Montserrat and Antigua, arriving back in Portsmouth on 
10 October. 
This chapter has provided a narrative for the tensions and triumphs of Edward’s 
royal tour of Australia, as enacted across six states between May and August 1920. 
Overall, although Australia’s relations were avowedly loyal to Britain, both politicians 
and citizens sought to adapt the tour as an opportunity to pursue Australian local and 
national goals within broader imperial boundaries. Twenty years after federation, each 
Australia state possessed a strong individual identity, sense of independent government 
and wish to market its attractions to prospective migrants, and the world at large, on its 
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own terms. By the same token, royal tour organisers across the country influenced the 
itinerary in attempts to assuage concerns over Australia’s defensive position, and avoid 
areas of social, religious and political contestation in favour of forging overarching 
consensus. 
Although the royal tour was without doubt an active official campaign to instil 
imperial ideology through the medium of public spectacle, curiously this encountered 
little practical opposition. In keeping with the contemporary policy of the Australian 
government, the tour’s emphasis on public gatherings helped to re-establish for citizens 
the transferable and long-lasting nature of British cultural frameworks despite the 
contradiction and tension of the immediate post-war period. In this objective, organisers 
were fortunate in that the Prince’s attractiveness helped smooth cultural, religious and 
political differences among observers, whether attracted by the future monarch’s 
personal qualities or simply the prospect of spectacle and pageantry. There can be no 
doubt that even if they opposed the celebration of monarchy on principle, many 
Australians nonetheless attended in pursuit of a good day out, especially if they received 
a day’s payment. 
Edward’s personal attributes and failings, during wartime observed with 
condescension by Australians, were by the time of the tour received with almost 
uniform enthusiasm. His suitability as a leader for the post-war Empire was confirmed 
by his abilities as an inspiring public speaker, his supposedly progressive ideas and his 
admittedly limited military experiences, while underpinned by a humanist sense of 
sympathy and compassion towards those less privileged than himself. His democratic 
dislike of self-aggrandisement and even his boredom with formalities were positively 
perceived by Australians. This perceived ‘ordinariness’ was further enforced by a 
disinclination to hide some modest personal indulgences, such as a weakness for 
gambling, attractive women, and staying up late in the company of his friends. The 
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Prince was apparently masculine, daring, able to hold his own on horseback and able to 
establish equitable relationships with women from many walks of life.  
In a more critical light, the tour can also be read as an example of how the magic 
of royalty, with good planning by the pro-imperial governing bodies and popular 
goodwill, could be used to temporarily reinforce pre-existing popular support for the 
monarchy, rather than an individual. Although Edward attracted many accolades, much 
of the tour’s success can be attributed instead to the particular atmosphere of post-war 
elation in which it took place, as well as the opportunities it offered for state 
expansionist ambitions, for individuals to gather in community celebration and the 
ability of the most vehemently opposed to the principles of imperialism and capitalism 
to suspend their opposition for the duration of the festivities. Australians were able to 
easily disassociate the Prince from his position as a symbol of the Crown in favour of 
the more candid popular perceptions of his personality produced by human interest 
journalism. Largely, for many observers in the devastation and optimism of the years 
following the war, it seems that the Prince in 1920 embodied the most aspirational 
qualities for the ideal post-war Australian male. As the following three chapters will 
show, within sixteen short years, this would no longer be the case. 
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Chapter 4: The bachelor King  
 
[He] would rather imperil his irreplaceable neck at a five-barred gate 
than imperil his happiness at the altar of Westminster. 
-The Mail, 30 June 1923.1 
 
The shift in two contrasting Australian perceptions of Edward spaced sixteen years 
apart can be charted through his declining popularity in public and official estimation 
throughout the remainder of the 1920s and early 1930s. To do this, I explore how his 
perceived qualities – as a symbol of the Crown, an inspiration for peace, a modern 
exemplar and as a member of the family – were subject to greater public scrutiny 
following the tour and were briefly revived at the time of his accession to the throne in 
January 1936. I then analyse the output of the Australian press during the brief months 
that passed as he took up and then abandoned his Kingship, between late July 1936, 
when Wallis initiated divorce proceedings, and early December 1936, when details of 
the couple’s relationship broke in the world’s press. To what extent were Australians 
privy to details of the King’s wish to marry Wallis prior to the abdication? 
The second half of this chapter turns to a closer examination of the development 
of the Australian government’s formal position in the months before the abdication. As 
noted in the Introduction, events, meetings and communications between British prime 
minister Stanley Baldwin, the King and their advisors during the prelude to the 
abdication has received considerable scholarly attention. Scholarly neglect of the 
Australian government’s perspective is especially striking given the crucial role of the 
Dominion prime ministers during the last week of November. In order to better 
understand the position of Australia’s Joseph Lyons, I examine the bureaucratic 
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exchanges between the British and Australian governments before the Act was made 
public and supplement existing published accounts of the development of the British 
government’s position with an interpretation of Australia’s role in the preamble to the 
King’s abdication. The Australian archival sources provide considerable new evidence 
for the background to Lyons’ advice, and the earliest reactions of his colleagues, the 
press and the Australian public to the startling behaviour of the supposedly-confirmed 
bachelor King. 
 
Declining public and official estimation  
1920 marked the highpoint of Edward’s popularity. Thereafter, popular and official 
Australian affection for his particular qualities – as a symbol of the Crown, an 
inspiration for peace, a modern exemplar and as a member of the family – began a 
terminal decline over the remainder of the 1920s and early 1930s. This demonstrates all 
too clearly the inherent incompatibility of the two versions of monarchy created by the 
constitutional distance and growing royal populism laid out by the Statute of 
Westminster. This is not to deny that, in an official sense, the monarch did not continue 
to preside at the apex of the Australian political system. Many of the concerns over geo-
political influence and defence that dominated Australian political rhetoric and public 
imagination at the time of the royal tour only intensified as the 1920s wore on. 
Imperialism continued to thrive as a tool of inter-war political dominance under 
Hughes’ and then, after 1923, Stanley Melbourne Bruce’s Nationalist governments. As 
McKenna puts it, by the 1930s, Australian political life still ‘remained in imperial 
chains’ evidenced by, for example, the continued appointment of British Governors and 
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Governors-General, and the maintenance of ceremonial, educational, community and 
commercial affection beneath ‘the comforting cloak of the connection.’2  
Despite this fertile cultural context, I have found that the more favourable 
democratic and progressive rhetoric that surrounded Edward as an individual receded, 
with the dominant emphasis shifting back to his association with the Crown. This 
finding reflects the dominant understanding of Edward’s kingship as an inevitable 
decline, as endorsed by most of the existing literature to date. In this case, it is important 
to note that this judgement was by no means true for all Australians, but there are 
certainly broad similarities. For many, Edward’s popularity reached its zenith with the 
departure of the H.M.S. Renown from Sydney harbour. For members of the Opposition, 
for example, a sparkling personality could no longer as easily compensate for the 
dominant political party’s insistence on imperial connections over domestic concerns. In 
1921 Labor’s Norman Makin noted his respect for Australia’s cordial ‘association with 
and relation to Great Britain’ but, similarly to the previous year, still refused to be 
‘allured by the so-called glories of Empire’ in pursuit of self-government and improving 
the living conditions of the Australian people.3 Equally, the issue of privilege continued 
to provoke socialist and working-class commentators. During the royal tour, some had 
put aside their intrinsic distaste for privilege by treating the Prince as an honoured 
visitor but not someone deserving of obsequious flattery. Ultimately Edward’s qualities 
had temporarily charmed some of the most virulently opposed to royalty when viewed 
at close range.  
Afterwards, however, left-wing opposition reverted to its traditional stance. In 
1926, the same year that the Balfour Declaration was enacted, the ALP’s Albert Green 
denounced the notion of ‘peasants bowing and scraping to Royalty.’ In his view, loyalty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 McKenna, The captive republic, p. 215. 
3 Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Debates’, 21 April 1921, pp. 7611-12. 
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to an institution was one thing, but subservience to one man by mere accident of birth 
quite another. ‘I am as loyal as any man’, he said, but:  
I do not think those are the sentiments that we should endeavour to 
foster among our Australian people. We can be loyal without 
idolizing any man … I do not want these distorted ideas of what 
loyalty demands of us to be presented to my children.4 
 
By the latter half of the 1920s a slight yet distinct antipathy to Edward’s 
personal behaviour can also be discerned, marking a permanent end to many 
Australians’ previously uncritical approval. Part of this change may be attributable to 
his advancing age. As a young man, he had been held up as a modern exemplar 
reflecting the optimism and glamour of the rebellious post-war generation, and an 
antidote to the anxieties faced by the inter-war Empire. He turned thirty in 1924, and so 
could no longer be considered in the first flush of bachelorhood. From this point on, 
Australian perceptions of his qualities changed, and attention sharpened toward his 
obligations to further both his own bloodline and, by doing so, perpetuate the power of 
the British monarchy within the Windsor dynasty.  
During and immediately following the tour, Edward’s familial qualities and 
supposed modern belief in marrying for love had been praised. In August 1920, the 
Glenn Innes Examiner, for example, had felt able to insist that the future King’s first 
acts should be to lead by example and choose his own wife, thus sharing in the same 
‘human joys and privileges’ as his people and enhancing the accessibility of those ‘born 
in the purple.’5 However, this generosity proved short-lived and enthusiastic 
commentary on his marriage prospects resumed on Edward’s return to England, with 
several women of royal and aristocratic lineage suggested for the highly-qualified role 
of consort. As Australians were able to read in The World’s News of December 1920, it 
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was referring to images seen in imported British cinematography.  
5 ‘ROYAL ALLIANCE’, Glen Innes Examiner, N.S.W., 19 August 1920, p. 6. 
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was reportedly necessary that the morality of the future King’s wife be beyond question, 
given her responsibility to exert a ‘beneficial sway over vast numbers of her fellow-
creatures.’6 Image 23 
Of equal if not greater importance was the King’s wife’s reproductive capacity. 
Without an heir to a royal family of the magnitude and tenacity of Britain’s, the future 
of the Empire was thrown into doubt. By 1922, the Gawler Bunyip described the 
unfolding of a ‘tremendous furore’ in England following the marriage of Edward’s 
younger sister, Princess Mary, the implication being that Edward could not for much 
longer restrain his bachelor freedom before being ‘led to the alter’ in order to produce a 
family of his own to succeed him.7 These fears were justified the following year with 
the birth of Mary’s son. Although George Lascelles was far removed from the throne by 
his mother’s gender and position in the royal family, he was nonetheless the King and 
Queen’s first grandchild. Edward was apparently averse to selecting a white British 
bride from the aristocracy, or even perusing the options remaining from within the 
fragmented European dynasties. Perhaps he would never marry at all – a major blow to 
the virility of the reigning House of Windsor.  
It was in this light that the Adelaide Mail of June 1923 along with many other 
newspapers reproduced the daring remarks of an American writer in a New York paper, 
who reported that the Prince now contemplated his siblings and nephew with the view 
that ‘we are none of us indispensable.’8 It had also been noted that Edward had begun a 
habit of delegating the less glamorous of his official duties to his ‘staid and silent’ 
brother Albert, the Duke of York. This, the author remarked, thrust the latter into a 
position of ‘unexpected prominence.’9 Thirteen years before the abdication, this first 
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7 ‘THE PRINCE’S BRIDE’, Bunyip, Gawler, S.A., 10 March 1922, p. 2. 
8 ‘PLAYFUL PRINCE OF WALES’, The Mail Adelaide, S.A., 30 June 1923, p. 15. 
9 Ibid. 
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raised the possibility that the Prince was disinclined for the Kingship, and also that his 
younger brother occupied the fringes of his public life. Image 24 
The major factor was that the Duke had the same year married the aristocratic 
Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon. At his father’s urging, Albert had reluctantly relinquished his 
relationship with Sheila Loughborough in 1920 in exchange for the Dukedom. The King 
had similarly demanded that Edward give up Freda but was met with defiance.10 As the 
Duchess was now the fourth most-prominent female member of the royal family, news 
of the alliance received some modest interest in Australia. For example, her perceived 
personality met with the approval of the Queensland Times, who praised her ‘joie de 
vivre and love of home.’11 When the couple’s daughter Elizabeth was born in 1926, the 
child became by virtue of her uncle’s childlessness the third in line to the throne, thus 
ensuring the indirect continence of the Windsor dynasty in Britain but also propelling 
the Yorks into the public eye as never before.  
Edward’s controversial private life, that is, his continued passion for Freda, 
could no longer be ignored within royal and diplomatic circles. A lively Australian 
perception of the whispers circulating in Whitehall is laid out in the private 
correspondence of Richard Casey, the Australian prime minister Stanley Bruce’s 
political liaison officer, who was based in London between 1924 and 1929. It was 
undoubtedly from information offered by the trusted Casey that Bruce developed his 
critical attitude towards the Prince’s behaviour. As this chapter will go on to explain, 
Bruce, by 1936 the Australian High Commissioner, would be influential in the 
development of the Australian government’s position during the abdication episode. By 
this time, as David Lee has described, Bruce had developed a ‘vehement opposition to 
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11 ‘The Duchess of York’, Queensland Times Ipswich, Qld., 21 June 1923, p. 8. 
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the prospect of a British sovereign marrying a twice divorced woman.’12 Casey’s first 
mention of the troubles came more than a decade earlier, in October 1925, when he 
quoted Queen Mary as wishing that Edward would ‘settle down’ to marriage and ‘take 
life a little more seriously.’13 Efforts by the royal family and the British government to 
entice Edward to the altar continued over the following years. Baldwin, for example, 
travelled to Canada with him in 1927. His role was ‘exert his influence’ in the Prince’s 
consideration of Princess Ingrid of Sweden as a prospective wife, a strenuous effort but 
all to no avail.14  
Also of concern to Australia was the Prince’s rising uninterest in his official 
duties. In 1926, he had been invited by Bruce to visit Australia once again to open 
Provisional Parliament House in Canberra, but according to Arthur Bousfield and Garry 
Toffoli, Edward had lost interest in public engagements and ‘was not enthusiastic about 
the idea.’15 And so it was confirmed that the newly-prominent Duke and Duchess of 
York would visit Australia between 26 March and 23 May 1927. The response was 
decidedly lukewarm. In September 1926, the North-Eastern Advertiser offered that the 
Duke: 
gives one the impression of being a very serious young man. He is an 
exceedingly hard worker, but it would be quite foolish to suggest that 
he is noted for any particular cordiality. The Prince of Wales seems to 
have the ‘lion’s share’ of that attribute in the Royal Family.16 
 
The Duchess was quite another matter. The London journalist behind ‘Woman’s 
Realm’ in the Queenslander could only offer that the Duke was a ‘nice boy’, but 
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16 ‘AUSTRALIA HOUSE EN FETE’, North-Eastern Advertiser, Scottsdale, Tas., 3 September 
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remarked how beloved Elizabeth was in Britain.17 Also in London, Casey heard that the 
Duke was ‘pleased’ to be going to Australia, tired as he was of acting as ‘third string.’18 
Albert hoped to one day hold the post of Governor-General within one of the 
Dominions and was working towards gaining the experience necessary for public life. 
His ‘great disability’ was his stutter, particularly troublesome over words starting with a 
hard ‘c’. ‘“Canberra” will be a big hurdle for him!’ Casey remarked.19  
In due course, Albert and Elizabeth attended the opening of Provisional 
Parliament House and visited all the states and territories with the exception of the 
Northern Territory. When compared with the popular success of his brother’s 
exhausting tour of 1920, this visit was markedly more restrained. Perhaps anticipating a 
similar reaction, Albert took steps to constrain the itinerary to manageable 
proportions.20 His concern was for his wife, whose doctors were anxious that she avoid 
‘extreme climatic conditions’ damaging to ‘her condition for her next confinement’, 
considering that the ‘birth of a male heir is considered vitally important.’21 Despite 
attempts to maintain a lower profile, as in 1920 some sections of the community 
criticised the allocation of public funds to the royal visit during a time of recession and 
unemployment. In Hobart, ‘ANZAC’, for example, condemned the spending of public 
funds on entertaining the royal couple ‘when in their very midst are returned soldiers 
starving.’22  
It was clear from the outset that the Duke lacked his brother’s attractiveness and 
talent for public engagement. Cyril White had again taken up the reins of organisation, 
but was apparently ‘so ill-informed’ that he believed that Albert could not speak in 
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19 Ibid. 
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public at all, and so many opportunities to engage with the crowds were lost.23 Although 
his persona was buoyed by the presence of the stylish and amiable Duchess and the 
trials of a royal tour were undoubtedly eased when shared between two, their 
coupledom also ruled out any opportunities to create a sensation by dancing with shop 
girls. Truth predicted that Elizabeth would be forbidden to dance or partake in 
‘strenuous forms of recreation’ at all, although the journalist could only have guessed at 
the reason why.24  
This decorous behaviour deprived the public of one of the most popular means 
of supposedly democratic visual access to royalty. The Duchess, ably demonstrating 
companionable support of her husband’s social inadequacies, did nonetheless charm 
those who met her. ‘Of the two, the wife’s personality made the greatest impression on 
me’, later admitted one woman.25 The Duke did not have many opportunities to meet 
anyone. According to William Maloney, Albert had been ‘fenced off from the people 
almost like an Eastern potentate.’ The royal progress also left much to be desired. In 
Sydney, he was ‘hurried so quickly through the streets in a motor car that the route over 
which he passed has been known ever since as “The Speedway”.’26 Image 25 
The onset of the economic downturn also undermined crowd numbers. Although 
5,000 invited dignitaries and some 100,000 members of the general public were 
expected to attend the opening of Parliament House, figures fell far short. 
Unfortunately, ‘the smallness of the crowd and the fact that the bulk of the crowd 
apparently brought their own meal’ left the government with a large debt to the catering 
company and several tons of uneaten meat pies.27 The celebrations were also blighted 
by an accident before the ceremonials took place. Royal Australian Air Force aviator 
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Francis Ewen lost control of his aircraft and crashed on the outskirts of the crowd near 
the refreshment tent. The horrified spectators who rushed to help could do nothing for 
the gravely injured young man and he died that evening.28 By any estimation, the 1927 
tour did not replicate the fervent popular engagement, widespread attendance or 
extensive press promotion inspired by the particular appeal of the Prince of Wales. 
While this must also be attributed to the never-to-be-repeated set of social conditions in 
place in Australia of 1920, and also Edward’s heightened appeal as the future King 
rather than a younger brother, it does highlight how visual accessibility and a winning 
personality were vital ingredients in a successful Australian royal tour.29 
However, the tour did help to secure the Duke, in the eyes of his advisors at 
least, as a suitably experienced candidate for a Dominion Governor-Generalship.30 
According to Casey, Harry Batterbee, the Under Secretary at the Dominions Office, felt 
that Albert could perform satisfactorily as a Governor-General when supported by the 
Duchess and a knowledgeable staff.31 Critically, however, there were other objectives 
already at work. In November 1927, for example, Australian newspapers noted the 
curious fact that the Duke’s household now issued its own Court Circular, a privilege 
only ever previously enjoyed by the heir to the throne. Mystified, the editor of the 
Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate decided this must be due to the 
Duke’s growing responsibility as the ‘business man’ of the family.32  
Casey’s private observations further reveal how royal and diplomatic plans for 
the Duke following the Australian tour had displaced him from his role as second 
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brother to occupy a more prominent position in promoting the royal family as guardians 
of the Crown. In February 1928, he recorded how Patrick Hodgeson, the Duke’s Private 
Secretary, felt some reluctance towards the idea of the couple leaving Britain for the 
Dominions, as this would mean there was no ‘appropriate Royal Lady’ to whom the 
now elderly Queen Mary’s social and philanthropic obligations could be delegated. The 
Duchess had begun taking on a greater number of these duties, increasing her public 
profile immeasurably at the same time. Predictably, Hodgeson also noted the 
desirability of ‘further additions’ to the Duke’s family ‘in the absence of any other male 
heir.’33 The King also maintained that the ‘creation of a family’ (Princess Elizabeth 
notwithstanding) was the Duke’s priority.34 By 1928, significant measures were being 
taken to expand the sphere of Albert’s public life in Britain, as at that time he 
represented the best hope of maintaining the prestige of the Windsor dynasty.  
Rehabilitative measures were nonetheless afflicted on the unresponsive Prince of 
Wales. The marriage negotiations took a forceful turn. In January 1928, Casey wrote of 
the ‘pressure’ directed towards Edward ‘with regard to his marriage.’ He hinted at 
‘some little anxiety’ within the Establishment, as to ‘the amount of heart that [Edward] 
would find himself able to put into it – as it would, of course, be a mariage de 
convenance [sic]’, meaning whether or not Edward could be persuaded to abandon 
adulterous relationships. Giving the increased interest in the private lives of the royal 
family, the press could no longer be relied upon to turn a blind eye as during previous 
reigns. Casey concluded that any ‘subsequent scandal would be almost as bad as if he 
had never married.’35 By this time, he perceived that matters had reached a watershed, 
Baldwin having only recently ‘woken up to the fact that the royal family is the only 
positive imperial link that is left’, and realised his own responsibilities to ‘keep them up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Casey, My dear P.M., p. 290. Letter to Bruce from Casey, 16 February 1928. 
34 Ibid., p. 411. Letter to Bruce from Casey, 27 September 1928. 
35 Ibid., pp. 250-51. Letter to Bruce from Casey, 19 January 1928. 
	  	   183	  
to their job, and to make opportunities for them to make more of themselves in the 
public estimation’, as he put it.36  
Any threat to the continuity of the British royal family was also a threat to 
Australia’s imperial trade and economic ties with Britain. In light of Baldwin’s lack of 
success to date, Casey urged Bruce as representative of ‘one of the major Dominions’ to 
confront the Prince himself at a planned Imperial Conference in the hope of conveying 
to him that the ‘certainty of the succession in a straight line is no less than essential for 
the maintenance of the Empire.’37 A few months later, however, he happily reported 
further ‘earnest conversations’ between the Prince, King and prime minister about the 
former’s ‘obligations to the nation.’38 The Prince, then still in love with Freda, was 
bullied into agreeing in principle to ‘consider a union’ with Princess Ingrid, but yet 
again nothing eventuated.39 
It was inevitable that these tensions would work their way into the Dominion 
press, particularly those with links to American newspaper agencies. By the later 1920s, 
irreverent Australian newspaper editors were willing to reproduce still more American 
opinion pieces concerning the Prince’s poor behaviour. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, the style of reporting sought to reveal aspects of the royals’ private lives in a 
radical departure from the previous restraint exercised by the British and Australian 
agencies. The Duke of York, one journalist pointed out in The Richmond River Herald 
and Northern Districts Advertiser in January 1928, was emerging as a figure of some 
importance, even one as popular as the Prince. This was because ‘in dynastic matters, it 
is necessary to think a few generations ahead’ and the Duke’s issue had already ensured 
the continuation of the Crown. His brother’s prominence was ‘probably not at all 
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displeasing’ to Edward, the paper alleged, going so far as to almost seditiously describe 
the latter’s attitude to his job as weary, slightly disgusted, perfunctory and 
disillusioned.40  
By now, the seeds of doubt had been publicly sown in the press over the 
Prince’s commitment to his future role and the continuation of the Crown and British 
Empire in all its power. The potential damage of Australian goodwill towards Edward 
was so much in evidence to Godfrey Thomas, his loyal Private Secretary, that he 
authorised the release of a serial reiterating the Prince’s deeds and achievements that 
was reproduced across the country towards the end of the year. Thomas strenuously 
defended the Prince against accusations of vapidity, nervousness and superficiality. 
Although the brothers were facially similar, Thomas claimed, there the likeness ended. 
The Duke was ‘at once more studious and possibly less gregarious’ and had been denied 
the exposure to the ‘galaxy of human types’ that equipped the Prince so well for 
democratic public life.41 Even though Australians did not seem to be quick to pass 
judgement on the Prince, readers of this piece must have surely felt Thomas’ anxiety 
emanating from the pages.  
Despite such measures, the situation would only worsen. By 1929, Casey 
relayed to Bruce that the Prince took little interest in matters administrated by the 
Foreign Office and the Dominions Office.42 He observed that Edward’s relationship 
with his father had deteriorated, so much so that he had shown no ‘pronounced filial 
feeling’ during the King’s illness, nor had he consistently attended meetings at which he 
was supposed to be representing him.43 The contrast between the Prince’s previous 
geniality and accessibility and growing reluctance to participate in his official duties 
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was starkly rendered. Having fallen off a racehorse at Ascot in 1924, he appeared to be 
willing to continue to ‘risk his life’ with equine-related activities, and selfishly, some 
thought, care little for the prospect of rendering himself unable to fulfil his official 
role.44  
The wisdom of his high degree of public engagement, as evidenced during 1920, 
began to appear misguided. It is possible that public expectations exceeded the Prince’s 
finite capabilities, burdened as he was by his private problems and limitations. Years 
before, the daring American journalist reprinted in the Adelaide Mail had argued 
Edward may have had too much of a good thing, and unwittingly laid bare his own 
failings. He had travelled ‘perhaps too much’, meaning his ‘restless instinct has been 
overdeveloped’ despite having ‘no new worlds to conquer … he has passed beyond the 
illusions.’ Nodding to Bagehot’s warning over revealing too much of the magic, the 
author felt that the Prince: 
cannot have it both ways. Either he is a sacred person or he is merely 
secular, and there is, perhaps, too startling a contrast between, let us 
say, a photograph of royal surf bathing at Honolulu and that modest 
pageant known as a coronation in Westminster Abbey.45 
 
This reflects unequivocally the view held by King George V. In his later years, 
Edward recalled some advice offered and unheeded. His father had noted that the Prince 
had enjoyed much greater freedom during his youth and been in a position to ‘mix with 
all manner of people’ in ways a monarch had never previously experienced. ‘But don’t 
think that this means you can now act like other people. You must always heed your 
position and who you are’ he told the young Prince.46 Edward had also been warned by 
Frederick Ponsonby, an elderly courtier, of the dangers of appearing ‘too accessible’ 
and that bringing the monarchy ‘down’ would destroy much of the mystery and 
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influence.’47 Casey too subscribed to the inadvisability of royalty appearing too much in 
the public eye. He was underwhelmed by the ‘atmosphere of unreality and fancy dress’ 
at a reception at Buckingham Palace and felt for a person to be ‘completely and 
overwhelmingly loyal, the subject should never see his sovereign.’48 As Beadle has 
observed of the Canadian context, perhaps by 1928 the Prince had experienced too 
much adulation, and fatally equated his personal popularity with the reverence accorded 
to his role.49 
Nonetheless, despite their disavowal of imperialism as a tool of dominance by 
the governing powers, some Australian Labor politicians still perceived Edward’s 
proactive qualities as eminently suitable for his role as future imperial leader. As in 
1920, some still chose to emphasise his attributes, at least where these aligned with 
traditional labour prerogatives, and perpetuated the belief that the Prince was a man 
possessing liberal leanings distinct from the role he was born to perform. In Britain, his 
tendency to voice his sympathy with the poor had threatened his political neutrality, 
where his comments indicated criticism of the government’s position on employment. 
In response, advisors attempted to divert the Prince’s attention to neutral causes such as 
farm schools and British trade.50 Bruce’s Nationalist government also hoped to bolster 
imperial connections provided the monarch kept well away from politics. When in 
1929, for example, the ALP’s Frank Anstey attempted to move a resolution in 
Parliament expressing ‘gratitude for the courage’ and ‘broad humanitarianism’ of the 
Prince, Bruce refused to ‘allow one word to be said’ in support of Edward’s 
convictions.51  
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A brief revival of popular affection  
Despite all efforts to the contrary, 41-year-old Edward was the only one of his siblings 
to remain unmarried at the time of his father’s death in January 1936. His reign began 
with lengthy court mourning procedures. J. Vance Marshall, an Australian who 
observed the funeral procession in London, perceived that the solitary new King’s face 
had ‘aged a thousand years … he was not adopting a majestic pose …[and] seemed ill at 
ease’ as he walked behind the coffin.52 There can be no doubt that Edward entertained 
many preoccupations. He had ended his relationship with Freda in 1931, but not due to 
the urging of his advisors. He had fallen deeply in love with Wallis, then married to 
Ernest Simpson. As his father’s health failed and it began to appear that his reign would 
not last long, he made up his mind to marry her, seeking to find ‘what for so long had 
been lacking’, the companion without whom his ‘service to the state would seem an 
empty thing.’53 As the Archbishop of Canterbury would be unable to perform the 
required rites in Westminster Abbey when one party was divorced, this decision 
effectively meant relinquishing his position as King, or at least, all that the position had 
symbolised until then. Image 26 
Unfortunately for Edward, the Archbishop at this time also had plans for what 
his biographer describes as an ‘Evangelistic campaign’ to coincide with the planned 
1937 coronation. This ‘recall to religion’ emphasised morality and patriotism at a time 
of supposed laxity in morals.54 Sexuality and the sacrament of marriage were central 
concerns to the Church. As George Machin has shown, amid growing secularism in the 
wake of the First World War, by the 1930s the clergy’s power over traditional morality 
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appeared waning.55 Lang was concerned over a ‘loosening of the ties of marriage and in 
a lack of restraint upon the impulses of sex.’56 Amid growing societal pressure to reform 
Britain’s divorce laws from the end of the nineteenth century, Lang saw the post-war 
British monarchy as powerful allies in his campaign for a morally cohesive society.57 In 
short, Edward’s future with Wallis was not auspicious.  
Though knowledge of the King’s affairs of the heart still remained mostly 
confined with the closed ranks of Establishment circles, other Australians besides Bruce 
and Casey were by now aware of the friction between Edward and his advisors. During 
the later 1920s, the former would almost certainly have imparted their concerns to 
colleague Joseph Lyons, then leader of the United Australia Party, who would become 
prime minister in 1932. The situation reached something of an impasse when Edward 
ascended the throne. In contrast to the modest disparagement published in the 
Australian press when he was Prince, now as King he could not be openly criticised as 
lèse-majesté was a punishable offence. Nonetheless, Lyons and his wife Enid heard 
further suggestions that Edward was involved with a married woman when attending 
the Silver Jubilee of King George V in London in May 1935.58 Other attending 
Ministers including Robert Menzies and Earle Page were also reportedly party to the 
rumours.59 Enid Lyons stated that her husband was ‘singularly uninterested in 
scandalous gossip’ and did not at that time suspect any forthcoming trouble.60 Image 27 
As this and subsequent chapters will collectively demonstrate, Lyons’ 
personality, in many ways at odds with the puritan Bruce, would come to bear on his 
accepting attitude towards the King’s behaviour and ultimately the Australian 
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government’s position on the abdication. Enid Lyons claims for her husband an 
admiration for the monarch’s position at the apex of government and as the neutral 
symbol of the Crown. By 1928, she writes that his early republican leanings had for the 
most part: 
given way to a convinced support of monarchy. He regarded the 
American system that required the Head of the State to struggle in the 
miry arena of party politics as lessening the dignity of the State itself, 
and tending to lessen the respect in which its laws were held. A 
symbol of State set apart above the common things of everyday had 
become his ideal.61 
 
David Bird has offered a considered sense of Lyons’ liberal Catholicism and 
sense of tolerance and sympathy that further informs what we know of his early 
uninterest in the Whitehall gossip. Lyons’ political style was ‘extremely sentimental, 
subjective and “personal” to an extent that would be considered extraordinary today’, he 
writes, also noting that the prime minister’s upbringing ‘gave him a gentleness that was 
never to leave him.’62 Enid Lyons agrees that tolerance was ‘a part of him.’63 Her 
husband also placed great value on the ‘life of the home’, children and a happy 
marriage.64 This liberal outlook extended to the private lives of other individuals, even 
when this broached on government territory. Of the celebrated case of Mabel Freer of 
October 1936, Lyons maintained that the government had ‘no right to interfere in the 
morals of other people; it’s nothing to do with us.’65 Knowing this of his character, his 
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decision in 1935 to turn a blind eye, initially, to criticism of the King’s behaviour seems 
customary.  
In any case, no suggestion of Wallis clouded the Australian coverage of King 
George V’s funeral, Edward’s proclamation ceremonies or the formal British accession 
reception of March 1936. Australian perceptions of the new King regained some of their 
previous exaltation, although as Nairn has cautioned, this cannot be too unsurprisingly 
as all incoming monarchs are identified as fresh and positive influences.66 Edward’s 
reign was largely positively received, perhaps in part owing to lèse-majesté, but also 
demonstrating an Australian willingness to forgo previous criticisms in favour of the 
new democratic King’s usefulness to the Empire. Tension in Europe, notably the rise of 
dictators Hitler and Mussolini, and their antagonism of the League of Nations, also 
foretold the need for an inspiring figurehead to unite the disparate Dominions under the 
Crown. Labor Senator Joe Collings hoped Edward would ‘steer, not only the Empire, 
but also the other nations involved, through the darkness which at present seems almost 
impenetrable.’67  
Similarly, in the House of Representatives, Lyons hoped that the new King’s 
reign would be ‘marked by the prosperity and progress of the countries comprising the 
British Empire’, revealing of his view of Australian defence as one with that of the 
Empire.68 Opposition leader John Curtin hoped for ‘great changes for the betterment of 
humanity.’69 The new King was also perceived by some Australians as a practical 
peacemaker. Later in the year, a small Tasmanian group compiled a petition of some 
1500 signatures in support of the dissolution of the League. The petitioners felt assured 
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that Edward demonstrated the ‘ability and influence and power to accomplish much for 
the well-ruling and governing of the world and the stability of its society.’70 
Favourable perceptions of the King’s personality and democratic inclinations 
were also revived. Particularly popular in Parliament was the incumbent’s declaration to 
work ‘for the happiness and welfare of all classes of my subjects.’71 Senator George 
Pearce insisted that Edward’s interest in the life of the people was ‘real.’72 The new 
King was ‘a product of modernity, with a breezy, unconventional outlook’, who 
attracted ‘profound admiration and respect from the peoples of the world’ one journalist 
enthused.73 Similarly, the Australian Women’s Weekly perceived a ‘modern King who 
will put his stamp on history.’74 The Queenslander put a positive emphasis on Edward 
being a man set on ‘marrying for love.’75 Each of the new King’s attributes most 
favourably regarded by Australians in 1920 - as a symbol of the Crown, as an 
inspiration for peace, as a modern exemplar and as a member of the family – were 
briefly revived during his accession celebrations.  
 
Impending trouble 
All the favourable publicity in the world could not dispel the encroaching tension in the 
King’s court. Before I turn my attention to growing Australian awareness of his 
relationship with Wallis between July and September 1936, it is necessary to lay out 
some context from the developments in Britain’s press. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, some years after meeting Edward, Wallis filed for divorce from her 
husband in July 1936. In her petition, she alleged that Ernest had admitted to adultery 
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with an ‘Elizabeth Kennedy’, circumstances confirmed by three employees of the Hotel 
de Paris in Bray, Berkshire.76  
Stephen Cretney has examined the legislative context of this bizarre situation. 
During the 1930s, evidence that a couple had, for whatever reason, privately agreed 
between themselves to divorce, rather than at the behest of the ‘injured’ party, was 
considered unlawful.77 Evidence had to be provided of the physical unfaithfulness of 
one against the other, and so the tale of the respondent being discovered enjoying a 
post-coital cigarette in bed with someone other than their spouse by a surprised hotel 
chambermaid became an oft-recounted one.78 Although the Simpsons swore no 
collusion had taken place, were evidence presented that Wallis had herself previously 
committed adultery with the King, or that money had changed hands in support of a 
separation, she would not have been entitled to petition for divorce.  
Not since the early eighteenth century scandal of Queen Caroline and King 
George IV had the public life of a monarch been quite so publicly and unsavourily 
associated with divorce.79 Should aspersions be cast by any private person, the King’s 
Proctor, Sir Thomas Barnes, a public servant responsible for investigating petitions for 
collusion, would be required to investigate. As Cretney points out, the possibility of the 
necessary investigations revealing damaging information against the King was of huge 
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concern to Baldwin and the British government.80 The other obvious conclusion could 
only be that it was the King who was the adulterer, rather than Ernest Simpson, who had 
‘admitted’ as such. Such a scandal would have a profound effect on public affection for 
the monarchy, and by extension the foundations of government. Any hope of the British 
and Dominion public continuing to perceive the King as an idealised, progressive 
family man would surely be lost. The hearing was scheduled for October 1936, meaning 
if Wallis’ petition was successful, her divorce would be finalised six months later. 
Edward was able to persuade the British newspaper doyens to restrict reporting to the 
facts only, which, as Schwartzenbach argues, adhered to an established precedent for 
the British press to respectfully ignore the activities of a monarch’s mistress.81  
 The King, however, did not match their discretion with his own. He began to 
behave increasingly recklessly, most notably during the notorious Nahlin jaunt between 
August and September. As Linkoff has pointed out, the cruise marked a point when the 
King appeared content to be photographed in the company of Wallis, and possibly even 
actively encouraged this public confirmation of their togetherness.82 The American 
press avidly followed Wallis’ every move, although Britain’s press remained obediently 
and resolutely silent in contrast.83 Beadle describes American journalists as seizing 
upon these activities ‘in the sensational manner of a Hollywood romance’ and outlines 
how the close geographical proximity of this ‘yellow journalism’ placed the Canadian 
press in a position of some awkwardness. Between July and December most Canadian 
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editors voluntarily boycotted any mention of the relationship, probably following the 
attitudes of their own staff based in London. This curtailed the formation of any 
widespread or meaningful Canadian public opinion (with the exception of those who 
had access to American publications) and ultimately left the Canadian public as ‘totally 
unprepared’ as their British counterparts when the ‘bombshell’ was revealed.84  
The situation in Australia, or indeed New Zealand and South Africa, has not to 
date been similarly scrutinised. Most accounts have assumed that Australian journalism 
deferred to Britain’s lead. Even at the time, the contemporary American press believed 
that Australian journalism observed the ‘greatest restraint and people [in the] great cities 
… know practically nothing.’85 In 1966, Fairbanks claimed that the Australian press 
was both cognisant of the agreement, and took steps to enforce it in consultation with 
the other Dominions. ‘The newspaper owners of Great Britain, Australia and the other 
Commonwealth countries decided to supress any and all references [to the couple]’ he 
wrote, suggesting an ambitious and far-reaching ploy aiming to keep all British subjects 
‘in the dark.’86 A year earlier, Edwards had made the general claim that no reports 
appeared in the Dominion press concerning the King ‘being so frequently in Mrs 
Simpson’s company.’87 While this may be more or less true in the case of Canada, the 
case of Australia was far more nuanced.  
The Australian response to the King’s activities is revealing of local attitudes 
towards the importation of inter-war American cultural influences. David Mosler and 
Robert Catley argue that Australia was at this time ‘one of the most willing absorbers of 
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Yankee cultural forms.’88 American media culture, advertising and the material 
aspirations of the ‘American Dream’ displaced nascent Australian cultural tropes and 
posed a growing threat to Anglo-Australian, that is, Empire dominance.89 In 1935, a 
body titled the Cultural Defence Committee was formed in Sydney to combat the 
‘menace’ of supposedly cheap and low-brow content found in syndicated American 
newspapers and magazines, the slang and ‘nasal intonation’ common to American radio 
broadcasts and, from 1929, the ‘talkies’, all of which were enthusiastically adopted by 
young people.90 The adoption of American notions of consumerism and capitalism 
clashed with many Australians’ sense of dedication to British monarchical symbolism, a 
unionised workforce and a growing sense of nationalistic self-interest.91 Growing 
Americanisation of the 1920s and 1930s, argues Kate Darian-Smith, was easily equated 
with ‘trash and corruption’ in contrast to the supposed quality of British culture and 
institutions.92 
It follows, therefore, that the Australian press’ response to the global circulation 
of reports of the King’s relationship with an American woman might reveal two 
possible attitudes. In the early stages, a large proportion of editors made no mention of 
the relationship at all. The Argus of 31 July, for example, mentioned only the Nahlin’s 
specifications rather than anyone on board.93 It is possible that this initial dearth of 
editorial commentary in both metropolitan and regional publications illustrates a 
genuine unfamiliarity with Wallis, although it is more likely that it reflects the reticence 
of the British press and their international agencies, which in turn coloured early 
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Australian perceptions on the matter. During the inter-war period, most of the press 
information available had originated from Britain. From the end of the nineteenth 
century, the British press behemoth Reuters and, to a lesser degree, the United States 
agency Associated Press, had exerted a monopoly over the content supplied to 
Australian agencies and newspapers.94 Australian journalists also rewrote information 
drawn from carbon copies of the British and American dailies.95 In 1935, the expense of 
obtaining news from overseas agencies prompted the amalgamation of the two 
Australian agencies existing at the time, the Australian Press Association and United 
Cable Service. With former royal tour journalist Keith Murdoch at the helm, the 
resulting Australian Associated Press had its own bureaux in London and New York. 
Prue Torney-Parlicki has estimated that in 1936-37, some 85 per cent of overseas news 
published in Australia came from London, with approximately 12 per cent from New 
York and the remaining three per cent from elsewhere.96  
Despite the lack of published commentary, there can be no doubt that 
information on the situation flowed along these well-established agency networks 
without ending up in print. The early reticence cannot therefore be identified as official 
censorship, despite the later allegation by Labor politician Sol Rosevear that early 
rumours were ‘excised’ from certain publications by ‘censorship officers in Australia 
and in other parts of the British Empire’ in a manner similar to that of Britain.97 A more 
likely explanation is that in the early stages, some proprietors in consultation with their 
colleagues in London, felt some hesitancy to publish news that was unsubstantiated and 
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could be construed as critical of the King. They may have feared an adverse reaction 
from their Australian readers.  
This reticence would not last. Perhaps as part of the rising appetite for 
American-style news, other Australian journalists and editors displayed great interest in 
the gossip. There can be no doubt that the information was available to readers of the 
American opinion pieces that were included in the 15 per cent of news originating from 
outside of Britain. By the 1930s, for example, Melbourne’s Table Talk magazine was 
reproducing American-authored treatises expounding on romance and marriage.98 As 
politician Eddie Ward would later exclaim, American articles available in Australia at 
that time were ‘full of the King’s relations with Mrs Simpson’, and indicated ‘some sort 
of alliance’ between them.99 Over the course of that winter, snippets of speculative 
narrative and images from the King’s summer holiday made their way into the 
Australian press, albeit obliquely in some cases. By 27 August, for example, the Sydney 
Morning Herald had confirmed Wallis’s presence on board the Nahlin but limited its 
discussion to her fashionable attire.100  
Others took the bolder step of printing photographs banned in Britain, and 
razored out of imported American magazines such as Time. On 1 September, for 
example, the Brisbane Courier-Mail published a photograph of the couple with Wallis’s 
hand on the King’s arm.101 Others dropped heavy hints. On 5 September, for example, 
the Australian Women’s Weekly enthused over ‘the charming American’, one of the 
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King’s ‘greatest friends.’102 Truth pronounced Wallis as evidence for Edward’s 
preference for American ‘straightforwardness’, noting approvingly that ‘it is certain that 
the King will do just what he likes’ in choosing ‘commoners’ for his friends.103 The 
Adelaide Chronicle of 10 September published a photograph of the couple above the 
caption ‘King smiles on holiday.’104 Although reporting across the country was 
sporadic, this demonstrates that, unlike in the case of Britain, attentive Australian 
readers capable of picking up some none-too-subtle clues had an opportunity to become 
conversant with the close relationship between Edward and Wallis several months 
before the abdication. Image 28 
 
The High Commissioner steps in  
In Britain, those within press and government circles remained tight-lipped over the 
course of the summer, perhaps hoping that the King’s passion would diminish following 
the cruise. This did not eventuate and events progressed at speed following Baldwin’s 
return from his own holidays in mid-October.105 Sensing that the press’s silence could 
not last, Alexander Hardinge, who had replaced the loyal Thomas as the King’s Private 
Secretary, took steps of his own to assess the status of public opinion on a possible 
marriage. Although Hardinge’s position was intended to provide close personal support 
to the monarch, the two men differed in many ways. As Williams explains, Hardinge 
was a ‘man of absolute rectitude’ whose conservativism was more closely tied with the 
previous court.106 On 15 October, Hardinge wrote to the Canadian Governor-General, 
asking for a sense of the local reaction to the fervent gossip circulating in the American 
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press. Lord Tweedsmuir replied that Canadian opinion was ‘most anxious and 
disquieting’ on the topic.107  
On the same day, the British press first became aware that Wallis’ divorce 
would be heard at Ipswich in the county of East Anglia the following week, giving the 
clearest indication thus far that she would soon be free to marry again. As Williams has 
pointed out, the decision to hold the action at the regional assizes, rather than wait for a 
trial at the High Court in London, implied haste and a clumsy attempt at discretion.108 
As Ziegler puts it ‘the news of what was in the wind spread panic in Whitehall.’109 
Baldwin consulted with Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of the Times, and a number of 
statesmen including Horace Wilson, his economic advisor. In contrast to the British 
press’ silence on proceedings, a concise cabled report on the forthcoming divorce suit of 
one of the King’s ‘guests’ appeared in several Australian papers.110 Scenting a 
sensation, Truth’s London correspondent travelled to Ipswich but was unable to find 
anyone willing to discuss the matter.111 Although little was said, Australian journalists 
and their readers who were aware of the King’s existing relationship with Wallis would 
have had no trouble putting two and two together. 
In the meantime, Baldwin visited Edward’s country home, Fort Belvedere, on 20 
October to confront him about Wallis for the first time. The meeting was not a success; 
having ‘edged around the subject’, Baldwin ‘stayed to talk about the roses.’112 Baldwin 
attempted to present himself as offering friendly advice and failed to negotiate any 
further action or decision. He also made no formal attempt to consult either the British 
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Parliament or the Dominions on the matter.113 This is not to say, however, that 
Dominion opinion had not been sought on an informal and secret basis. According to 
unpublished notes prepared by Wilson, on 23 October, for example, Baldwin had a 
‘long discussion’ with William Mackenzie King, the visiting prime minister of 
Canada.114 Mackenzie King had had an audience with Edward earlier that week and told 
Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, that he had ‘spoken 
very plainly’ about the negative ‘state of feeling’ in Canada.115  
Significantly, Baldwin was also made confidentially aware of an Australian 
point of view. From the outset, Bruce, by now the influential High Commissioner of 
Australia to the United Kingdom, was opposed to the prospect of the King’s marriage. 
Following the end of his term as prime minister in 1929, Bruce had taken up the post in 
London in 1933. He was prominent in the London diplomatic community, influential in 
Australia’s relationship with Britain and, thanks to years of gossip conveyed by Casey, 
more than aware of the constitutional danger threatened by the revelation of the King’s 
private foibles. Bruce had taken no action that summer. Despite being ‘aware of the all 
the rumours and gossip that had been floating about’ he had not ‘taken them too 
seriously.’116 He did note that an Anzac soldier reportedly complained to him that it was 
‘a bit thick, his [the King] taking that woman with him to Gallipoli’ during the Nahlin’s 
voyage to Turkey.117 After the divorce proceedings became publicly known however, 
Bruce felt obliged to arrange to speak with Baldwin on the matter. He intended to 
become well-informed enough to communicate the situation to Lyons, as well as some 
measure of his own personal opinion; to offer ‘the facts as I saw them.’118  
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It is certain that Bruce’s resolve was, even at this early stage, unshakeably in 
opposition to the marriage. Lee has shown that although the High Commissioner valued 
the authority exerted by the monarch’s winning characteristics, he firmly believed this 
was best directed in support of the Crown. Bruce felt that ‘the personal qualities of the 
monarch helped to bind individuals to the crown and through the crown to the nation 
and Empire.’119 His major concern was any potential threat to Australia’s strategic 
position, given that uniform loyalty to the monarchy bolstered the relationship between 
the dominions and by extension Australia’s prominence on the League of Nations 
council.120  
Bruce’s concerns over future imperial cohesion were shared by the British 
bureaucracy and press. On 26 October, Dawson showed to Hardinge and Baldwin a 
letter to The Times from a British man living in America and signing himself 
‘Britannicus in Partibus Infedelium.’121 This vehement piece was supposedly illustrative 
of the growing outrage in Canadian and British-American ex-patriate circles to the 
moral conduct of the King. The seemingly straightforward resolution of the Simpsons’ 
divorce on 27 October also marked a milestone in the emerging abdication incident. 
Ernest Simpson had offered no defence and the presiding judge at Ipswich Assizes 
agreed to a decree nisi with a six-month compulsory waiting period.122 This ruling 
allowed for further investigation if required or the presentation of additional evidence. 
Although the results of the case were widely reprinted in Australian regional and 
metropolitan newspapers, the press still refrained from speculation. The Cairns Post, for 
example, on 29 October simply referred to Wallis as the King’s ‘guest.’123 In Canberra, 
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still no mention of the unfolding incident had been formally communicated to Lyons.  
 
Lyons contains the matter  
The prime minister could not remain unaware for long. By early November, Australian 
newspaper speculation was rife. More than three weeks before the news broke in the 
British press, Australian journalists were quick to introduce the prospect of abdication, 
giving their interested readers the chance to become conversant with the issues at stake 
at an early stage. Editorial commentary began to appear to supplement the cabled 
reports from overseas. At this stage, the tone was not noticeably judgemental and 
journalists seem merely gleeful at the prospect of a scoop. For example, referring to 
‘American files just to hand’, one editorial of 10 November gave a breathless account of 
the King’s dilemma, the unsuspecting nature of the majority of the British public, and 
the possibility of abdication in favour of his brother.124 On 14 November, Smith’s 
Weekly pounced on the ‘flood of fantastic yankee prophesies’ on the likelihood of the 
‘Baltimore girl’ becoming Queen.125 Although quick to condemn the ‘flagrant and 
objectionable discussion’ of the American scandal sheets, the Perth Mirror also 
speculated on the King’s eagerness to cast aside some of the ‘old ideas’ and the 
attraction of a ‘bond of union’ offered by an American-British marriage.126 The tone 
was not at this stage negative. The Mirror, for example, sympathetically offered that 
‘whomever and whenever he elects to marry, his choice is sure to be popular with his 
people.’127  
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In Whitehall, anxiety increased as to the effects of a scandal on imperial 
cohesion. Howell Gwynne, doyen of the Newspaper Proprietors Association, warned 
Baldwin that the ‘Great Silence’ would not last and that the resulting sensational 
coverage would be a ‘deadly blow’ to the monarchy.128 Bruce also capitalised on several 
informal opportunities to present his point of view. On 13 November, the High 
Commissioner met for lunch with Hardinge.129 Drawing on his experience, Bruce 
indicated that Australia would not support the proposed marriage, a meeting that almost 
certainly influenced Hardinge to take matters into his own hands. The same day he 
penned a letter of admonishment to the King, outlining in no uncertain terms the 
government’s growing alarm over his intention to marry, and the strained nature of the 
press’s silence on the matter.130 He urged the King to send Wallis out of the country 
without further delay.131 Two days later, Bruce was also able to discuss the matter at 
length with Baldwin, when he ‘told him of the serious view that was being taken in 
Australia.’132  
This meeting between Bruce and Baldwin marks the entry of Australia into the 
discussion. Although informal, it nonetheless determined the ultimate direction of the 
Australian government. The two men agreed that British people had, given the reclusive 
domesticity of King George V, ‘become accustomed to a high moral standard in the 
Court’ and that any marital scandal would damage ‘the prestige of the Crown.’133 Bruce 
pressed upon Baldwin ‘the alarming and devastating possibility’ that Edward should 
marry Wallis, noting it would be ‘impossible to calculate the consequences.’ His 
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opinion was that Australians ‘would never accept the woman as Queen.’134 The two 
men feared the revelation of damaging allegations of Edward’s role in the Simpson 
divorce and were also aware that the press’ silence could not last.135 
Bruce summarised these arguments in a further communication sent the 
following day.136 Despite lacking input from Lyons, he assured Baldwin that ‘in any 
action you decide to take’, he could be confident of ‘any measure of support my Prime 
Minister can render you.’137 Baldwin would go on to place particular emphasis on Bruce 
and Mackenzie King’s advice as a reliable indicator of public and government attitudes 
during his next meeting with the King on 16 November. He drew attention to ‘the state 
of feeling throughout the Empire, on which he had received some very direct and 
significant information’ from Bruce.138 Edward confirmed that his mind was made up, 
stating the oft-quoted line ‘I am going to marry Mrs Simpson, and I am prepared to 
go.’139 He subsequently told his mother and brothers of his intentions and so decisively 
committed himself to this course of action. From this perspective, the abdication 
episode was effectively over without any formal political debate and before the general 
public had access to any official information.  
The British press’s silence was close to disintegration. On 18 November, Labour 
MP Ellen Wilkinson asked a question in the House of Commons referring to the 
censorship of incoming American magazines. ‘What is this thing the British public are 
not allowed to know?’ she asked.140 In contrast, the nature of the ‘thing’ was directly 
articulated to an Australian readership the same day. The Perth Daily News, for 
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example, displayed no reticence, reprinting a large photograph of Wallis under the 
heading ‘Mrs Simpson stories censored?’141 While newspaper references to date had 
been mostly non-committal, the salient details were nonetheless in circulation. It seems 
certain that many Australians found it a topic of great interest, although they were slow 
to judge one way or another. At this stage, the public mostly waited and digested the 
news.  
If it were evident by this stage that the King’s actions were close to becoming 
public knowledge in Britain, it was also becoming apparent that the tendering of the 
Dominions’ advice needed to be formalised and consistent with the stipulations of the 
Statute of Westminster. Oscar Dowson, the Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, was 
one of the first bureaucrats to query whether this was not a matter ‘in which the 
ministers of the Dominions equally have an interest and a duty to tender advice?’ 
Admitting that the consolidation of any forthcoming contradictory advice ‘bristles with 
difficulty’, he concluded that 
an open and general scandal affecting the foundations of the 
monarchy is a matter in which the Dominions must be concerned 
equally with the U.K.142  
 
At the same time, tensions further increased after the King toured the destitute 
mining villages of south Wales on 18 and 19 November. ‘Something must be done’, he 
said in response to meeting with poverty-stricken residents.143 As Williams has 
explained, for Baldwin this was the final straw and ‘yet one more example in which he 
seemed to side with the working-class against those in power.’ The King’s lack of 
political nous sparked a fervent clamour in the labour press, reigniting longstanding 
fears of a communist takeover and a reprisal of hunger marches by the unemployed to 
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143 Ziegler, King Edward VIII, p. 301. 
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London.144 Baldwin construed these comments as a criticism of the government’s lack 
of intervention that seemed to further confirm Edward’s unsuitability as an apolitical 
monarch. It was timely therefore that, on his return from Wales, the King first broached 
the prospect of morganatic marriage with Baldwin as an option to allow him to remain 
on the throne. The prime minister commented that he felt sure the House of Commons 
would not assent to the legislation required, but offered to think it over and consult his 
Cabinet.145  
In agreeing to Baldwin’s offer, the King committed a major tactical error. This 
shifted the problem from one of conservative and ecclesiastical opposition to Wallis’ 
supposed morality, to a simple legislative matter that could be easily rejected. In 
committing to an official course of action, Edward was bound to accept the advice of 
his government.146 If he did not, the government would be forced to resign, creating a 
constitutional upheaval of unprecedented magnitude for the Empire. The repercussions 
for the Australian government, and by extension the constitutionally-appointed roles of 
Governor-General and state Governors, was uncertain. The chaos may have provided an 
opportunity for the Dominions to revaluate their constitutional obligations against their 
own nationalistic needs. Baldwin therefore required the consistent agreement of all of 
the Dominions to be able to proceed with the course already charted and avert any 
dissent.147 This highlights the importance of the Dominions’ supportive opinion, and the 
manner in which this was manipulated by Baldwin in forcing the King to abdicate. It 
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   207	  
also shows the arbitrary lines of moral distinction drawn by a small number of 
influential politicians.  
Duly, on 27 November, Baldwin met with Cabinet. Not unsurprisingly, the 
suggestion to introduce new legislation to allow for a morganatic marriage was soundly 
rejected, but nonetheless steps were taken to consult the Dominion governments in 
order to finalise this decision. Hardinge took it upon himself to send a telegram to the 
Australian Governor-General, Alexander Gore Arkwright Hore-Ruthven, on 27 
November advising of the serious developments arising.148 The following day, formal 
advice outlining the situation was received by the British High Commissioner’s office 
in Canberra, as well as those of each of the other Dominions.149 The draft had been 
prepared for Baldwin by MacDonald with the assistance of Batterbee, and Cabinet 
Secretary Maurice Hankey.150  
Interpreted by Beaverbrook as ‘words of disaster for the King’, this telegram did 
nothing to put forward Edward’s perspective and was delivered in such a way as to 
engender a response supportive of the government’s stand against the marriage.151 This 
strategy sought to remove the King from the throne as quickly as possible, by garnering 
the Dominions’ support to block any new legislation that would allow him to marry 
Wallis.152 Following a summary of Baldwin’s communication with the King and his 
‘fixed intention’ to marry, it outlined three options concerning the morganatic proposal. 
Firstly, that Edward marry Wallis and she become Queen; secondly, that he marry her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 NAA, A3522, 3/1. Telegram to Hore-Ruthven from Hardinge, 27 November 1936. 
149 In Lyons, So we take comfort , p. 249, Enid Lyons claims that the telegram of 28 November 
1936 was the first intimation Joseph Lyons had received on the matter. According to protocol, 
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without abdication but on the basis that she would not become Queen and accompanied 
by the necessary legislation to achieve this basis; or thirdly, that Edward voluntarily 
abdicate in favour of the Duke of York.153  
Bloch has assessed this correspondence as ‘not in the least impartial, but a 
political canvassing operation in favour of abdication.’154 The text conveyed Baldwin’s 
personal opinion on the introduction of legislation to allow for a morganatic marriage. 
He felt ‘convinced’ that neither his government nor the British public here would accept 
either a morganatic marriage or Wallis as Queen.155 While he was of course entitled to 
put forward the British government’s point of view, this was misleading. As Williams’ 
work has demonstrated, when speaking of the ‘public’, Baldwin was most likely 
alluding to the influential members of the Establishment and upper-classes, and not the 
working and middle-classes who comprised the majority of the population and for 
whom sexual modernity allowed for a more sympathetic attitude to divorce. Baldwin 
was effectively asking the prime ministers to approve a course of action already 
instigated by the British government as a fait accompli.  
The prime ministers were also restricted from consulting in a democratic 
manner. The British government was anxious to avoid ‘leakage’ prior to the passing of 
any legislation, an anxiety that extended to forbidding Dominion prime ministers from 
mentioning the issue to their Cabinets.156 Baldwin advised that the prime ministers 
would be asked to consult more broadly at some later stage, but could then only consult 
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‘one or two’ colleagues in ‘absolute secrecy.’ Baldwin asked only for their private 
views on the likely public response in each Dominion.157 
In Acton, Canberra, the British High Commissioner, Geoffrey Whiskard, and his 
office staff had the task of deciphering and circulating incoming secret coded telegrams 
to the prime minister, a few miles distant at Provisional Parliament House in the suburb 
of Parkes. This was the only secure means of communication. Whiskard immediately 
communicated Baldwin’s message to Lyons, who was about to leave for Melbourne. He 
also sent on another message from London on 29 November, in which Bruce indicated 
his strong support for Baldwin’s objective to finalise the matter swiftly, writing that 
Australia’s acquiescence would ‘greatly assist’ the situation.158 Writing that marriage to 
Wallis would not ‘be accepted by people either Great Britain or other parts of Empire’, 
Bruce saw no distinction between the possible British and Australian reaction.159 
Whiskard described how, upon receiving this news from Britain, Lyons had 
expressed deepest shock.160 Nonetheless, his mind was immediately and resolutely 
made up. To this decision, we can attribute what we know of Lyons’ attitude that the 
monarch should be a figurehead ‘set apart and above the common things of 
everyday.’161 As per Bruce’s urgings, he dismissed Baldwin’s first two options ‘at once’ 
and assumed the third would be the only possible solution. He agreed that the ‘domestic 
traditions of the late Monarch’ could be revived in the figure of the Duke of York, ‘a 
worthy successor’ whose accession would be met with ‘deepest relief and satisfaction 
throughout Australia.’162 Unable to discuss the matter broadly within Parliament and 
with the Opposition, Lyons turned to a small number of his senior ministers; the Deputy 
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prime minister, Earle Page, Richard Casey, who had by then taken up the position of 
Treasurer, and the Attorney-General, Robert Menzies. All ‘acquiesced in the opinions 
given.’163 On 30 November, Whiskard informed the Dominions Office that Lyons and 
his colleagues were ‘unanimously and emphatically’ in favour of abdication.164 
Ultimately, Australia’s formal response to the possible introduction of legislation to 
allow for the King’s morganatic marriage was therefore determined by a handful of 
politicians of the dominant party. Sworn to secrecy, even if they had wished to, options 
to determine public opinion were limited. 
This also meant that no reference to the scandal had been made within 
Parliament, and Curtin remained uninformed. However, the limited yet explosive press 
coverage meant that in some cases Australian journalists and readers were quickly 
becoming as well informed as members of the Opposition. Also on 30 November, 
several newspapers had remarked at length and in no uncertain terms on the rumoured 
desire of the King to marry Wallis.165 The text referred to the opposition faced by the 
King from the Church and conservative government. Of greatest consternation to 
Whiskard was the claim that the matter had been the subject of ‘earnest consideration’ 
in court and ‘ministerial circles’, although entirely absent from Australian parliamentary 
debates. 166 As Collings later pointed out in the Senate, most objectionable was the 
insinuation that the Dominion prime ministers were privy to secret discussions with 
Britain.167 Following several months of speculation gleaned directly from American 
press reports, the story broke in Australia well before Britain, and became public 
knowledge prior to any discussion within the Australian government.  
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This unusual situation is revealing not only of the attitudes of the press during a 
time of national debate, but also its complex relationship to the formation of public 
opinion. As Mort argues of the British context, the diversity of responses to Edward’s 
abdication demonstrated that ‘ordinary’ observers were well-able to sift through the 
conflicted offerings of the mass communications industry and the Establishment in 
order to draw their own conclusions.168 In Australia too, changing social codes such as 
greater public scrutiny of the longstanding ethical conduct of high politics and a 
growing awareness of the right of the individual to self-expression, were also brought to 
bear on local perceptions of the incident. In any case, the fragmented transfer of press 
information, gossip and sentiment placed the Australian public in an unequalled 
position, possibly unusual among the Dominions, to consider this dramatic reappraisal 
of the King’s suitability for his role.  
 
All is revealed  
With assistance from Menzies, Lyons responded formally to Baldwin’s telegram on 1 
December.169 In keeping with Bruce’s advice, he expressed only support for Baldwin’s 
actions and the King’s abdication. Edward was ‘extremely popular’, Lyons wrote, but 
he anticipated ‘widespread condemnation’ of a marriage to Wallis. The morganatic 
option, he felt, also ran ‘counter to [the] best popular conception of Royal Family’ and 
that a ‘grave weakening’ of loyalty would eventuate unless the King abdicated. He 
indicated that in his view, any such marriage would generate substantial change in 
Australian attitudes towards the royal family and their idealised reputation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Mort, ‘Love in a Cold Climate’, pp. 27-29. 
169 Lyons, So we take comfort, p. 251. 
	  	   212	  
domesticity. Offering his sympathy for Baldwin’s predicament, Lyons signed off ‘sure 
that your action and attitude correct.’170  
The archival record reveals that Lyons was at the outset anxious to communicate 
widely within the Australian government. He feared that his Ministers would be ‘greatly 
upset’ if the matter became public before they were informed.171 These honourable 
intentions did not eventuate in time. All the while, parliamentarians were acquiring the 
bulk of their understanding of the situation from the newspapers. Lyons himself was 
operating on limited information and the difference in time zones made it difficult to 
advance any queries and receive a response within reasonable working hours. Distance 
and the need to communicate in secret code, rather than making use of unsecured 
telephone or radio networks effectively limited any negotiation.172 
The following day, 2 December, Lyons received Baldwin’s summary of the 
individual Dominion responses, excepting New Zealand. Despite lacking this advice 
from Labour prime minister Michael Savage, Baldwin noted that he perceived a 
‘general agreement as to best course in present circumstances’, before again requesting 
continuing secrecy.173 However, the collated responses were not as consistent as 
Baldwin intimated. Ziegler’s statement that ‘certainly, Baldwin had grounds for 
contending that the Dominions would not accept Wallis either as Queen or morganatic 
consort’ simplifies a complex reality.174 All four Dominion prime ministers expressed 
different views, both personal and in regard to their opinion of the public response. The 
conservative James Hertzog of the Union of South Africa was the most assured, 
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describing abdication as ‘the lesser of two very grave evils.’ He viewed the matter as 
one with repercussion for the Empire at a time when the Crown was ‘a vital necessity to 
[a] whole world in unrest and revolution.’175  
New Zealand’s reply, when it came, was however distinctly sympathetic to the 
King. Savage had not heard of Wallis prior to the arrival of the telegram and had to ask 
his Governor-General for enlightenment.176 Given the ‘great affection’ felt in New 
Zealand for the King and the peoples’ desire for ‘his happiness’, Savage hoped that 
‘some such arrangement might be approved’ to legislate for a morganatic marriage, 
although he conceded that New Zealand would be guided by Britain and a collective 
desire for imperial unity.177 Given Savage’s lack of quotable objections, Beaverbrook 
later alleged that Baldwin took steps to ‘secure a reply favourable to his own designs’ 
and interviewed Walter Nash, a New Zealand Minister visiting London, in an 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain a more hostile opinion.178  
Canada’s reply was equally measured. Although Mackenzie King viewed 
abdication as ‘the honourable and right course’, he alone of the Dominion prime 
ministers seemed aware of the pitfalls surrounding the British government’s collation of 
the responses. Canadian Parliament had been fiercely protective of its independence and 
the equality of the relationship between the King and the Dominions since adopting the 
terms of both the Balfour Declaration in 1926 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931, 
thus bringing constitutional issues under its own control.179 Although avowing that 
Canada did not support the morganatic option, Mackenzie King was at pains to state his 
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distance from any machinations that forced abdication as ‘imposed by Ministers’, rather 
than voluntarily by Edward.180  
Within this context, Lyons’ response is most comparable with the forthright 
support for abdication offered by Hertzog, and certainly less sympathetic to Edward 
than other Dominion prime ministers. However, it was Lyons’ decision on 2 December 
to send a second, more forcefully expressed telegram that earned for Australia the 
reputation as the most opposed to the King. He claimed that even if the King abandoned 
his marriage plans, the ‘situation had passed the possibility of compromise’, public 
confidence being ‘so shaken that no course is possible.’181 At this point, there was still 
little sense of Australian public opinion on the matter, as reflected in the nation’s 
newspapers at least, and so Lyons’ reiteration of Australia’s opposition is at first 
puzzling. Clearly, nonetheless, he had his urgers. Although unsigned and undated, a 
letter held within his personal correspondence demonstrates some identical sentiments 
to those communicated to Westminster.182 This offered to ‘put bluntly’, the ‘views of 
British-Australians’:  
The King must abdicate – for we can no longer have any respect for 
him … for a King who would think so little of his empire that he 
could plunge it (as he has done) into sorrow, distress and humiliation 
… he has done the thing that is not done by decent men ... [he has] 
lowered British prestige, in the eyes of other nations … Where is his 
sense of honour? Where is his sense of ordinary decency and 
conduct? … It will break the loyalty of all British subjects. Without 
respect, there can be no loyalty. If that woman were recognised as a 
wife or Queen, or openly paraded as mistress, then many of us would 
renounce our British nationality, there would be undoubtedly a sharp 
move of hearts away from any country or government that 
countenanced it. Stand firm, Mr Lyons … For the sake of Britain, for 
the sake of the Empire, and for the sake of the Church, both Protestant 
and Roman Catholic. We will not have such a woman on the throne. 
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Let the King abdicate at once.183 
 
Whether or not it was prompted by this singular expression of opposition to the 
King on moral grounds, Lyons’ second telegram was to be significant in the resolution 
of the affair. On 2 December, the British Cabinet formally rejected the morganatic 
proposal and Baldwin visited the King at Fort Belvedere, where he informed him of 
these developments, and provided an overview of feeling in the Dominions. He did not 
mention Savage’s moderate response and he showed Edward only this second telegram 
from Lyons indicating that Australian public confidence had been wholly lost.184 This 
indicates that the Australian response was, although not misrepresented as such, 
manipulated to serve Baldwin’s purposes. Baldwin wished to present the Dominions as 
unequivocally opposed to the proposed marriage. Lyons’ decision to support Baldwin 
meant that he acquiesced to the majority of the British government’s points as 
suggestions rather than requests for advice. However, as Mansergh has noted, to offer 
‘support for a course of action already chartered is not the same thing as a determination 
of that course.’185  
With the scandal already a topic of discussion in Australia, the British press’ 
extended silence was coming to an end. On 1 December, Bishop Blunt of Bradford had 
delivered in a sermon what appeared to be a mild criticism of the King’s morals and 
attitude to Christianity, an act that decisively loosened the British press gag. Within 
hours, the Australian press published unambiguous reference to the forthcoming 
revelation, although restraint was not entirely abandoned. Although promising on 2 
December to reveal the ‘Foundation For Gossip’, the Maitland Daily Mercury stopped 
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short of mentioning abdication but hinted that the rumours concerned Wallis.186 
Similarly, the Burnie Advocate reproduced Blunt’s comments under the headline 
‘Disquieting American Statements’ but avoided further elaboration.187 Overnight, the 
story broke in Britain and would generate the beginnings of a wave of discussion that 
would also engulf Australia from 3 December.  
This chapter has provided a narrative for the decline of Edward’s popularity 
from an Australian perspective following the triumph of his royal tour of 1920, and 
charted the response of the Australian press and Lyons government to news of the 
King’s scandalous behaviour following his ascension. Although the exchange of 
correspondence demonstrates that Australia’s role was simply that of supporting a 
course of action decided upon and implemented by the British government, the fact that 
the Opposition was not consulted despite the matter’s diplomatic importance forced 
Lyons into an undeserved position of appearing to have colluded with Baldwin. This 
was only one aspect of the reception of the news in Australia, to which we now turn.  
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Chapter 5: A condemned man 
 
Many more as well as myself will never rise to their feet again on 
hearing the national anthem if he marries her. 
-Nellie Davies, 8 December 1936.1  
 
An examination of the contours of Australian press and public reaction to news of the 
King’s proposed marriage and its implications in the week following the first mention in 
the British press on 3 December and the irrevocable confirmation of Edward’s 
abdication a little over a week later allows us to test the view Lyons conveyed to the 
British government. Was Lyons correct when he insisted that the Australian people 
were not in favour of the King’s proposed marriage, and that abdication could be the 
only honourable option for a man condemned from the outset by public opinion? What 
other subtleties characterised Australian political, press and public opinion during these 
few days?  
This chapter is structured in four successive increments, beginning with the 
period between Thursday 3 and Saturday 5 December 1936, when early press reports on 
the Australian government’s then unacknowledged role in the incident begin to gather 
pace. I then move to a discussion of the trends of Australian public opinion between 
Sunday 6 and Monday 7 December, and how the commentary increased as the 
Australian government failed to issue any statement between Tuesday 8 and Wednesday 
9 December. This chapter concludes with an account of the final confirmation of the 
end of the King’s reign on Thursday 10 December and Lyons’ official radio broadcast 
during the early hours of Friday 11 December.  
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Press commentary gathers pace  
As shown in the previous chapter, the Australian press had since the previous July 
reported plenty of information about Edward’s relationship and its impact on his 
Kingship. After the revelation of the news in Britain on 3 December, Australian editors 
abandoned all reticence. The days that followed were marked by the unrestrained 
publication of reports from British and American papers. This offered Australians a 
comprehensive understanding of the international response, and when coupled with 
some degree of advance warning, may have given some readers a well-informed 
understanding of the issues at stake and, therefore, time to develop a more considered 
stance on the marriage.  
Unfortunately for Lyons, the loquaciousness of the press rendered his 
contrasting silence on the role of the government all the more acute. On 3 December, 
the Maitland Daily Mercury published a frank report syndicated from the British 
tabloids that painstakingly outlined the implications of the King’s negotiations. It noted 
that British administrators had paid ‘particular attention’ to reports from Dominion 
governments, and raised the startling possibility of the resignation of all the King’s 
governments.2 To any reader, it was clear that the Australian government were not only 
aware of proceedings but, if reports were to be believed, had played an active role in the 
consultation process. Faced with a deafening silence from Canberra, alarmed politicians 
and members of the public could ignore the matter no longer.  
Lyons, meanwhile, faced an unenviable impasse. Despite his best efforts, 
Baldwin’s approval to share the situation with his Cabinet, at least, was not 
forthcoming. Despite the press’ revelations, no word of any constitutional difficulty was 
mentioned at the final meeting of Parliament the same day. As the lower House session 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Grave Crisis Revealed In Britain’, The Maitland Daily Mercury, N.S.W., 3 December 1936, 
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was drawing to a close and plans made for a recess until February the following year, it 
became clear to all members that the issue was being avoided. This was too much for 
federal members of the Lang Labor faction, a radical breakaway faction of the ALP led 
by New South Wales politician Jack Lang, the domineering former state Treasurer who 
had been on conversational terms with the Prince in 1920. Joseph Gander took the step 
of boldly referring to the ‘disquieting’ news ‘concerning certain events in Great 
Britain.’ Had the Australian government been consulted, and if so what was the 
decision?, he asked. Parliament and the Australian people should be entitled to some 
sort of official pronouncement, he reasoned.3 Labor member Albert Green also appealed 
to the prime minister to ‘allay our fears’ over what had occurred.4  
To their consternation, Lyons responded emphatically that ‘neither the British 
government, nor any other authority, has asked the Government for an expression of 
opinion.’5 Strictly speaking, this was correct as his own personal opinion had been 
sought, rather than the government’s official advice. This manifestly inadequate 
response was unlikely to keep the questioners at bay for long. As Whiskard pointed out 
to the Dominions Office, Lyons faced ‘great and increasing difficulty’ in concealing the 
situation. Further untrammelled discussion in the press over the coming weekend would 
more than likely give rise to a ‘politically awkward’ situation, to say the least.6  
In England, Baldwin was busily engaged in delicate negotiations to subdue once 
and for all the King’s morganatic marriage proposal. Noting that ‘the less opportunity 
for public discussion and debate, the better’, he proceeded with the drafting of a bill to 
legislate the ‘voluntary’ abdication.7 He advised the Dominion prime ministers that the 
popular press in Britain had revived the idea of a morganatic marriage, but regardless 
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4 Ibid., p. 2879. 
5 Ibid.  
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7 TNA, DO 121/32. Telegram to Dominion prime ministers from Baldwin, 3 December 1936. 
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felt this would be unacceptable to ‘the overwhelming majority of people in this 
country.’ In any case, he concluded that any extended press coverage was ‘obviously 
extremely undesirable.’8 He intended to make an announcement in the House of 
Commons that Friday, 4 December, before the matter could gain momentum in the 
press over the weekend, and he assumed the Dominions agreed that the morganatic 
option was not to be pursued further. For the first time, he also suggested they 
communicate directly with the King, it being ‘proper that [he] should know the views of 
his other governments.’9 There was never any suggestion that the official views of these 
governments would differ substantially from that previously intimated to Baldwin by 
the prime ministers in an unofficial capacity.  
Knowing also that the Dominion governments had been entitled at any stage to 
communicate directly with the King on their own terms, Baldwin was anxious to dispel 
any scent of collusion with this show of inclusivity during the final moments. In his 
examination of Baldwin’s resultant address to the House of Commons, Halford Ryan 
shows how the prime minister successfully presented the King’s insistence on 
consideration of the morganatic marriage as an indictment of his moral character, that 
is, that he would go to any lengths to have his way, including excluding his children 
from their right of succession and accepting a lower status for his wife.10  
At the same time, alarmed by the apparent swing of British popular support for a 
morganatic marriage, Baldwin forbade Edward from speaking publicly and with that 
prohibition, removed any hope of him winning the people over with a personal appeal. 
Radio represented Edward’s best chance to reach even the most far-flung people of the 
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10 Halford Ryan, ‘Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin vs. King Edward VIII’, in Halford Ryan 
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Empire in their own homes, and communicate directly his feelings at the situation. 
Knowing this, Edward had drafted a heartfelt message appealing for ‘hearers to reflect 
calmly and quietly’ on his desire to marry Wallis and offering to ‘go away for a while’, 
but Baldwin stood firm, describing the proposed broadcast as ‘unconstitutional’ as the 
text could only be given on advice of his Ministers, who would then ‘be responsible for 
every word of it.’11  
The following days were critical to the shaping of Australian public opinion on 
the matter. According to Lord Hartington, the Under Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, who happened to be in Australia at the time, by 4 December many people in 
Melbourne were ‘profoundly disturbed’ by the news from London.12 Whether he meant 
in sympathy or opposition to the King’s predicament remains unclear. However, the 
major conservative metropolitan Victorian papers had already been quick to take a 
definitive stance, and so their editorials doubtless assisted in the crystallisation of 
opinion in their readership. These early journalistic accounts reduced the issue to an 
impasse between the King and his advisors, settling firmly in support of the latter. The 4 
December edition of the Argus, for example, made its position clear with a 
comprehensive reprint of the opinion espoused by the London Times. The text flatly 
refused to countenance a marriage with Wallis as anything other than conflicting with 
the King’s leadership responsibilities, all the more critical in light of looming war in 
Europe. ‘A King’s path can never be easy, at least for a King who has reached middle-
age without the blessing of a happy marriage’, the editor acknowledged, but: 
neither the King, the nation, nor the Empire can afford that the 
influence of the great office he holds should be weakened. If ever His 
Majesty’s private inclination were to conflict openly with his public 
duty, and were allowed to prevail, there is no doubt that mischief and 
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danger would result … The high office that the King holds is no 
man’s personal possession. It is a sacred trust handed down from 
generation to generation.13  
 
The Age of the same day similarly reserved editorial judgement of its own, but 
offered a precis of British and American reporting, underscored the issue as one of a 
conflicting ‘crisis’ between the feckless King and his learned statesmen, from whom he 
had ‘refused to take advice’, an act signalling significant repercussions to the Empire.14 
The stance taken by these major publications demonstrates an initial expectation that the 
King not only should, but most likely would, fall into line and forgo personal his 
happiness in favour of his preordained duties to the Empire. The situation was the same 
in New South Wales, where the conservative Sydney Morning Herald pronounced that 
the King should ‘renounce his heart’s most intimate human aspiration’, and ‘make the 
highest possible personal sacrifice for the enhancement of the Monarchy and all it 
means to the great Empire.’ If he were able to do this, the editorial concluded, his 
subjects themselves would also, ‘in their turn, make every due sacrifice for the national 
welfare.’15 Even though the Brisbane Courier-Mail devoted several paragraphs praising 
the auspicious beginnings of the King’s reign and his ‘unflagging energy’ in completing 
his duties thus far, the editor nonetheless concluded that ‘he cannot choose to please 
himself only; it is a matter that deeply affects the monarchy and the Empire.’16  
As public awareness increased, the weekend also marked the start of reporting 
that indicated the significant role of the Dominion prime ministers in supporting 
Baldwin’s position. This would have come as a surprise to Australian readers, even 
more alarming when juxtaposed against the lack of any corresponding press release 
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issued from Canberra. The Argus, for example, added fuel to the fire on 5 December, 
revealing from cabled reports that Savage, Hertzog, Mackenzie King and Lyons had: 
made representations in the strongest terms about the concern felt 
overseas relative to the circumstantial reports of the King’s proposal. 
It is said the situation that has been created is now being handled by 
five men – Mr. Baldwin and the Prime Ministers of the four 
Dominions.17  
 
Also quoting from a British newspaper, the Launceston Examiner offered further detail, 
revealing that in England it was ‘no longer concealed that the Dominions have 
conveyed to the Government that marriage would be deeply deplored, and might even 
prejudice Imperial connections.’18 By the end of the weekend, the first indignant 
demands for an explanation from Lyons began to appear. ‘Who gave Mr Lyons 
permission to cable to Prime Minister Baldwin that Australia is opposed to the marriage 
of the King and Mrs Simpson?’ demanded ‘Perth Professional Man’ of the more liberal 
Sunday Times, concluding that ‘of all the impertinence the world has ever witnessed this 
surely ranks first.’19  
In Canberra, Lyons was able for the first time to break the stalemate. Having the 
day before successfully avoiding questioning and adjourned both Houses for the 
extended summer recess, that morning he took the extraordinary step of recalling 
Parliament to Canberra. This abrupt turn was generated by receipt of advice from 
Baldwin that finally allowed him to be able to move from the impasse. That day, the 
King had informed Baldwin privately that he intended to abdicate, although final 
confirmation still remained days away. The ‘course of events makes it necessary to 
prepare without delay for voluntary abdication’, Baldwin wrote to the Dominion prime 
ministers, adding that the ‘whole position’ could now be communicated to their 
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respective Cabinets within the bounds of ‘absolute necessity for continued secrecy.’20 
Bruce in London also indicated that time was short, cabling that ‘[p]resent indications 
are King will announce abdication on Monday but there is no certainty.’21  
Although some had stayed in Canberra, many MPs and Senators were reaching 
the end of the long journey home to their respective states and were displeased by this 
turn of events. Some members had their suspicions as to the purpose. As ALP member 
Francis Baker later commented, they had gathered some ‘meagre information’ from the 
newspapers including that Baldwin had been in consultation with the Dominion prime 
ministers on the matter of the King’s marriage.22 Nationalist Harold Holt also remarked 
that ‘we knew, in our own minds, that there was a distinct possibility’ that members had 
been recalled in order pass legislation relating to the abdication.23 Lyons’ inner retinue 
had to turn around immediately in the hope of arriving in time for a Cabinet meeting 
scheduled for Tuesday morning, 8 December.24 For everyone else, an extraordinary 
meeting of Parliament was scheduled for the following day, 9 December.  
By this point, the conclusion of the matter seemed imminent. Exercising his 
right of direct communication with the monarch for the first time, Lyons sent Edward a 
direct telegram on the evening of 5 December that, while ostensibly asking the King to 
reconsider, unequivocally reiterated his position favouring abdication over any sort of 
marriage. Drawing on the opinion expressed by Lord Hartington, he described the 
‘disturbed state of public opinion’ in Australia that followed the press reporting. ‘The 
clear opinion of my government the Commonwealth Parliament and Australian people 
is unfavourable to such a marriage’, he confirmed.25 By this stage, opinion among the 
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other Dominion prime ministers had consolidated. The Canadian and South African 
governments sent similar messages, although New Zealand still hoped for an outcome 
where the King could both marry and retain the throne, but nonetheless accepted the 
British government’s position.26 To the King, it would have appeared that there was no 
support for him in the Dominions. This was untrue. Image 29 
 
The Australian public respond  
By now, the response of the Australian public can be more clearly discerned in the 
written record. Debate over Edward’s choice of a wife reveals a deep divide in 
Australian attitudes towards the relationship between private life and public 
responsibility. In the earliest stages, and despite the wails of the conservative press, it 
appears that many Australians held a more moderate view of the King’s dilemma when 
compared to Baldwin’s desire to bring the matter to a close as quickly as possible. 
Many held out hope for a compromise whereby the King remained on the throne, even 
if at the expense of his relationship. This reflects the view that his particular qualities of 
leadership were needed at the helm of the Empire during such uncertain times. If 
Edward needed further time to consider his decision fully, then so be it. This particular 
strand of opinion was championed by Billy Hughes, then the Minister for Repatriation 
and Health. The former prime minister entered the fray with an eloquent speech given to 
journalists in Sydney on 6 December and reproduced in papers of all affiliations across 
the country the following day. To some Australians, Hughes’ passionate oratory came 
as a ‘refreshing “steadier”’, all the more welcome in contrast to the unrelenting silence 
of all other government officials, including the Opposition, and the increasingly vocal 
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bewilderment of the press, who was relying mainly on reprinting information sourced 
from their overseas correspondents and agencies.27  
By this point, Hughes had known the King personally for almost two decades. 
Although doubtless a mutually exasperating relationship, both shared a common 
understanding of the monarch’s popularity as critical to Australia’s continued imperial 
prowess. As in wartime, Hughes conceptualised appropriate masculine behaviour as 
putting duty above familial and romantic attachments for the greater good of the nation. 
Accordingly, he believed that the King was duty-bound to give up his relationship with 
Wallis. Furthermore he was confident that Edward would do this, if given time to come 
to the right decision. Despite sympathising with the ‘struggle between the King and the 
man’, Hughes nonetheless believed Edward’s duty to his people and his ‘great love for 
the woman’ were starkly opposed. He saw only a choice between ‘all that love means, 
with its infinite peace and assuagement and the stern path of duty and national 
responsibility.’ The loss of Wallis, he felt, was justified in light of the threat to the 
institution of monarchy and, by extension, the Empire at large. Hughes perceived that:  
Theirs is the sacrifice, theirs the decision, but if from this fiery ordeal 
of purifying passion they come victorious over self, and stand sublime 
in sacrifice, they may light such a torch, of selflessness and devotion 
to the highest call-of duty as will light the feet of men in the struggle 
of life, and dispel the menacing clouds bf strife and selfishness that 
now beset the world.28 
 
Echoing evocative sentiments expressed in Britain by Churchill, Hughes called 
for a period of reflection for the King to react thoughtfully to this unprecedented 
situation.29 He superlatively illustrated the redemptive power of such a gesture by so 
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revered a public figure, proclaiming that Edward’s popularity and influence could only 
increase, perceiving that: 
in his gallant chivalry and devotion to his people, in his deep and 
tender sympathy for all who are poor or are heavily laden, in his 
intolerance of all hypocrisies and veneers and swift discernment of 
false and true … he has brought to our peoples a spiritual inspiration 
and example that can carry us triumphantly through all the perils and 
darkness of our times. In the sacrifice we beseech of him he would 
reach transcendent heights.30  
 
Lyons, eager to finalise matters without inflaming public opinion, reacted to the 
unsanctioned outburst with ‘sharpest annoyance’ and vowed to ask for Hughes’ 
resignation when matters were settled.31 But it was too late: Hughes’ provocative words 
prompted a welter of debate from all quarters, and attracted a significant following. Far 
from a relatively minor difference of opinion between the King and his government, 
Hughes’ particular sentimental linguistic appeal had firmly cast the dilemma as a 
romantic drama with grave human repercussions. Mr. F.E. Taylor of George Town, 
Tasmania, described the address as the most apt expression ‘of what many of us are 
feeling.’32 ‘Never have I worshipped you more or loved you better than when I read 
your exquisite appeal to our beloved King’, wrote D. Hobban of Grafton, New South 
Wales.33 ‘You have made everyone who read it, see it from all angles, in a fair, 
honourable, and sympathetic way’, agreed Edith Taylor, the wife of a Sydney returned 
soldier.34  
Despite the way his attitude to Australia’s obligations to the Empire had divided 
Australia in the past, in this situation Hughes’ stance on Edward’s dedication to his 
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official duties resonated especially with some sections of the returned servicemen 
population. As Mrs. M. Killeen of Vaucluse, New South Wales, explained:  
You, Mr. Hughes, who have always been the mouthpiece of the men 
of the AIF and often represented the opinions and feelings of the 
dependents of these men, have the keen support of many, many 
people in your appeal to the King to make his small sacrifice for the 
Empire.35 
 
Widely quoted across the nation because he was the only Minister to comment 
publicly, Hughes swiftly acquired the status of spokesman for the Australian popular 
voice, or at least a liberal alternative to that of Lyons. The labourite Brisbane Worker, 
for example, enthused that Hughes’ interjection would ‘knock the ground from under 
Baldwin’ by offering an alternative to Lyons’ statement on Australia’s attitude, ‘for 
both men are known in London: Lyons as a blob and Hughes as a live force.’36 Hughes’ 
statement offered some hope that the King could be persuaded to remain on the throne 
and that abdication, as seemingly insisted on by Baldwin and the Dominion prime 
ministers, would not eventuate. As Rita Esler of Carnegie, Victoria, wrote, ‘Australians 
love King Edward and dread abdication … time may offer a solution of the situation.’37 
In Tasmania, the Labor Premier Albert Ogilvie recorded that there was a ‘substantial 
body of responsible public opinion here which regards abdication … as a major disaster 
to the nation, with possible consequences beyond anyone’s power to foresee.’38 
Abdication, agreed Dan O’Brien of Woodford, Queensland, would ‘commence [the] 
disintegration of [the] monarchial [sic] empire.’39 
Some even hoped that Hughes could exert some influence over the King’s 
capacity for reason. ‘He may listen to you thereby avoiding catastrophe’ urged one 
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man.40 Hughes’ supporters believed that the King ought to know the views of 
Australians despite their distance, further illustrating the consternation felt in some 
quarters that Lyons had spoken on their behalf in favour of the finality of abdication. 
R.L. Langford of Glen Osmond, South Australia, wrote to Hughes urging that the full 
text be cabled to London, for ‘it might be the determining factor in the solution of this 
far-reaching matter.’41 Henry Allen of Melbourne offered to ‘gladly pay’ for the cost of 
the telegram if someone could persuade the King to read a copy of the text.42 
Sentiments such as this reveal the evident frustration some Australians felt at 
having no obvious means to convey their opinion concerning Lyons’ apparent 
presumption. In one instance, Smith’s Weekly reported the attempts of another un-
named contemporary publication that endeavoured to test the waters with a cut-out 
voting coupon gauging whether Edward ‘should or should not hold to his avowed 
purpose.’43 In Melbourne, a returned soldier took to a public space to voice his 
dissatisfaction with Baldwin’s ultimatum, enticing the orchestra in a Melbourne cinema 
to an impromptu rendition of ‘God Save the King’, inciting a ‘prolonged clamour’ from 
the other patrons and generating ‘a fervour seldom heard in an amusement house.’44 
Others wrote to their MP, unaware that almost all parliamentarians were 
similarly uniformed. In Canberra, the Post Office had to acquire extra staff to deal with 
the flood of telegrams that coincided with the federal members’ return for the 
extraordinary meeting of Parliament scheduled for 9 December.45 According to the 
Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate, 90 per cent of those received 
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‘protested against any attempt to induce King Edward to abdicate.’46 Although the basis 
for the newspaper’s insider knowledge is unknown, and its labour sympathies may have 
induced the editor to champion this strand of public opinion in particular, this does hint 
at the existence of a deep wellspring of Australian public opinion that, like Hughes, 
preferred the considered negotiation of a compromise over an abrupt abdication. This 
was manifested as a widespread depth of outrage at the perception that the King’s 
governments had collectively forced the issue. Roland Perdriau of Horseshoe Creek, 
New South Wales, for example, wrote directly to Lyons of his deep resentment as to the 
‘pressure’ regarding the ‘marriage question.’47 Others were most incensed that no public 
consultation had taken place. ‘[I] demand [that] you consult people before irrevocable 
action [is] taken’, wrote J.J. Thompson of Cairns, Queensland, to Lyons.48 ‘This is a 
people’s issue’, the South Australian ‘United Democrats Nonparty’ agreed.49 In a letter 
to the Sunday Times, ‘Perth Professional Man’ avowed that: 
We, the people of Australia, have a right to be consulted about this 
business … before the final word is said ... it never has been a case for 
a few people to settle; it was and is a matter to be settled by the 
people.50  
 
Others, such as the pro-financial reform Queensland Douglas Social Credit 
Party, explicitly suggested a formal referendum was needed.51 ‘Loyal subjects in 
Canberra are not aware that any attempt has been made to assess the public opinion of 
the Commonwealth of Australia in the matter of your marriage’, agreed Verity 
Fitzhardinge and Mabel Tapp of Canberra in a letter intended for the King. This, the 
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writers argued, ‘could only be done by a referendum.’52 Like R.L Langford and Henry 
Allen, these women wanted to exercise their right of direct communication with the 
King, hoping to impress upon him the diversity of Australian public opinion beyond 
what was reported to have passed between the prime ministers. Their attempt to send 
their message to Edward via the Governor-General was, however, unwise. ‘His 
Excellency does not propose to forward such a message to the King which is only 
signed by two ladies’, Leighton Bracegirdle, Hore-Ruthven’s Military and Official 
Secretary, told Frank Strahan, Lyons’ Secretary.53  
In contrast, the views of ‘Nationalist’, published in the Hobart Mercury, fared 
somewhat better, or at least stood a greater chance of being read by more people. Like 
many others, the writer protested that:  
[T]he Lyons government may not approve the King’s choice, but time 
should be given for the people to speak for themselves in this 
important matter … if [they] were allowed to vote on this matter, a 
very different message would be sent to Mr. Baldwin.54  
 
In the same edition, R.A. Clive agreed that the prime minister had ‘committed Australia 
and Australians as a whole to a policy of opposition to their Sovereign’ and that steps 
ought to be taken to ‘voice the dissatisfaction that must exist at this arbitrary action.’55 
This commentary reveals the strength of Australians’ conviction that the relationship 
between the King and his people was direct and profound and should not be subject to 
interference from the government.  
If, in the first instance, a significant proportion of the public followed Hughes’ 
view, that the King was duty-bound to abandon his relationship plans due to his 
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particular qualities suitable for steering the Empire through the dark times ahead, 
another more liberal strand of opinion began to emerge as the week passed. Like 
Hughes, this group considered abdication to be the last resort in favour of the King 
remaining on the throne, but differed in that they were willing to consider, even 
embrace, the idea of Wallis as his future wife as another solution to the problem. These 
Australians viewed his personal, rather than leadership, qualities as irreplaceable. ‘We 
in common with many others are in accordance with your desire to marry the woman 
you love rather than lose you’, wrote Fitzhardinge and Tapp in their letter intended for 
their ‘beloved’ King.56  
Others expressed sympathy and support for Edward’s freedom to love 
whomever he wished, seeing no obvious reason to dislike his intended wife other than 
moral prejudice. ‘Cavalier’ of Perth, who agreed that Wallis’ only fault was that ‘like 
you and me she loves King Edward’, wrote that ‘the dilemma is none of our choosing, 
but we must declare ourselves, either for the young King or for the Old Pretenders.’57 
This last comment hints at the existence of a critical difference in Australian opinion 
towards the obligations of citizenship and private happiness. As first mentioned in 
chapter 1, this response points to the advent of sexual modernity in some more liberal 
and youthful sections of the population.  
Alongside the right of the individual to pursue private concerns, a more 
enlightened response to the increasing instances of divorce can be discerned in some 
more permissive elements of inter-war Australian society within this pantheon of 
cultural changes. ‘What right have we to sneer at divorced persons?’ asked Perth 
Professional Man’ of the Sunday Times, pointing out that Wallis had simply availed 
herself of the legalisation available to all persons whether innocent or wronged. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 NAA, A461, V396/1/1. Letter to Hore-Ruthven from Fitzhardinge and Tapp, 6 December 
1936. 
57 ‘GENTLEMEN, THE KING!’, The Daily News, Perth, W.A., 9 December 1936, p. 3. 
	  	   233	  
claimed a ‘genuine feeling of pleasure that King Edward has at last found someone 
whom he can love.’58 ‘Rookwood’, also of Perth, saw Edward’s moral integrity as 
manifest in his chivalrous insistence on marrying Wallis, going so far as to credit the 
King as almost ‘too honourable’, given his desire for a legal union with the promise of 
lifelong companionship rather than simply keeping her as his lover.59  
Other sympathetic observers felt that human feelings had no relevance to 
national and imperial affairs, even that the King’s private happiness could only enhance 
his capacity to perform his duty. In a Sydney sermon, Baptist minister the Rev. Thomas 
Ruth, for example, spoke of Edward as ‘one of the most lonely men alive’, offering 
sympathy ‘in the sore strain put upon his rare qualities of sovereignty.’60 Similarly, Mr. 
A.J. Nadebaum of Perth trusted that the King’s decision was the right one. ‘King 
Edward has always shown that he wants what is best for everybody, and I have not the 
slightest doubt that he now proposes to marry Mrs. Simpson believing that action on his 
part to be best for everybody’, he wrote to the Daily News.61 Unlike those who believed 
Edward ought to give up his relationship with Wallis, commentators such as Nadebaum 
perceived modern masculine qualities as entailing the pursuit of private happiness and 
considered companionable romantic love as a stabilising force.  
Also discernible in the public response was the widely held perception that 
Edward had been unfairly treated, and deserved a chance to assert himself. Some 
Australians took action. On 7 December, for example, 2,000 people gathered in 
Sydney’s Domain, to demonstrate their stance ‘behind our King in his hour of trial.’ 
One speaker, Pauline Budge, hailed Edward as ‘the most democratic sovereign ever to 
sit on the throne’, adding with spirit that ‘we are certainly not going to take this lying 
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down.’62 As Whiskard observed in a telegram to the Dominions Office, perceptions of 
the King’s democratic ideals, and the view that the episode had arisen due to the desire 
of Baldwin and the conservative Establishment to remove him from the throne gave the 
debate a certain intensity in the labour movement, as reflected particularly by the 
Sydney Labour Daily.63 The principle at stake, that one man should be forcibly removed 
from office by another, was the critical objection. Working and socialist-leaning 
Australians deplored the patent fact that a ‘democratic’ King was being overthrown in 
an undemocratic fashion. ‘Who is this man Baldwin, who can say in effect to the 
Empire’s King, “Do as I tell you, or get off that throne”’?, demanded Boote in The 
Australian Worker. ‘Have they a Dictator over there?’64 Image 30 
These sympathetic and supportive strands of public opinion emerged most 
strongly for Williams in her study of letters written by British and Dominion peoples to 
the King during this timeframe. This led her to the conclusion that the Prince’s 
widespread travels and friendly contact with ordinary people within the Dominions and 
colonies had ‘been met with appreciation and gratitude’, meaning that when his wish to 
marry for love became world news, ‘these ordinary people felt great sympathy.’65  
A close analysis of the Australian sources, however, indicate that, for the 
majority of the public, sympathy extended only so far. As the week drew to a close, the 
opinion of numerous Australians came to unwittingly correlate with that of Lyons, their 
reticent leader. As public and press commentary flourished across the nation, some 
gradually came to believe that the King could no longer recover his previous good 
standing and ought to abdicate. Contrary to the sympathetic views of those mentioned in 
the preceding pages, numerous Australians, as we shall see, could not countenance 
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Wallis as either wife or Queen. Others perceived the King’s insistence on private love 
as an affront to the monarchy and insignificant in the face of danger in Europe. As 
Schwartzenbach has remarked, the hackneyed sexual double standard of the corruptive 
influence of a woman over a supposedly pure man has been oft-cited in narratives of 
royal couples, including Caesar and Cleopatra, Justinian and Theodora and even 
Edward’s relatives, the murdered Nicholas and Alexandra.66  
In this light, it is likely that Wallis never stood much chance of being accepted 
by the Australian public. An American diplomat posted in Canberra, for example, 
observed at the time that ‘the Australian outlook on life is distinctly middle-class, and in 
morals is distinctly Victorian.’67 While certainly a more permissive attitude to morality 
was flourishing in some sections of Australian society, in many quarters the royal 
family were still expected to uphold the conservative domestic values of King George 
V. It is unsurprising, therefore, that so much of the Australian opposition to the 
marriage, and therefore support of abdication, took the form of misogynistic slights to 
Wallis’ perceived character and nationality. Although earlier in the week many 
Australians had written in terms of their ‘love’ for the King and expressed anxieties 
concerning the demise of this love, his perceived disregard for his duty soon began to 
fatally sour the relationship.  
For many, Wallis’ divorce meant she would never be suitable as the King’s wife, 
and was possibly incapable of further love herself. ‘The fact that the King has taken 
upon himself the privilege of marrying a woman with two divorces already is, I think, a 
great humiliation to the whole Empire’, Mannix wrote from Melbourne on 8 
December.68 Some could not see Wallis as an individual who genuinely loved the King, 
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concluding that she was a shrewd sycophant who had somehow ensnared him. Nellie 
Davies wrote ‘from the suburbs’ to thank Hughes for what she perceived as his ‘efforts 
in trying to strangle the serpent which is trying to slime its ways around the English 
throne. We do not want this twice married American as Queen of England … We have 
lost a great deal of respect for our beloved King.’69 The British race could not ‘tolerate a 
prostitute on the greatest throne in the world’ another writer informed Lyons.70 Even 
though at the time of the royal tour and, to a lesser degree, up until his accession, 
Australians had been prepared to permit Edward his bachelor freedom as a 
manifestation of his modernity, perceptions of Wallis in 1936 reveal that the monarch 
was in reality subject to impossibly high moral standards from his people.  
The incident also revealed the power that masculine ideals first established in 
wartime still wielded over Australian society of 1936. Some Australians equated 
Edward’s insistence on personal happiness as an affront to Australia’s selfless 
dedication to Britain’s aid during wartime. In a telegram to Lyons, Brisbane clergyman 
David Garland, for example, warned ‘remember them’, pointing to the sacrifice of 
Australian soldiers who ‘laid down their lives to ensure the throne.’71 Nellie Davies felt 
the King’s behaviour had irreparably damaged his previous good standing as a model 
for loyal masculinity. ‘Many men here say most unpleasant things regarding the King’, 
she told Hughes, ‘they say he is not doing his duty, and if war comes he will expect us 
to go and do ours.’72 Mrs Killeen offered more detail from this perspective, affirming 
that: 
the woman of the Empire did not hesitate to sacrifice their men – 
mothers, wives and sweethearts gave their husbands, sons and lovers. 
Today the great majority of these women, after twenty years, are 
lonely and not rich in worldly goods. Today the greatest King in the 
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world, the best-loved King in this world, hesitates to sacrifice his love 
for one woman who has already failed to make two other men happy 
in married life. The King has impinged on the finer and nobler 
feelings of his subjects in his hesitation.73  
 
As these perspectives show, such anxieties emerge all the more sharply in light 
of the precarious state of peace in Europe at the time and the growing possibility of 
another war. This commentary also demonstrates how the wartime and post-war notions 
of ideal masculinity as comprising self-sacrifice for the nation and Empire, as first 
discussed in chapter 1, were all the more firmly embedded in Australia society of 1936. 
Lucas De Garis of Geelong, Victoria, for example, believed that the King’s ‘individual 
responsibility for conscientious scruple’ would prove ‘the only defence against 
dictatorship and exploit.’74  
It was already too late. As Nellie Davies was quick to point out, ‘an ideal King 
and Queen is [sic] standing in the background.’75 The prospect of the Duke of York 
taking up the throne in favour of his brother was of course not a new prospect, having 
been discussed in official circles and in the Australian press since the late 1920s. It 
seems that, even in the uncertain week or so leading up to the official announcement of 
the abdication, Australians had all but lost faith in Edward’s commitment to his 
leadership of the Empire. For the most part, minds were made up. ‘Delay can only mean 
possible revolution’, agreed another writer to Lyons. ‘We prefer the Duke and Duchess. 
They stand for decent family life, for respect, for honour, and for safety and security of 
the Empire.’76 In her diary, Melbourne artist Joan Kingsley-Strack noted approvingly 
that Albert would bring ‘loyalty & love & a happy family to the throne & a great respect 
from his people.’77 Ultimately, although there were some who profoundly disagreed, 
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Lyons’ at first seemingly uninformed assessment of the opinion of the Australian 
people’s loss of respect towards the King and his apparent neglect of his inherited duties 
over his private love was proved largely correct.  
This knowledge would likely have been cold comfort to the prime minister as he 
struggled with the more immediate problem of managing the affair within Parliament. 
While public and press opinion outside increased in stridency, Lyons held a Cabinet 
meeting in Canberra on the morning of 7 December. Ministers waited all day for the 
news from London without which their own discussions could not begin. The British 
government’s planned Cabinet meeting was scheduled for that day in London, or mid-
evening in Australia. If the Minutes are to be believed, the Lyons government 
apparently wiled away the time in desultorily discussions ranging from the awarding of 
a Nobel prize to Stanley Bruce, to the import of horses, and the provision of milk for 
children.78 However, it is worth recalling that on 4 December Lyons had received 
Baldwin’s permission to disclose the details, such as they were, to his Cabinet. 
Although the Minutes for this meeting, as well as the two that took place over the 
following days, do not record any official discussion of the issues at stake, anecdotal 
sources suggest instead that some energetic conversation took place nonetheless. Enid 
Lyons claims that Cabinet was ‘unanimous in support of the views Joe had proffered’ 
on the matter.79  
A livelier view is put forward by Sheila Lochhead, Malcolm MacDonald’s 
sister, who entertained Menzies as a dinner guest in England the following year. This is 
a second-hand account, but it does confirm the already-articulated battleground 
demarcated by Hughes in opposition to Lyons and his colleagues. Behind Cabinet’s 
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closed doors Hughes apparently remained supportive of the King remaining on the 
throne. In her diary, Lochhead evokes a confrontation where: 
Hughes [was] inclined to make [a] King’s Party. Sentimentalised 
situation ... In Cabinet, when affair was becoming tediously dragged 
out, [Hughes] suggested after much reference to his intimacy with the 
Sovereign, that Australia should propose further fortnight’s 
postponement of decision. Menzies followed quickly [saying] that, if 
affair was not settled that evening, Australia should suggest the use of 
force in removing the King.80  
 
The rest of the day passed without any communication from London, although 
the Launceston Examiner of the same day stated its conviction, drawing on British press 
reports, that the Baldwin government would confirm an abdication within days.81 
Despite this, Lyons held a brief press conference reiterating that he had no statement to 
make, and denied the rumour that his government had initiated the opposition to the 
proposed marriage.82 Clearly anticipating the outcome, he also sent a secret telegram to 
the state Premiers that simply requested their comments on proposed legislation 
allowing for the appointment of a new monarch ‘in the deplorable event’ of 
abdication.’83 Although this was the states’ first official notification, it merely served to 
convey that abdication was an inevitable outcome.  
The response was mostly accepting. South Australian Premier and Liberal Union 
Party member Richard Butler hoped to avoid ‘acrimonious debate.’84 Victorian Premier 
and Country Party supporter Albert Dunstan was more concerned about the possible 
dissolution of the Governor’s office and that of the Governor-General.85 The most 
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vehement response came from Tasmanian Albert Ogilvie, an old foe of Lyons.86 ‘We 
are completely without information of an authoritative character … your position would 
be strengthened by the support of the states, which in our case at any rate cannot be 
given merely on press reports’ he fumed.87 Ogilvie’s outrage led him to exercise his 
right of direct communication with the King, assuring him that ‘the loyalty of the people 
of this State remains unshaken’ and ‘we pray that difficulties now existing will speedily 
be solved.’88 In Canberra, no further news was received that night from London, despite 
the swift installation of a new radio receiving BBC broadcasts in the Cabinet room.89 
Static marred the reception, meaning Lyons remained reliant on information conveyed 
by incoming secret telegrams, which had to be first laboriously decoded at the High 
Commission before the information could be passed on to Provisional Parliament 
House.90 
 
Political tensions increase  
By 8 December, the tide of popular support and sympathy for the King’s predicament 
had largely receded: it now seemed he had to go, and quickly. In Melbourne, Lord 
Hartington summarised that Edward’s capacity to command respect had vanished, 
lamenting to the Dominions Office that the throne’s prestige would be ‘gravely 
compromised’, save for the speedy accession of the Duke of York.91 Such sentiments 
reflect that Australian public opinion had come to espouse Lyons’ earliest untested 
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prediction. The editorial in that day’s Argus newspaper vouchsafed for the integrity of 
both the Lyons and Baldwin governments, and their understanding of the solidarity of 
imperial relationships as ‘something more important than the personal qualities of the 
King as they have hitherto manifested themselves with such pleasing effect on the 
people.’ Perceiving the predicted upheaval in the direst terms, it pondered: 
[H]ow far the prestige of the Throne and of the Empire has been 
impaired by the calamitous events … That some damage will have to 
be repaired can scarcely be doubted …The potentialities of the 
struggle which might be precipitated are appalling to contemplate. 
The sooner the melancholy episode is brought to an end the better for 
the peace and good government of the Empire.92  
 
Unfortunately for Lyons, the end was nowhere in sight. He held another fruitless 
Cabinet meeting on 8 December. Bruce wrote from London to dissuade the prime 
minister from making any further statement to the press but at the same time 
encouraged him, when it came, to ‘express your complete agreement with Baldwin’s 
statement.’ He also warned that the British press viewed the sudden recall of the 
Australian Parliament as suspicious.93 That day’s Adelaide Advertiser had already 
reported the musings of a British newspaper over the lack of an apparent reason for 
Lyons to recall Parliament, suggesting that the Dominions were busy mulling over the 
terms of the legislation altering the laws of succession.94 Although Australia was 
undeniably waiting in readiness to review the legislation, Lyons could do nothing. As he 
waited, Baldwin met with the King that evening for a final discussion followed by an 
evening dinner.95 In the meantime, another avenue of compromise sudden emerged 
when Wallis made a statement in the press offering to give up the relationship, ‘if such 
action would solve the problem.’96 This display of willingness to compromise alarmed 
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Baldwin, and worried by how this resurgence of the matter would reignite commentary 
in the Dominions, he sent a telegram insinuating that she was insincere, in an effort to 
hasten the closure of the matter once and for all.97  
Cabinet reconvened during the morning of 9 December. Although further 
unofficial discussion must have unfolded, Lyons made a point of recording that all 
explanations were to be saved for the extraordinary meeting of the House of 
Representatives scheduled for later that day.98 Even by then, no confirmation had 
eventuated from London, and Lyons could no nothing but remain coy in the House later 
that morning, to the frustration of many of those present. After almost a week of 
national tension, it was expected that the prime minister would offer some words of 
reassurance and direction. Spectators crammed into the packed public galleries amid an 
atmosphere ‘the most expectant and dramatic since the early days of the Great War.’99 
In a speech that could have been nothing other than provoking to its listeners, Lyons 
opened with a limited account of communication to date, noting he did not wish to 
submit any business to Parliament that day, or reply to questions without notice. He 
offered the emergence of the unresolved yet ‘serious constitutional problem’ related to 
the King’s suggested marriage as necessitating the recall of Parliament, yet failed to 
expand further. ‘All I need say’ he stated, was that the Australian government ‘concurs 
in the decision of the government of the United Kingdom not to legislate something in 
the nature of a morganatic marriage.’ He concluded that ‘a respectful and sympathetic 
silence in Parliament is the best contribution we can offer to a happy solution.’100  
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Not unexpectedly, this was not well-received. Lang Labor MP Jock Garden was 
the first to scoff ‘so you can sell him out in the meantime.’101 According to the West 
Australian, at this interjection the mood shifted to one of ‘bitterness’ and ultimately 
‘scenes of angry disorder’ occurred before extended debate was stifled.102 Opposition 
Leader John Curtin also expressed dismay at this limited offering, calling for a full 
account of ‘the whole extent of the communications’ that had passed between Lyons 
and Baldwin.103 As mentioned in chapter 2, from the earliest stages of his career, Curtin 
had taken a traditional labour stance towards the monarchy; that the institution was 
central to understandings of Empire and the advancement of Australian interests therein, 
but the individual less so. This underpins his objection to Baldwin’s now-redundant 
notion of passing special legislation to suit the King’s convenience, believing that no 
man’s wife should be denied his status and that, for the betterment of all, no one should 
exert their own will to the detriment of others. Accordingly, Curtin noted that Edward 
should be left ‘unfettered’ in his choice of a wife and not subject to coercion or 
influence from any government.104  
Some point of comparison can be made with the attitude of the British Labour 
Party. As leader Harry Snell said a few days later, ‘although the King might reign, the 
people, through Parliaments, must rule.’ Snell explained how Labour sought to 
emphasise ‘plans for the public good before its own political advantage’, and hence his 
party would not continue to rake over divisive issues. He simply hoped the new reign 
would take effect as speedily as possible.105 Curtin’s final word was similarly-
expressed. He concluded that:  
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the King must accept full responsibility for his conscience and to the 
Empire for the choice he makes. We shall not interfere with him, but 
we shall not inconvenience him, in the choosing of his wife. [The 
ALP] hopes that the present King will remain upon the throne of 
England.106  
 
Although Curtin’s intention appears to have been to signal his outrage over the 
apparent conclusion of the matter without his input and the ALP’s disinterest in the 
personal affairs of the monarch, the press seized upon his final sentence in particular. 
By appearing to back the King, the Opposition leader seemed to stake out a definitive 
stance against Lyons’ subservient support of the British government’s lead. This 
seemed to suggest to some the dangerous proposition that the Australian Opposition 
would remain loyal to the King, or by extension support the formation of a 
revolutionary King’s party, even if he abdicated or the government was dissolved. 
Whiskard was so alarmed that he immediately contacted the Dominions Office, and he 
and Lyons set about prompting Curtin to further clarify his comments at the next public 
opportunity.107 
Whiskard’s concerns were justified. Curtin’s words were instantly controversial 
in Parliament and repeated widely in the press. As reported by the West Australian, the 
Lang Labor faction seized on the issue as an affront to the freedom of private life, 
becoming ever more rowdy as Speaker George Bell tried to close the debate. Rowland 
James reportedly gave a cry of ‘God save the King!’, while Jack Beasley shouted out 
that ‘his thoughts for the masses are too democratic for you.’108 Sympathetic members 
immediately sized up the potential of the situation for gaining a political advantage, 
with James shouting ‘it will show little Teddy that he has some friends in Australia … 
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Test an election on this … We will go to the country on this issue.’109 After the passage 
of a motion that the House should meet again the following day and as parliamentarians 
began to file out of the chamber, some Opposition members sang ‘God Save the King’ 
sotto voce.110  
As in 1920, the labour movement was able to easily overlook Edward’s 
aristocratic privilege in light of his apparent sympathy for the working-classes and as a 
friend of Australia’s ex-servicemen. In this regard, we can discern a parallel with the 
supportive attitudes of radical and working-class commentators towards the Queen 
Caroline affair of the 1820s, where King George IV’s attempts to divorce his estranged 
wife by an Act of Parliament served only to configure Caroline as a heroine for the 
oppressed. 111 In 1936, the ungenerous treatment of a ‘democratic’ monarch once again 
was perceived as a challenge to the notion of individual liberty and democracy itself. 
The press reports of the King’s visit to Wales the previous month had further revived 
earlier perceptions of his democratic leanings and honourable intentions for leadership. 
Having had no direct contact with him for sixteen years, Labor supporters and 
politicians were readily able to believe that ‘little Teddy’ remained the same idealistic 
and progressive young man.  
News of the disturbance spread quickly. Within hours, Lyons’ inadequate 
explanation in Parliament fanned a wave of outrage across the country, provoking 
government and municipal organisations to make hasty attempts to censor public 
discussion. Unlike the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the role and function of 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) had been prescribed by a 1932 Act of 
Parliament, and so the management was not at the time fully independent of ministerial 
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direction.112 Following the excitable claims of a Sydney radio station that ‘Mrs Simpson 
will make the finest Queen England has known’ and ‘it is certain that in this battle 
between autocracy and democracy the King is on the side of democracy’, the Director 
General of Postal Services took steps to prevent all stations from broadcasting ‘anything 
that might inflame public opinion’ on the issue.113  
Public demonstrations were planned nonetheless, although whether Australians 
were motivated to protest about the suitability of the marriage, or as is more likely, the 
undemocratic role of the Australian government is not clear. In any case, groups were in 
some cases prevented from gathering in public places. In Melbourne, for example, the 
application of a conglomeration of liberal and radical citizens groups to use the Town 
Hall to ‘express loyalty to the King’ was rejected by municipal officials.114 In Sydney, 
the application of a Loyalty League was similarly rejected by the Town Hall Council.115 
Evidently under great pressure to resolve the situation and curtail further public unrest, 
that evening Lyons sent one more desperate plea to Baldwin asking for any update.116  
 
The abdication is officially confirmed  
News of some sort was received in Canberra during the early hours of Thursday 10 
December. The King’s desire to marry Wallis remained fixed, Baldwin wrote, and he 
had told him ‘informally that it is his desire to abdicate.’ To Lyons, he gave permission 
to pass this decision on to his Cabinet, but added ‘it is of course extremely important 
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that information should be kept secret.’ Although the abdication was now as good as 
confirmed, Lyons was still prevented from announcing the fact in Parliament.117 
Baldwin had also sent a follow-up telegram to the Dominion prime ministers 
emphasising that in future debate in the House of Commons he intended to say that all 
Dominions were agreed on the proposed course of action, but that this did not amount to 
formal advice to abdicate and that the King’s decision was entirely ‘voluntary.’118 
Baldwin was most anxious to cover up any appearance of collusion and asked the 
Dominions to join him in contacting the King directly to ask him to reconsider. Lyons 
immediately sent a personal message voicing his regret and asking that the King think 
over his decision and ‘continue to reign over us.’119  
The prime minister was faced with further trouble that morning as a second 
extraordinary meeting of the House of Representatives was scheduled, one which, as 
before, would be attended by the nation’s press. The necessity for the British 
government to meet first to arrange the necessary legislation would mean that another 
working day would pass in Australia without Lyons being able to discuss the issue in 
the House of Representatives. Baldwin’s insistence on a simultaneous announcement 
across the Dominions forced Lyons into waiting to approve a fait accompli. The terms 
of the Bill were swiftly drafted, with some advice from Dominions but minimal input 
from Lyons. And so for the second consecutive day, disorderly scenes took place in the 
crowded and ‘despondent’ House of Representatives.120 Amid shouts of ‘what sort of 
game is this?’ and ‘what, again?’ from the Opposition, Lyons made a brief statement 
almost identical to that of the previous day. ‘I have no further information to supply to 
honourable members’, he began, but ‘I expect to make a definitive statement to the 
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House when it meets tomorrow.’121 He offered no response to Curtin’s request that the 
full correspondence to date be revealed.  
Expressing frustration at the second adjournment, the Opposition leader’s 
response made his dissatisfaction with the government abundantly clear. He retorted 
that: 
[T]his Parliament is being silenced in regard to a matter of major 
importance to the Throne, to the succession to the Throne, and to 
Australia’s membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations … I 
have to record that the Opposition is very much dissatisfied with the 
whole situation … the Prime Minister owed it to the Parliament to-
day, to perhaps a much greater extent than he did yesterday, to make 
known what advice he has tendered to His Majesty, and what His 
Majesty has had to say in response to that advice … I object to the 
Parliament of this self-governing dominion - this Commonwealth of 
Australia - which, in every major matter that pertains to this 
Commonwealth, has the right directly to advise His Majesty, being 
reduced to the status of having merely to legalise whatever action may 
be taken in another parliament, and without reference to this 
Parliament … We are not here to subordinate our relations to His 
Majesty the King to the relations that exist between the Government 
of the United Kingdom and the King. We are here, in the first place, 
to discharge the entire nature of the relations of this Commonwealth 
of Australia to the Throne.122 
 
It is not certain whether at this stage any communication had passed between 
Lyons and Curtin, as the former had intended, but as this speech proved, Curtin was 
steadfast in his conviction that the Australian government ought to have been able to 
communicate fully with the King. Curtin went on to powerfully reiterate his support of 
the King and his hope that he would ‘not relinquish the Throne.’123 This impassioned 
speech sparked further tumultuous scenes and heckling. Curtin’s attempt to record a 
message for Edward expressing Australian Labor loyalty was technically disallowed by 
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the Speaker at that stage of parliamentary proceedings, but was of little consequence.124 
As he would have been well aware, the text would be widely reproduced by the press 
nonetheless and made its way to London one way or another.  
There was great agitation in both Houses of Parliament that day. When a similar 
move was made to adjourn the Senate, Collings expressed similar sentiments, protesting 
that the Opposition was:  
[B]eing asked to remain here until the Government is prepared to tell 
the Parliament what a government somewhere else in the world has 
done, and then to ask it to say “ditto” … Australia is no longer a 
colony, subject to control by Great Britain, but a nation with full 
rights, including the right of direct access to the King.125  
 
Collings demanded an explanation from Lyons as to the secret correspondence 
with Baldwin, stating ‘I claim my right to deal with every line and syllable of that 
statement… we, on this side, are prepared to allow the electors to judge on which side 
the balance of justice lies.’ ‘We shall not be in a position to come to an intelligent 
decision because we have not been placed in possession of any of the facts, let alone all 
of them’, he concluded.126 These debates lend fresh insight into the constitutional 
transition that Australia was undergoing at the time, when left and liberal politicians 
advocated for a more independent role for the country within the imperial framework. In 
this case at least, the Opposition astutely perceived a fundamental subservience in the 
relationship between Britain and Australia, actively encouraged by the ruling decision-
makers who occupied the seats of government, which served to subdue nationalist 
agency and legislative independence. 
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91. 
125 Parliament of Australia, Senate, ‘Debates’, 10 December 1936, p. 2887. 
126 Ibid.  
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Lyons had still made no statement by the time the abdication was decisively 
confirmed from Britain that afternoon.127 While the Australian Parliament was in 
session, the King’s intention to sign the Instrument of Abdication was officially and 
irrefutably confirmed in Britain. At this point, matters proceeded swiftly. Baldwin had 
requested a simultaneous announcement of his statement to the House of Commons to 
each of the Houses of Parliament across all the Dominions.128 The difference in time 
zones posed major problems if Lyons were to be the first to communicate this message 
to the Australian people. When the abdication became public in Britain, it would be 
only a matter of hours before it was repeated in the early morning Australian press, and 
many hours before Parliament was scheduled to meet again mid-morning. The ABC 
immediately began to arrange for Lyons to broadcast this message to the nation by radio 
at the unenviable hour of 2am.  
This was a complex undertaking. Involved from Lyons’ office was his Private 
Secretary, Irvine Douglas, who described these as ‘among the most exciting couple of 
hours’ of his life.129 The Director of Postal Services was hurriedly extracted from 
enjoying an official dinner in central Sydney, and 175 technical officers were 
summoned from their living rooms to attend the emergency. Despite the best of efforts, 
unfortunately some remote commercial stations had closed and ‘their managers could 
not be found.’ Nonetheless, in a major feat of organisation, the network of ABC radio 
stations stretching from Sydney to Perth and Rockhampton, as well as many 
commercial stations servicing every state across the continent, had all diverted their 
normal traffic in anticipation of Lyons’ announcement.130 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 This is inferred from an understanding that Lyons was in Parliament when the telegram 
arrived, and this would in turn have taken some time to be decoded. 
128 NAA, A3522, 3/1. Telegram to Whiskard from Dominions Office, 10 December 1936.  
129 ‘Irvine Douglas interviewed by Mel Pratt’, 1972. 
130 ‘HOW MESSAGE WAS HEARD’, The Argus, Melbourne, Vic., 12 December 1936, p. 20. 
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The public response in the metropolitan centres can be in some ways be 
compared to the royal tour of sixteen years before. Contemporary accounts of 
community members gathering together in anticipation of further news offer a 
discernible sense that this event was considered important in local historical narratives. 
Australian public opinion was diverse, and although in the early days had been mostly 
supportive of the King remaining on the throne with Wallis or without, it had by now 
moved to a desire for the matter to be finalised by an act of abdication. As such, it could 
be argued that those who left their homes across the country to participate in gatherings 
did so less out of concern for the King’s future than that of their own and the leadership 
of the Empire. As the evening wore on, demonstrations took place in Melbourne. For 
example, a parade of 200 people organised by the Douglas Social Credit Union with 
placards and Union Jacks draped over their shoulders moved down Swanston Street and 
gathered near the Town Hall to sing ‘God Save the King.’131 The end of a ‘week of 
suspense’ was illustrated by ‘lighted houses and the blare of loudspeakers in the early 
hours’, and told of metropolitan Melbourne’s desire to know the King’s decision. Not 
even the test series that had just commenced ‘aroused so much interest among the 
people’, commented the Argus.132  
In Sydney too, people milled around the streets and shops remained open until 
after midnight.133 The Sydney Morning Herald described an ‘atmosphere of strain, such 
has not been evident since the days of the war’ through which small groups moved, 
talking in undertones ‘almost as if they were conspirators.’ ‘We felt we could not stay 
indoors on a night like this’, said one attendee. The usual ‘chatter and laughter’ of 
King’s Cross was subdued, and ‘as the hours grew smaller the tension grew greater. 
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132 ‘HOW PEOPLE HEARD NEWS Sorrow Mingled With Relief’, The Argus, Melbourne, 
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Sydney waited with a hush and the crowds became even more alertly silent. Sooner or 
later it would be known either one way or another.’134  
In Canberra, at one point the all-important speech was threatened with 
cancellation as the King’s message failed to arrive. As Douglas recalled, his staff had 
prepared Lyons’ accompanying words, but there was no sign of Baldwin’s copy of the 
King’s message with less than an hour to go before the scheduled broadcast. Quick-
thinking Douglas arranged for Lyons to ring Baldwin directly on the telephone and ask 
for the text to be read over the line. Minutes before Baldwin was due to appear in the 
House of Commons, his Private Secretary did so, and the text was simultaneously 
transcribed by two stenographers for distribution following the broadcast.135 The final 
act of resorting to the telephone illustrates the desperation of the situation. Lyons had 
abided by Baldwin’s desire for absolute secrecy up to this point to his personal 
detriment, relying on the laborious process of encoding and decoding multiple 
telegrams in an effort to stay one step ahead of the news agencies. Image 31 
Even if the telephone line had been tapped, Lyons’ staff worked faster and the 
broadcast went out at 2am on Friday 11 December, no doubt to the great relief of all 
concerned. ‘I regret to announce that I have received the King’s message of abdication’, 
the prime minister told the nation, ‘I feel sure that I am voicing the sentiments of every 
Australian when I express the most profound regret at the step which His Majesty King 
Edward has taken. We must all wish most heartily that he had acted other-wise.’ He 
recalled Edward’s personal charm, describing how ‘no member of the British Royal 
Family has ever made himself so well-known to his people’ and reminded listeners that:  
[W]e in Australia remember his visit with the happiest thoughts. Our 
men who fought in the Great War knew him as a soldier; all 
Australians knew him also as a Royal Ambassador, as a friend, as a 
guest who had endeared himself to us, all while he was amongst us. 
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… Of his own will, he steps down from the throne of this mighty 
Empire, I say of his own will, because it was against the expressed 
wish of the representatives of his people that he took this course. The 
people of the Commonwealth of Australia, no less than those of any 
other part of the Empire, hoped to the last that he would remain their 
King, and when the Commonwealth Government urged him to 
reconsider his decision, I spoke I knew for every Australian.136 
  
Lyons moved on to extol the virtues of the new King, a man ‘whom we know 
and love’ and his wife ‘whom we also know and love.’ He recalled for listeners the 
beginnings of the relationship between Australians and the Duke of York during the 
visit of 1927, a connection that now took on new significance. He felt certain that 
‘whatever regret we may feel at the abdication of King Edward’, he spoke for everyone 
‘when I say that our new King, and his Queen, already strong in our affections, will 
continue to excite and attract the admiration and loyalty of the people of the 
Commonwealth.’137 Although hastily drafted, Lyons’ speech struck the right tone 
between regretful acquiescence of the King’s irrefutable departure, before moving 
swiftly onto praise of the new monarch, apparently already occupying a place in 
Australian hearts. Image 32  
The prime minister then moved to relate the now-often quoted message from the 
King commencing: ‘After long and anxious consideration I have determined to 
renounce the Throne.’ As mentioned in the previous pages, this stilted message was 
heavily censored by Baldwin prior to broadcast and makes obtuse reference to:  
[T]he burden which constantly rests upon the shoulders of a 
Sovereign is so heavy that it can only be borne in circumstances 
different from those in which I now find myself … further delay 
cannot but be most injurious to the peoples whom I have tried to serve 
… and whose future happiness and prosperity are the constant wish of 
my heart. I take my leave of them in the confident hope that the 
course which I have thought it right to follow is that which is best for 
the stability of the Throne and Empire and the happiness of my 
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peoples.138  
 
This chapter has provided a narrative for the uncertain week between 3 
December and the official announcement of the King’s abdication in the early hours of 
11 December. From then on, the press waiting at Parliament House had within a matter 
of minutes reproduced and cabled both texts to agencies across the nation in ample time 
for the morning newspapers. After a few hours of sleep in his suite, Lyons was due back 
on duty, where he would for the first time offer a fulsome account of events to the 
House of Representatives that morning. As we will see, he would be severely, and 
undeservedly, rebuked by his contemporaries and the Australian people for his cautious 
dealings with the British government.  
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Chapter 6: Plain Mr. Windsor 
 
[T]hat such as [sic] person would be regarded as still worthy of the 
loyalty of the moral section of any part of the Empire is unthinkable. 
-The Rev. James Gillespie, 14 December 1936.1 
 
An examination of the swift closure of the abdication episode from the morning of 
Friday 11 December and the subsequent erasure of Edward as an Australian public 
figure by the latter half of 1937 allows us to better understand whether or not the 
familial regard of the Australian people could be so simply transferred from one man to 
another. Did Australia follow Baldwin’s lead in appealing to the British media to ‘rally 
behind the new King’ and ‘maintain the integrity of the monarchy’ overall?2  
Firstly, this chapter offers an account of how Lyons broke his silence after 
confirming Edward’s abdication, and the resulting criticism and commentary that 
eventuated from many quarters, before examining the Australian response to Edward’s 
final broadcast to the Empire, and the marking of the proclamation of King George VI’s 
accession to the throne. It charts the resignation and outrage with which the news was 
received by the Australian public, and the eventual transfer of affection from the old 
King to the new. It demonstrates how Lyons’ continued acquiescence in the view of the 
British government cemented Australia’s position as having aided Baldwin in a strategy 
to remove the King from the throne. Finally, by examining the ongoing attention paid to 
the Duke of Windsor and his bride that extended throughout the following year, I focus 
on the way the exiled couple, to some extent, engineered their own fall from favour in 
the imperial public eye by the final months of 1937.  
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Lyons breaks his silence 
After a few hours of rest, Lyons returned to Parliament on the morning of 11 December, 
to offer for the first time an explanation for the extraordinary turn of events over the 
previous week. Looking ‘tired and worn’, he took his place amid an air of ‘hushed 
expectancy’ emanating from the public and press galleries.3 After re-reading Edward’s 
message, he set out a full history of the correspondence that had passed between himself 
and Baldwin. The prime minister was at pains to assure his audience that Baldwin had 
asked him for his personal views on the morganatic option at a time when the matter 
was ‘highly secret and confidential’, and denied that any ‘pressure’ was exerted by any 
of the Dominion governments. Moving that Parliament assent to altering the Act of 
Succession in favour of the Duke of York, he concluded that: 
Little remains to be said … how deeply we regret His Majesty’s 
decision, and how profoundly grieved we all are at this sudden 
termination of a reign which seemed so full of golden promise … We 
must turn our eyes to the future … I appeal to members of this 
Parliament, and to the people of Australia, to show to our new 
sovereign all that loyalty and affection which they showed to his 
brother and his father.4 
 
To some extent, the four differing strands of opinion expressed by the Australian 
public over the week just passed were also articulated in Parliament in response to 
Lyons’ statement. In the discussion that followed, Opposition politicians of different 
persuasions variously expressed the view that Edward ought to have done his duty for 
the good of the institution, or alternatively insisted that he should have enjoyed freedom 
to conduct his private life. Others deplored the loss of a leader with the valuable 
qualities needed to guide future imperial relations. All expressed dismay that the 
Government had provided advice without consultation and perceived that, as a result, 
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Australia had unwittingly aided in Britain’s ‘plan’ to vacate the throne. These opinions 
are particularly useful, representing as they do the reflections of experienced orators. 
Although they had been purposely denied access to the full details, they nonetheless 
possessed a comprehensive understanding of the issue as represented not only by press 
reports, but public opinion as conveyed by their local constituents and consolidated by 
discussion within their respective parties.  
The first to reply to Lyons’ statement was the leader of the Opposition. 
According to a telegram sent by Whiskard to the Dominions Office, Curtin responded 
with ‘notable dignity.’5 Certainly, and as in previous debates, Curtin displayed the 
expected uninterest in the personal dilemma experienced by the monarch, but his 
contribution to debates in the House that day nonetheless firmly reiterated his 
objections; firstly to the passing of legislation to suit the convenience of an individual 
and secondly, the in principle disagreement to the notion whereby a woman should 
occupy a status ‘less than that would be the inherent right of her wifehood as the wife of 
her husband.’6 Curtin’s remarks also suggest that he perceived Edward’s wealth of 
experience as having equipped him for the office like no other. Rather than outright 
opposition to the stance of the British government, the Opposition leader’s attitude 
towards the conflict between private happiness and duty to the Empire was revealed as 
akin to that of Billy Hughes; that is, the King’s first obligation was to fulfil the demands 
of his office. Edward was, he observed: 
[P]robably the most prominent and conspicuous symbol of the unity 
of the British speaking people, for he had travelled through every part 
of the dominions. He knew the people of the dominions probably 
better than anybody who previously held the office which came to 
him. It is a matter of deep regret that he should find it necessary from 
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his own personal point of view to relinquish that office.7 
 
In choosing to focus on the issue of the King’s wife occupying a subordinate role, 
Curtin instead deliberately emphasised the importance of the continuity of the Kingship. 
Concluding that ‘there appears to me to be nothing for this Parliament to do but to carry 
the motion’ that Lyons had moved, he went on further emphasise this position by 
voicing his expectation that the new King uphold: 
[T]he symbol of the union of the community constituting the British 
Commonwealth of Nations … We all hope - I hope - that in the reign 
of the King who is to succeed King Edward the work which can be 
done for civilization by the British Empire will be of such a character 
as to make even more stable the institutionalism which it has 
developed and which has played so important a part in the history of 
the world.8 
 
Rather than taking a stance against the trials of the individuals, or for that matter the 
Lyons government’s secretive management of the episode that had so incensed him 
only days before, Curtin’s focus on the legislative injustice of the situation meant that 
he avoided the major issue at stake - that the British government objected to the 
morality of the woman concerned.  
Other parliamentarians held no such qualms. Although in his report to the 
Dominions Office Whiskard also remarked that ‘debate was noticeable for its unusual 
dignity and restraint’, Hansard reveals instead what can only be described as a series of 
escalating contretemps between the government and divisions of the Opposition.9 
Uproar ensued, especially among Lang Labor supporters, many of whom were 
remarkably in favour of Edward as a symbol of democracy and a friend of the people. 
Beasley, for example, refused to accept Lyons’ explanation, insisting that members 
were being treated ‘like children’ in ‘the most momentous issue that the Parliament, the 
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country and the Empire have ever faced.’10 The Dominions would not accept the King’s 
decision as final, he said: 
[F]or their love and admiration for the gentleman who is abdicating 
the throne is so widespread that it will never die in the hearts of the 
people over whom he has reigned.11  
 
The government attempted to wrestle back control of the situation. With lesser 
emotion, Menzies as Attorney-General then set out the constitutional framework for the 
British government’s proposed legislation to alter the laws of succession. His Majesty’s 
Declaration of Abdication Act 1936 (UK) served to strip Edward of his kingly titles and 
privileges, and bar him and his descendants from any claim on the throne. Ironically, 
although passing of special legislation to allow for a particular type of marriage had 
been dismissed out of hand by the British and Dominion governments, this new Act, 
effectively enabling Edward’s abdication in order to marry, apparently posed no similar 
problems.  
Anne Twomey has examined in detail the unusual nature of this piece of 
legislation. 12 She explains how, as the enactment of the Statute of Westminster did not 
fully apply to New Zealand and Australia in 1936, those Dominions simply sought to 
have the British law extended to them as part of their own legislation, without the 
necessity for further legal steps. In the case of Canada, however, to whom the Statute 
applied in full, Parliament were required to ‘consent and request’ to altering the 
necessary legislation. The King could only be advised on the matter by his Canadian 
Parliament, allowing Mackenzie King a comparable participatory role to that of 
Baldwin. The case of South Africa was different again. Hertzog did not agree to 
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passively give assent to British laws and instead enacted South Africa’s own legislation 
the following year.13 
In contrast, Australia did not legislate, but as merely passed resolutions of assent 
in both Houses. The Australian Parliament was also the only one in session at the time 
of the abdication, although as any reader of the world’s newspapers could discern, had 
been recalled for this very purpose at the extraordinary request of the prime minister. As 
Twomey notes, ‘assent’ was, legally, simply regarded as a ‘matter of courtesy.’14 
Arguably, these two factors gave weight to later accusations of Lyons’ supposed 
submissive acquiescence in Britain’s demands. In contrast, and despite commencing 
from the same legal footing, New Zealand exhibited a more active role. Savage 
indicated New Zealand’s assent in advance by way of executive act, but later passed a 
parliamentary resolution in each House which “ratified and confirmed” that assent for 
the purposes of convention.15 
Although his intention was undoubtedly the opposite, Menzies’s extended 
discussion revealed some of these uncertainties over Australia’s proposed legal 
response to the abdication. Although left-wing member Jack Holloway was quick to 
point out that Australia’s adoption of the Statute was still on notice, the Attorney-
General confidently assured the House that some of its provisions, notably those 
effecting the succession, nonetheless operated ‘of their own force.’16 Francis Baker 
interrupted to point to the importance of Australia’s input, as with all the Dominion 
governments, in ensuring the collective agreement required to pass the Act. Rowland 
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James also emphasised that, without Australia’s assent, the legislation could not 
proceed, thus upsetting ‘the plot to depose the King.’17  
In this unprecedented situation, it could be ventured that even the federal 
Attorney-General did not fully visualise how the intricacies of the Statute, then not 
wholly applicable to Australian law, worked in relation to the Constitution. Pausing 
only to dismiss ‘those entirely mythical delusions’ from which James was suffering, 
Menzies went on to argue that, having examined the terms of the Constitution himself, 
the easiest course was for Australia to assent by resolution. To this end, he cited the 
complexity of possibly undergoing two Royal Assent processes and cast doubt over the 
Parliament’s ‘direct power of its own motion to pass a substantive law’ relating to the 
succession to the throne.18 Although Menzies conceded that ‘our emotions are stirred’, 
he maintained that ‘our primary duty as a Parliament in a British community is to 
preserve both the constitutional rights of both the Parliament and the people.’19  
Although Menzies was cheered by his supporters, dissenting responses within 
the House, including from within Curtin’s own party, could not be silenced. Labor 
member Maurice Blackburn, a lawyer by profession, took to the floor to turn debate 
back to Lyons’ unsatisfactory account of proceedings. He added his voice to the general 
dissatisfaction with the prejudiced morality inherent in the provision of advice, pointing 
out what Curtin, as the leader of the Opposition, had not. The insurmountable problem, 
he stated, was not that the King wanted a wife but who that wife would be. Lyons had 
committed a ‘great wrong’ he said, in ‘suggesting that the people of this country would 
not tolerate the King marrying the person whom he wished to marry.’20 Blackburn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., p. 2908. 
18 Ibid., p. 2909. This interpretation has not, it is believed, been re-examined in more recent 
years.  
19 Ibid., p. 2909. 
20 Ibid., p. 2910. 
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demonstrated a sympathetic attitude to Wallis, pointing out that she had been the 
innocent party in both of her divorce petitions.21  
Lang Labor supporter Eddie Ward took up Blackburn’s observation with 
alacrity. Why, he demanded, had ‘these self-styled puritans’ taken it upon themselves to 
protect the morals of the King in what should have been a private matter?22 He went on 
to comment that ‘certain members’ present had themselves married divorced women, 
earning himself a reprimand from the Speaker, but clarifying that his point was that a 
different standard of conduct had been delineated for the King as opposed to ordinary 
people.23 Baker also protested that ‘we have to take the members of the Royal Family as 
they are … they should be able to conduct their own private lives as their own private 
concerns.’24 Ward perceived significant social repercussions in Lyons’ presumptive 
action, believing that the resultant abdication was a blow to the notion of democratic 
liberties that weakened the imperial relationship. He warned parliamentarians that no 
other action by a Dominion prime minister had: 
[S]o weakened the position of the Crown as has the action taken by 
the present government. The King was popularly supposed to be the 
personal guarantor of the liberties of every individual subject, when, 
as a matter of fact, he was not in sufficient power to preserve even his 
own liberty.25  
 
Ward believed that conservatives had disapproved of the King stepping outside of his 
apolitical role by visiting the unemployed and expressing sympathy with their poverty 
and conditions; in short, by being ‘difficult to handle.’26 He argued that the abdication 
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22 Ibid., p. 2911. 
23 Ibid., p. 2913. To whom he was referring was not revealed.  
24 Ibid., p. 2922. 
25 Ibid., pp. 2911-13. 
26 Ibid., p. 2913. 
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of one King in favour of another would change very little, observing that ‘the workers 
will still have to sweat and toil for British capitalism and imperialism.’27  
Others concerned with workers’ rights also seized on the democratic aspects of 
the issue. For Lang supporter Jock Garden, the episode encapsulated the triumph of 
modern masculinity over the prejudices of ‘sordid convention’, where the King’s oft-
remarked upon desire to marry for love and willingness to protest on behalf of the 
dispossessed represented the rightful subordination of ‘the glories of office to the 
majesties of manhood.’28 It was deeply hypocritical, he finished, for parliamentarians to 
approve of legislation allowing for divorce yet morally disapprove of divorced 
persons.29  
Harold Holt, a Nationalist and a young man at 28-years-old, offered the 
perspective of those who had ‘grown to maturity’ in the modern post-war world; that 
abdication remained a ‘major calamity’ as the former King had possessed unique 
qualities now lost to them. He claimed that from his earliest recollections, Edward 
always commanded his ‘complete allegiance’, explaining that:  
The knowledge that he has relinquished the throne strikes us the most 
deeply … He realized so clearly that we were passing through a 
period of great social and economic change, during which institutions 
which had been the bulwarks of other generations have been severely 
criticized, and some of them shaken. Because we believed he 
understood us, we looked to him to lop off from the tree of tradition 
the dead branches that threatened to interfere with its healthy growth 
within the British Empire … had His Majesty chosen to select any 
woman, to whom he was legally entitled to be married, as his Queen, 
I, for one, would not have hesitated in my loyalty to him.30 
 
Baker, also a member of the younger post-war generation at 33-years-old, 
moved debate back to Australia’s subservience to Britain’s legislative leadership. The 
most troubling point of contention was, for him, the precedent set by the government’s 
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apparent willingness to follow the lead of the British government in matters of great 
strategic importance. Baker protested that as to the passing of legislation, Parliament 
was ‘now asked merely to acquiesce in a fait accompli’ and was guilty of 
unconstitutional compliance and subservience in ‘a monstrous injustice.’31 The 
government, he perceived, had interfered in the rightful and direct relationship between 
Australians and their King. Lyons, he believed, had committed the nation as a whole to 
opposing the monarch on an issue where significant divisions of opinion existed. Baker 
commented that the British newspaper reports had claimed that all Dominion 
populations had felt the same, but ‘it was impossible to say whether that was so, or 
not.’32 He claimed that the Lyons government: 
[J]ust does what the British Government does. It waits, no matter for 
how long a period, until the British Government has come to a 
decision, or until its representative in Australia has notified it of the 
British government’s decision, and then hastens to follow suit.’33  
 
Baker’s views were shared by Labor’s Sol Rosevear. Describing the Lyons-
Baldwin endeavour as an attempt to ‘politically sandbag the King of England’, he 
protested that members had: 
[B]een brought here, not for the purpose of deliberating at all on this 
vital matter, but in order to suit the convenience of the United 
Kingdom, with a view to recording certain resolutions after the whole 
of the damage has been done … honourable members have been 
hamstrung, hampered and refused information, and even the right to 
speak on this vital subject until it was too late.34  
 
The views of many politicians within the Opposition seemed to reflect the trends 
observable in the public response of the week prior to the abdication. In contrast to 
Lyons’ belief that simply assenting to an extension of British law was the correct course 
to follow, these perceptions advocate instead for a greater independence in legislative 
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33 Ibid., p. 2920. 
34 Ibid., p. 2922. 
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negotiations, continuing the autonomous spirit of the Balfour declaration of 1926 and 
taking up the full rights afforded by the Statute of Westminster.  
Nonetheless, at least one other parliamentarian thought Lyons had acted 
appropriately in a difficult situation. With the exception of Menzies, no government 
member present had spoken out in support of their prime minister. Although United 
Australia Party member Eric Harrison began with the comment that Lyons’ move to 
pledge Australia to ‘follow blindly the lead of other governments’ was ‘distinctly 
dangerous’ he was quick to ally himself with the government’s agreed path.35 He went 
on to assert that Lyons had acted with ‘great delicacy’, and believed his decision to ban 
open discussion in Parliament was astute, avoiding as it did any potential 
‘emotionalism’ that could cloud rational judgement.36 Harrison’s view of the King’s 
behaviour differed from those of Beasley, Baker and Holt, who saw Edward’s personal 
values as critical to his successful Kingship. Abdication was for the greater good, 
Harrison commented, as in his view when a King assumed the responsibility of the 
office, ‘he ceases to be an individual and becomes the highest expression of the ideals 
of the people whom he governs.’ This tallies with Enid Lyons’ impression of her 
husband’s view of the monarchy.  
Discussion in the Senate that day was markedly more restrained. Collings said 
carefully that he had viewed Edward as a King ‘out of the ordinary’, who had been 
expected to have become ‘the most democratic monarch of all time, and one from 
whom we could expect great things.’37 Despite the protestations in the lower House, in 
the end the Australian Parliament quietly adopted a Resolution giving the necessary 
consent for the Act, and, from there, their British counterparts moved to pass the 
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37 Parliament of Australia, Senate, ‘Debates’, 11 December 1936, p. 2896. 
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necessary Abdication Act.38 
 
The formalities are completed 
Australia’s passive acceptance of the British government’s charted course extended to 
the completion of most of the relevant formalities. Lyons made no move to distinguish 
Australia’s response for posterity and seems eager, not unexpectedly, to draw the matter 
to a close with the minimum of further disruption and controversy. Continued support 
of the British government’s management of the matter was critical. In his discussion of 
the aftermath of the abdication in Europe, Schwartzenbach has noted that conservative 
opinion held that Baldwin’s actions were ‘reassuring proof of the strength of Britain’s 
political system’ and he was praised for his competency in maintaining stability despite 
the unpredictability of a feckless monarch.39 A comparable sense of relief and 
admiration can be discerned in Lyons’ letter to Baldwin, written following the latter’s 
confirmation of the abdication. Lyons expressed his ‘sympathy and appreciation’ in the 
time of ‘great strain and anxiety which we are all sharing but [the] brunt of which falls 
on you personally.’ He believed Baldwin had ‘shown rare qualities of leadership and 
discretion that have been of the utmost assistance to us all.’ He concluded with the hope 
that ‘in some measure we have been helpful to you during this time of great trouble.’40 
Baldwin agreed that ‘these have been difficult days for all of us’, but remarked that he 
would remember with pleasure ‘the spirit of perfect co-operation with which those of us 
who are His Majesty’s Prime Ministers have worked together in a time of trial for the 
British Commonwealth.’41 This exchange epitomises the relationship. Rather than an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For further contextual discussion, see Twomey, ‘Changing the rules of succession to the 
throne.’ 
39 Schwartzenbach, ‘Love, Marriage and Divorce’, p. 147. 
40 NAA, CP4/10, 1. Telegram to Baldwin from Lyons, 10 December 1936. 
41 NAA, CP4/10, 1. Telegram to Lyons from Baldwin, 10 December 1936. 
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equal political partner, Australia had been merely ‘helpful’ in assisting to achieve an 
end result desired by the British government.  
This argument is further strengthened by an examination of Lyons’ attitude to 
the completion of formalities. As mentioned in the Introduction, the Australian prime 
minister’s supposed ‘uncompromising stand’ against the King was first awarded 
particular prominence by Baldwin in 1949, when interviewed by biographer John 
Lockhart.42 The reproduction of these remarks in several Australian newspapers under 
the sub-header ‘Joe Lyons forced Britain’s hand’ caused distress to Enid Lyons, given 
that her husband who had supposedly ‘brought about the abdication’ had died a decade 
before.43 Certainly, Lyons was by then unable to defend himself.44 But contemporary 
archival records reveal instead that it was perhaps his liberal sense of tolerance and 
restraint that proved him to be an easy scapegoat in the aftermath of the abdication.  
To explain, as previous chapters have demonstrated, the responses and attitudes 
of the other Dominion governments were less than straightforward. The Canadian prime 
minister, for example, had from the arrival of Baldwin’s first telegram made it clear that 
Canada would not support abdication unless it was voluntary and free from any 
collusion among the Dominion governments. Mackenzie King’s stated attitude towards 
public perceptions of the Dominions’ role in the incident may be usefully compared 
with Lyons’. As the abdication became an inevitable outcome, he noted as early as 9 
December his concern that Canada be cited as ‘a factor of consequence.’ He remarked 
that while he was ‘most anxious’ to be helpful to Baldwin:  
[B]oth Canada and myself as Canada’s Prime Minister would be put 
in a wholly wrongful light were anything said which could convey the 
impression that … Canada any more than any other dominion or 
Canadian opinion any more than that of any other Dominion has been 
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44 As were also Savage and Hertzog. 
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a determining factor in situation at any stage.45 
 
Mackenzie King astutely predicted a controversy that surfaced, albeit briefly, in 
the aftermath of the abdication. On 13 December, several Australian newspapers 
reproduced the remarks of an American newspaper speculating on the relevance of both 
Australia and Canada’s input to discussions, and alleging that Baldwin had particularly 
feared that the dispute could cause Australia and Canada to abandon the Empire in the 
case of a war.46 The Canadian prime minister then took steps to ensure that for posterity 
his precise position should be clarified. At the end of the month, in view of managing 
possible future questioning, he asked if the correspondence exchanged would be 
published in a public format.47 The chilly response was unequivocal. Baldwin claimed 
that ‘no question has been raised as to publication of the correspondence nor, in 
particular, has any request been made for information as to the details of views 
expressed by the various governments.’ He warned that, as the matter stood, ‘it would 
be far better … to avoid any publication of correspondence which could, I feel, only 
serve to reopen issues now closed.’48  
Archival research has failed to reveal any suggestion that Lyons similarly 
attempted to quantify his position in response to the press’ speculation. This willingness 
to comply with Baldwin’s leadership and to conclude matters as quickly as possible 
were central to later understandings of Lyons having precipitated the abdication. 
However, this can perhaps be more accurately attributed to Lyons’ gentleness and 
tolerant character. With little rest for over a fortnight, the episode had also taken a 
physical toll on the Australian prime minister, already in poor health.49 Following 
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Baldwin’s plea in the House of Commons that ‘no word be said that causes pain to any 
soul’, Lyons likely agreed that the less said on the matter the better. As Baptist Minister 
Samuel Pearce Carey would later note approvingly on 18 December, the prime minister 
had ‘spoken throughout no word he need wish to recall.’50 
Two further public announcements were to complete the formalities. Firstly, 
Edward would speak directly to the Empire’s people for the first time in his oft-quoted 
abdication speech. This was broadcast by radio by the BBC in the evening of 12 
December. Despite the success of Lyons’ nationwide broadcast the previous day, which 
demonstrated the feasibility of a simultaneous ABC broadcast, this notion was met with 
little enthusiasm from the administrators. Pointing to the early hour as ‘one subject to 
atmospheric disturbances so far as world broadcasts from England are concerned’, it 
was suggested that a recording of the original might be relayed to Australian audiences 
at some unspecified future occasion.51 This is surprising, given that John Reith, founder 
and director of the BBC, had the previous week informed Baldwin of his ability to 
broadcast ‘any statement or anything the Prime Minister feels might be helpful, not only 
at home but also to the Empire, at any hour of the day.’52 Considering that the ABC was 
not independent of government intervention, perhaps practicality became a convenient 
excuse for neglecting to broadcast this final, and significant, message from Edward to 
his listeners. 
 In any case, this communication had been heavily censored so as to incite no 
controversy. Baldwin was at pains to ensure the message emphasised a spirit of 
complete cooperation between the monarch and the government. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Edward could only speak on a matter of such intense public interest 
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once he had ceased to be King, as otherwise his words could only be interpreted as 
being offered with the support of all of his governments. However, even now speaking 
as a private individual, Baldwin assured the Dominion prime ministers that Edward’s 
message would be ‘unembarrassing [sic]’, as it had been prepared with the advice of 
‘people in whose discretion I have complete confidence.’53 This caution may have been 
justified, as Edward’s own first proposed broadcast, drafted before the abdication 
became an inevitable conclusion, contained much potential for embarrassment. 
Addressing his ‘friends’, he insisted that listeners knew him well enough to understand 
that he ‘never could have contemplated a marriage of convenience.’ Using emotive 
language, he had hoped to explain how: 
It has taken me a long time to find the woman I want to make my 
wife. Without her I have been a very lonely man. With her I shall 
have a home and all the companionship and mutual sympathy which 
married life can bring. I know that many of you have the good fortune 
to be blessed with such a life, and I am sure that in your hearts you 
would wish the same for me.54 
 
In contrast, the final vetted version broadcast on 11 December contained little 
emotion, and in fact little by way of explanation. Introduced by Reith as ‘His Royal 
Highness Prince Edward’, the former King simply stated that he had never intended to 
restrict the matter, but ‘until now it has not been constitutionally possible for me to 
speak.’ He no more than referred to ‘the reasons which have impelled me to renounce 
the throne’, explaining simply that:  
I have found it impossible to carry the heavy burden of responsibility 
and to discharge my duties as King as I would wish to do without the 
help and support of the woman I love … my brother, with his long 
training in the public affairs of this country and with his fine qualities, 
will be able to take my place forthwith without interruption or injury 
to the life and progress of the empire. And he has one matchless 
blessing, enjoyed by so many of you, and not bestowed on me - a 
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happy home with his wife and children.55  
 
To some, the message was curiously curt. From Bournemouth in England, Dora 
Brown wrote to her Australian friends, Herbert and Ivy Brookes, of her indifferent 
reaction. Edward ‘sounded absolutely calm and unmoved’, she remarked, ‘I can’t say 
we were affected to tears as many people seemed to be!’56 However, the Brookes’ of 
Melbourne were unlikely to have been in a position to judge for themselves. Unlike 
many others within the Empire and Dominions, Australians and South Africans did not 
hear the message at the time of broadcast, owing to the time difference, which 
reportedly ‘did not favour transmission.’ Instead, recordings were distributed by the 
BBC, and the transcript reproduced in the nation’s newspapers over the following 
days.57  
Strikingly, this was not the case in Western Australia. This part of the country 
received the broadcast, albeit heavily disrupted by static, at 6am on 12 December.58 It is 
not clear how exactly this eventuated, but considering the ABC’s stance, must be 
attributable to the actions of an independent commercial station, or possibly access to 
other networks across the Indian Ocean. Although the Perth Mirror was in agreement 
with Dora Brown that Edward’s voice was ‘slow [and] sad’, the Daily News observed 
that the immediacy of radio allowed for a certain poignant humanity to pervade the 
speech.59 For example, his voice became suddenly earnest when mentioning Wallis and 
wavered over the reference to his mother. This connection sparked an emotional 
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response in Western Australians, with tears brimming ‘in many an eye as pyjama-clad 
people sat by their wireless to hear him speak.’60 Image 33 
Lacking the immediacy of the original radio broadcast, without doubt one of the 
most significant speeches of the twentieth century, the reproduction of the transcript in 
other states does not appear to have generated much comment in response. For most 
people other than some Western Australians, this final opportunity to engage with their 
former King was lost. With this broadcast, Edward formally ceased his public life and 
left Britain for Austria that night under cover of darkness. For fear of jeopardising the 
resolution of Wallis’ divorce decree, he remained in exile from his beloved at Enzesfeld 
Castle, near Vienna, until the following year. 
Finally, the proclamation of the new King George VI was announced in King’s 
Hall at Parliament House the same evening, 12 December. The accession had to be 
proclaimed at the unsociable hour of 10pm so as to coincide simultaneously with the 
announcement in Britain. Despite this late hour and the presence of a violent storm 
outside, the Sydney Morning Herald claimed that ‘hundreds’ of spectators attended the 
occasion.61 Flanked by his Secretary and two aides-de-camp, Hore-Ruthven presided 
over what seems to have been a dismal gathering. Lyons attended accompanied by the 
only two members of his government remaining in Canberra: Casey, his Treasurer, and 
Henry Gullett, the Minister for Trade Treaties.62 The task of reading the necessary text 
fell to Strahan, the prime minister’s Secretary. There was little fanfare and the ceremony 
lasted less than five minutes. Some among the crowd were quick to draw a comparison 
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with the abdication and the fierceness of the storm passing into the distance, and the 
‘subsequent freshness of the atmosphere’ with the new reign just beginning.63 Image 34 
Popular enthusiasm was more in evidence the following Monday, 14 December, 
when across the country each state held their own celebratory ceremony that also served 
to mark the new King’s birthday. These typically involved the attendance of high 
ranking federal and people’s representatives, accompanied by no small degree of 
pageantry. In Adelaide, for example, a large crowd attended the reading of the 
proclamation by the resplendently attired state Governor, Lord Huntingfield on the steps 
of Parliament House. Gun salutes were fired and the spectators sang ‘God save the 
King’, reportedly ‘with obvious emotion.’64 Officially, at least, the abdication chapter 
had been firmly closed. Image 35 
 
Australians resign themselves  
Despite the completion of the necessary public formalities between 11 and 14 
December, emotions continued to run high and fervent discussion seethed among the 
people of Australia. In 1937, Hector Bolitho commented that, in the wake of the 
abdication, ‘Australians expressed their concern in sorrow rather than indignation.’65 
During these days in particular, but as also borne out over the remainder of the month, 
some degree of public opinion certainly acquired a regretful yet resigned character. For 
the most part, Australians settled in favour of the accession of King George VI. For 
some, however, it cannot be denied that the spirit of indignation still burned brightly.  
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In Parliament on 11 December, Beasley had argued that this trend was 
demonstrative of the success of a covert strategy by the ‘propagandistic’ publications in 
the promotion of the new reign.66 Ward also mooted the existence of a conservative 
conspiracy to set the trend of press commentary and ‘by innuendo and suggestions of 
immorality … blind the people to the real issue involved.’67 Smith’s Weekly also 
claimed that Baldwin had quoted public opinion in the Dominions to bolster 
conservative views in Britain, and that likewise, newspapers of the traditionalist 
character of The Times were being reprinted in Australia in order to ‘set the popular tide 
the way Baldwin wants it to run.’68 Perhaps most realistically, the Wagga Wagga Daily 
Advertiser suggested that over the previous days ‘mob-psychology and unbridled 
hysteria’ had temporarily ‘submerged the judgement, the commonsense [sic] and the 
capacity for national outlook’ of most of the population.69 
While much of the above is a matter of conjecture and would be difficult to 
confirm one way or another, it would certainly be true to observe that the conservative 
metropolitan press immediately embarked on a program of sanctimonious regret for the 
demise of the former King, bolstered by determined promotion of the new King George 
VI. On the morning of 11 December, the Melbourne Argus, for example, recorded an 
early morning rush on newspapers, resulting in small knots of people forming to 
‘express sorrow that a reign which had begun so auspiciously had ended so 
dramatically.’ The demotion of the former King was treated almost as a death. The 
editorial described a funereal scene where men and women discussed ‘incidents of the 
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King’s tour when Prince of Wales, and affectionately recalled examples of his fondness 
for his people no matter how humble their lot.’70  
Other publications expressed views in keeping with that of the Australian prime 
minister; that is, relief that the prestige of the monarchy was intact. The Adelaide 
Advertiser, for example, remarked indifferently on 14 December that ‘Kings may go but 
the Crown remains [a] symbol of national unity.’71 Other conveyed disinterest in the 
fortunes of the unfortunate individual who had failed to perform his duties adequately 
and hence had been expelled from office. ‘Like a flash King Edward has passed from 
the scene’, the Crookwell Gazette stated, expressing mild contempt for the ‘man without 
a country, [who had] slipped away to reside in a foreign land.’72 The Courier-Mail was 
similarly resigned. ‘We can but let him go’ it editorialised, noting that even if he had 
remained on the Throne, Edward’s reign would have been only a brief moment in a 
‘long line of Kings stretching back into history.’ The only route forward was, the article 
concluded, to transfer loyalty ‘implicitly and unquestioningly’ to the new King.73  
Much of the approving commentary also emphasised the suitability of the 
Duchess as the wife of a King. As the Yorketown Pioneer clumsily expressed, ‘the 
unanimity of the empire in its attitude to the king’s choice was impressive because it 
displayed the exceptionally high qualities deemed indispensable for the first lady in the 
land.’74 Echoing her husband’s sentiments, Enid Lyons spoke publicly and superlatively 
on 11 December of Elizabeth’s dedication to the ‘domestic life that is traditional in the 
Queens of England’ and ‘the best ideals of English womanhood.’75 More specifically, 
the Women’s Weekly was at pains to emphasise Elizabeth’s ‘straightforward nature, her 
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well known domesticity, and her singular personal charm.’76 Brisbane’s Archbishop 
John Wand perceived the couple’s apparently happy marriage and children as evidence 
of ‘the very model of all that seems to us best and dearest in our own homes.’77 Despite 
the claims of those that the individuals concerned did not matter, this focus on the 
Duchess served to emphasise that the monarch’s choice of consort was an 
insurmountable issue for many Australians. Far from his previous incarnation as a 
member of the family, Edward’s private inclinations fell far short of remarkably lofty 
moral ideals.  
The merit of the individuals concerned was a recurrent and emotive theme in 
much of the debate following the abdication. This confirms that, for Australians, the 
character of the monarch was at least equal if not of greater importance than the 
fulfilment of their public role. This observation is further supported by the way Wallis 
remained the focus of much negative attention, despite her attempts to retreat from the 
public eye. By this point, she had fled Britain for France, never to return. Although the 
abdication was irrevocable, purist commentators continued to vilify her perceived 
morality and values. ‘An Empire discarded for one whose capacity for love has not 
endured in the case of two husbands’, lamented the Lithgow Mercury on 11 
December.78 Prejudice and emotion ran high. At the end of the month, Joseph Longton, 
an Australian journalist living in Baltimore, wrote a thousand word tirade in critique of 
both Wallis and Edward, whom he addressed with ‘less respect than I have for a 
rattlesnake.’ Although he also spared a few well-chosen words for Wallis, Longton’s 
attack firmly identified Edward as the instigator of the affair: 
“You killed what hope for happiness that reposed in Mr Simpson’s 
home. “You coveted his wife. “YOU STOLE MR SIMPSON’S 
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WIFE. “You broke Mr Simpson’s home up. THEN YOU BROKE 
YOURSELF … Supposing another HOME WRECKER and WIFE 
THIEF -- like yourself “HAD STOLEN YOUR MOTHER FROM 
YOUR FATHER’, how would you feel about it?” … Upon a recent 
trip I took through the South-South of the Mason and Dixon Line I 
heard southerners saying “If Edward was to COME DOWN SOUTH 
AND STEAL A MAN’S WIFE, we would tar and feather him and 
then burn him at the stake.79 
 
Longton’s criticism of the King’s adulterous part in the whole affair was rare. It 
seems that for most Australians the myth of Wallis’ culpability persisted, rather than 
any blame being laid at Edward’s door. Albeit with a lesser degree of venom than 
Longton, the Brisbane Telegraph remarked accusingly that although she ‘must have 
known’ and was ‘supposed to have been concerned’ with Edward’s concern for workers 
and economic stability, Wallis had failed by her ‘inaction’ to persuade him from 
abandoning his ‘rightful’ course.80  
Others were in fact notably more generous towards Edward, concluding that, as 
in the words of the Armidale Express and New England General Advertiser, although 
‘his decision may not have concurred with our desires … he, at least, was true to his 
own conscience.’81 The Rev. James Gillespie, an Australian living in London, agreed in 
a letter to Lyons on 14 December that Edward had done ‘the only thing he could 
rightfully have done’ in light of the public’s widespread knowledge that he had been 
‘carrying on openly with an alien woman who had been divorced and again married, 
with her second husband still living.’82 The Wagga Wagga Daily Advertiser offered a 
more sympathetic view, arguing that Edward’s dignified surrender had preserved some 
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respect and affection.83 For Francis Cotton, writing in The Australian Worker on 16 
December, true masculinity entailed loyalty to an intended marriage partner; ‘[Edward] 
would have been less than a man had he not taken that course’, he stated.84  
The variety in these differing views of Edward and Wallis’ behaviour starkly 
render the well-entrenched double standard, already noted in Parliament by Beasley, 
Blackburn and Baker, that underpinned many Australian perceptions of the monarch’s 
private life. Commonly, such observations were upheld by a hypocritical expectation 
that the head of state must exhibit loftier moral behaviour than that expected of ordinary 
people in their private lives. For example, in one breath the Lithgow Mercury claimed 
that a King ‘can never be above his people’ yet at the same time ‘owe a greater duty to 
his Crown than his human feelings.’85 The Yorketown Pioneer struggled to uncover the 
roots of this apparently indisputable fact, suggesting that ‘the ordinary citizen’ was 
deeply opposed to divorce, and that in this case, critics had ‘fashioned what their ruler 
should be like and how he could act and no substitute will be permitted.’86 Archbishop 
Wand, who pronounced the love between the couple as ‘not proper for the wearer of the 
British crown’, identified the monarch as a bastion of traditional morality in an 
increasingly modern world. He believed that the King must set an example of moral 
propriety as well as perform their duties. This, he explained in a speech to his Brisbane 
congregation, would counteract a dangerous social context not limited to ‘laxity in 
married life.’87 
Wand’s expression of his concerns for society was prompted by the widespread 
reporting of a vindictive speech broadcast on BBC radio by the Archbishop of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 ‘KINGS AND PARLIAMENTS’, Daily Advertiser, Wagga Wagga, N.S.W., 14 December 
1936, p. 2. 
84 ‘A King Who Has Become A Man’, The Australian Worker Sydney, N.S.W., 16 December 
1936, p. 6. 
85 ‘THE KING ABDICATES’, Lithgow Mercury N.S.W., 11 December 1936, p. 3. 
86 ‘Vale-Edward VIII.’, The Pioneer Yorketown, S.A., 18 December 1936, p. 3. 
87 ‘CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO OPPOSED STANDARDS OF LIFE’, The Telegraph, 
Brisbane, Qld., 14 December 1936, p. 15. 
	  	   279	  
Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, on 13 December. Never previously had the most senior 
bishop of the Church of England publicly criticised the monarch, but Lang now rebuked 
the former King for his attempt to seek ‘his happiness in a manner inconsistent with the 
Christian principles of marriage’ and pointed to the murky morals of the King’s social 
circle as responsible.88 Like Wand, some Australians agreed that Edward’s behaviour 
was reprehensible and he should be held accountable like any other man. ‘It is a hopeful 
sign when the Archbishop of Canterbury … declares that the King can do wrong, and is 
blameworthy because he has done so’ stated Fred Bowden of Melbourne on 18 
December.89 In Sydney that week, Baptist Minister Wilfred Jarvis allocated some forty-
five minutes to an enthusiastic critique of Edward’s character and friends. It was a 
shame, he argued, that as a young man, Edward’s head had been turned by ballrooms 
and world travel, concluding that he ‘made a bad bargain, a mad bargain.’90 
Australia’s lack of an established Church can also perhaps partially explain the 
lack of wholehearted agreement between religious bodies. A sizeable proportion 
expressed some degree of sympathy with Edward’s predicament, even if at the same 
time staunchly condemning his behaviour on principle. Although he agreed with Lang’s 
condemnation of the sliding moral values of the twentieth century, Donald Baker, the 
Anglican Bishop of Bendigo, admired the ex-King’s ‘frank, open conduct.’91 Although 
also despairing of any hope of revising attitudes and morals (‘the world has gone too far 
for that’), Daniel Mannix also offered sympathy to the unfortunate King who ‘brought 
all the trouble on himself.’92 The situation was the same elsewhere. In Sydney, the 
Anglican Archbishop Howard Mowll said generously that although Edward had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 ‘EDWARD’S SOCIAL CIRCLE STANDS REBUKED’, The Telegraph, Brisbane, Qld., 14 
December 1936, p. 15. 
89 NLA, MS 1924/1/13290. Letter to the Brookes’ from Bowden, 18 December 1936. 
90 ‘NEVER-TO-BE-FORGOTTEN STRAIN’, The Sydney Morning Herald, N.S.W., 14 
December 1936, p. 17. 
91 ‘NEWS AND NOTES FROM KYABRAM’, Shepparton Advertiser, Vic., 16 December 
1936, p. 14. 
92 ‘RADIO LISTENERS’, The Catholic Press, Sydney, N.S.W., 24 December 1936, p. 20. 
	  	   280	  
departed the throne, ‘we shall always keep him in our hearts.’ Also in Sydney, the 
Presbyterian Rev. D.P. MacDonald cautioned his congregation against negative 
judgement and stated that when Edward renounced the throne, he ‘claimed his rights as 
a man.’93 
Although opposition to Edward and support for the new reign constituted the 
bulk of Australian public opinion at this time, these examples discussed above reveal 
the existence of a significant body of moderate sympathy for Edward, if not support per 
se. Additionally, it is equally important to note that there was also a small yet vocal 
body of active and Australian support for the former King, although their commentary 
opposing the abdication inevitably dwindled fairly quickly in the face of such a 
consummate fait accompli. Whereas the conservative press moved quickly to express 
their alliance to the new King, still the liberal and left-leaning press protested against 
the removal of the former. Smith’s Weekly maintained that it represented the typical 
‘Australian attitude’; that is, refusing ‘to be stampeded from its loyalty into sitting in 
censorious judgment on the King and Empire.’94 The Labor-leaning Bathurst National 
Advocate saw Lyons as having ‘committed Australia to a policy altogether in variance 
with the views of the Australian people’ and condemned the result as reducing ‘one of 
the greatest friends the people ever had’ to simply ‘the football of the politicians.’95  
As in federal Parliament, some state labour politicians continued to publicly 
articulate their dissatisfaction with Lyons’ management of the affair. In the Melbourne 
Legislative Council on 16 December, for example, Labor member Esmond Kiernan 
caused a stir by claiming that the actions of the Australian and British governments had 
humiliated the former King. He called for Lyons and Baldwin to be held accountable for 
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‘the manner in which they had betrayed the best wishes of the people of Australia.’96 
Edmund Dwyer-Gray, the Treasurer in the Tasmanian government, published a 
damning editorial in the Voice of 12 December, alleging the deposition of the King for 
his anti-capitalist and industrialist stance following ‘some miserable lying, cowardice, 
evasion and lack of candour’ in London and Canberra. Like many federal Lang Labor 
supporters, Dwyer-Gray lamented the particular qualities of the ‘Poor Man’s King’ now 
lost. ‘The worst sequel will be the aftermath of “might have beens.”’, he said. ‘King 
Edward could have done so much no other can do.’97 Image 36 
In contrast, other labour and left-wing commentators were more in agreement 
with Curtin that the individual monarch receded in importance, at least while they 
performed their duties adequately. The socialist movement decried individual self-
interest to the detriment of others, and so may explain perceptions that Edward was 
beloved when he appeared to take action on aspects of benefit to society but fell from 
favour when he appeared motivated by his own personal gain. The Labor Call, the 
official publication of the Victoria Labor Party, for example, saw the resolution of the 
issue as self-evident. ‘The individual, no matter who he may be, must be subordinate to 
the institution’, it stated, casting doubt over whether the former King, as a lone 
individual lacking in any political power, would have had any capacity to effect real 
change in any case.98 Cotton took a more sanguine view of the future, hoping that 
Edward’s abandonment of the throne would not necessitate his retreat from public life, 
where his qualities and labour sympathies could be usefully employed. ‘What will he do 
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with his newly acquired manhood?’ he wondered, ‘Will he stand and fight with brain 
and voice and pen for a larger measure of right for the mass of his fellow men?’99 
Those Australians who had supported the King remaining on the throne did not 
generally share Cotton’s optimism for the future, or hold out hope that the decision 
could be reversed. The reality of abdication caused great anguish and regret to those 
who perceived Edward as a ‘people’s King.’ In Sydney, James Walker, the President of 
the Masonic Veterans’ Association of New South Wales, protested that ‘English people 
all over the world’ had wished that ‘best and most loved King in the world’, a ‘warm 
friend’ of returned soldiers, the unemployed and the poor, had remained on the throne 
for the rest of his life.100 ‘Unemployed’ lamented to the Hobart Mercury on 14 
December that as long as Edward lived he would ‘always be King in the hearts of the 
vast majority of the people of our Empire.’101 H.H. Nesbitt wrote to the Newcastle 
Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate to remind readers that a large section of the 
returned soldier population ‘still say “God bless him wherever he is”’, and were 
prepared to ‘take up cudgels’ against anyone heard to utter derogatory statements.102 
Similarly, Don McEachern of Taree, New South Wales, penned a poem published in the 
Northern Champion that asserted Edward ‘still reigns for loyal hearts … methinks, he’s 
still a king, the world his Empire, too.’103 In Wagga Wagga too, events inspired A.R.D. 
Moye to put poetic pen to paper, commanding that readers of the Daily Advertiser ‘hear 
now thy nation’s anguished cry … Goodbye, Edward, goodbye, goodbye!’104 Kathleen 
Stephen of West Merrylands, New South Wales, urged the prime minister to ‘not forget 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 ‘A King Who Has Become A Man’, The Australian Worker Sydney, N.S.W., 16 December 
1936, p. 6. 
100 ‘REFERENCE AT LUNCHEON’, The Sydney Morning Herald, N.S.W., 10 December 
1936, p. 11. 
101 ‘LETTERS’, The Mercury, Hobart, Tas., 14 December 1936, p. 6. 
102 ‘KING EDWARD’S ABDICATION’, Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate, 
N.S.W., 18 December 1936, p. 5. 
103 ‘EDWARD STEPS DOWN’, The Northern Champion, Taree, N.S.W., 16 December 1936, 
p. 5. 
104 ‘ABDICATION’, Daily Advertiser, Wagga Wagga, N.S.W., 17 December 1936, p. 7.  
	  	   283	  
him whom we have served and still esteem. God bless Sir Edward Windsor!’ she 
finished.105  
In other quarters the abdication met with disbelief and concern. ‘I cannot accept 
the abdication of Edward VIII, and therefore am unable to recognise any other 
sovereign in his place’, one writer from Willoughby, New South Wales, firmly 
informed Lyons.106 Charles Gilbert of Oakleigh, Victoria, suspected the worst. ‘Would 
you kindly try to get the real reason our beloved late sovereign left the throne’, he 
beseeched the prime minister on 12 December, going on to explain: 
It seems clearly to me as I read the tragic affairs that our beloved King 
has been so worried the last few months … I strongly believe he has 
momentarily lost his reason … My idea is he will not marry Mrs 
Simpson in the next three months but might put an end to himself in 
some tragic manner … he should be most strongly guarded and 
watched before it is too late to save him. If you could get in touch 
with his professional doctor in London on this theory I think we may 
be able to save him from further calamity. As you know he is so much 
beloved by everyone at home and abroad.107 
 
After this week and the completion of the public formalities, the debate over 
Edward’s behaviour largely lost its momentum. Although for the remainder of that 
month, politicians would continue to deliberate over Lyons’ controversial management 
of the episode, and some quarters of the population would continue to employ Edward 
as an example of moral breakdown, it was clear to the people of Australia that their 
King, whether beloved or reviled, had been exiled for good.  
 
The transfer of affection to a new King 
‘I venture to prophesy’, remarked the Bishop of Bendigo on 16 December, ‘that we 
shall witness such an exhibition of loyalty to the throne as we have never seen 
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before.’108 He was correct. On the whole, Australians were receptive to the replacement 
of one King with another, as long as the newcomer could display the desirable qualities. 
In the harsh light of abdication, it had never been clearer to observers exactly what these 
qualities should be. Although in comparison to 1920, the royal tour of 1927 had been a 
fairly low-key affair lacking in public access to the Duke and Duchess, it nonetheless 
provided some reassurance to the people that the couple were familiar with public 
responsibilities.  
In this light, their comparative aloofness and practiced dedication to official 
rather than social duties acquired greater significance in hindsight. While admitting that 
King George VI was not ‘of the type to fire popular imagination as his brother did’, the 
Mullumbimby Star and Byron Bay-Bangalow Advocate was nonetheless confident that 
‘there would be no shirking of duty and that he will be conscientiousness personified’ in 
the style of his traditionalist father.109 As evidenced by the weeks past, the fact that the 
new King was securely married and had already ensured the succession of the Windsor 
dynasty was also viewed as a ‘great advantage.’110 Rather than seeking out and praising 
perceived attractive modern and democratic qualities and a disregard for convention in 
their monarch, Australian attention now sharpened towards their new ruler’s record of 
dutiful behaviour in his public life, and staid domesticity in his private dealings. 
The 1927 meeting between Australians and their new King hurriedly acquired a 
new importance. From both houses of Parliament, Patrick Lynch, the President of the 
Senate, and Speaker George Bell sent a letter of congratulation that affirmed the 
people’s ‘happiest recollections’ of the visit.111 It had been during this meeting that the 
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couple decisively ‘endeared themselves to the citizens of the Commonwealth’, J.P. 
O’Toole of Queenscliff, Victoria, told Lyons.112 ‘So many of us had the honour of 
seeing you’, Ruth Fairfax of Edgecliffe, New South Wales, wrote to the King.113 Thus 
far, Lyons’ expressed hope that the Australian public would redirect their ‘admiration 
and loyalty’ proved largely successful.  
As Bessant has remarked, in the wake of the abdication Edward also abruptly 
disappeared from educational material such as the School Papers, becoming a ‘non-
person.’114 Part of this departure can also be attributed to the practical reality of 
replacing one public figure with another in advance of commercial deadlines expedited 
by the Coronation. In an era of ‘make-do’, vendors of commercial goods scrambled to 
replace images of the old King with the new. For example, Edward’s portrait was pasted 
over with a photograph of his brother in posters already printed in advance of the 
Coronation.115 A baker on board a Bass Strait ferry service was praised by the 
passengers for his ingenuity in convincingly altering the facial features of the kingly 
figure atop the steamer’s Christmas cake.116 On the whole, however, he seems to have 
retreated just as easily from the hearts and minds of Australians. As early as Christmas 
1936, the Nambour Chronicle and North Coast Advisor was able to report that the local 
people had ‘settled down to business as usual under the new King.’117 Image 37 
In the British context of the aftermath of the abdication, some authors have 
argued that Edward’s swift disappearance was the result of a deliberate strategy by the 
Establishment. Bloch, for example, has convincingly suggested that, over the following 
years, the royal family feared that the former King’s popularity, undiminished in some 
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quarters, and the public’s vocal dissatisfaction with the government’s management of 
the episode would jeopardise the longevity of his brother’s Kingship.118 In light of the 
South Wales episode, Edward’s political leanings coupled with a body of existing 
public support and sympathy presented a dangerous combination. Having renounced all 
his titles and as ‘plain Mr. Windsor’, he may have considered embarking on a fresh 
political career.119 Accordingly, certain steps were taken to ensure his on-going 
banishment from England, the constraint of his income in the civil list, and the 
repudiation of his supposed political and social ambitions.  
However, as Gough Whitlam would later comment in 1972, the conferring of 
particularly restrictive styles and titled proved a vindictive masterstroke. Williams 
further reveals the deliberations over titles between the new King and his advisors that 
effectively ‘neutered’ the former King and curtailed any ambitions he may have 
harboured to participate in political life.120 By conferring on Edward a royal dukedom, 
styled ‘His Royal Highness the Duke of Windsor’, his brother in one stroke removed 
Edward’s eligibility for political life. As a politically-neutral royal personage, he could 
not neither sit nor vote in the House of Lords, and as a Duke he could neither stand nor 
be elected to the House of Commons as an ordinary citizen. The attitude of Queen 
Mary, Queen Elizabeth and King George VI towards the withholding of Wallis’ rightful 
royal status was equally spiteful. Although as in any other marriage, she was legally 
entitled to equal status to her husband, what eventuated was ultimately a morganatic 
marriage. For the remainder of the couple’s life in exile, her designation as the non-
royal Duchess of Windsor would instigate what Williams refers to the ‘festering pain’ 
of bitter estrangement from the family.121 The disparity in status between man and wife 
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was also strategic, making it difficult for Wallis and Edward to be respected in the 
Society circles they wished to exert influence within. 
In Australia, the more radical and liberal press pounced upon rumours of a 
possible British plot to extinguish Edward from public life. The Worker, for example, 
claimed that a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ had ruled that the couple should ‘come before 
the public as little as possible.’122 According to the Worker, rumours in ‘political 
circles’ in Canberra held that instructions had come from London to impose a blanket 
ban to avoid popularising the Duke to the disadvantage of his brother.123Anecdotally, it 
seems certain that the spectre of Edward was unwelcome in any media from the official 
perspective. For example, although copies of the final broadcast could be purchased as 
souvenirs in America, Britain and Australia made no move to circulate copies.124  
Hopes that the couple would of their own initiative retreat from public life 
proved forlorn. If, on the whole, Australians had largely accepted the new King, at 
every turn they were besieged by ongoing coverage of Edward and Wallis. In some 
sections of the press, the couple appeared with as much regularity throughout 1937 as 
Edward had as King in 1936. He was ‘still big news’ on the London dailies’ front pages, 
proclaimed Frank McIlraith, Smith’s Weekly’s correspondent on 20 February.125 
Although as in the case of the School Paper, no mention of the incident appears in the 
women’s periodicals, such as New Idea or Everylady’s Journal, this was not the case for 
some of the more sensational proprietors. The drama of the situation continued to offer 
untold commercial opportunities. The Sydney publisher Thomas Scott, for example, 
prepared a lurid magazine promising ‘romance, suspense, thrills, and supreme self-
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sacrifice!’ within its pulp paper pages.126 The abdication, the preface entreated readers, 
‘contained far more of the elements of Tragedy than anything ever shown on the screens 
or the stages of the world. Not Shakespeare, not the records of Ancient Greece or Rome, 
ever dealt with such material.’ Having survived the shock, for some Australians the 
couple acquired the gilded patina of romantic drama as seen in imported American 
cinematography from the Hollywood studios. Image 38 
Edward’s self-imposed Austrian exile also continued to excite great interest in 
the world’s press during the early months of 1937. The Australian government made 
some attempt to restrict commentary by applying some mild censorship restrictions to 
related cinematographic material. In March, for example, some innocuous footage of a 
distant Edward skiing down a hill was cut from a Fox Movie-tone newsreel that was to 
be shown in Australian cinemas. The film, explained Lionel Hurley, the Chief Censor, 
was ‘of a character not desirable for the screen.’127 Frustrated at the banning of this 
‘completely harmless’ footage, Fox Movie-tone News’ manager, Mr. H. Guinness, 
revealed that from his perspective there had been an almost all-encompassing ban on 
films of the couple, even those intended for reference or library purposes.128 It seems 
most likely that Hurley and the Australian film distributers may have looked to the lead 
of their English counterparts for guidance in this matter. As the Perth Daily News 
speculated, those in the English trade were held to understand, unofficially at least, that 
there was an embargo on imagery of the Duke prior to the Coronation, so as to avoid 
any ‘jarring note.’129 The official line was much the same; Hurley ruled that related 
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cinematography images would be subject to special consideration ‘depending on their 
character’ until after the Coronation.130  
The context of this decision is revealing. During the early months of 1937, most 
journalists across the world were transfixed with the forthcoming resolution of the 
Simpsons’ divorce case. Thomas Barnes, the King’s Proctor, had in February, at the 
behest of a private citizen, undertaken extensive investigations into any possible 
collusion in the Simpsons’ divorce proceedings. Despite the seemingly smooth transfer 
of affection to the new King and the restoration of imperial cohesion and the dignity of 
the throne, some Australians still perceived the eventual unchallenged resolution of the 
divorce as a threat. For some, moral standards and worldwide respect for the legislative 
system were at stake, given the many anomalies in the case and Edward’s conspicuous 
absence as co-respondent. As the noxious Longton warned the King: 
If you do figure upon taking THE BUTTERED BUN back to England 
as “The Duchess of Windsor” (and not the MISTRESS she has been) 
You had better prepare yourself for a GOOD OLD FASHIONED 
ENGLISH REBUKE … THE EYES OF THE CIVILISED WORLD 
ARE UPON THE KING’S PROCTOR. If that divorce is not 
INVALIDATED, the great respect that the whole world has for 
BRITISH JUSTICE and FAIR PLAY will be INVALIDATED and 
BRITAIN WILL CRUMBLE TO DUST.131 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by ‘An English Woman’ who wrote to the King’s 
Proctor from Adelaide to reinvigorate the established sexual double-standard that 
Wallis’ adultery was self-evident in the case. ‘Save the Duke of Windsor from a 
designing woman’, she pleaded, going on to argue that if Barnes were to prevent the 
divorce, ‘then you will have a good example of truth and honour for the English 
people.’132 She wrote again in more threatening tones two weeks later, demanding that 
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he enact this duty ‘in the Fear of God, if not then God will demand a just payment from 
you.’133 Some comparable feeling can be tentatively discerned in Canada, where writer  
P. Sheppard warned that ‘nothing is to be gained by playing ostrich…it is safer and 
nobler to face the facts.’134 Responses such as this are consistent with those observed at 
the end of the previous year towards the prospect of a morganatic marriage, and all that 
implied about the privileging of the rights of the individual over the state. The 
finalisation of the divorce once again agitated perceptions, temporarily soothed by the 
accession of King George VI, that Edward had used his influence to undermine the 
legislative institution in pursuit of his private happiness. As one person, who identified 
themselves as ‘One whose divorce was disallowed for the merest technical hitch’, 
lamented bitterly to Barnes, the case was a ‘glaring example of one law for the rich and 
one for the poor.’135 
In any case, Barnes appears to have been unruffled by the Fear of God. His 
investigations concluded that although the Simpsons’ divorce was most probably 
arranged, he had found no evidence to support that assumption.136 On 3 May 1937, 
Wallis’ divorce was made absolute, a little over one week before the Coronation of 
King George VI on 12 May. This announcement proved captivating for the world’s 
press, so much so that the Perth Sunday Times correspondent in London observed that in 
British newspapers the forthcoming Windsor wedding ‘out-starred’ reports of the 
Coronation preparations.137 Despite Hurley’s likely desire to limit Edward’s public 
visibility until after his brother was crowned, the close proximity of these two news 
items doubtless prompted readers to consider how differently the story could have 
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eventuated. The couple married on 3 June, just three weeks after the Coronation. The 
venue was Château de Candé, a French castle belonging to their friend, the millionaire 
industrialist and fascist Charles Bedaux. Not one member of the royal family attended. 
Image 39 
From this point onwards, it seems that Australians’ professed indifference 
towards Edward turned mostly to antipathy. On 11 June, the editor of the Cessnock 
Eagle and South Maitland Recorder felt that, having experienced seven months of 
fervent publicity, the best thing would be for the couple to ‘sink into oblivion’ unless 
they soon accomplished ‘something of benefit to the community.’138 The Hobart 
Mercury of 16 June argued that Edward should have displayed more discretion in the 
timing of his marriage, so as to allow the Coronation celebrations to run their course 
before he came back into the public eye. The newspaper despaired over the unrelenting 
news coverage of the wedding that lent a ‘false glamour’ to the story.139  
The public screening, or otherwise, of cinematographic films of the couple’s 
wedding also proved controversial, less so for the content than the quantity of 
commentary generated. On 18 June, left-wing Senator Gordon Brown drew unwelcome 
attention to the issue in Parliament, seeking explicit confirmation from the government 
that relevant films had not been subject to particularly stringent restrictions exceeding 
normal censorship guidelines.140 Had the coverage simply been broadcast as a matter of 
course within normal newsreel programs, it would probably have passed with little 
comment. However, rather than ensuring Edward’s desired slide into oblivion, the 
suggestion of ungenerous censorship created not a nonentity but a martyr of the Duke. 
‘When will this darn-fool spoon-feeding of royal propaganda stop?’ asked the 
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Katoomba Blue Mountains Times.141 The government’s attempts to handle ‘human 
problems by means of suppression’ were more divisive than the ‘frank acceptance of 
public interest and regard for a former monarch and still popular member of the royal 
family’, warned the Newcastle Sun.142 
By the time twelve months had passed since the abdication, this generous 
estimation of the Duke’s popularity seems largely unsustained. As Ziegler has 
explained, the couple sparked alarm and condemnation within the Establishment 
following their tour of Germany in October 1937. Ostensibly undertaken in a private 
capacity for the purpose of ‘studying housing and working conditions’, the Duke and 
Duchess (the latter obsequiously addressed at all times as ‘Your Royal Highness’) were 
publicly feted by Hitler and his colleagues.143 Although Edward was at great pains to 
stress the unofficial nature of the trip, it nonetheless confirmed for the Germans that the 
Duke, a man still possessing some degree of public notoriety and possibly nurturing a 
grudge towards the Establishment, supported their cause.144 The couple’s subsequent 
plan, eventually abandoned, to similarly peruse working and housing conditions in the 
United States the following month was similarly misguided, orchestrated as it was by 
the reviled capitalist Bedaux, the ‘anathema to organized [sic] labour’ in America.145 
Image 40 
In Australia, the dismay this news generated mirrored that of Britain and 
America, the latter previously mostly in favour of the couple’s continued public 
visibility in view of Wallis’ nationality. Although ‘A Devonian’ suggested to the 
Brisbane Courier-Mail that the couple should be invited to make Queensland their 
permanent home as it was not ‘right that [Edward] should be living in foreign 
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countries’, it seems that few were in agreement.146 Although now straying outside of 
this thesis’ scope, press commentary from the latter half of 1937 clearly coincides with 
the trends of opinion observed in Britain that would later come to mar the Duke and 
Duchess’ reputation as sympathisers with Hitler’s National Socialist philosophy.147 The 
Goulburn Evening Penny Post commented that Edward would find it impossible to ‘live 
as an ordinary man’ and through his ill-thought-out associations and activities, was now 
‘playing with fire.’148 Although the Duke’s spokesman hurriedly issued a press release 
affirming that, as a newly private individual, Edward’s comings and goings would no 
longer be publicly announced, the damage had already been done.149 In Australia, the 
promise of Edward’s public life, evidenced by perceptions of his advantageous 
qualities, had been decisively erased by later understandings of his behaviour as 
reckless and selfish.  
This chapter might suggest that the closing stages of the abdication episode 
reveal a profound divide within the Australian population at large as to how a 
monarch’s behaviour should relate to and inform their position. The conservative end of 
the social and political spectrum valued an unobtrusive personal life that enhanced and 
perpetuated their position as the symbol of an unchanging institution. At the other end, 
more liberal and left-wing commentators saw the former King’s insistence on personal 
happiness as an intrinsic part of modern masculinity. These findings also underscore the 
fact that, despite protestations to the contrary, the perceived character of the monarch is 
of the utmost importance and is held to higher moral standards than are expected for the 
rest of the population. The reaction of both Australian people and politicians to Lyons’ 
seemingly presumptuous acceptance of Britain’s leadership further reveal the 
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remarkable depth of advocacy for Australia’s independence in legislative negotiations, 
continuing the autonomous spirit of the Balfour declaration of 1926 and exploring the 
parameters of the terms afforded in principle by the Statute of Westminster.  
Despite the British government’s uncertainties over Edward’s suitability for the 
role that arose during the later 1920s, the residual traces of Australian perceptions of a 
‘democratic’ monarch, a friend of the people, were still in evidence in 1936. Although 
many liberal and left-wing Australians continued to express great regret and 
indignation, this nonetheless dwindled quickly in the face of such a final and decisive 
act, perhaps hastened by the way Edward’s final radio broadcast was heard by so few. 
Overall, his departure was accepted with resignation, and, aided by the fervent 
promotion advocated by the conservative press, Australians turned to their new 
monarch. However, if there was indeed a transfer of affection to the new King and 
Queen, this was intersected by generational differences and political skirmishes that 
were not resolved by the removal of Edward. Generating further public fascination with 
royal private lives, the demise of the King’s career was more open-ended in its political 
and cultural consequences for the Crown than many previous commentators have 
suggested. 
The disparity between qualities previously perceived as essential for the reign of 
Edward and subsequently that of George are also from this point clearly observable. 
Australians wished for a familiar and personable monarch, but only to a certain degree. 
The nature of the attraction was revealed to be superficial. Rather than seeking out and 
praising perceived attractive modern and democratic qualities and a disregard for 
convention, Australians now professed to value a record of dutiful dedication to public 
life, and a marriage to a morally upstanding woman, who had already by virtue of 
bearing children ensured the succession of the House of Windsor for the next 
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generation. By this point, the spectre of Edward was effectively banished from the 
Australian popular, political and imperial lexicon.  
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Conclusion 
 
The monarchy is more than the monarch … it endures though Kings 
pass: though Kings, alas! forsake their trust. 
-The Courier-Mail, 11 December 1936.1 
 
This thesis contributes to present inter-war historiography on Australians and the 
monarchy by providing a narrative for the previously under-researched evolution of 
Edward’s public life in this country between approximately 1916 and 1936. In analysing 
the historical context that accompanied a shift in Australian perceptions of Edward’s 
public persona between his 1920 royal tour and his abdication of 1936, my objectives 
have been twofold. The first has been to provide a descriptive Australian account of 
what has been most commonly presented as a public life that resonated mainly within 
Britain, and in doing so illustrate the potency of the relationship that existed between 
Australia, as one of the Dominions, and the Crown. Secondly, through identifying the 
changing nature of Edward’s appeal as espoused by the public, the press and political 
rulers over time, I aimed to establish fresh insights into the localised preoccupations of 
Australian society and contribute to a greater understanding of the centrality of the 
monarch in inter-war imperial imagination. 
I offer three major findings. Firstly, the most prominent and enduring 
perceptions of Edward’s character that underpinned his particular appeal across time are 
now clear. For Australians of the inter-war period, he was perceived as the ideal modern 
man, embodying a series of desirable masculine characteristics that reflect much of the 
cultural and social dynamics of the time. Edward’s earliest, and as it would turn out, 
most important role in public life was as a symbol of the Crown; the next in a natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘LONG LIVE THE KING!’, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, Qld., 11 December 1936, p. 18. 
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progression of Kings and Queens to occupy the throne at the apex of imperial authority. 
As enshrined in the dominant educational and political prerogatives of the time, his 
office perpetuated the cohesion of Empire governance, although this operated 
comfortably alongside the Dominions growing sense of independence during the time 
frame.  
Other characteristics were intensely specific to the man himself. By the end of 
the First World War, his persona would acquire an inspirational and militarised cast that 
faithfully adhered to the most desirable qualities for the contemporary Australian male. 
His wartime experience was perceived as evidence for his humanity and empathy for 
common struggles. During the 1920s, Edward’s reported foibles and fascinations 
exemplified for many the challenges faced by any individual living in the modern 
world. In the context of an already prevalent contemporary fondness for royal material 
and visual culture, he also acquired a warm familiarity in an everyday context, meaning 
that Australians were readily able to identify points of resonance with his private life 
and their own aspirations for marriage and fulfilment.  
  Although resonant across the timeframe discussed, the value placed on these 
qualities ebbed and flowed. This I attribute to the shifting terms of one of the most 
significant Australian debates of the era; that of the changing obligations of the 
individual to themselves and to the nation state between two world wars. In the earlier 
years under consideration, Australians favoured qualities that accentuated Edward’s 
humanity, and were held to conform to the contemporary masculine ideal. Over time, 
and in response to reports of his behaviour in his private life, the emphasis shifted to the 
other extreme and the same qualities were reimagined as demonstrating his lack of 
dedication to his duty. 
A second significant contribution is to offer a new perspective charting these 
local contours of Edward’s public life between his first encounter with Anzacs during 
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wartime to the ignominy of his departure from the throne. I have shown how his 
assumed progressive brand of masculinity would initially be celebrated alongside the 
surge of imperial optimism generated by the end of the First World War, so much so 
that I argue this is largely responsible for his popularity during his tour of Australia in 
1920. The victory in Europe created a new era of Australian nationalistic self-
confidence that paradoxically both enhanced imperial sentiment and sparked 
apprehension in London over Dominion independence. My research revealed the 
myriad ways the tour’s administration, both British and Australian, successfully 
capitalised on existing support for the monarchy and presented the inexperienced and 
easily overwhelmed young man as the antidote to the fragmentation of the post-war 
Empire. The itinerary that resulted was mutually beneficial to both visitor and host, 
although most powerfully shaped by Australian opportunism. 
The long-term significance of his tour in enhancing Australia’s inter-war 
imperial connection to Britain has been somewhat overstated. I suspect that, although 
the tour was doubtless extraordinarily well-attended, other elements such as the 
provision of a paid holiday across the nation and the opportunity to participate in civic 
spectacle arranged for a celebrated personage were likely significant factors. I 
demonstrated how the Prince’s speech writers, photographers, cinematographers and 
journalists all held authority in transmitting the tour’s validation of imperial loyalty to 
Australian and British observers. 
This is not to diminish the tour’s impact as a triumph of popular spectacle and a 
memorable national event in the eyes of Australian observers. In conservative middle-
class quarters, approval centred on Edward’s apparent capacity to adhere to a code of 
leadership calculated to maintain the cohesion and longevity of the throne, albeit behind 
a popularly-appealing façade. For more liberal and labour movements, varying degrees 
of approval, or at least tolerance, of the individuality of the monarch was assured on the 
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condition that their democratic behaviour served the greater good of humanity and did 
not seek to take advantage of their unearned privilege. Although those who dissented in 
1920 mostly suspended their objections during the visit, this was temporary and the 
Prince’s personality appears to have barely disturbed deeply held Australian labour 
beliefs. Australians were well able to differentiate between the monarch as a man and as 
a symbol of Empire dominance, and nationalist endeavours continued unabated. 
I also found that the notion of the Prince as a genuinely beloved individual is not 
sustained by the way Australian expectations for his private and public life changed 
after the tour. Part of this can be attributed to Australian access to both British and 
American commentary, which enabled more realistic perceptions of his character and 
attitudes to his duty. The heightened public awareness of Edward’s failings was in itself 
specific to the age, created as it was by the candid and irreverent nature of modern 
journalism and the greater access to overseas information generated by the expansion of 
news agencies in the post-war period. The balance of emphasis between Australian love 
for Edward as an individual and respect for the leadership qualities of the future 
monarch shifted as he himself aged and as Australians encountered the uncertainties of 
the later 1920s. This paradox between private fulfilment and national obligation 
correlates with the resonance of the same inter-generational debate within society of the 
time. Australian political and popular attitudes towards the monarch were remarkably 
flexible, on the condition that he or she continued to uphold their obligations to the 
state. In contrast, attitudes towards the monarch’s personal fulfilment were markedly 
restrictive. The monarch was held to much higher moral standards that did not reflect 
changing social mores. By the time of Edward’s accession as King, these same qualities 
for which he had been celebrated would fatally conflict with his dedication to duty as 
Australia faced the prospect of a second war in Europe. 
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Thirdly, this thesis’ final major contribution is to offer a new Australian 
narrative for Edward’s abdication in 1936, one of the most significant imperial events of 
the twentieth century. Edward’s fall from favour illustrates most clearly that Australians 
of all political shades held an exclusive set of expectations for the private and public life 
of the monarch. Ultimately, the abdication encapsulated the debate mentioned above. In 
this case, the question was manipulated to appear as one of legal repercussions, and the 
decision rested with the educated and pro-imperial ruling sections of political society. In 
a sense, once the British and Dominion governments had conceded that his behaviour 
was unsuitable for a monarch, there could be no other outcome but exile. 
In the eyes of many Australians, but by no means all, Edward fell short of 
expectations for the impartiality and longevity of the Crown as a governing entity. If on 
one hand the press had inflated Edward’s public persona, it also proved his undoing. 
The enthusiastic response to the royal tours of the 1920s may have persuaded Edward 
that he was genuinely popular and his enjoyment of his private life could be maintained, 
even after his public façade slipped after becoming King. Unlike Britain, the Australian 
press were more receptive to incoming news reporting from America and reproduced 
information on Edward’s unsuitable relationship for the edification of their readers. 
This, I argue, lessened the shock of the abdication to some degree, as some Australians 
were conversant with the matter prior to the official announcement. This allowed public 
opinion to form in advance. 
As Edward himself had agreed to relinquish the throne so as to be able to live a 
contented private life with Wallis, he made no move to influence the terms of the 
messages sent to the Dominions and was later prevented from communicating directly 
with the people of the Empire. To those in Australia, it was not therefore evident that 
the King had not been coerced, and the absence of any official information it was left to 
the press to make sense of the situation. This meant the abdication was largely 
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perceived as a ‘crisis’ where constitutional connections could be damaged and the 
supposedly volatile and unpredictable monarch’s political ambitions would be 
challenged. As a result, Australians were most eager to see the matter settled without 
damage to the links between the Dominions.  
As far as the government was concerned, the issue presented by Baldwin in the 
correspondence was Wallis’ moral unsuitability as future Queen. Lyons correctly 
predicted the majority of Australian responses, some embracing modernity, others 
holding onto the traditional morality of the older generations. This demonstrates Lyons’ 
astute political acumen, as this trend was neither the first response of Australian public 
opinion nor the most vocal, but it was the decisive and enduring one. In the initial 
stages, one strand of public opinion sympathised with the King’s dilemma but 
nonetheless felt he should abandon his marriage as his particular qualities of 
statesmanship were needed to guide the Empire through the encroaching war in Europe. 
As time wore on, a subsection of society expressed the view that the situation had 
passed the point of compromise and Edward must abdicate. Throughout, there was a 
modest body of Australians, possibly the younger generations, who offered only 
sympathy and understanding for the trials of the modern man, believing Edward must 
remain on the throne at all costs even if this entailed some form of marriage to Wallis. 
From all perspectives, the abdication rocked notions of morality, appeared to 
challenge constitutional principles, and threatened the continued existence of the 
monarchy as the binding link between Britain and the Dominions. Despite the 
protestations of the more progressive element of the population, ultimately this debate 
had little meaning. Whatever the attitudes of these Australians to their own private lives, 
the royal family was held to adhere to a distinct suite of outdated and unyielding moral 
codes. Despite the perceived flexibility of the political and legal elements of the 
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monarch’s role, there existed a prevalent expectation that the monarch should embody 
the highest moral and religious standards. 
Nonetheless, the debate over the King’s morality was secondary to widespread 
protestations concerning another significant issue at stake: the apparently subservient 
attitude of the Australian government in their dealings with Britain. Although Lyons 
correctly judged the mood of the Australian population towards Edward, their attitude 
towards his own role in proceedings was unforgiving. Lyons was anxious to avoid 
interfering in the relationship between the King and the British government, but in 
doing so had neglected his own constitutional rights of communication, and his 
obligation to represent Australia’s independent position. His apparent passivity in 
Dominion affairs was criticised as an affront to the democratic people of Australia, an 
independent nation intent on moderating the boundaries of the imperial relationship in 
their own best interests. Generally, more attention was directed towards Lyons’ 
management of the situation, rather than the more obvious issue at stake; that of the 
rights of the modern individual. Once again, the mainstream press successfully shaped 
public opinion by promoting the new King to the detriment of the old one, and Edward 
gradually disappeared forever from Australian public consciousness.  
By revealing some of the foundation for the deep inter-war attachment to the 
monarchy, I have suggested that scholars need to rethink current conclusions about 
Australians and their connection to the Empire. Changing perceptions of Edward’s 
public life over time serve, on one hand, to underscore the strength of secular support 
for the Crown that buttressed both political and popular imagination, but are also 
revealing of its highly selective and nuanced nature. Post-war Australian perceptions of 
Edward’s suitability to lead the Empire were gilded by the apparent advantages offered 
by his winning and youthful personality, which seemed to mirror the progressive 
modernism of the age. The longevity of the Crown may be attributable to its capacity 
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for reinvention across multiple political and legislative spheres and, to a significant 
extent, cultural changes. However, Edward’s inter-war public life proved that the moral 
standard expected of the royal family by contemporary Australians was resolute. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, members of the royal family cannot readily 
embody social changes such as sexual modernity.  
This is not to say that there was no support for Edward’s position. Although 
modernity divided Australia along generational lines, initial staunch support for the 
King’s private happiness quickly dwindled. His father and brother displayed a better 
understanding of this distinction but Edward’s apparent popularity as an individual may 
have caused him to misconstrue this as enduring support for his inherited office. The 
destruction of his attractive public persona, so closely aligned with the ideal Australian 
male, was also perceived as a blow to Australia’s own imperial identity and the loss of 
his particular qualities was lamented. Generally, however, in Australia ostensible 
support for an egalitarian and democratic monarch sat uneasily to some extent with an 
obscured but pervasive underlying need to preserve connections to Britain. This 
supposedly ‘free’ association within the Commonwealth would persevere mostly in this 
form until the early 1960s. Concern for the survival of monarchy correlated with its 
capacity as a means to realise nationalistic aspirations. This political consensus was 
upheld by the aspirational middle-classes and educated pro-imperial properties ruling 
sections of society, whose concerns became ever more acute when faced with a second 
war in Europe. Australian support gathered for an appropriately dutiful and moral 
monarch who understood this position to be swiftly crowned.  
This thesis leaves a number of viable directions for future research. Firstly, a 
consequence of the analysis of Edward’s public life in Australia suggests that a 
comparative study of the inter-war attitudes of the other white settler Dominions 
towards their monarch might reveal much about the cultural trajectory of the Empire. 
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Further to this, I do not here consider Edward’s public life in any comparative sense 
with monarchs who came before or after him. A study contrasting Australian 
perceptions of the introverted King George V, for example, and his gregarious eldest 
son suggests itself, but the hapless figures of King George IV and Charles, Prince of 
Wales, also offer intriguing possibilities.  
A better understanding of Australian twentieth century perceptions of the 
monarchy, and their comparative Dominion context can only serve to better inform 
understandings of present day Australian attitudes towards the current royal family. The 
present generation includes members who have fallen foul of the necessary moral 
standards, and yet also includes others who are held up as exemplars for companionable 
marriage and reproductive continuity. Adherence to traditional modes of sexuality and 
domesticity is evidently still favoured by the monarchy as a tested means of ensuring 
public approval. With the present Queen’s reign approaching its final stages and 
perhaps the imminent revival of the debate over an Australian republic, Edward’s 
Australian public life is confirmed as a significant milestone in this country’s inter-war 
relationship with the monarchy. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Image 1 A portrait of a young Prince of Wales following his investiture in 1911. Item 
1986.0117.4890, Josef Lebovic collection, NMA. 
 
 
Image 2 This Empire Day commemorative medallion features ‘Our Empire Prince’, 
1926. Author’s own. 
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Image 3 Soldier Charles Elliott took this photograph showing the Prince with Anzacs at 
Serapeum, Egypt, in 1916. Item NS669-17-1-77, AOT.  
 
 
Image 4 Anzacs had further interactions with the Prince of Wales during celebrations 
held in London in 1919. Item 1986.0117.3989, Josef Lebovic collection, NMA. 
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Image 5 The Prince’s unfussy modern clothing sparked a corresponding trend in 
fashions across the Empire. ‘LASKER’S’, Smith’s Weekly, Sydney, N.S.W., 5 June 
1920, p. 13. 
 
 
Image 6 This souvenir lapel pin produced for the 1920 royal tour offered a romantic 
perception of the Prince. Author’s own. 
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Image 7 Samuel Wells caricatured the royal party in Punch of June 1920. Reproduced 
in Mountbatten, The diaries of Lord Louis Mountbatten 1920-1922 (London: Collins, 
1987), no pagination.  
 
 
Image 8 Hughes in company of members of his government and the royal family 
outside Australia House in London in 1918. Item M4063, 1, NAA. 
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Image 9 As satirised by Cecil Hart, Indigenous Australians were largely excluded from 
the royal tour itinerary. ‘KING BILLY’, Smith’s Weekly, Sydney, N.S.W., 19 June 
1920, p. 24. 
 
 
Image 10 H.M.S. Renown as later depicted by Australian artist Arthur Streeton in 1922. 
Item ART14910, AWM. 
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Image 11 The Commonwealth Cinematographer, Bert Ive, in 1914. Bert Ive, 
unpublished personal scrapbook, item 358126, NFSA. 
 
 
Image 12 The inner retinue of H.M.S. Renown, depicted relaxing on board by Samuel 
Begg. ‘H.M.S. Renown’, The Illustrated London News, London: UK, 10 April 1920, p. 
2. 
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Image 13 Crowds awaiting the arrival of the Prince at St Kilda. Reproduced in 
unknown author, Souvenir, Prince of Wales visit to Australia 1920, p. 66.  
 
 
Image 14 People’s Receptions, as seen here in Brisbane, Queensland, appeared 
throughout the itinerary. Item 193590, JOLSLQ. 
	  	   312	  
 
Image 15 Some despaired of the mainstream press’ attitude to the Prince, as seen in this 
work by an unknown cartoonist published in the Bulletin during the royal tour, 
reproduced in Peter Coleman and Les Tanner, Cartoons of Australian history 
(Melbourne, Vic.: Nelson, 1967), p. 69. 
 
 
Image 16 As seen at Keswick Hospital in South Australia, Edward’s itinerary included 
meetings with ex-servicemen. Item B 26285/270, SLSA.  
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Image 17 Crowds lined Macquarie St. during Sydney’s royal progress. Reproduced in 
unknown author, Souvenir, Prince of Wales visit to Australia 1920, p. 64.  
 
 
Image 18 As cartoonist Alex Sass wryly commented, all shades of the Sydney populace 
felt compelled to dress up for the Prince’s arrival. Detail from ‘MACQUARIE ST’, 
Smith’s Weekly, Sydney, N.S.W., 26 June 1920, p. 11. 
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Image 19 Although the newspaper heading that accompanied this image foretold of a 
‘delightful excursion’, Edward did not enjoy his cruise on the Hawkesbury river. Sydney 
Mail, N.S.W., 30 June 1920, p. 17.  
 
 
Image 20 Aboriginal residents of the mission at Ooldea, South Australia, were 
instructed to perform for the royal party at a railway stop. Still from 50,000 miles with 
the Prince of Wales, reel 3.  
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Image 21 The Prince’s affinity with Australia’s white children was emphasised, as seen 
here in this contemporary illustration by Agnes Gladys Holman. Unknown author, Our 
digger Prince with the Australian kiddies (London: John L. Bennett, 1921), p. 5. Item 
SRq 823.912 H747ur, NLA. 
 
 
Image 22 Edward’s masculinity in 1920 was perceived in military terms. Author’s own. 
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Image 23 The Prince’s choice of a bride was closely scrutinised from all quarters. ‘Who 
Will Be England’s Future Queen?’, The World’s News, Sydney, N.S.W., 11 December 
1920, p. 8.  
 
 
Image 24 Portrait of Albert, Duke of York, mid 1920s. Item PIC P850 230/5/1, NLA.  
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Image 25 The Duke and Duchess wave to Sydney crowds during their tour of 1927. 
Item PIC/15611/482, Fairfax archives, NLA. 
  
 
Image 26 Portrait of Wallis Simpson in 1931. Reproduced in Higham, Wallis, no 
pagination.  
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Image 27 Stanley Bruce and Joseph Lyons, Sydney, New South Wales, in 1934. Item 
obj-157855844, Fairfax archives, NLA. 
 
 
Image 28 Edward and Wallis were photographed together in Croatia in September 
1936. ‘KING’S HOLIDAY CRUISE IN THE ADRIATIC’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2 September 1936, p. 18.  
	  	   319	  
 
Image 29 As Stan Cross commented, from the King’s perspective it appeared that he 
had no support within the Empire. ‘THE THINKER’, Smith’s Weekly, 12 December 
1936, p. 16. 
 
Image 30 Many were incensed over perceptions of Baldwin’s role. ‘Mr Baldwin Turns 
Dictator’, The Australian Worker, Sydney, N.S.W., 9 December 1936, p. 3. 
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Image 31 Lyons in conversation with Baldwin, 10 December 1936. Item 8303852, 
NLA.  
 
 
Image 32 Lyons first discussed the abdication by radio during the early hours of 11 
December. ‘RECENT PICTURES’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 December 1936, p. 
20. 
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Image 33 The former King’s final message to the Empire was broadcast from Windsor 
Castle on 12 December. Reproduced from Stephen Birmingham, Duchess: The story of 
Wallis Warfield Windsor (London: Macmillan, 1982), no pagination.  
 
 
Image 34 The proclamation of King George VI was held in King’s Hall, Parliament 
House on 12 December. Item 3821009, Collingridge collection, NLA. 
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Image 35 Proclamation ceremonies were held in every state on 14 December 1936, as 
seen here at Parliament House, Brisbane, Queensland. Item 41071, JOLSLQ.  
 
 
Image 36 Some compared Edward’s foiled political ambitions with those of Cardinal 
Wolsey in Shakespeare’s Henry the Eighth. ‘Farewell!’, The Daily Telegraph, 
Launceston, Tas., 11 December 1936, p. 16. 
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Image 37 Enterprising commercial vendors simply pasted over the face of the former 
King with that of the new. Items AR00165.001-2, King Edward VIII collection, NMA. 
 
 
Image 38 The story of Edward and Wallis inspired writers of pulp fiction. Cover of 
unknown author, The Uncensored story of a royal romance.  
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Image 39 Wallis and Edward were married in front of friends at Château de Candé in 
June 1937. Reproduced from Birmingham, Duchess: The story of Wallis Warfield 
Windsor, no pagination. 
 
 
Image 40 The seeds of the couple’s later notoriety were sown within months of their 
wedding, when they met cordially with Hitler in Germany in October 1937. ‘DUKE OF 
WINDSOR MEETS HITLER’, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, Qld., 5 November 1937, p. 
14.   
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